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Abstract 
Since figurative expressions involve a double interpretation and are easily misinterpreted, 
they can pose a serious problem in translation. Kināyah, a central figure of speech in the 
Arabic rhetorical tradition, is extensively employed in the Qur’an. While several existing 
studies examine how Qur’anic figurative expressions are translated into English, this is 
to my knowledge the first substantial study to focus on kināyah.  
The study first considers the main Arabic figures of speech (ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz al-
mursal, kināyah) plus the main English ones (metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche), 
demonstrating that there is no equivalent figure to kināyah in English. Forty-five Qur’anic 
kināyah expressions are then chosen, pursuant to al-Jurjāni’s definition of kināyah and 
the majority of Qur’anic exegetes. Using authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries 
and exegeses, these expressions are analysed contextually in order to understand the 
meaning and purpose of each kināyah. This is followed by a target text (TT) analysis of 
four well-known English Qur’an translations: Ali, al-Hilali & Khan, Saheeh 
International, and Abdel Haleem. The study examines: (1) how the four translations 
render each kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there is any loss 
of meaning, (4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the ST kināyah, and (5) 
consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different ʾāyahs (Qur’anic 
verses).   
Underlining the fact that kināyah has no equivalent in Western rhetoric, the study shows 
that while majāz mursal has similar features to the western metonymy and synecdoche, 
kināyah does not. Therefore, the use of the terms kināyah and majāz mursal for 
‘metonymy’ and vice versa, as in most dictionaries and some studies, is incorrect. The 
study also shows that although the selected Qur’anic translations are largely source-
oriented, the translators were able to render most of the kināyah expressions successfully. 
However, the translations were frequently not able to maintain the functions of the 
kināyah, apart from the euphemistic one, demonstrating that they prioritise meaning over 
function. In cases where there is a probable loss of the intended meaning, the translators 
employ footnotes, paraphrasing, or explicitation. The translations of Saheeh International 
and particularly Abdel Haleem are more intelligible than the rest due to their choice of 
contemporary and idiomatic vocabulary. Hence, they use footnotes and paraphrasing 
much less than Ali and Al-Hilali & Khan. For the most part the translations are consistent, 
especially Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem. 
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Chapter one: Background of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter introduces this study and its components. The chapter 
comprises the statement of the problem, rational for choosing this particular topic 
including the significance and originality of the work, aims and objectives, main 
questions of the study, scope and limitation, how the study is going to be conducted, and 
an outline of the chapters. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The main objective of translation is “the transformation of a text originally in one 
language into an equivalent text in a different language retaining, as far as is possible, the 
content of the message and the formal features and functional roles of the original text” 
(Bell, 1991, p. xv). This might be a simple task if the intended message in the source text 
(ST) is explicit, but when it is implicit, it becomes harder. In some cases, it becomes an 
obstacle, especially when the ST is linguistically and culturally different from the target 
language (TL). For instance, Arabic and English are linguistically and culturally different, 
belonging to two different families. Arabic is a Semitic language, belonging to the 
Afroasiatic phylum, whereas English is a West Germanic language, belonging to the 
Indo-European phylum. These differences, to a considerable extent, contribute to the 
difficulties in translation between the two languages. Figures of speech, which are a form 
of expressions used to convey specific intended meanings implicitly to achieve a special 
effect, are amongst the difficulties that a translator could encounter, particularly when the 
figure of speech is culture-specific. Newmark agrees with this and argues that they could 
pose a problem for translators (1988, p. 104). In general, figures of speech form an 
integral part of our language; they can be found in religious texts, political speeches, oral 
literatures, poetry, and basically in everyday speech. Kināyah is one of those figures of 
speech in Arabic.  
Kināyah can be a problematic issue for translators due to a number of reasons. First and 
foremost are the components that form the kināyah. Without noticing that there is another 
meaning intended behind the literal meaning, a translator could misinterpret the kināyah 
expression by rendering it literally, since the literal meaning of a kināyah may sound true. 
In other words, a kināyah may hold two meanings, a literal meaning and a figurative 
meaning. Thus, a translator can be easily deceived by the literal meaning of the kināyah. 
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Also, in most cases, the relationship between the intended meaning and the literal 
meaning is cultural-specific. Consequently, a translator must be aware of the semantic 
and cultural features in a kināyah in order to understand the intended meaning and to find 
an appropriate expression in the target language (TL). Furthermore, kināyah, like its 
fellow figures of speech, is used for specific purposes to achieve special effects. Amongst 
the purposes (functions) of kināyah are euphemism, brevity, clarity, and hyperbole. 
Overall, if a translator goes for the literal meaning (proper meaning) and, unintentionally 
neglects the intended meaning (figurative meaning) of the kināyah then this will mean 
that the message of the ST along with its function will be misrepresented in the target text 
(TT). 
The type of text plays a big role in the difficulty of translating figurative expressions in 
general and kināyah specifically. Religious texts are sensitive and their translation should 
be approached cautiously. The central religious text of Islam is the Qur’an. Muslims 
believe that the Qur’an is miraculous and inimitable. They believe that Qur’anic discourse 
has its own unique genre. Abdul-Raof states that “the Qur’an as a genre in its own right 
is marked by prototypical features, as well as rhetorical features, that are hardly to be 
found in any type of writing throughout its history” (2003, p. 305). This uniqueness of 
the Qur’anic discourse has led to a perennial argument among many Muslim clerics about 
whether it is possible to translate the Qur’an from both the linguistic and religious points 
of view. They are concerned about the ethical side of translating the holy text, mainly 
because they believe that the formal side of the Qur’an contributes much to its meaning. 
Rendering such a text will bring into question the degree of fidelity with which it is 
transferred. Consequently, they have raised some religious, ethical, and linguistic 
objections to translating it. This fact is clearly reflected in the fatwa on the ruling of 
translating the meanings of the Qur’an (The Permanent Committee for Scholarly 
Research and Ifta' , 2013)1. This fatwa, clearly, suggests the impossibility of translating 
the Qur’an literally due to its unique style, which comprises linguistic features that make 
it impossible to convey its meanings accurately in another language. It considers 
                                                
1 “It is impossible to translate the intended meanings of the Qur’an as a whole or even partially. Literal 
translation of the Qur’an is not even permissible as it will alter and distort its meanings. A person may 
translate whatever meanings they can understand, rules they may deduce, morals and ethics they may 
learn, and so on, into foreign languages, such as English, French, Persian or any other language to spread 
the meanings understood and call people to abide by them. It will be like explaining the Qur’an in Arabic, 
provided the person in question has the required qualifications to do so and is capable of communicating 
the rulings and morals contained therein accurately. Whoever lacks these conditions or lacks the means 
and resources that help understand the Qur’an should not embark on this endeavour, lest they should 
distort the Words of Allah or change their meanings, thus defeating their purpose”. 
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translation to be a process that ‘distorts’ its meaning, and the aim of translation is not to 
textually render the holy book but to disseminate its meaning for teaching purposes. 
It is beyond doubt, for those who know the Qur’an, that it is, indeed, linguistically and 
rhetorically rich. In addition, its āyahs2 [verses] are presented in such a unique form and 
style that they leave a strong impact on people who read or listen to them recited, and 
especially those who comprehend and infer their meanings. Thus, a translator will 
inevitably face serious difficulties in conveying the effectiveness of the original together 
with a comparable, let alone equivalent, style. Arthur J. Arberry, a British orientalist who 
translated the Qur’an, states that: 
[T]he rhetoric and rhythm of the Arabic of the Koran are so characteristic, so 
powerful, so highly emotive, that any version whatsoever is bound in the 
nature of things to be but a poor copy of the glittering splendour of the original 
(1980, p. 24). 
The rhetorical features of the Qur’an, such as kināyah, along with other linguistic features 
contribute significantly to the uniqueness of the Qur’anic discourse. Moreover, Abdul-
Raof (2003, p. 113) argues from a textual analysis point of view, that the figures of speech 
(such as kināyah) employed in the Qur’an richly “act as cohesive constituents in the 
Qur’anic texture. The rhetorical features in the Qur’anic discourse are considered 
Qur’anic-specific and therefore, in some come cases, they can be a problematic issue for 
a translator (ibid, p. 68). 
To sum up, kināyah is employed in the Qur’anic discourse abundantly not only for 
stylistic reasons, but more importantly to serve other significant purposes. These purposes 
can be recognized through the functions of the kināyah. When it comes to translating 
Qur’anic kināyah expressions, we would like to borrow Newmark’s quote (1988, p. 104) 
and claim that while “the central problem of translation is the overall choice of a 
translation method for a text, the most important particular problem is the translation of” 
kināyah. That is because kināyah can hold both literal and figurative meanings, and 
therefore can easily deceive a translator. Also, in addition to its being mainly culture-
specific, kināyah serves a particular purpose, such that it could be challenging to convey 
the intended meaning and at the same time maintain the same function as the original 
especially given that the Qur’anic genre is believed to be unique. 
                                                
2 Āyahs is used as the plural of ʾāyah [verse]. 
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1.3 The reasons for choosing this topic 
The rationale for conducting this study is mainly based on the following considerations: 
- Kināyah has not received much attention compared to other Arabic figures of 
speech, such as ʾistiᶜārah (Arabic ‘metaphor’), specifically within translation 
studies (TS). 
- The majority of English-Arabic-English dictionaries, if not all, translate the term 
‘metonymy’ as kināyah and majāz mursal, and at the same time they refer to the 
term ‘synecdoche’ as majāz mursal. This clearly means that the concept of 
kināyah is still ambiguous in English.    
- Kināyah is a figurative expression, i.e. its intended meaning is concealed, or in 
other words implicit. However, unlike ʾistiᶜārah (Arabic ‘metaphor’), its 
constituents usually sound as if what is being expressed is the proper sense, which 
can easily deceive the translator. Therefore, its translation requires careful 
consideration to reveal its implicit meaning, which most likely relies heavily on 
the SL cultural background, which also differs from one language to another. 
- Curiously, we have noticed that some Qur’anic kināyah expressions have been 
translated differently by various translators; some even render the intended 
meaning directly. In other words, it appears that there is some sort of discrepancy 
among the translators when translating Qur’anic kināyah. This leads us to the 
assumption that each translator adopts a different approach in reproducing 
kināyah in the TT. Also, it seems that some of the functions of the kināyah are not 
maintained in the TT. This raises the question whether kināyah is translatable, i.e. 
whether it is possible to render the intended meaning implicitly with a similar 
image to the original, and simultaneously preserve the same original function. 
- More than 2.1 billion people follow the Qur’an as a code of worship and ethics, 
most of whom do not read Arabic. Misinterpretations reflected in the translations 
of the Qur’an might lead to misunderstanding the real intent of the texts 
1.4 Aim, objectives, and questions of the study 
The principle aim of this study is to understand the concept of kināyah and to investigate 
how kināyah expressions in the Qur’an are translated into English. Hopefully, this study 
will shed light on this beautiful Arabic figure of speech, which has been long mistaken 
for metonymy on the one hand and has been neglected in TS on the other. This work will 
attempt to demonstrate that kināyah is not metonymy; and simultaneously contribute to 
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filling the gap in TS, since there is a clear lack of work devoted to the translation of 
kināyah expressions. This work will thus contribute positively to Arabic-English TS in 
general, and to Qur’anic studies and Qur’an translation in particular. 
1.4.1 The objectives 
The study also seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
- To explore whether kināyah and metonymy are one in the same, since most scholars 
and dictionaries refer to kināyah as ‘metonymy’. 
- To explore whether the translators were able to recognise the implicit meaning, i.e. 
intended meaning, of the kināyah, since its literal meaning can be true and may 
deceive the translator. 
- To compare and contrast how the selected kināyah expressions are rendered by the 
selected four translators.  
- To examine and identify the methods employed by the translators in rendering 
kināyahs from the Qur’an. 
-  To explore whether the translators were able to overcome the cultural boundaries, if 
any, and what procedures were employed by them. 
- To examine whether the translators were able to convey the intended meaning of the 
kināyah implicitly and maintain its function as in the original.  
1.4.2 Questions of the study 
The study seeks to answer the following main questions: 
- Is metonymy the equivalent English figure of speech for kināyah? If not, then: 
a- Which is the closest Arabic figure that has similar features to metonymy? 
b- Which English figure of speech is equivalent to or at least shares some of the 
features and functions of kināyah? 
- If there is no equivalent English figure of speech for kināyah, then were the 
translators able to render the intended meaning of the original implicitly as in the ST 
and simultaneously maintain the kinayah function? If not, then why? 
- What translation methods do the translators tend to employ in rendering Qur’anic 
kināyah? 
- What translation procedures do the translators adopt to compensate for any loss in 
translation? 
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- Were the translators consistent in translating the same kināyah in the event it occurs 
in other parts of the Qur’an? 
1.5 Scope and limitation 
Initially, figures of speech emerged as rhetorical devices, since their studies, both in 
English and Arabic, began from a rhetorical perspective. Abdul-Raof affirms that the 
Qur’anic discourse is full of such devices, this type of language being proptotypical in 
the Qur’an (2003, p. 95). That said, it would be impossible to cover and analyse all of the 
large number of kināyah expressions employed in the Qur’an due to the available time. 
Therefore, this work will be limited to the analysis of forty-five kināyah expressions 
extracted from various parts of the Qur’an. The selection of the kināyah expressions will 
be based on al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah and on the consensus of the majority of 
Qur’anic exegetes (see 5.1).  Furthermore, the study will be limited to the translations of 
Ali (1998), al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel 
Haleem (2005) (see 3.7 for a brief overview and the rationale for selecting these 
translations). 
1.6 Procedural framework 
The study is more or less divided into two parts. The first part substantiates the claim that 
kināyah is not metonymy as the majority of dictionaries and scholars claim it to be, and 
that majāz al-mursal is the closest Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche. 
This requires a careful consideration and comparison of the main Arabic figures of speech 
(ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz mursal, kināyah) as well as the English ones (metaphor, simile, 
metonymy, synecdoche). 
The second part is composed of a twofold analysis. First, a ST analysis will be conducted. 
That is to say, the selected kināyah expressions will be analysed linguistically and 
contextually in order to understand the meaning and purpose of each kināyah. When the 
same kināyah expression is used in a different āyah, we will identify these āyahs and 
examine them to see whether they differ from each other in terms of meaning and purpose 
of use. This will involve reliance on authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries 
(including Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, particularly those exegeses that 
approach the Qur'anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical perspective. This is followed 
by a comparative TT analysis of the four selected English Qur’an translations. The 
examination will take into consideration: (1) how the four translations render each 
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kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there is any loss of meaning, 
(4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the original kināyah, and (5) 
consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different āyahs (Qur’anic 
verses). We underline that this comparative analytical phase, and indeed the whole work, 
is by no means a judgement aimed at undermining the efforts made by the translators. 
From an equivalence perspective, this study attempts to provide a descriptive linguistic 
insight into how this crucial Arabic figure of speech, kināyah, is rendered from the Qur’an 
into English. 
1.7 Structure of the study 
The study comprises seven chapters with each chapter focusing on a certain aspect of the 
research. Chapter one, as indicated earlier (see 1.1), is mainly introductory and provides 
the reader with a broad idea about the topic, including its significance and originality, and 
how it will be conducted. It encompasses the statement of the problem, reasons behind 
choosing this topic, aims, objectives and research questions, scope and limitation, 
procedural framework, and a brief outline of each chapter. Chapter two looks carefully 
at the main Arabic figures of speech, ʾ istiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz mursal, and kināyah, along 
with the main English figures of speech: metaphor, simile, metonymy, and synecdoche. 
The main aim of this chapter is to substantiate the claim that kināyah is not metonymy 
and to demonstrate that majāz mursal is the closest Arabic figure of speech to metonymy 
and synecdoche. Chapter three casts light on the nature and status of the Qur’an, the 
legitimacy of its translation, and a brief historical background of its English translations. 
It also discusses the role of Qur’anic exegeses in understanding and translating the genre 
of the Qur’an. This includes a brief overview of the Qur’anic exegeses used in the study, 
followed by some insight into the employment of kināyah in the Qur’an. The chapter also 
demonstrates how kināyah is very much neglected in TS and no substantial work has been 
devoted to its translation. It also shows that even the handful of works that touch upon 
kināyah do not realise that it has no equivalent English figure of speech, since the majority 
refer to it as metonymy. Chapter four touches upon some of the equivalence theories in 
TS, such as those of Vinay and Darbelnet, Jakobson, Nida, Newmark, Baker, Beekman 
and Callow (1974), and Larson (1998), with a specific focus on the last two. It critically 
discusses their concepts and approaches towards equivalence in translation, with some 
attention given to translating figurative expressions. Chapter five is devoted to 
examining the selected forty-five original Qur’anic kināyah expressions linguistically and 
 -8- 
contextually. It discusses the intended meaning of each kināyah used in the Qur’an and 
its purposes, including the views of several Qur’anic exegetes. Chapter six compares the 
translations of the selected kināyah expression made by Ali (1998), al-Hilali and Khan 
(1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005). It is mainly a 
descriptive and critical examination. The analysis will define how these translators deal 
with kināyah in the TT, and examine whether they were able to convey the intended 
meaning and preserve its purpose (function), and whether they were consistent in 
translating the same kināyah in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an. Chapter 
seven provides a synopsis of the study. It includes the findings and conclusion of the 
work. It also offers some suggestions for further research respecting the translation of 
kināyah. 
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Chapter two: Kināyah and metonymy are they one and the same? 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will attempt to find out whether kināyah and metonymy are the same 
in terms of features and functions (purposes of use). To achieve this, we will first discuss 
the main Arabic figures of speech, ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, majāz mursal, and kināyah. This 
will involve a bird’s-eye view of Arabic rhetoric, especially if we take into consideration 
that the study of Arabic figures of speech is part of rhetorical studies. Also, in a similar 
manner, we will briefly look at Western rhetoric. Then, we will present the main English 
figures of speech, metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy, with special interest on 
the latter in order to find out whether it is equivalent to kināyah in terms of concept, 
semantic relationships, features, and purpose of use. 
2.2 Arabic rhetoric 
The emanation of Arabic rhetoric was through Qur’anic sciences (ᶜulūm al-Qurʾān) along 
with the sciences of syntax and morphology/linguistics (ᶜilm an-naḥū wa as-ṣarf) and the 
science of literature (ᶜilm al-ʾadab). The scholars of Qur’anic studies during the formation 
of Islamic studies were rhetoricians as much as they were exegetes or linguists. 
Furthermore, the science of rhetoric emerged to enhance the understanding of the Qur’an 
and the sayings of the Prophet of Islam and to explore their beautiful style. Early linguistic 
and rhetoric savants such as abū ᶜUbaydah bin al-Muthannā (d. 208 AH/823 AD), abū 
ᶜUthmān ᶜAmrū bin Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 AH/868 AD), abū al-Ḥasan ar-Rammānī (d. 
384 AH/994 AD), abū Hilāl al-ᶜAskarī (d. 395 AH/1004 AD), ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī 
(d. 471 AH/1078 AD), and others3 participated in laying down the fundamentals of 
rhetorical science by writing books such as, al-Bayān fī ʾIᶜjāz al-Qurʾān, Maᶜānī al-
Qurʾān, and al-Fawāʾid al-Mushshawiq ʾilā ᶜUlūm al-Qurʾān wa ᶜUlūm al-Bayān. Their 
argumentations and demonstrations were mainly extracted from the Qur’an. In view of 
the foregoing, it suffices to say that the relationship between rhetoric and Qur’anic 
sciences is not only germane but absolutely solid.  
                                                
3 There are other early scholars who made a remarkable contribution in laying the groundwork of rhetorical 
science such as al-ʾAkhfash Saᶜīd bin Musᶜada (d. 215 AH/830 AD), az-Zajāj (d. 311AH/923AD), 
ʾAḥmad bin Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388 AH), ʾAbū Bakr Muḥammad bin al-Ṭayib al-Bāqīlānī (d. 
403 AH), and abū Muḥammad ᶜAbd Allah ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466 AH), Jār Allah Maḥmūd az-
Zamakhsharī (d. 538 AH) Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606 AH),  Sirāj ad-Dīn as-Sakkākī (d. 626 AH), and 
ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 751 AH). For more historical details on Arabic rhetoric in English see Abdul-
Raof (2006, pp. 31-74). 
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It is believed that rhetorical science reached its apex through ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 
471 AH/1078 AD). Most of the books on rhetoric written by scholars in the wake of al-
Jurjānī were summarisations and commentaries, mainly on al-Jurjānī’s books4 and views 
in addition to some other early savants’ books. This is suggested by the fact that most, if 
not all, the examples used in all the books on rhetoric are the same. This could be marked 
as a negative point in Arabic rhetorical studies. But it is worth mentioning that a couple 
of these scholars, such as az-Zamakhsharī and as-Sakkākī, added distinctly new views to 
the theories of Arabic rhetoric, for instance, the classification of the rhetorical disciplines 
(see figure 1), particularly the classifications of kināyah that was initially presented in 
detail by as-Sakkākī. 
Before setting sail into the ocean of ᶜilm al-bayān (Science of expressions [lit. Science of 
clarity]) and particularly kināyah, it is sensible to go through some practical definitions 
such as the definitions of faṣāḥah (eloquence), ᶜilm al-maᶜānī (semantics/word order), 
and ᶜilm al-badīᶜ (Science of embellishments). 
 
Figure 2.1: Major disciplines of Arabic rhetoric. 
2.2.1 Rhetoric (balāġah) and eloquence (faṣāḥah) 
Arab linguists and scholars who are conversant with Arabic rhetoric will notice that there 
was an on-going debate amongst rhetoricians regarding the two concepts of rhetoric and 
eloquence; and that it engrossed their minds for generations from the outset of rhetorical 
studies. Many rhetorical scholars do not differentiate between the two notions of rhetoric 
and eloquence. For instance, abū Hilāl al-ᶜAskarī, a well-known Arabic rhetorical figure, 
proclaims in his book ‘aṣ-ṣināᶜatayn’ that “balāghah (rhetoric) and faṣāḥah (eloquence) 
refer to the same thing even if their origins are different. That is because both terms, 
balāghah and faṣāḥah, denote ʾibānah (clarity, making clear) and ʾiẓhār 
                                                
4 For a more detailed argument on al-Jurjānī’s theory and classifications of Arabic rhetoric in English see 
Abu Deeb (1979) and Larkin (1995). 
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(conspicuousness/evincement) (cited in al-Hāshimī, 2005, p. 5). Al-Hāshimī also 
indicates the following: 
 ةفدارتم ظافلأ ةعاربلاو نايبلاو ةغﻼبلاو ةحاصفلا نأ نيمدقتملا نم عمجو يناجرجلا رهاقلادبع ىري
 بسح ملكلا نيب اميف وحنلا يناعم يرحت دعب مﻼكلا اهب فصوي امنإو ،تادرفملا اهب فصتت ﻻ
غﻷا.اهل غاصي يتلا ضار  
Al-Jurjānī and some who preceded him consider faṣāḥah (eloquence), 
balāġah (rhetoric), bayān (elocution), and barāᶜah (proficiency) as 
synonyms. They believe these synonyms do not characterise individual 
lexical items but describe a sentence, provided that the sentence structure 
conforms to Arabic syntax, grammatically and meaningfully (Hāshimī, 2005, 
p. 10 [my translation]). 
In relation to this matter, Abdul-Raof asserts, in his book, Arabic Rhetoric: A pragmatic 
analysis, that al-Jurjānī considers rhetoric and eloquence as two sides of the same coin. 
He adds that the difference between the two, as al-Jurjānī sees it, is that eloquence “is 
attributed to the lexical item but not to signification while rhetoric is attributed to both 
the lexical item and signification” (2006, p. 95). Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606 AH), a 
posterior scholar to al-Jurjānī, agrees that “most rhetoricians barely differentiate between 
eloquence and rhetoric” (ibid, p. 10). Likewise, al-Jawharī (d. 393 AH/ 1002 AD), a 
linguist and the author of the famous Arabic dictionary ‘aṣ-Ṣiḥāḥ’, indicates that 
“eloquence is rhetoric” (ibid, p. 10). In the main, eloquence is generally concerned with 
utterance while rhetoric is concerned with meaning (cf. ᶜAbd Rabbuh, 2005). For 
example, a parrot may pronounce words correctly but without meaning; therefore, the 
parrot might be described as an eloquent (faṣīḥ) bird but not as (balīgh) rhetorical. In a 
nutshell, every rhetorical speech is eloquent, but not every eloquent speech is rhetorical. 
The following synopses will briefly illustrate the difference between eloquence (faṣāḥah) 
and rhetoric (balāghah).  
In general, faṣāḥah in Arabic rhetoric refers to lexical items that are clear, understandable, 
and commonly used amongst penmen and poets, due to their beauty and flexibility. Al-
Hāshimī (2005) posits that eloquence could be attributed to a single lexical item/word 
(lafḍah/kalimah), statement/utterance (a speech in all its forms, written or spoken) 
including its syntactic structures (kalām), or a text producer (mutakallim). The latter is 
considered eloquent, only if s/he is of an erudite bent and has a great ability to produce 
any form of discourse eloquently at any time. The other two aspects, single lexical items 
or whole statements, should be free from certain imperfections to be regarded as eloquent. 
According to al-Hāshimī (ibid.), an eloquent single lexical item should be free from: (1) 
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phonetic incongruity/cacophony [of the letters] (tanāfur al-ḥurūf), (2) strange usage 
(gharābat al-istiᶜmāl), (3) transgression of Arabic inflectional morphological rules 
(mukhālafat al-qiyās), and (4) distasteful sounds (al-karāhatu fī as-samᶜi). Additionally, 
Al-Hāshimī suggests that an eloquent utterance/statement should be free from: (1) 
incongruent/cacophonous word-combination sounds (tanāfur al-kalimāti mujtamiᶜatan), 
(2) syntactically poorly-formed structure (ḍaᶜfu at-taʾlīf), (3) complex structure (at-taᶜqīd 
al-lafẓī), and (4) semantic ambiguity (at-taᶜqīd al-maᶜnawī). The latter, i.e. semantic 
ambiguity is mainly expressing a specific meaning implicitly, as in figurative expressions, 
using words that lead to a meaning other than the intended meaning. For instance, using 
a kinayah to denote a meaning other than its conventional meaning. 
As for balāġah, linguistically the term balāġah derives from balagha, which means to 
reach, arrive at, get to, or attain the aim/goal/end/extreme limit (Lane, 1968; ibn Manẓūr, 
1980; cf. Qāsim & Dīb, 2003, p. 8). Both Lane and ibn Manẓūr seem to suggest that the 
sense of balāghah is the same as that of faṣāḥah. Lane, however, asserts that the 
difference between the two terms is that faṣāḥah “is an attribute of a single word and of 
speech and of the speaker”, whereas balāghah “is an attribute only of speech and the 
speaker” (Lane, p. 251). Lane also adds that “ةغﻼب in the speaker is A faculty whereby one 
is enabled to compose language suitable to exigency of the case, i.e., to the occasion of 
speaking [or writing], with chasteness, or perspicuity, or eloquence, thereof” (ibid, 
author’s italics). According to al-Hāshimī, the general sense of balāghah is “expressing 
a significant meaning clearly by using proper and eloquent expressions that have a 
spellbinding impact on one’s soul, while simultaneously being appropriate to the 
situational context and the recipients” (al-Hāshimī, 2005, p. 29, my translation; cf. Qāsim 
& Dīb, 2003, p. 8; ᶜ Abd Rabbuh, 2005). Furthermore, a speaker is described as ‘rhetorical’ 
when s/he has the ability to employ the major disciplines of Arabic rhetoric (see figure 1) 
in order to conquer the hearts and minds of the recipients. To come to the point, rhetoric 
and eloquence are closesly related to another. It is known that in statements/speeches, 
eloquence is a major requirement to achieve rhetoric, while rhetoric is not at a requirement 
to achieve eloquence. Therefore, one could say that every rhetorical speech is eloquent, 
but not every eloquent speech is rhetorical. 
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2.2.2 ᶜIlm al-maᶜānī [Science of meanings] 
ᶜIlm al-maᶜānī, which literally means ‘science of meanings’, corresponding somewhat to 
what is known in modern linguistic studies as ‘semantics’, is one of the main disciplines 
of Arabic rhetoric. It is the discipline that deals with composite utterances (word 
order/grammatical structure). In other words, the order of the syntactic constituents of an 
utterance or speech, i.e. statement. Additionally, it intersects with other linguistic fields, 
that is, it reveals the correlation between word order, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics 
in forming an eloquent discourse with a rhetorical effect on the addressee. ᶜIlm al-maᶜānī 
is known by Arab rhetoricians as: 
وصأل  مﻼكلا ةقباطُم ّةيفيك اهب فرُعي دعاوقوﻀتقمل ﻰ نوكي ثيحب لاحلاوضرغلا قْف س يذلا قي.هل 
The knowledge of the conditions, rules and norms which governs the 
congruency of the utterance (the structure of the statement) with the 
requirements of the situation in accordance to the purpose it is composed for 
(al-Hāshimī, 2005, pp. 37-38; my translation). 
In other words, the knowledge of the conditions and laws that enables one to compose a 
speech appropriately in accordance to the situational context and the recipients it is 
intended for. According to their understandings of as-Sakkākī’s works, Bekkum, et al. 
claim “the main purpose of the ‘science of meanings’ [ᶜilm al-maᶜānī] is the avoidance of 
errors” (1997 , p. 263). ᶜIlm al-maᶜānī is possibly the largest rhetorical discipline and it is 
divided into several categories as shown in figure 2. It is believed that early Arab linguists 
and rhetoricians scrutinised the Qur’an through, inter alia, ᶜilm al-maᶜānī to comprehend 
its inimitability (ʾiᶜjāz), such as its skilful structures, superior representation and 
expression, delicate brevity, and so forth. They also examined the rhetoric and eloquence 
in Hadith and in Arabic prose. Though the signification of ᶜilm al-maᶜānī has been 
featured by a number of scholars who preceded al-Jurjānī, several modern rhetoricians 
take it for granted that al-Jurjānī is the one who laid the foundations of this science 
through his book Dalāʾil al-ʾIᶜjāz (cf. Braginsky, 2001). Nonetheless, it is believed that 
it was az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538 AH) who first used the term ᶜilm al-maᶜānī in his book al-
Kashshāf; his ideas were developed later by as-Sakkākī (d. 626 AH) and al-Qazwīnī (d. 
739 AH). 
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Figure 2.2: Categories of ᶜIlm al-maᶜānī. 
2.2.3 ᶜIlm al-badīᶜ [Science of ornamentation] 
ᶜIlm al-badīᶜ is the rhetorical discipline that is concerned with the linguistic mechanism 
of embellishing a speech. ʿIlm albadīʿ is defined as: 
 ملعي  .ةلﻻدلا حوضوو لاحلا ﻰﻀتقم ﻰلع هقيبطت ةياعر دعب ، مﻼكلا نيسحت هوُجو هب فرع 
A science through which we can understand the mechanism of embellishing 
a discourse, provided that the discourse maintains its compatibility with the 
requirements of the situation and is semantically unambiguous (al-Qazwīnī, 
1996, p. 383; my translation). 
By exploiting various features of ᶜilm al-badīᶜ, the text producer could present an aureate 
speech that has a rhetorical impact on the addressee. This rhetorical discipline is divided 
into two categories, semantic ornamentations - al-muḥassināt al-maᶜnawīyah - and lexical 
ornamentations - al-muḥassināt al-lafḍīyah. Each category is subdivided into several 
forms; and each form has a distinctive beautifying rhetorical aspect. In semantic 
ornamentation, a discourse preserves the beautifying aspect of semantic ornamentation 
even after the replacement of a given lexical item by its synonym. Whereas, in lexical 
ornamentation, its beautifying aspect disappears if a given lexical item is replaced by its 
synonym. However, both categories of ornamentation are considered as tools for the text 
producer to embellish his/her speech in order to achieve an impact on the addressee. 
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2.3 ᶜIlm al-bayān [Science of elocution] 
 
Figure 2.3: Categories of ᶜilm al-bayān. 
Literally ᶜilm al-bayān means ‘the science of clarity’; and linguistically, bayān means 
uncovering -kashf- and clarification -ʾiḍāḥ (al-Qazwīnī, 1996). Moreover, the word, نِّيب -
bayyin-, which derives from the same root as bayān, means eloquent (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, 
p. 407). Lane points out the word bayān signifies “the means by which one makes a thing 
[distinct], apparent, manifest, evident, clear, plain, or perspuous”. He also addds that it is 
“making the meaning apparent to the mind so that it becomes distinct from other 
meanings and from what might be confounded with it” (Lane, 1968, p. 288). He goes on 
to say, bayān “is also applied to language that discovers and shows the meaning that is 
intended: and  an explanation of confused and vague language” (ibid.). On top of that, 
Lane provides a full description of this rhetorical discipline, which includes the the 
technical meaning of ᶜilm al-bayān known amongst Arabic rhetoricians5: 
A  faculty, or principles, [or a science] whereby one knows how to express 
[with perspicuity of diction] one meaning in various forms [some of the Arabs 
restrict the science of نايبلا to what concerns comparisons and tropes and 
metonymies; which last the Arabian rhetoricians distinguish from tropes; and 
some make it include rhetoric altogether] (ibid,; author’s italics). 
As generally understood, ᶜIlm al-bayān is an Arabic rhetorical science devoted to figures 
of speech. It is categorised into three main figures of speech, tashbīh (Arabic ‘simile’), 
majāz (figurativeness), and kināyah, as shown in figure 2.3 (for more details on ᶜilm al-
bayān and its categories see Lāshīn, 1998).  But since kināyah is the core of this study it 
                                                
5 هيلع ةلﻻدلا حوضو يف ةفِلتْخم قرطِب دحاولا ﻰنعملا داريإ هب فرعي ملع – “The science through which we can state a 
single meaning clearly in different ways” (al-Qazwīnī, 1996, p. 246; my translation). 
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will henceforth be discussed in detail separately in section 2.4. As to the rest of the Arabic 
figures of speech, their definitions and types will be presented briefly in this section. It is 
worth noting that this discipline is at times referred to in English as the science of figures 
of speech and at other times as the science of expression. 
2.3.1 Tashbīh (Arabic simile) 
The term ‘tashbīh’ is the verbal noun derived from the verb shabbaha (to liken, make 
resemble), and its basic linguistic meaning is tamthīl (likening). There are various 
definitions of tashbīh, but they all share the concept of resemblance. For example, al-
Qazwīnī (1996, p. 248) provides the following definition: 
يبشتلا:ه ﻰنعم يف رخﻵ رمأ ةكراشم ﻰلع ةلﻻدلا  
Tashbīh: refers to the sense that one thing shares an element of meaning with 
another. (My translation) 
ʾAmīn (1982, p. 15) also states that this figure of speech is defined by the scholars of ᶜilm 
al-bayān as: 
تشم ﻰنعم يف ،رمﻷ رمأ ةكراشم ﻰلع ةلﻻدلا وه :مهلوقب هيبشتلا نايبلا ءاملع فّرعييب كر ،امهن
.مﻼكلا قايس نم ةموهفملا ةردقملا وأ ،ةروكذملا هيبشتلا تاودأ ىدحإب  
“Scholars of ᶜ ilm al-bayān define tashbīh by saying: it is the indication that 
something is shared with something else in terms of a common [element 
of] meaning by using one of the tashbīh tools6 (particles) explicitly 
(mentioned in the statement/expression) or implicitly (that can be 
understood through the context)” (My translation). 
Likewise, al-Hāshimī (2005, p. 206) provides the following definition: 
راشم :نايبلا ءاملع دنع هيبشتلا ُةك مأرمﻷ ر  يف روﱡناك ملِعلا) :كلوقك ،ةمولعم تاودأب ﻰنعم يف
م ملعلاف (...ةيادهلاش ناكرأ ذئنيحف ؛هيبشتلا ةادأ فاكلاو ،هبشلا هجو ةيادهلاو ،هب هﱠبشم رونلاو ،هﱠب
م و ،هﱠبشم :ةعبرأ هيبشتلا ﱠبش وأ ةظوفلم) هيبشت ةادأو ، هبش هجوو ، (هيبشتلا ﻰفرط ناي ﱠمسيو) هب ه
.(ةظوحلم 
Tashbīh is defined by the scholars of ᶜilm al-bayān as: linking one thing to 
another in terms of meaning by using known tools (particles), such as when 
one says: ‘ علال ُمونأكةيادهلا يف ر  - education is like illumination in guidance’. 
Here ملعلا ‘education’ is the مشهﱠب  ‘likened’, رون ‘illumination’ is the هب هﱠبشم 
‘likened to’, ةيادهلا ‘guidance’ is the هَبَشلا هجو ‘point of resemblance’ and the 
ادأ ةهيبشت  ‘simile tool/particle’ is the letter ك. So, there are four basic 
elements of tashbīh, which are: شمهﱠب  ‘likened’, ّهبشم هب  ‘likened to’ (both the 
‘likened’ and ‘likened to’ are referred to as هيبشتلا ْﻰفرط ‘ṭarafay at-tashbīh 
                                                
6 The هيبشت ةادأ ‘simile tool’ may be a particle (such as ك and نأك), a noun used adverbially (such as ﻞﺜم and 
وحن), or a verb (such as عراﻀي and يكاحي). 
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- the two ends of the simile’), هَبَشلا هجو ‘point of resemblance’, and the ادأة 
هيبشت ‘simile tool/particle’ (verbal or implicit/deducible) (My translation). 
The classification of tashbīh is mainly based on its basic elements, the ‘two ends of the 
simile’, ‘the point of resemblance’, and ‘the simile tools’ (For more details in Arabic, see 
Amīn, 1982, pp. 17-57; al-Hāshimī, 2005, pp. 207-232; and in English see Abdul-Raof 
2006, pp. 200-208.)  
Tashbīh is regarded as an artistic and aesthetic stylistic feature, which achieves the 
rhetorical function of hyperbole. Thus, it is also known as fann at- tashbīh (the art of 
resemblance/likening). The general intention of this figure of speech is to clarify an idea 
or to show the resemblance of one thing to another. The text producer resorts to tashbīih 
to achieve specific pragmatic functions that serve the simile element, the likened, such 
as: 
1- To clarify the image of the ‘likened’ 
2- To exhibit the mood/case of the ‘likened’. In other words, to identify a specific 
feature of the ‘likened’. 
3- To praise/beautify the ‘likened’. 
4- To satirize/disfigure the ‘likened’. 
The degree of the rhetorical stylistic feature of tashbīh depends on the presence of its 
elements in the speech. The more omitted simile elements in a given speech, the more 
rhetorical it is. In other words, the speech is highly rhetorical in terms of tashbīh if the 
‘likened’ and ‘likened to’ are only mentioned, without the ‘simile tool’ and ‘the point of 
resemblance’ such as in دسأ دمحم – Muḥammad is a lion (what is meant is that Muḥammad 
is brave like a lion).  
2.3.2 Majāz (Figurativeness) 
The common noun ‘majāz’ is derived from the verb jāza which means ‘to cross - pass 
through - penetrate - traverse’ (رسجلا دمحأ َزاج - Aḥmad crossed the bridge). Rhetorically, 
majāz (figurativeness) goes beyond the basic meaning of the word, i.e. majāz indicates a 
meaning that is not the ‘real’ meaning/‘proper’ sense of the word. Thus majāz is regarded 
as the antithesis of properness (ةقيقح ḥaqīqah). Ḥaqīqah, on the other hand, refers “to truth, 
reality, things as they truly are” or as Larkin describes it as ‘ontological truth’ (1995, p. 
86). She also points out that ḥaqīqah “is used, in contrast to majāz, to refer to literal 
speech (ibid.). The following definitions of ḥaqīqah (properness) and majāz are noted by 
al-Asmar (1998, p. 35): 
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فللا مادختسا يه ةيقيقحلاﻆ  رامحلا ﻞكأي)) :وحن ،ﻞصﻷا يف هل َعضو يذلا ّيقيقحلا هانعم يف
 ًاريعش.((  
Properness is using the utterance in its real meaning/true sense, as in ‘The 
donkey eats barley’ (My translation). 
قيقحلا هانعم ريغ يف ِﻆفللا مادختسا وه زاجملا يقﻼعل ﻞصﻷا يف هل َعضُو يذلا ةنعملا نيب ،نْيي
زلز)) :وحن ل.((يباصعأ ربخلا 
Majāz is using the utterance to indicate a sense other than its true sense 
due to a relationship between the two meanings, such as in ‘the news shook 
my nerves’ (my translation).  
As-Sayūṭī (cited in Ṣabbāgh, 1998, p. 243) provides a linguistic definition for majāz as 
follows: 
زاجملا نم زاج  يلصﻷا هانعم هب اوزاج مهنﻷ كلذب يمسو .رخآ ناكم ﻰلإ هادعت اذإ هزوجي ناكملا
.رخآ ﻰنعم ﻰلإ  
Majāz is from the verb jāza, which means to cross a place to another and 
thus it is called [in rhetoric] majāz, because the meaning of a word is 
transferred from its true meaning to another one (my translation). 
As for al-Jurjānī (ibid. p. 243), his definition of majāz is:    
 يهف لوﻷاو يناﺜلا نيب ةظحﻼمل اهاعضاو عضو يف هل تعقو ام ريغ اهب ديرأ ةملك ﻞك زاجملا
.زاجم 
Every word that is used to indicate a meaning other than its true meaning 
due to a relationship between the indicated and the true meaning7 is called 
majāz (my translation). 
For his part, as-Sakkākī (ibid. p. 243) provides the following definition: 
ﻰنعم يف ةلمعتسملا ةملكلا وه زاجملا ﻻامعتسا قيقحتلاب اهانعم تقيقح عون ﻰلإ ةبسنلاب كلذ يف عم اه
.عونلا كلذ يف اهانعم ةدارإ نم ةعنام ةنيرق 
Majāz is the usage of a word in a sense that has a relationship with the 
proper8 meaning, with a cue that precludes the proper meaning (My 
translation).  
Regardless of the various definitions, they all indicate that majāz is a product ascribed to 
a process of transferring a proper meaning of a word to another intended meaning due to 
a relationship between the two meanings. This semantic relationship is highly significant 
                                                
7 Some rhetoricians suggest that the relationship should be looked at from the true meaning; others, like 
al-Jurjānī, suggests that it should be looked at from the intended meaning; some, also suggest that it should 
be looked equally from both sides (al-Hāshimī, 2005, p. 237). However, the relationship between the 
basic (true) and secondary meanings is essential so that the addressee could imagine and understand the 
intended meaning.  
8 The word ‘proper’ is probably the closest equivalent term for ḥaqīqah. However, in this context and in 
general, it refers to the ‘non-figurative’ meaning, in other words, the ‘literal’ meaning.   
 -19- 
for two reasons. The first reason is that it is through this semantic relationship, between 
the proper meaning and the intended meaning, that the addressee can understand the 
meaning aimed by the text producer. The second reason is that it determines the type of 
majāz. In other words, if the semantic relationship is based on similarity then the majāz 
is called istiᶜārah (Arabic ‘metaphor’), and if not then it is called majāz mursal (Arabic 
‘metonymy/synecdoche’). That said, majāz in Arabic rhetoric is divided into two main 
categories, majāz ᶜaqlī (cognitional figurativeness) and majāz lughawī (lingual 
figurativeness). The latter includes istiᶜārah and majāz mursal. 
2.3.2.1 Majāz ᶜaqlī (cognitional figurativeness) 
In his introduction to al-Jurjānī’s book, Kitāb asrār al-balāghah, Helmut Ritter states that 
“[t]ropical meaning (majāz) can appear in a sentence in two ways. It may consist either 
in the ascription of a certain action to a certain subject, or in the ascribed thing itself” (al-
Jurjānī, , 1954, p. 23). He also adds:  
If the trope lies in the ascription of an activity to a subject, it lies in the logical 
judgment expressed therein and thus belongs to the domain of reason (ᶜaql). 
If the figure lies in the thing ascribed it belongs to the domain of the use of 
the language, the vocabulary (lugha) (ibid, p.23).       
Accordingly, it is clear that majāz ᶜaqlī is concerned with figurative representation on the 
sentence (syntactic structural) level, more precisely with the ascription of the verb to 
majāz to a figurative subject. For example, in the sentenceةديدج ةبتكم نوؤانبلا ﻰنب – The 
constructors built a new library - the subject نوؤانب (constructors) are the actual persons 
who built the new library. The ascription of ‘building’ to the subject ‘constructors’ is then 
a proper predication, i.e. the predication of the verb ﻰنب (built) to the subject نوؤانب 
(constructors) is proper/intrinsic and not majāz. Whereas in the sentence  زديل ةعماج َْتَنب
ةديدج ةبتكم (University of Leeds built a new library) the subject زديل ةعماج – University of 
Leeds - is an improper subject because the actual building was done by constructors. But 
the action of building would have not been done in the first place without the request of 
the university. So the ascription of ‘building’ to the subject, University of Leeds, is majāz 
ᶜaqlī. In other words, the prediction of the verb ﻰنب (build) to the improper subject  ةعماج
زديل, University of Leeds, is majāz ᶜaqlī.  
Consequently, majāz ᶜaqlī is related to the prediction of a verb to an agent other than the 
actual doer. The following definition will give us a clear concept of majāz ᶜaqlī: 
 ﻰمسيو .هل وه ام ريغ ﻰلإ هانعم يف ام وأ ﻞعفلا دانسإ يف يأ ،دانسﻹا يف نوكيو :يلقعلا زاجملا
و ،يمكحلا زاجملا.بيكرتلا يف ﱠﻻإ نوكي ﻻو ،يزاجملا دانسﻹا 
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Majāz ᶜaqlī takes place in predication, to wit the prediction of the verb, or 
whatever replaces the verb9, to an agent other than the proper doer. It is called 
majāz ḥukmī (judgemental figurativeness) and is also known as ʾisnād majāzī 
(figurative predication). It only occurs in a syntactic structure (ᶜAtīq, 1980, p. 
337; my translation). 
Another definition of majāz al-ᶜaqlī provided by ʾAmīn (1982) explains that there should 
be a cue that precludes the proper predication and that there should be a relationship 
between the verb and the improper subject: 
 نوكي نأ عنمت ةنيرق عم ،ةقﻼعل ،هبحاص ريغ ﻰلإ ،هانعم يف ام وأ ،ﻞعفلا دانسإ :وه يلقعلا زاجملا
.ًايقيقح دانسﻹا  
Majāz ᶜaqlī is the predication of the verb, or whatever replaces the verb, to an 
agent other than the proper doer, due to a relationship, with a cue/context that 
precludes the proper predication (ibid, p.81; my translation). 
Cause (sababīyah), time (zamānīyah), and place (makānīyah) are types of relationships 
between the verb and the improper subject in majāz ᶜaqlī, in addition to infinitive 
(maṣdarīyah), subject (fāᶜilīyah), and object (mafᶜūlīyah) relationships. For instance, in 
the foregoing ‘University of Leeds’ example, the relationship between the verb ﻰنب (build) 
and the subject زديل ةعماج (University of Leeds) is a cause relationship (ᶜilāqah sababīyah), 
because, as has been pointed out above, the process of the building was carried out by 
constructors and not by the university itself; but that would have not happened without 
the request of the university. So, the University of Leeds ws the cause of this action. 
Therefore, the ascription of the verb ﻰنب (build) to the subject زديل ةعماج (University of 
Leeds) was due to a cause relationship. 
2.3.2.2 Majāz lughawī (Lingual figurativeness) 
Unlike majāz ᶜaqlī, majāz lughawī is concerned with the utterance level and not the 
sentence level. The usage of an utterance in its improper meaning due to a semantic 
relationship between the proper and improper meaning is known as majāz lughawī. As 
mentioned previously, this semantic relationship is highly significant for two reasons. It 
is important because it helps the addressee to understand the meaning aimed at by the text 
producer; and it determines whether the type of majāz (figurativeness) is istiᶜārah (Arabic 
‘metaphor’) or majāz mursal (Arabic ‘metonymy/synecdoche’). If the semantic 
relationship is based on similarity the figurative meaning is known as istiᶜārah; otherwise 
it is known as majāz mursal. 
                                                
9 Whatever replaces the verb, such as a nominalised noun, active participle, or passive participle.  
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2.3.3.2.1 ʾIstiᶜārah (Arabic metaphor) 
ʾIstiᶜārah is one type of majāz and it is referred to in English to as metaphor. Generally, 
ʾistiᶜārah is based on analogy and resemblance, as is also tashbīh (Arabic ‘simile’)10. 
Some rhetoricians aver that ʾistiᶜārah is a branch of tashbīh and some even confuse 
between the two figures of speech to the extent that they consider both of them one figure 
of speech. (ᶜAṭīyah, 2004, p. 62). Tashbīh, as mentioned earlier in section 2.3.1, is 
considered highly rhetorical when the two ends of the simile are mentioned, the ‘likened’ 
and ‘likened to’, without the simile tool/particle (adāt at-tashbīh), such as in دسأ دمحم 
(Muḥammad is a lion). ʾIstiᶜārah goes beyond the limit of tashbīh in terms of rhetorical 
level, i.e. in ʾistiᶜārah only one end of the ‘two simile ends’ is mentioned and of course 
without the simile tool/particle, as in دسأ تيأر ‘I saw a lion’ (what is meant is that I saw a 
person brave as a lion). Thus, as-Sakkākī’s definition of ʾistiᶜārah is as follows: 
 هب هبشملا سنج يف هبشملا لوخد ايّعدم رخﻵا فرطلا ديرتو هيبشتلا يفرط دحأ ركذت نأ ةراعتسﻻا
.هب هبشملا ّصخي ام هبشملل كتابثإب كلذ ﻰلع ًﻻاد  
ʾIstiᶜārah is mentioning one end of the ‘two simile ends’ while on the contrary 
you mean the other end, claiming that ‘the likened’ is of the same genus as 
the ‘likened to’ in order to transfer and evoke a specific character from the 
‘likened to’ to the ‘likened’ (cited in ᶜAtīq, 1980, p. 368; my translation)  
Linguistically, the verb  َعأ َرا  - ʾaᶜāra (to lend/borrow) is the origin of the term ʾistiᶜārah. 
The concept of the termʾistiᶜārah is also derived from راعتسا  هبلط  :لاملاةيراع  - astᶜāra al-
māl: ṭalabahu ᶜāriyah- (He lent money: he requested a loan). Generally speaking, it is 
known that no one would lend someone something or give a loan to another person unless 
if there is some kind of acquaintance or relationship between the two persons. This kind 
of acquaintance or relationship is applied in ʾistiᶜārah, i.e. between the proper meaning 
of the utterance and the figurative meaning. In other words, there has to be some kind of 
semantic relationship between the proper meaning and the figurative meaning in order to 
borrow and transfer a specific feature from one to the other. The aforementioned can be 
inferred through the following definition of ʾistiᶜārah by ibn al-ʾAthīr: 
 لوقنملا ِرْكِذ ِّيط عم امهنيب ةكراشمل ﻆفل ﻰلإ ﻆفل نم ﻰنعملا ﻞقن ةراعتسﻻا) :هلوقب ريثﻷا نبا اهفرع
.(هيلإ 
ibn al-ʾAthīr defines ʾistiᶜārah as transferring a meaning from one utterance 
to another, because of a common relationship between the two, and without 
                                                
10 For discussion in English regarding al-Jurjān’s theory of ʾistiᶜārah and tashbīh, and the relationship 
between the two see Abu Deeb (1979) and Larkin (1995). 
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stating the ‘transferred to utterance’” (Cited in ᶜAtīq, 1980, pp. 368-369; my 
translation).  
ᶜAtīq (ibid, pp. 367-368) provides various definitions of ʾistiᶜārah made by several 
rhetoricians, as follows: 
 .(ةغللا ﻞصأ يف هل تعضو ام ريغ ﻰلع ةرابعلا لامعتسا ةراعتسﻻا) :هلوقب ينامرلا نسحلا وبأ اهفرع 
abū al-Ḥasan ar-Rammānī defines ʾistiᶜārah as using an expression in a sense 
different from its original meaning in the language (my translation). 
 ﻰلإ ةغللا ﻞصأ يف اهلامعتسا عضوم نع ةرابعلا ﻞقن ةراعتسﻻا) :هلوقب يركسعلا لﻼه وبأ اهفرع
.(ضرغل هريغ  
abū Hilāl al-ᶜAskarī defines ʾistiᶜārah as transferring an expression from its 
original usage in the language to another for a purpose (my translation). 
 يوغللا عضوملا يف ﻞصﻷا ﻆفل نوكي نأ ةلمجلا يف ةراعتسﻻا) :هلوقب يناجرجلا رهاقلا دبع اهفرع
يغ يف رعاشلا ريغ وأ رعاشلا هلمعتسي مث ،عضو نيح هب ّصتخا هنأ ﻰلع دهاوشلا لدت ًافورعمر  كلذ
.(ةيراعلاك كانه نوكيف مزﻻ ريغ ًﻼقن هيلإ هلقنيو ،ﻞصﻷا  
ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī defines ʾistiᶜārah as an expression, which has a well-
known specific original meaning, and is used in a context by a poet or anyone 
else in a sense different from its original sense temporarily as if borrowing 
the original meaning (my translation). 
By all accounts, some rhetoricians believe that ʾistiᶜārah is originally a tashbīh (simile) 
in which one of the ends of the simile is omitted, and that there is a cue, lexical or 
circumstantial, that precludes from intending the proper meaning. If we take this into 
account, then ʾistiʿārah is also, like simile, formed of three components; the components 
of ʾistiʿārah being: mustaᶜār lahu, the borrowed to (equivalent to the ‘likened to’ element 
in simile), mustaᶜār minhu, the borrowed from (equivalent to the ‘likened’ element in 
simile, and mustaᶜār, the borrowed (which is the semantic relationship borrowed, and it 
is equivalent to the ‘point of resemblance’ in simile). The following example will 
illustrate the aforesaid: 
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It is important to note that one of the components of ʾistiᶜārah, ‘borrowed to’ or the 
‘borrowed from’ should be omitted. Otherwise, if both are mentioned then this will be 
considered a ‘rhetorical simile’ (غيلب هيبشت). That is to say, it will be regarded as a highly 
rhetorical simile and not as ʾistiᶜārah, since it may look like as if what is only omitted are 
the simile tools/particles. Also, the components are related to the classification of 
ʾistiᶜārah. In other words, the types of ʾistiᶜārah are based on its components. For 
instance, the previous example is ʾistiᶜārah taṣrīḥīyah (an explicit metaphor), where the 
omitted element is the ‘borrowed to’ and the preserved element is the ‘borrowed from’. 
For more details of the types of ʾistiᶜārah in Arabic see ᶜAtīq (1980, pp. 370-386) and in 
English see Abdul-Raof (2006, pp. 219-224). 
Arabic metaphor, ʾistiᶜārah, is regarded as the master trope of figures of speech by a 
majority of rhetoricians and linguists. As a result, other figures of speech have mainly 
been neglected in the realm of TS, especially Arabic-English translation studies, or at 
least have not received the same attention as metaphor. However, all figures of speech 
should have significant attention because they together form bayān in Arabic rhetoric; 
and since al-Jurjānī is considered the pioneer, who laid the grounds of Arabic rhetoric, 
then let us not forget his following statement: 
 ُغلبأ َةيانكلا نأ ﻰلع ُعيمجلا عمجا دق  ًّةيزم ةراعتسﻼل نأو ،حيرصﱠتلا نم ُعقوأ ضيرعتلاو ،حاصفﻹا َنم
.ةقيقحلا نم ُغلبأ ًادبأ َزاجملا نأو ،ًﻼﻀفو  
There is a unanimous agreement that kināyah is more rhetorical than 
enunciation, taᶜrīḍ (allusion) is more effective than proclamation, ʾistiᶜārah 
(metaphor) has excellence and merit, and that majāz (figurativeness) is 
without any doubt more rhetorical than proper sense (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 69; 
my translation). 
2.3.3.2.2 Majāz mursal (Arabic metonymy/synecdoche) 
Although most English/Arabic dictionaries11 translate synecdoche as majāz mursal, some 
translation scholars see majāz mursal as synecdoche. Reem al-Salem (2008), in her PhD 
research, Translation of Metonymy in the Holy Qur’an: A Comparative, Analytical Study, 
considers majāz mursal to be metonymy, which is in agreement with what Larkin asserts: 
                                                
11 The irony is that one can notice that some dictionaries, such as Al-Mawrid: a modern English-Arabic 
dictionary by Munir Baalbaki (1985), translate ‘synecdoche’ as majāz mursal and at the same time the 
translation of ‘metonymy’ is kināyah and majāz mursal (cf. Baalbaki & Baalbaki, 2013). Also one can 
notice in Al-Mawrid: a modern Arabic-English dictionary by Rohi Baalbaki that the translation of 
‘kināyah’ is ‘metonymy’ and the translation of ‘majāz mursal’ is ‘metonymy’ and ‘synecdoche’.  
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[m]ajāz mursal is the term for metonymy used by later scholars” (Larkin, 1995, p. 87). 
So what is majāz mursal in Arabic rhetoric?  
As mentioned earlier, majāz is a product ascribed to the process of transferring the 
‘proper’ meaning of a word to another intended meaning due to a relationship between 
the two meanings; and that the semantic relationship between the ‘proper’ and intended 
meanings determines whether the figurative meaning is ʾistiᶜārah or majāz mursal. If the 
semantic relationship is based on similarity then the tropical meaning is ʾistiᶜārah, as 
shown in the previous section, and if the semantic relationship is based on non-similarity 
then the tropical meaning is majāz mursal. 
al-Asmar provides the following definition for majāz mursal: 
لامجا ﻞسرملا زلعتسا ةظفتلم عل يلصﻷا اهانعم ريغ يفﻼةق يغر ةهباشملا، ةنيرق عم إ نم ةعنام ةدار
ﻷا ﻰنعملالص.(تارفلا ءام تبرش) :وحن ،ي 
Majāz mursal is the usage of a word in its improper meaning due to a non-
similarity relationship (between the proper and improper meaning) with a cue 
that precludes the proper meaning, as in: ‘I drank the Euphrates’ water’ (1998, 
p. 74; my translation). 
Al-Asmar (ibid) explains that what is meant in the aforesaid example is that the person 
drank a cup or several cups of the Euphrates’ water and not the whole Euphrates River, 
because that is impossible. He added that the relationship between the proper and 
improper meaning is a ‘part-whole’ relationship. In other words, the ‘whole’ (Euphrates’ 
water) is mentioned to indicate a ‘part’ (a cup or several cups of the Euphrates’ water), 
and that the verb ‘drank’ is the cue that precludes the proper meaning, i.e. prevents us 
understanding that the whole Euphrates was drunk. 
The following example of majāz mursal in [Q. 40:13] shows what is known as ‘result’ 
relationship between the figurative meaning and the proper meaning of the utterance:    
 َوُه ﴿ يِذﱠلا  ُكيُِري ْم  ِِهتاَيآ ُل ِّزَنُيَو اًقْزِر ِءاَم ﱠسلا َن ِّم مَُكل اَمَو  ُرﱠَكَذتَي  ﱠﻻِإ نَم  ُبيُِني  ﴾]رفاغ:13[  
It is He who shows you [people] His signs and sends water down from the 
sky to sustain you, though only those who turn to God will take heed” [Q. 
40:13] (Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. 302).  
The phrase  ُل ِّزَنُي اًقْزِر ِءاَمﱠسلا َن ِّم مَُكل  (lit. He drops for you livelihood/boons from the sky) in 
fact means that God sends us rain from the sky, and as everyone knows that rain (water) 
is one of the essential sources of life; rain, as a result, causes the growth of food and the 
existence of fresh water and so on. Therefore, the relationship between the figurative 
meaning and the proper meaning is a ‘result’ relationship. The noun ‘sky’ is the cue which 
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precludes the proper meaning ‘livelihood/boon’ and through it the addressee can 
understand the intended meaning which is ‘rain’. 
 
Figure 2.4: Forms of majāz mursal and their semantic relationships12. 
With regards to the types/forms of relationship in majāz mursal, it is said that rhetoricians, 
early and modern, have mentioned approximately twenty-five relationships (ᶜAṭīyah, 
2004, p. 117). ᶜAṭīyah, states the following relationships: sababīyah, musabbabīyah, 
juzʾīyah, kullīyah, lāzimīyah, malzūmīyah, mutlaqīyah, muqayyadīyah, ᶜumūmīyah, 
khusūsīyah, ḥālīyah, maḥallīyah, zāʾidīyah, nāqisīyah, ḍiddīyah, ālīyah, mujāwarīyah, 
wasfīyah, ʾiᶜtibarīyah limā kān, ʾiᶜtibarīyah limā yakūn (cf. figure 2.4). 
2.4 Kināyah 
The first person to touch upon kināyah was the linguist al-Khalīl al-Farāhīdī (d. 175 AH). 
He mentions kināyah in his dictionary, muᶜjam al-ᶜayn, which is viewed as the first Arabic 
dictionary to see the light of day (Ṭilib, 1997, p. 131). Thereafter kināyah was discussed 
by other linguists such as Sibawayh (d. 180 AH) in his book al-kitāb, al-Farāʾ Yaḥyā bin 
Ziyād (d. 207 AH) the author of Maᶜānī al-Qurʾān, and ʾabū ᶜUbaydah bin al-Muthannā 
(d. 210 AH) in his book Majāz al-Qur’ān. The concept of kināyah, according to the 
foregoing linguists and other early linguists, is ‘to conceal, to cover, to hide, or to veil. A 
nickname, alias, or even a pronoun is also regarded as ‘kināyah’ because it conceals the 
true identity, i.e. the person or thing is not mentioned directly and explicitly (see Kaḥīl, 
2004, pp. 21-28; Ṭilib, 1997, pp. 131-138). 
                                                
12 Taken from Abdul-Raof (2006, p. 225). Notice that the semantic relations he demonstrates are the same 
as those presented by most Arab rhetoricians, but in English. However,  bear in mind, Abdul-Raof refers 
to majaz mursal as ‘hypallage’, which is quite bizarre. We would advise not to rely on some of his 
terms, since they appear to be incorrect and are very likely to cause confusion. 
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Ṭilib (1997, p. 133) comments on al-Farāhīdī’s concept of kinayāh as follows: 
ئشب ناسنﻹا ملكتي نأ يهو ةغللا يف ةيانكلا فرع دقل  ثفرلاو طئاغلاو عامجلاك ،هريغ ﻰلع هب لدتسي
 دبع وبأ :وحن ةينكلا نع ثدحت امك ،كلذ وحنو هريغك بئاغلا ريمض ﻰلع اﻀيأ ةيانكلا قلطي وهو ،ﷲ
.ةاحنلا نم  
al-Farāhīdī defines kināyah linguistically as: saying something to infer 
something else, such as jimāᶜ (sexual intercourse), ghāʾiṭ (defecation), and 
rafath (sexual intercourse). He also talks about the kunyah (alias/nickname) 
as in abū ᶜAbd Allah. Furthermore, he regards third-person pronouns as 
kināyah like other grammarians (my translation). 
In addition, Tilb (ibid, p. 136) indicates that the grammarians had two notions of kinayāh; 
the first is “naming something other than its true name for a particular reason, such as to 
conceal the explicit meaning or to euphemise a word or expression” (my translation); the 
second is that “any pronoun is a kinayāh, and not only the third-person pronoun as most 
people imagine” (my translation).   
Some argue that al-Muthannā (d. 210 AH) was the first writer to mention kināyah. The 
reason may be because his view of kināyah is slightly different from previous 
grammarians. Although he agrees with his fellow grammarians that a pronoun is 
considered a kināyah, al-Muthannā adds that kināyah is related to text, context, and 
cognition (ibid, p. 137; Kaḥīl, 2004, p. 29). In other words, kinayāh is an implicit word 
or expression that could be comprehended through visualising and contemplating the 
context. In short, grammarians were interested in kinayāh from a linguistic perspective 
(the meaning of kinayāh) rather than a technical one (Al-Hajjaj, 2004, p. 84). 
On the other hand, the perusal of kinayāh and other tropes from a technical perspective 
was represented by rhetoricians. Of course, like other concepts, the concept of kināyah 
developed gradually. Al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 AH/868 AD) was one of the first scholars who took 
an interest in kināyah, as is evident in his books, al-Bayān wā al-Tibyān and al-Ḥayawān. 
In the main, al-Jāḥiẓ mentions kināyah alongside taᶜrīḍ (allusion) as if they were 
synonyms with no difference between them semantically (Kaḥīl, 2004, p. 30). However, 
al-Jāḥiẓ considers kināyah the opposite of ‘declaration’ (taṣrīḥ) and ‘enunciation’ 
(ʾifṣāḥ). ᶜ Atīq (1980, p. 398) asserts that al-Jāḥiẓ “sees kināyah in its general sense, which 
is expressing a meaning through allusion and not through declaration or enunciation 
whenever the situation requires this (my translation). Although al-Jāḥiẓ’s views on 
kināyah are rather general, they are without any doubt far more comprehensive than the 
grammarians’ views. They are tinged with some rhetorical features, such as text, context, 
and state of addressees. Moreover, Kaḥīl (2004, p. 31)  argues that al-Jāḥiẓ infers that the 
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concept of kināyah is cognitional and requires visualising and contemplating. However, 
if we were to take ᶜAtīq’s notes into consideration, we might claim that some 
shortcomings are found in al-Jāḥiẓ’s conception of kināyah. ᶜAtīq (1980, p. 399) argues 
that kināyah, according to al-Jāḥiẓ’s statements and examples, encompasses “all types of 
figurative representation, simile, metaphor, and allusion” (my translation), i.e. al-Jāḥiẓ 
does not differentiate between kināyah and other figurative expressions. Furthermore, 
Shawqī Ḍayf (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 31) notes that al-Jāḥiẓ was not interested in 
rhetorical rules as much as in representing rhetorical examples. 
On the other hand, Muḥammad bin Yazīd al-Mubarrid (d. 285 AH), one of al-Jāḥiẓ’s 
students, classifies discourse into three types. He believes that a speech involves either 
properness (i.e. using the words in their true sense), kināyah, or simile (Kaḥīl, 2004, p. 
37). It is true that al-Mubarrid does not present a definition of kināyah, but he is probably 
the first person to discuss it in terms of ‘functional scope’. He points out in his book al-
Kāmil three types of kināyah: blinding/disguising and concealment, euphemism, and 
aggrandisement (grandiloquence). It is clear that al-Mubarrid’s classification of kināyah 
is based on usefulness and purpose, i.e. functions of kināyah.  
Qudāmah bin Jaᶜfar (d. 337 AH) discusses the concept of kināyah in his book Naqd ash-
Shiᶜr (Criticism of Poetry) but under the term ʾirdāf’ (substitutability). He sees ʾirdāf as 
a type of concord between utterance/word (lafḍah) and meaning. He presents the 
following definition: 
 رعاشلا ديري نأ فادرﻹا ﻆفلب ﻞب ،ﻰنعملا كلذ ﻰلع لادلا ﻆفللاب يتأي ﻼف ،يناعملا نم ﻰنعم ﻰلع ةلﻻد
.عوبتملا نع نابأ عباتلا ﻰلع لد اذإف ،هل عباتو هفدر وه ﻰنعم ﻰلع لدي  
ʾIrdāf’ (substitutability) occurs when a poet wants to indicate a specific 
meaning, but rather than using the [original] word that conveys that proper 
meaning, he opts for an alternative word that is considered ‘appositional’/ 
adjacent to the proper meaning (cited in ᶜAtīq, 1980, p. 400; my translation). 
The examples presented by Qudāmah of ʾirdāf (see Kahīl, 2004, pp. 44-45) such as ‘long 
eardrops’ to describe a women with a long neck13 (which is a sign of beauty in Arab 
culture) alongside his definition shows that he considers kināyah and ʾirdāf to be one 
phenomenon or more precisely synonyms. Furthermore, Yūsuf abū al-ᶜAdūs points out 
that the ‘mediums’ or ‘vehicles’ leading to the meaning of ʾirdāf are similar to those in 
kināyah (cited in Kaḥīl, 2004, p. 47; the specific interpretation is mine). It is worth noting 
                                                
13 “The semantic adjacency or the semantic entailment of the expression stems from the fact that if the 
woman's earring ornament is long then this entails that she has a long neck” (Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 24). 
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that a ‘medium/vehicle’ functions through ‘semantic adjacency’ which helps the 
addressee to understand the intended meaning of the expression rather than the ‘proper’ 
sense. Having said that, the relation between ‘mediums’ and ambiguity is a ‘direct 
relationship’. In other words, the more ‘mediums’ embedded in the kināyah expression 
the more visualisation and contemplation are needed by the recipient to clear the 
ambiguity and comprehend the meaning intended by the text producer.  
One can notice that kināyah is discussed by early rhetoricians under several terms, such 
as taᶜrīḍ (allusion) and ʾirdāf’. Abū al-Hilāl al-ᶜAskarī (d. 395 AH), the author of al-
Ṣināʿtayn, is one of those who mixed between kināyah, ʾirdāf, taᶜrīḍ and other terms. al-
ᶜAskarī provides the following definition (cited in ᶜAtīq, 1980, p. 402): 
كي نأ ضيرعتلاو ةيانكلان نع ةيروتلاب اولمع ام بسح ﻰلع ،حرصي ﻻو هب ضرعيو ءيشلا نع ﻰ
.ءيشلا 
Kināyah and taʿrīḍ (allusion/innuendo) is to conceal and allude something 
and not to mention it explicitly as in paronomasia/pun (my translation). 
On this account, one can deduce that al-ᶜAskarī considers kināyah and taʿrīḍ as the same 
phenomenon. He exemplifies his definition through examples from the Qur’an, Arabic 
poetry, and men of letters (see Tilb, 1997, p. 148). One of the examples he provides is:  
 ﴿َاي اَهﱡَيأ  َنيِذﱠلا اوُنَمآ  َﻻ اوُبَرَْقت  َةَﻼ ﱠصلا  ُْمتَنأَو  ٰىَراَكُس  ٰﻰﱠتَح اوُمَلَْعت اَم  َنوُلوَُقت  َﻻَو اًُبنُج  ﱠﻻِإ يِرِباَع  ٍﻞيِبَس 
 ٰﻰﱠتَح اوُلَِستَْغتۚ  ِنإَو ُمتنُك  ٰﻰَضْر ﱠم  َْوأ  ٰﻰَلَع  ٍرَفَس  َْوأ  َءاَج  ٌدََحأ مُكن ِّم  َن ِّم  ِِطئاَغْلا  َْوأ  ُُمتْسَمَﻻ  َءاَسِّنلا  ْمََلف اوُدَِجت 
 ًءاَم اوُم ﱠَمَيتَف ًاديِعَص ًابِّيَط اوُحَسْماَف  ْمُكِهوُجُِوب  ْمُكيِدَْيأَوۗ   ﱠنِإ  َ ﱠဃ  َناَك ا̒وُفَع  اًرُوفَغ﴾ ]ءاسنلا :43.[  
(You who believe, do not come anywhere near the prayer if you are 
intoxicated, not until you know what you are saying; nor if you are in a state 
of major ritual impurity – though you may pass through the mosque – not 
until you have bathed; if you are ill, on a journey, have relieved yourselves, 
or had intercourse, and cannot ﬁnd any water, then ﬁnd some clean sand and 
wipe your faces and hands with it. God is always ready to pardon and forgive) 
[Q. 4:43] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
Both words, al-ghāʾiṭ and lāmastum are used euphemistically, which is one of the 
functions of kināyah, to indicate the meanings of ‘defecation’ and ‘sexual intercourse’ 
respectively (see chapters five and six). Al-ᶜAskarī also talks about ʾirdāf 
(substitutability) and tawābiᶜ (appositional/ adjacent to the proper meaning) in a separate 
chapter in his book, al-Ṣināᶜtayn, and presents the following definition: 
در وه ﻆفلب يتأيو ،هب صاخلا هيلع لادلا َﻆفللا َكرتيف ،ﻰنعم ﻰلع ةلﻻدلا ُملكتملا ديري نأف ،هل عباتو ه
رابع هلعجيف ة.هدارأ يذلا ﻰنعملا نع  
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[ʾIrdāf and tawābiᶜ is when] the text producer seeks to indicate a specific 
meaning by choosing a substitutive word that is adjacent to the proper/true 
meaning as an expression for the intended meaning, rather than using the 
‘original’ word that denotes the true sense (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 50; my 
translation). 
According to Kaḥīl (ibid., p. 50; Tilb, 1997, p.149) al-ᶜAskarī’s definition of ʾirdāf and 
tawābiᶜ actually siginifies the concept of kināyah. As a consequence, one can suggest that 
there is some kind of inconsistency in al-ᶜAskarī’s views of kināyah. The reason for 
saying this, besides his definition of ʾirdāf’ and tawābiᶜ, is that the examples he uses to 
exemplify his views were known, later on, as examples of kināyah, such as دامرلا ريﺜك 
([having] a lot of ashes - a kināyah for generosity), طرقلا ىوهم ةديعب ([having] long eardrops 
- a kināyah for a women with a long neck), and   داجنلا ﻞيوط ([having] a long sword-
scabbard/sheath - a kināyah for a tall person).  
The concept probably remained ambiguous until al-Jurjānī came up with a clear solid 
rhetorical definition. But it is worth mentioning that the first noteworthy attempt to 
capsulise kināyah in the rhetorical sphere was by ᶜAbd Allah bin Sinān al-khafājī (d. 466 
AH) the author of Sirr al-faṣāḥah (Secret of Eloquence). Though he did not come up with 
a clear definition of kināyah, he linked kināyah to the basic principle of rhetoric, which 
is ‘requirements of the situation’ (context of situation). al-Khafājī (cited in: Kahīl, 2004, 
pp. 78-83; Tilb, 1997, pp. 153-156) argues that there is a ‘style of expression for each 
situation’, hence kināyah should only be used when the ‘situation’ is appropriate; for 
instance, expressions concerning ‘jesting, impudence, and stating rarae aves’ are 
advisable to use ‘directly’ rather than through kināyah. Concisely,al-Khafājī believes that 
kināyah is one of the bases of eloquence and one of the stipulations of rhetoric whenever 
it is used appropriately (ibid).  
It is not surprising to find that the first clear rhetorical definition of kināyah was at the 
hands of al-Jurjānī, since modern rhetoricians agree that he is the one who laid the 
grounds of Arabic rhetoric. Al-Jurjānī’s definition is as follows: 
امل ،يناعملا نم ﻰنعم تابثإ ملكتملا ديري نأ ةيانكلاب دارعوضوملا ﻆفللاب هركذي ﻼف ا يف هل نكلو ،ةغلل
يجيء  وه) :مهلوق كلذ لاﺜم ،هيلع ﻼيلد هلعجيو ،هيلإ هب ئمويف ،دوجولا يف هفدِرو هيلات وه ﻰنعم ﻰلإ
ط موؤن) :ةأرملا يفو .ىرقلا ريﺜك نونعي (ردقلا دامر ريﺜكو) ،ةماقلا ﻞيوط نوديري (داجنلا ﻞيو
ﻀلاحارملاو (ﻰد ودخم ةفرتم اهنأ.اهرمأ اهيفكي نم اهل ،ةم 
Kināyah is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a 
specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known 
(original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he opts for a meaning 
(word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to the true meaning (proper sense) in 
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order to allude to and attest the meaning intended; for example: ‘He is long 
of sword-scabbard’ to indicate that he is tall in stature, ‘[having] a lot of 
cooking-pot ashes’ to mean very generous, and ‘forenoon sleeper’ to indicate 
a women who is self-indulgent, living in great luxury and being served (al-
Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my translation). 
Al-Jurjānī considers kināyah a stylistic expression to substantiate and attest a distinctive 
characteristic of a person/thing (al-Jurjānī, 1995, pp. 69-70, 203-205). He argues that the 
association between the substitutive word/s and the ‘original’ word is necessary to verify 
the meaning intended. This verification is accomplished through a cognitive process by 
the addressee. For example, in order to understand the meaning intended in the expression 
‘She is a forenoon sleeper’, the recipient ‘imagines’ and ‘wonders’ why a woman would 
keep sleeping until just before noon (especially given that in Arabic traditional life, a 
woman wakes up at dawn to attend to household matters if she is a housewife or prepares 
to go out to work) unless she has nothing to do because she is living in great luxury and 
being served. Abu Deeb explains kināyah in the eyes of al-Jurjānī: 
The relationship between the “intended meaning” and the conveyed 
[expressed] meaning is described by al-Jurjānī as a relation between one 
meaning and another which is “corollary of the first and whose existence is 
conditional on the first being conceived of”, the latter being the one actually 
conveyed by the linguistic form. The process by which the relationship is 
revealed is expressed by “the indication and suggestion through the expressed 
meaning of the non-immediate meaning … Unlike istᶜāra [sic], kināyah 
presents a picture which is not fused or identified with the entity to which it 
refers. The two entities stand apart, their relationship being determined not by 
the linguistic or immediate context, but by the social, cultural context, on the 
one hand, and a set of logical or factual links relating them, on the other. It is 
due to this pattern of relationships that kināyah “has an effect on the soul” 
which a direct statement of the meaning does not have. For the same reason 
its effect is conditional on “interpreting” the conveyed [expressed] meaning. 
Yet the artistic value of kināyah does not spring entirely from the statement 
it makes. Al-Jurjānī emphasizes that two pictures expressing the same non-
immediate meaning are not equivalent to each other, but are each an origin 
and separate category or type. He clearly believes that the value of the image 
resides in the series of the associations and concrete and visual details it 
evokes (1979, p. 165-166). 
It is worth noting that in his book, Dalāʼil al-iᶜjāz (ibid, pp. 235-241), al-Jurjānī sheds 
light upon two types of kināyah but without detailed classification: kināyah of affinity 
(nisbah) and kināyah of an attribute (ṣifah). However, the first person to differentiate 
between kināyah and taᶜrīḍ (allusion) is probably az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538 AH). He states 
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that kināyah is “expressing something through a word other than its conventional word” 
and taᶜrīḍ is “to express something in order to lead/allude to something else not 
mentioned” (cited in Tilb, 1997, p. 169; my translation). 
as-Sakkākī provides a slightly different definition of kināyah in which he introduces the 
concept of ‘entailment’, involving lāzim (entailing) and malzūm (entailed): 
 روكذملا نم ﻞقتنيل ،همزلي ام ﻰلإ ءيشلا ركذب حيرصتلا كرت يه ةيانكلاف :لوقت امك ،كورتملا ﻰلإ نﻼ
.ةماقلا لوط وهو هموزلم وه ام ﻰلإ هنم ﻞقتنيل ؛داجنلا ﻞيوط  
Kināyah is to avoid expressing something explicitly, but rather stating what 
it entails in order to shift the exposition of what is expressed to what has been 
left implicit, such as in saying ‘so-and-so is long of sword-scabbard’ where 
the meaning of ‘a long sword-scabbard’ [the entailing] is shifted to ‘the 
entailed’ which is tallness in stature (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 121; my 
translation). 
The salient contribution by as-Sakkākī is that he provides a detailed classification of types 
of  kināyah, which is followed by the majority of modern rhetoricians (see 2.4.1). Ibn al-
ʾAthīr (d. 637 AH), from his part, criticises some early scholars for not differentiating 
between kināyah and taᶜrīḍ.  He defines taᶜrīḍ as:  
.يزاجملا وأ يقيقحلا عضولاب ﻻ ،موهفملا قيرط نع ءيشلا ﻰلع لادلا ﻆفللا 
“The expression that indicates a meaning through conception, not through 
proper or figurative expressions (cited in ᶜAtīq, 1980, p. 238; my translation). 
Ibn al-ʾAthīr also argues that kināyah occurs in single and complex forms (lexemes), 
while taᶜrīḍ only involves complex forms (lexemes), because taᶜrīḍ could not be 
understood directly through a true/proper sense nor through a figurative expression, but 
only through all the words in the statement (ibid. 239). As for kināyah, he defines it as: 
زاجملاو ةقيقحلا يبناج ﻰلع هلمح زوجي ﻰنعم ﻰلع تلد ةظفل ﻞك  
An expression that holds both meanings, its proper sense and its figurative 
sense (cited in Kahīl, 2004, p. 129; my translation). 
Ibn al-ʾAthīr notes that there should be a generic relationship between the literal meaning 
(proper sense) and the figurative meaning. He exemplifies his argument with several 
examples from the Qur’an, one being the following āyah: 
 ﴿ ﱠِنإ َاذ َٰه يَِخأ  َُهل  ٌعْسِت  َنوُعْسِتَو  ًةَجْعَن  َيِلَو  ٌةَجَْعن ... ٌَةدِحاَو﴾ ]ص :23[  
(This is my brother. He had ninety-nine ewes and I just the one …) [Q. 38:23] 
(Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
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Ibn al-ʾAthīr believes that the meaning of the word ‘ewe’ in the āyah is a kināyah for 
women; the generic relationship is that both a women and ewe are female; hence the 
meaning can be taken from both sides, literally and figuratively. The final definition of 
kināyah in this section belongs to al-Qazwīnī (d. 739 AH). He defines kināyah as follows 
(1996, p. 365): 
فل :ةيانكلا:ﻆ ذئنيح هانعم ةدارإ زاوج عم هانعم مزﻻ هب ديرأ  
Kināyah is an expression “used to entail something semantically concomitant 
with it, with the possibility of intending the literal meaning” of this expression 
(translation is taken from: Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 27). 
Al-Qazwīnī’s definition combines ibn al-ʾAthīr and az-Zamakhsharī’s views of kināyah, 
i.e. he uses the notion of ‘concomitance’ (lāzim and malzūm) and the possibility of 
intending the literal meaning, respectively. But what is remarkably interesting in ibn al 
ʾAthīr and al-Qazwīnī’s concepts of kināyah, in addition to some other scholars’ views, 
is that they all refer to the possibility of intending the literal and figurative senses of the 
kināyah expression. This brings us to the rousing debate among some rhetoricians, 
namely in the wake of al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah, whether kināyah is a figure of 
speech or not. 
Some scholars, such as ar-Rāzī, (Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 4-6), do not consider kināyah a 
figurative expression, arguing that it merely represents a true sense. They present two 
justifications; their first justification is that there is no contradiction in the kināyah 
expression with its literal meaning, i.e. the literal meaning of the kināyah is actually true 
unlike ʾistiᶜārah. For example, the metaphorical word ‘lion’, as in ‘I saw a lion in my 
office’ means ‘I saw a person brave as a lion in my office’; therefore, under no 
circumstances may the literal sense of ‘lion’ be true. By contrast, according to the some 
scholars, the kināyah expression داجنلا ﻞيوط (long of sword-scabbard) to denote the 
meaning of a ‘tall person’ is in reality true, because that person has a long sword-scabbard. 
With regards to kināyah, this excuse is in some ways true, but not always; for example 
(Ṭilib, 1997, pp. 181-182), the kināyah ‘long of sword-scabbard’ could be used with a tall 
person who does not actually have a sword-scabbard, consequently the true sense (literal 
meaning) is not actualised. Also, it is absolutely impossible to intend the true sense in 
kināyah of affinity (ةبسنلا نع ةيانكلا) (see 2.4.1), as in يماس مد يف ﻞخبلا ‘stinginess is in Sami’s 
blood’. There is another situation where it is impossible to intend the true sense of 
kināyah, particularly those related to God (Allah), as in the following examples (ibid; 
Kahīl, 2004, p. 6):  
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 ﴿ ُن َٰمْح ﱠرلا ﻰَلَع  ِشْرَعْلا  ٰىََوتْسا ﴾ ]هط :5[ 
(The Lord of Mercy, established on the throne) [Q. 20:5] (Abdel Haleem, 
2005)  
 ﴿اَمَو اوَُردَق  َ ﱠဃ  ﱠقَح  ِهِرْدَق  ُضَْرْﻷاَو ًاعيِمَج  ُُهتَﻀَْبق  َمَْوي  ِةَمَايِقْلا  ُتاَواَمﱠسلاَو  ٌتاﱠيِوْطَم  ِِهنيِمَيِبۚ   ُهَناَحْبُس 
 ٰﻰَلاََعتَو ا ﱠمَع  ِرْشُي َنوُك﴾  :رمزلا]67[  
(These people have no grasp of God’s true measure. On the Day of 
Resurrection, the whole earth will be in His grip. The heavens will be rolled 
up in His right hand – Glory be to Him! He is far above the partners they 
ascribe to Him!-) [Q. 39: 67] (Abdel Haleem, 2005)  
The kināyah in the first āyah is to indicate the ‘authority’ and ‘superiority’ of God (Allah) 
through ‘sitting firmly on the throne’; the kināyah in the second āyah is to indicate God’s 
mightiness and exaltedness through ‘the gripping of the whole earth in one hand’. It is 
impossible to ascribe ‘sitting’ and ‘gripping’ in reality to God; hence it is impossible to 
intend the true sense. In such situations, the true sense of kināyah is intended in a stylistic 
way only, but not on its own. In other words, it is merely a means of reaching the meaning 
intended. 
The second justification of those scholars who consider kināyah as an expression of true 
sense rather than a figurative expression is related to the notion of ‘entailing /concomitant 
and entailed/concomitee’ (lāzim wa malzūm). The transference of this notion in figurative 
expressions is from the ‘entailed’ (malzūm) to the ‘entailing’ (lāzim), whereas in kināyah 
it is the other way round. Tilb (1997, p. 182) points out that there are some situations 
where the concomitance is equal, i.e. the ‘concomitant’ and the ‘concomitee’ are equal; 
In other words, in senses, the literal meaning and the meaning intended, are concomitant 
to each other. Tilb states that if this equality occurs, then there is no difference between a 
kināyah and majāz, and that the only thing that differentiates the two is that in kināyah 
the literal sense could possibly be true. 
No matter what these scholars say about kināyah, in the end kināyah is an expression that 
represents a meaning other than its literal meaning, and the possibility of intending its 
literal meaning is merely a tool to reach and substantiate the actual meaning intended. 
That said, the majority of rhetoricians affirm that kinayah is a figure of speech that 
belongs to ᶜilm al-bayān (for more details on this matter as well as a historical view on 
the development of kināyah in Arabic see al-Qatān, 1993; in English see Al-Sharafi, 2004, 
pp. 22-28). Ibn al-ʾAthīr and al-Qazwīnī perceived this; hence they added to the definition 
of kināyah ‘the possibility of targeting the original meaning’, i.e. its literal sense. 
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Consequently, kināyah remains one of the essential tropes of ᶜilm al-bayān, alongside 
ʾistiᶜārah, tashbīh, and majāz mursal (cf. Lāshīn, 1998). 
2.4.1 Classifications of kināyah 
It seems the majority of rhetoricians, if not all, agree on the classification proposed by as-
Sakkākī and followed by al-Qazwīnī. As-Sakkākī looks at kināyah from two main 
perspectives. First, from an objective perspective, i.e. the type of attribution as intended 
by the text producer. Second, from the perspective of context and medium, i.e. the context 
and medium leading to the meaning of the kināyah. These two perspectives of 
classification will be discussed at length below (cf. al-Qatān). 
2.4.1.1 Kināyah from an objective perspective 
Based on the type of attribution intended by the text producer, this perspective subsumes 
three types: kināyah of an attribute (kināyah ᶜan al-ṣifah), kināyah of an attributed 
(kināyah ᶜan al-mawṣūf), and kināyah of an affinity (kināyah ᶜan al-nisbah). These types 
can be explained and exemplified as follows: 
Kināyah of an attribute (kināyah ᶜan al-ṣifah): The objective of this type of kināyah is 
to indicate a specific characteristic trait, ‘an attribute’ such as generosity, courage, or 
beauty (c.f. Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 236). The attributed and the affinity expression(s) are 
mentioned without the attribute in order to lead to the ‘attribute’ intended. In other words, 
the kināyah expression consists of an attribute(s) that is semantically associated with the 
attribute intended. The addressee reaches the attribute intended through this association. 
For example, the phrase دامرلا ريﺜك ‘has plenty of ashes’ as in دامرلا ريﺜك يماس ‘Sami has 
plenty of ashes’ indicates generosity (مرك), because in Arabic culture, a person who is 
generous normally hosts many guests, and traditionally they are provided with hot drinks 
and food. Before the modern era there was no gas or electricity, and all the cooking was 
done on firewood which leaves ashes behind. So, plenty of ashes means plenty of cooking 
which, in turn, means a lot of guests and that implies generosity. Another example is  ﻞيوط
داجنلا ‘long of sword-scabbard’ to indicate any person who is tall in stature, because 
wearing a long of sword-scabbard requires a person who is tall. 
Moreover, as-Sakkākī classifies kināyah of an attribute into two categories (ᶜAṭīyah, 
2004, pp. 134-135; Kahīl, 2004, pp. 8-9; Mahdi, 2009, pp. 14-15; al-Hāshimī, 1999, p. 
371; cf. al-Qatān, 1993) based on the number of mediums or concomitants needed to 
reach the meaning of the kināyah (the meaning intended): a close/near kināyah and a 
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distant kināyah. Kināyah expressions such as ‘long of sword–scabbard’ for a tall person 
and طرقلا ىوهم ةديعب ‘long of eardrops’ for a woman with a long neck are examples for a 
‘close’ or ‘near’ kināyah. It is called a close kināyah because the addressee reaches the 
meaning of the kināyah without any mediums, i.e. the cognitive-shifts of the addressee 
do not need any medium to understand the kināyah meaning. By contrast, in a ‘distant 
kināyah’ the cognition of the addressee, from the kināyah expression to the meaning 
intended, goes through one shift or more, based on the number of mediums, in order to 
understand the meaning intended. For example, the kināyah expression ردقلا دامر ريﺜك 
‘having a lot of cooking-pot ashes’ for generosity, requires several mediums in order to 
reach the meaning intended. That is to say, the addressee’s cognition shifts from ‘a lot of 
ashes’  ‘a lot of embers’  ‘a lot burning’  ‘a lot of cooking’  ‘a lot of guests’ in 
order to reach the meaning intended, which is hospitable and generous. As a result, the 
more mediums there are, the more cognitive shifts are required by the addressee to 
understand the meaning of the kināyah (cf. al-Qatān, 1993, p. 197).        
Kināyah of an attributed (kināyah ᶜ an al-mawṣūf):  In this type of kināyah the objective 
is to indicate an attributed. The attribute, which is strongly associated with the attributed, 
is mentioned along with the affinity ‘expresssion(s)’ and without the attributed. The 
association between the ‘attribute’ and the ‘attributed’ is so strong that sometimes the 
attribute stands as a symbol for the attributed, such as the ‘Nile’ for ‘Egypt’, ‘10 Downing 
street’ for the ‘British Prime Minister’, ‘the eastern star’ (قرشلا بكوك) for the late Egyptian 
singer ʾUmm Kalthūm, and ‘the place of secrets’ (رارسﻷا نطوم) for ‘the heart’. The 
following example will further illustrate this point: 
ءارحصلا ةنيفس ﻰلع ةميدقلا ةنيدملا يف تلوجت – I toured in the old city on ‘the ship 
of the desert’ (camel) 
The phrase ‘ship of the desert’, which is an attribute for a camel is mentioned; the affinity 
words (the words on which the interpretation of ءارحصلا ةنيفس are predicated), which are 
‘Toured … on’ are also mentioned, while the attributed ‘camel’ is not mentioned. In the 
kināyah of an attributed (kināyah ᶜ an al-mawṣūf), the attribute must be a feature or quality 
belonging typically to the attributed (a person or object) (cf. al-Qatān, 1993). 
Kināyah of an affinity (kināyah ᶜan al-nisbah): In this type of kināyah expression the 
objective is to affirm or deny a specific characteristic to the attributed. In other words, the 
attribute and the attributed are mentioned while the affinity is left out, although it is the 
required element, for the purpose of specialising a specific characteristic to the attributed. 
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The attribute is predicated to something that is associated with the attributed (al-Hāshimī, 
1999, p. 372; Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 237; ʾAmīn, 1982, p. 162; Mahdi, 2009, p. 13; Kaḥīl, 
2004, pp. 12-13). The following example further illustrates this point: 
 مد يف ﻞخبلايماس  -Stinginess is in Sami’s blood 
The intention of the text producer is to affirm implicitly that Sami has the quality of 
stinginess (ungenerousness); instead of saying directly ﻞيخب يماس ‘Sami is stingy’ or 
‘ungenerous’, it is indirectly implied through the nominalised attribute (ﻞخبلا -stinginess) 
by referring to it through the attributed noun (Sami) figuratively by using something that 
is associated with the attributed which is Sami’s blood. Therefore, the addressee can 
understand that the person dispraised and described as ‘stingy’ is only Sami since the 
‘blood’ belongs only to him and no one else (cf. al-Qatān). 
2.4.1.2 Kināyah from a context and medium perspective. 
Based on a context and medium perspective, kināyah according to al-Sakkākī ranges from 
taᶜrīḍ (allusion), to talwīḥ (waving), ramz (indicating), and ʾimāʾ or ʾishārah 
(gesticulation or pointing) (Kaḥīl, 2004, pp. 15-18). 
Taᶜrīḍ (Allusion): This is an expressional statement which indicates a meaning that can 
be only understood through the context. For example, ملسملا نم ملس نوملسملا نم هناسل  ‘The 
[true] Muslim is one from whose tongue [other] Muslims are safe’, which is part of a 
Hadith, means indirectly that Islam repudiates the injuriousness of others. Thus a person 
who harms others by any means is not considered a Muslim. Another example of an 
allusive expression (taᶜrīḍ) is تئج ملسﻷ كيلع رظنأو كهجو ميركلا  ‘I came to greet you and look 
at your generous face’, which is a statement said by an indigent person to his host to ask 
for help implicitly. A third example of taᶜrīḍ is the ʾāyah which informs us what the 
notables among Noah's own people said when they refused to follow him: 
 ﴿ َلاَقَف  ُﻸَمْلا  َنيِذﱠلا  ْاوُرَفَك نِم  ِهِمِْوق اَم  َكاَرَن  ﱠﻻِإ اًرَشَب اََنْلﺜ ِّم اَمَو  َكاَرَن  ََكعَبﱠتا  ﱠﻻِإ  َنيِذﱠلا  ْمُه اَنُلِذاََرأ  ِدَاب َي 
 ِْيأ ﱠرلا اَمَو ىَرَن  ْمُكَل َانَْيلَع نِم  ٍﻞْﻀَف  ْﻞَب  ْمُكﱡنُظَن  َنيِبِذاَك ﴾ ]:دوه27[ 
(But the prominent disbelievers among his people said, ‘We can see that you 
are nothing but a mortal like ourselves, and it is clear to see that only the vilest 
among us follow you. We cannot see how you are any better than we are. In 
fact, we think you are a liar) [11:27] (Abdel Haleem, 2005) 
Taᶜrīḍ here is اَم  َكاَرَن  ﱠﻻِإ اًرَشَب اَنَْلﺜ ِّم , which means indirectly that ‘we are more entitled to the 
prophecy than you’. As a result, all examples clearly show that the meaning intended in 
an allusive statement can only be understood through the context and not literally. 
Therefore, kināyah, from the context and medium perspective, is called taᶜrīḍ (allusion) 
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when its intended meaning is only reached through the context. One may also notice that 
taᶜrīḍ is much more of a whole statement (sentence) and not a word or phrase, and 
therefore, some rhetoricians see it as an independent figure of speech. However, the 
majority of rhetoricians suggest that taᶜrīḍ is a type of kināyah (for more details see al-
Qatān, 1993). 
Talwīḥ (waving): Literally, the meaning of talwīḥ (waving/displaying) is to beckon to 
someone else, especially from a distance; rhetorically, from the perspective of context 
and medium, a kināyah is called talwīḥ when it has plenty of cognitive shifts (cf. kināyah 
of an attribute) and without taᶜrīḍ. An example of talwīḥ is ردقلا دامر ريﺜك for generosity, 
because it contains several cognitive shifts in order to arrive at the intended meaning. 
Ramz (indicating/symbolizing): Unlike talwīḥ, ramz, literally, is to beckon someone else 
nearby secretively through eyes, eyebrows, lips, or mouth. Rhetorically, it is a kināyah 
that has fewer mediums, concealment of its concomitance, and without tarᶜīḍ 
(allusiveness). In other words, it is a kināyah expression that needs fewer cognitive shifts 
in order to arrive at the intended meaning. Kināyah expressions, such as ءامسلا يف هفنأ ‘his 
nose is in the sky’ for a person who is haughty, دبكلا ﻆيلغ ‘thick of liver’ (i.e. thick-livered) 
for a person who is hard-hearted, ةداسولا ضيرع or ضيرع افقلا  ‘wide of pillow’ or ‘wide of 
nape’ for a person who is stupid, and ءاﻀعﻷا بسانتم ‘proportional of limbs’ for a person 
who is intelligent do not need several cognitive shifts to arrive at the intended meaning 
as in talwīḥ. 
ʾImāʾ or ʾishārah (gesticulation or pointing): ʾIshārah (pointing), sometimes called 
ʾimāʾ (gesticulation), is when the kināyah, according to the perspective of context and 
medium, has few cognitive shifts, invovles explicit concomitance, and is not a tarᶜīḍ. An 
example of this type is the following line of poetry: 
ميمت نم ورمع نب ةملسمو     ميرك نم ميمت ولخت ﻰتم  
When will Tamīm run out of a hospitable [person]      and Muslimah bin 
ᶜAmr is from Tamīm 
Tamīm is a well-known tribe which Muslimah bin ᶜ Amr belongs to. The poet is describing 
bin ᶜAmr as a hospitable person, but instead of saying this directly, he implies it through 
ᶜAmr’s tribe. As is clear from the example, the addressees do not need several cognitive 
shifts to reach the intended meaning, and it is not expressed in a taᶜrīḍ manner. 
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2.4.2 Functions of kināyah (purposes of use) 
Kināyah, in Arabic rhetoric, serves a variety of purposes. According to ᶜAṭīyah (2004, p. 
147), kināyah is used to serve the purpose of praise and dispraise, clarity, demonstrating 
the state or quality of the attributed, and concealment. However, the most common 
functions of kināyah, particularly in the Qur’an, are as follows (ᶜAṭīyah, 2004, pp. 145-
147; al-Hajjaj, 2004, p. 97): 
Euphemism: There are some words that seem unpleasant or impertinent; through kināyah 
they are expressed in a pleasant and acceptable way, as in: 
﴿...  َْوأ ءاَج  ٌدََحأ مُكن ﱠم  َن ِّم  ِِطئاَغْلا  َْوأ  ُُمتْسََمﻻ ءاَِّسنلا ... ﴾]:ةدئاملا6[  
(… or one of you comes from the place of relieving himself or you have 
contacted women …) [Q. 5:6] (Saheeh International, 2004) 
Elegance: There are some words that can be expressed more elegantly through kināyah, 
as in: 
﴿  َونَم  ْمِه ِّلَُوي  ٍذِئَمْوَي  ُهَُرُبد  ﱠﻻِإ  ًاف ِّرََحتُم  ٍلَاتِق ِّل  َْوأ  ًازِّيََحتُم ﻰَلِإ ... ٍَةئِف:لافنﻷا] ﴾16[ 
(And whoever  turns  his  back  to  them  on  such  a  day,  unless swerving 
[as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company …) [Q. 8:16] (Saheeh 
International, 2004) 
Reminding and warning of God’s (Allah) greatness and power, as in: 
 َوُه يِذﱠلا  َقَلَخمُك ن ِّم  ٍسْفﱠن  ٍَةدِحاَو ... ﴾:فارعﻷا]189[ 
(It is He who created you from one soul …) [Q. 7:189] (Saheeh International, 
2004) 
Reminding and warning of fate, as in: 
 ﴿ ٍبََهل َتَاذ اًراَن ﻰَلْصَيَس۝  ُُهَتأَرْماَو ِبَطَحْلا ََةلا ﱠمَح:دسملا] ﴾3-4[  
(He will [enter to] burn in a Fire of [blazing] flame  ۝And his wife [as well] 
- the carrier of firewood) [Q. 111:3-4] (Saheeh International, 2004) 
Brevity as in:  
 ﴿ِنإَف  ْمﱠل  ْاوُلَعَْفت نَلَو  ْاوَُلعَْفت ... ﴾:ةرقبلا]24[  
(But if you do not - and you will never be able to …) [Q. 2:24] (Saheeh 
International, 2004) 
Hyperbole: The intention of exaggeration, as in: 
 ﴿ ِتَلَاقَو  ُدوَُهيْلا  ُدَي  ِဃّ  ٌَةلُولْغَم  ْتﱠلُغ  ْمِهيِدَْيأ  ْاوُنِعُلَو اَمِب  ْاوُلاَق  ْﻞَب  ُهَادَي  ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم  ُقِفُني  َفْيَك  َشَيءا ... ﴾
:ةدئآملا]64[  
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(And the Jews say, "The hand of Allah is chained." Chained are their hands, 
and cursed are they for what they say. Rather, both His hands are extended; 
He spends however He wills …) [Q. 5:64] (Saheeh International, 2004) 
2.5 Western rhetoric 
Western rhetoric appeared a long time before Arabic rhetoric. It was during the classical 
Greek and Roman era when this branch of scholarshiop began to flourish, namely through 
the renowned philosophers Plato (428–347 BCE), Aristotle (384–322 BCE), and Cicero 
(106–43 BCE) (Kennedy, 2001; Prosser, 2009). There is a supposed conviction that the 
pioneers of rhetoric were the two Sophists of Sicily, Corax and Tisias (Clarke, 1996, p. 
1; Enos & Fahnestock, 2001, p. 50; Johnstone, 2001, p. 260; Murphy & Katula, 2003, p. 
24). Nevertheless, the majority believe that Plato laid down the first principles of rhetoric, 
especially given that the Greek term ῥητορικός (rhētorikē) initially appeared in his work 
Gorgias (Kennedy, 2001b, p. 105; Kennedy, 1994, p. 3). 
From the early definitions of classical rhetoric we can deduce that the central focus of 
rhetoric was persuasion through discourse. One of the earliest definitions of rhetoric may 
be found in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, in which Socrates and the sophist Gorgias discuss 
the nature and moral implications of the use of rhetoric. Gorgias defines rhetoric as “the 
artificer of persuasion” used primarily for legal and judicial purposes (Plato, 1994). 
However, Plato (through the voice of Socrates) objects to this narrow definition, 
suggesting that rhetoric is “an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law 
courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well” (Plato, 
1994). While the study of rhetoric in its origin was conceived of as an activity restricted 
to public oratory and the courtroom, an awareness developed within the classical period 
that it affected all aspects of discourse (ibid.).  In the Gorgias, Plato was highly critical 
of the persuasive agenda of the Sophists and of rhetoric in general, believing it to be 
fundamentally immoral. 
Aristotle, a Greek philosopher who belonged to Plato’s Academy (Kennedy, 1994, p. 51), 
is known for his effective treatises on rhetoric, such as Rhetoricand Poetics. Through his 
treatises, Aristotle established and developed the classical concept of rhetoric. Aristotle 
considered rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic (Timmerman & Schiappa, 2010, p. 97; 
Prosser, 2009, p. 105); in other words, rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is another means 
of finding the truth. Thus, his definition of rhetoric is the ability to find the available 
means of persuasion (Aristotle, 2007, p. 37). Though Aristotle belonged to Plato’s 
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Academy, he pursued a different perspective in studying rhetoric to the extent that his 
work is recognised as the “first systematic treatise” on rhetoric (Johnstone, 2001, p. 260). 
George Kennedy notes that rhetoric in Aristotle’s view also has a theoretical element and 
in addition clearly does often “produce persuasion, speeches, and texts” (Aristotle, 2007, 
p. 16). Aristotle’s theoretical contribution to rhetoric was explicit; he introduced different 
rhetorical classifications. For example, based on the audience (the hearers of speeches), 
Aristotle suggested that there are three genres of rhetorical texts or type of speeches, 
deliberative, judicial, and epideictic (Aristotle, 2007, p. 46; Lanham, 1991, p. 164). In 
general, Aristotle’s role was influential and salient; credit goes to Aristotle for being one 
of the first scholars to discuss rhetoric from a theoretical perspective, and for his remarks 
on style, arrangement, metaphor, and simile (see 2.6.1 and 2.6.2). 
The increase of interest in rhetoric and the power of oratory, in the Roman period, appears 
to have come about also as a response to political trials and prosecutions that attracted 
public attention (Calboli & Dominik, 1997, p. 3). Therefore, the study of rhetoric was 
expanded and formalised by Roman philosophers or rhetoricians, most notably by Cicero 
and Quintilian, but under the term ‘oratory’. Lanham (1991, p. 105) defines oratory as 
“public speech” and points out that rhetoric “usually means the theory of oratory”.  For 
Cicero and his Roman contemporaries, rhetoric was an art of persuasion that could be 
effectively learned and studied by systematically breaking it down into its composite 
parts. These parts are: invention, arrangement, expression (style), memory, and delivery 
(Cicero, 1949, p. 19); they are known as the five branches/canons/offices of rhetoric. 
Cicero, Quintilian, and other Roman rhetoricians focused on the importance of these 
branches of rhetoric and regarded them as the spine of rhetorical education and therefore 
a system and guideline to produce powerful speeches and writing. However, Cicero’s 
rhetorical theory is mainly focused on the concept of ‘eloquence’; a concept which only 
appeared clearly through Cicero’s ideas. The relevance of eloquence to rhetoric, 
according to Cicero, is as follows: 
There is a scientific system of politics which includes many important 
departments. One of these departments – a large and important one – is 
eloquence based on the rules of art, which they call rhetoric” (Cicero, 1949, 
p. 13/15). 
Cicero considers eloquence as an art and therefore “two of Cicero's mature works define 
eloquence in the sense of artistic expression” (Fantham, 2001, p. 251). Furthermore, 
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Cicero defines the function of eloquence as “to speak in a manner suited to persuade an 
audience” in order to “persuade by speech” (Cicero, 1949, p. 15).  
Unlike Arabic rhetoric (see 2.2), we can notice, in general, that the definition of Western 
rhetoric has become a controversial issue. At times, rhetoric is described as an art and 
sometimes as a technique, and at other times as a faculty. The development of interest in 
language, which has caused the emergence of new disciplines in the linguistic field, such 
as semiotics, pragmatics, stylistics, and so forth, has made the definition of rhetoric even 
more controversial (Wales, 2001, pp. 344-346). One of the definitions of eloquence given 
in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is “rhetoric” (4. OED), while on the other hand 
the definition of rhetoric includes the following: “the study of principles and rules to be 
followed by a speaker or writer striving for eloquence” (1.a OED). Probably one of the 
most comprehensive books on rhetoric and its definitions and descriptions is Introduction 
to the Study of Rhetoric by Rev. Francis Cuthbert Doyle (1893). The reason for this is 
that Doyle clarifies the meaning of ‘art’ and ‘faculty’ before clarifying rhetoric. He 
indicates that faculty is “a power bestowed upon us by God, which power enables us to 
do anything whether corporal or intellectual. Thought, imagination, memory, are 
faculties”; whereas ‘art’ is “an habitual power, that is to say, a power not born with man, 
but acquired by means of a system of well-approved precepts” (ibid., p. 1). Afterwards, 
Doyle asks whether the power of persuasion is a faculty or an art, and notes the following: 
The power of persuasion may be regarded either as a faculty or as an art. As 
a faculty, it is called Eloquence, and is defined to be ‘The power of moving 
others to act, by convincing their intelligence, by moving their hearts, and by 
bending their wills’. As an art, it is called Rhetoric, and is defined to be: ‘That 
body of rules or precepts by which the faculty of eloquence is guided so as 
more securely to obtain its end’ (ibid.). 
According to Doyle, etymologically the term ‘rhetoric’ means “the art of speaking well” 
and it can be defined as the “body of rules and precepts by which the faculty of 
eloquence is guided more securely to obtain its end” (1893, p. 4). Another definition of 
rhetoric is “the art of speaking and of writing well” (ibid.). Doyle also notes that 
directing “the talent of those who have received the faculty of eloquence” is regarded as 
the purpose or objective of rhetoric (ibid.) 
However, at the beginning of the 20th century, due to the development of linguistics, as 
mentioned earlier, a renewed focus on communication and systems of discourse resulted 
in new approaches to rhetoric. In recent years, modern rhetorical theory has shifted the 
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focus onto persuasion, meaning that the study of rhetoric now comprises a number of 
key elements of speech or text. These include the intentions and agency of the speaker 
himself, the role of the audience, the discourse and symbols that underpin the situation 
and the cultural context in which the situation is addressed (Foss, 2009, p. 856; Bitzer, 
1968). In short, rhetorical theory, as Foss notes, is “[n]o longer confined to simply the 
study of speeches or discourse, it is generally viewed as the study of any kind of 
symbols”; therefore, the terms ‘rhetoric’ and ‘communication’ are often used 
interchangeably by scholars of rhetoric (Foss, 2009, p. 855). Suffice it to say that 
rhetoric, from the 20th century onwards, is no longer a discipline that stands alone by 
itself, i.e. modern rhetorical theory has become an inter-disciplinary field. In other 
words, modern rhetoric has become an important area of study in linguistics and other 
language-specific disciplines, such as literature, philosophy, and translation studies (cf. 
Campbell, 2001, pp. 517-527). 
As for the relationship of tropes or figures of speech with rhetoric, it seems that it was 
at first, specifically in classical rhetoric, slightly vague and complex in terms of their 
features, functions, and classifications (cf. Leech, 1969, p. 74). Rowe (2001, p. 125) 
points out that Quintilian reported that there was an irresolvable disagreement among 
grammarians and philosophers as to the correct number and categorization of tropes. As 
a consequence, it is not surprising that “there are names for more than 60 tropes and 
figures identified by rhetoricians from the fifth century BC through to the early Christian 
era” (ibid. p. 121). Nevertheless, tropes were initially seen as an element of style. Hence 
most of the discussions on tropes were located under the rhetorical part, which is 
concerned with expressions and word choice, known as ‘style’ (see 2.5.1). However, if 
classical rhetoric developed due to the development of linguistics and other language-
specific studies, then traditional tropes have too, ipso facto, developed (see 2.6). 
2.5.1 Classifications of Rhetoric14 
Early rhetoricians, such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, believed that rhetoric was an 
art of discourse that can educate orators to produce a successful and persuasive speech. 
Rhetoric as an art was categorized systematically into five branches known as the 
‘canons’ or ‘offices’ of rhetoric; they are called respectively: Invention, Arrangement, 
Style, Memory, and Delivery. It is said that some scholars tend to omit the last two canons 
                                                
14 For more details on the classifications of rhetoric see Doyle (1893); and for details on the canons of 
rhetoric see Porter (2001).  
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from the list; some might consider them already included in the canon of style (cf. Doyle, 
1893, p. 5) or “being matters more of nature than of art” (Clarke, 1996, p. 24). However, 
these five canons form, as a whole system, classical rhetoric theory; and according to 
classical rhetoricians, an orator should gain mastery in these rhetorical branches in order 
to produce a successful and powerful discourse that has an impact on the receiver. 
So, what are the significations of these canons? In general, invention, which is the first 
canon, refers to “discovery” (Heath, 2001) or in a more proper sense finding the 
appropriate contents, material, data, or information that support an argument and gives it 
value and essence. Doyle points out that as a faculty, invention is defined as “the power 
or ability which the speaker or the writer has of discovering those materials out of which 
he weaves his discourse”; and as an art or a part of rhetoric, invention is defined as “the 
art which supplies rules and precepts to aid the speaker or the writer to discover these 
materials” (1893, p. 6).  
The second canon of rhetoric is ‘arrangement’. It is defined as “the ordering of the 
substance of what was accomplished in the process of εΰρεσις/inventio [invention] for the 
purpose of serving the partiality/utilitas in the discourse’s aim” (Wuellner, 2001, p. 51). 
Arrangement is the process of how the contents, data, or material of an argument are put 
together. In other words, arrangement is regarded as the organizational structure of an 
argument or discourse. The cohesiveness and coherence of a discourse depend heavily on 
organizational structure. Furthermore, the standard of persuasion is also affected by the 
way the discourse is arranged. The importance of this part of rhetorical theory is noted by 
Wuellner: 
Arrangement is the necessary complement to εΰρεσις/inventio [invention] 
with focus on arrangement of thoughts or ideas, but also of the order and 
choice of words, both as to their style (λέξνς/elocutio) and their delivery 
(ϋπόκρισις/actio)—in terms of their appropriateness (aptum) for the adopted 
partiality, and in terms of the ‘parts of speech’ (ibid. p. 51). 
The third part or canon of rhetoric is ‘style’. Elocutio is the Latin term for style, and 
according to Doyle elocution or elocutio “is that part of Rhetoric which teaches the orator 
how to express in a suitable manner the thoughts which he wishes to lay before his 
audience” (1893, p. 71). Style or elocution is the part of the rhetorical theory that is related 
to the way the discourse is expressed in order to stir the emotions of the audience. Johnson 
reports that “style is defined primarily in terms of how diction, sentence structure and 
arrangement, and the use of the figures contribute to the speaker's or writer's intention to 
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move the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will in particular ways” 
(Johnson, 2001, p. 543). Accordingly, word choice, composition of sentences, and the 
usage of tropes and figures are stylistic elements that enhance the discourse and contribute 
to the impact on the audience. The aforementioned stylistic elements are mainly discussed 
under certain virtues or principles: correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and propriety 
(Rowe, 2001, p. 121). It is worth noting that the canon of style seems similar to the three 
major branches of Arabic rhetoric: ᶜilm al-maᶜānī, ᶜilm al-bayān, and ᶜilm al-badīᶜ. 
Memory is the fourth canon in Western rhetorical theory. Memory in this context is not 
used in the sense of memorizing word by word; this canon refers to the capability to 
understand, grasp, absorb, and memorize the content of a discourse. Doyle defines 
memory as “a faculty by which our soul is able to recall the ideas of things, of which the 
intelligence at some previous time has been cognisant” (1893, p. 104). On the other hand, 
Olbricht quotes a classical definition concerning the function of memory: “Memory is the 
firm retention in the mind of the matter, word and arrangement” (2001, p. 160).  
The last part of rhetoric is delivery. This canon is more related to oral than written 
discourse. It is about the techniques that a speaker can use while transmitting his speech 
through voice and gesture. Delivery, according to classical rhetoricians, “is the graceful 
regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (ibid. p. 160). 
2.6 Western (English) tropical representations 
A tropical representation (figurative expression) is presented through the use of a specific 
device known traditionally as a trope, which nowadays is known as a figure of speech. 
Etymologically, the term ‘trope’ is derived from the Greek word ‘τρόπος’ (tropos) which 
means a turn, turning or direction (OED; Doyle, 1893, p. 80; Lanham, 1991, p. 154; cf. 
Anderson, 2000, p. 121; cf. Wales, 2001, p. 398). What is meant by a ‘turn’ is that the 
meaning of a single word or phrase deviates from its literal or basic or proper sense to 
another intended meaning which is called a figurative meaning. In classical rhetoric, 
tropes were regarded merely as stylistic devices to beautify a discourse for persuasive 
reasons. Quintilian states that “the name of trope (tropos) is applied to the transference of 
expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the 
embellishments of style” (Quintilian III, 1921, p. 351); Quintilian also mentions that most 
grammarians define trope as “the transference of words and phrases from the place which 
is strictly theirs to another to which they do not properly belong” (ibid.).  
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Today, the term ‘trope’ is a synonym of ‘figure of speech’, i.e. the two terms are 
interchangeable; but in classical rhetoric, the term ‘figures of speech’ refers to a 
comprehensive category which is divided into sub-categories that includes tropes and 
other rhetorical figures (see figure 5). However, this classification, in classical rhetoric, 
was “often arbitrary and differs in different handbooks” (Kennedy, 2001b, p. 122; cf. 
Fahnestock, 1999, p. 9-15). 
 
Figure 2.5: Classifications of figures of speech made by the majority of Western classical 
rhetoricians. 
The distinction between tropes and schemes, according to classical rhetoric, is that the 
former involves a change in the meaning of words, whereas the latter involves a change 
in forms without any ‘semantic significances’ (see Müller, 2001, p. 773). A scheme, 
according to Lanham, is “[a]ny kind of figure or pattern of words … a figure of 
arrangement of words in which the literal sense of the word is not affected by the 
arrangement” (1991, p. 136)15.  
As for tropes, which is the main interest of this study, specifically metonymy, they carry 
a common feature which is a secondary meaning apart from their literal interpretation. 
Tropes include simile, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, among others, and can be 
so often used within an everyday context that they may be said to retreat into 
‘transparency’. As a result, tropical representations (figurative expressions) are 
unconsciously absorbed within our speech and are indicative of the broader culture or 
sub-culture inhabited by the speaker (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In general, traditional 
classifications of figures of speech, in addition to the confinement of tropes as merely 
embellishment devices, has dramatically changed with the revolution in linguistic studies 
                                                
15 For more information, definitions, and examples differentiating tropes and schemes, see Leech (1969), 
and on traditional figures of thought and figures of word see Wales (2001), Lanham (1991), Kennedy 
(1984), and Plett (2001). 
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in the twentieth century. The emergence of several linguistic-related disciplines, such as 
semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, and cognitive linguistics, has 
contributed significantly in reshaping our thinking towards figurative language. For 
instance, in her article, Figurative language and the semantics-pragmatics distinction, 
Anna Papafragou states the following: 
It is by now a commonplace in the pragmatic and psycholinguistic literature 
that the so-called  “figures  of  speech”  such  as  metaphor  or  metonymy  are  
not  mere  linguistic devices  serving  ornamental  or  literary  purposes  but  
correspond  to  mental “figures” grounded  in cognition  (see Lakoff 1987, 
Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, 1990, Gibbs 1994) (1996, p. 179). 
Accordingly, it is believed that works by Searle (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
Lakoff (1987), Gibbs (1994), and other inter-disciplinary scholars (such as philosophers 
and psychologists of language) have broadened the horizon of tropes – a horizon which 
considers tropes such as metonymy “to be ubiquitous aspects of language, not simply 
fringe elements” (Tyler & Takahashi, 2011, p. 598). In other words, tropes are no longer 
limited to rhetoric and literature; they are within our everyday language. Aspects of this 
horizon on metonymy, in addition to the traditional one, will be presented in this section 
after defining other central tropes, namely simile, metaphor, and synecdoche. 
2.6.1 Simile 
It is clearly noticeable that two matters, comparison and metaphor, are almost always 
associated with discussions of simile, particularly the latter. As for the former matter, the 
majority of simile definitions tend to describe simile as a form of comparison. For 
instance, Freeborn defines simile as “[a] comparison of one thing to another, especially 
as an ornament in poetry and rhetoric” (1996, p. 62); similarly, Alm-Arvius defines simile 
as “a trope which like metaphor describes one thing by comparing it with another” (2003, 
p. 125). That is true to some extent, because similes use constructional elements or what 
are known as ‘similarity indicators’, such as ‘like’ and ‘as (… as)’; but that does not mean 
using such indicators always create a simile, in spite of being a form of comparison, i.e. 
there is a literal comparison and a non-literal comparison. Consider the following 
examples: 
a- Britain is like France, they are EU countries. 
b- Britain is like a fridge in the winter season. 
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Both examples ‘a’ and ‘b’ are comparison statements, literal and non-literal comparisons 
respectively. Accordingly, example ‘a’ is not to be regarded as a simile, while ‘b’ is. The 
comparison in ‘a’ is made between two similar types of things, i.e. both Britain and France 
are countries, whereas in ‘b’ it is obviously between two totally different types, i.e. 
‘Britain’ is a country whereas a ‘fridge’ is an electrical appliance to keep food and drinks 
cool. An important issue, that has to be pointed out, is that the two different types 
compared to each other must share a salient feature or otherwise the simile will not be 
intelligible; in other words, the comparison will not be understood, for example, ‘Britain 
is like a cup’ would make no sense (see Dickins, 1998, pp. 292-295; Glucksberg, 2001, 
pp. 29-51). But the problem is what makes two things alike and how one can identify the 
similarity or shared feature(s) between each other (the likened and likened to)? This 
notion of similarity is difficult to define and highly subjective. According to Israel, et al. 
this is “a matter of construal”, which largely hinges on what exactly is being focused on, 
i.e., which attribute the comparison is based on (2004, p. 126). No wonder Dickins said 
that it might be impossible to draw a clear definite line between a literal and non-literal 
comparison (1998, p. 292). However, one of the comments made by Israel, et al. on the 
differences between literal and non-literal (simile) comparisons16 is as follows: 
Similes … [are] really  are  a  kind  of  comparison. Unlike metaphors, they 
require individuation of both source and target concepts, and an evaluation of 
what they have in common, but unlike  literal comparisons, they  are  
figurative—comparing  things  normally  felt  to  be  incomparable, typically 
using vivid or  startling  images  to  suggest  unexpected connections between 
source and target (2004, p. 124). 
Israel, et al. elaborates upon the differences by saying the following: 
As a figure of comparison, similes serve the basic rhetorical functions of 
description and evaluation … Basically, a simile is just a way of describing a 
target by asserting its similarity to some unexpected entity. The figurative 
nature of similes, however, has consequences which set them apart from 
literal comparisons. Most obviously, similes may be evocative in a way that 
literal comparisons cannot, prompting associations which go beyond 
whatever property they explicitly highlight Moreover, similes may be 
interpreted in ways which differ systematically from literal comparisons 
(2004, p. 126). 
In general, from common definitions of simile, especially in dictionaries, one can deduce 
that the term ‘simile’ denotes a trope whereby two objects are explicitly compared 
                                                
16 For more details on figurative and literal comparison see Dickins (1998, pp. 292-295), Glucksberg 
(2001, pp. 29-51), Alm-Arvius (2003, p. 126), and Niculae, (2013, pp. 110-114). 
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through the use of ‘like’ or ‘as’, such as in ‘as white as snow’ or ‘soft like baby thighs’. 
From such definitions, it may be asserted that the primary features of simile use are that 
it is explicit, and involves the presence of two identifiable objects; and that it is figurative, 
meaning that the comparison must be made between two objects that are not 
conventionally compared. The common definitions requiring the use of ‘like’ or ‘as’ 
promotes a rather restrictive understanding of the term17, as it fails to acknowledge the 
breadth of grammatical constructions in which simile might be adopted. For example, 
‘buying that car is the equivalent of throwing money down the drain’ may be construed 
as an acceptable simile in common parlance. Therefore, it suggested that they are able to 
take a range of constructions that express an explicit comparison (ibid, p. 125).  
In addition to this, to make an explicit comparison effectively, the two objects referenced 
must be “fully individualised”, meaning that both the source and target concepts must 
refer to a discrete entity (ibid, p.125). For example, in ‘she was as cool as a cucumber’ 
both ‘she’ and ‘cucumber’ are fully individuated, distinguishable, and convey the idea 
that the person is relaxed and calm18 (ibid, p.125). Furthermore, in order to classify as a 
figurative comparison, as opposed to a literal one, the two objects should not be easily 
compared, i.e. they should be fundamentally different as previously mentioned; and above 
all the comparison between the two objects should be provoking to the mind, senses, and 
imagination19.  
On the other hand, the second matter which is noticed when it comes to discussions on 
simile is its association with metaphor. Most scholars, if not all, mention metaphor in 
their discussion of simile, but normally not the other way round. Alm-Arvius’ definition 
of simile (2003, p. 125), which was mentioned earlier, is an example. Other noted scholars 
have too made this association, such as Leech (1969, p. 153/156), Leech & Short, (1981, 
                                                
17 Perhaps Wales recognised this issue and therefore provided a more or less comprehensive definition: 
“simile is a FIGURE OF SPEECH whereby two concepts are imaginatively descriptively compared: 
e.g. My love is like a red, red rose; as white as a sheet, etc. Like and as (… as) are the commonest 
connectives” (2001, p. 358; author’s emphasis and italics ). One can notice that she does note that the 
constructional elements mentioned are the commonest, which means that there are others. In addition, 
unlike with most simile definitions, metaphor was not included as part of the definition. 
18 It is important to note that some figurative comparisons cannot be rendered to another language literally 
because of culture-specific reasons (cf. Lakoff & Johnsen, 1980; Dickins, et al., 2002). For instance, the 
comparison ‘as cool as a cucumber’ would not necessarily convey the idea that the person is relaxed 
and calm in another language as it would in English. In that case, one has to find the most appropriate 
figurative expression in the TL that delivers the same features as in the ST; for that reason, in addition 
to others, this research exists.      
19 Remember that some figurative comparisons may become, over a period of time, so common that the 
literal meaning is supplanted unnoticeably; idioms are an example of this metamorphosis. 
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p. 79), Dickins (1998, pp. 292-296), Lanham (1991, p. 140), Nate (2001a, p. 511), and 
Nate (2001c, p. 741). Definition and discussion of simile has often been inextricable from 
that of metaphor, as the two tend to be defined in relation to one another. This tradition 
dates back to Aristotle himself, who notes that “the simile is also a metaphor… the 
difference is but slight” (cited in Israel, et al., 2004, p. 123; see Anderson, 2000, p. 38). 
As a result, there is a relative paucity of literature or academic debate concerning the 
attributes and function of simile. Where simile is discussed, it is frequently with a 
simultaneous focus on metaphor. This has resulted in the common misapprehension that 
simile and metaphor essentially have the same function (that of comparison) albeit 
through two different methods. That is why quite a few scholars believe that simile is an 
explicit version of metaphor; and that a simile can be transformed into a metaphor and 
vice versa. This is frequently true but not in all cases20.  
2.6.2 Metaphor 
Metaphor was regarded as a predominant trope ab ovo. Today, this thought is still 
maintained by some rhetoricians and scholars. That is clearly evident in the fact that the 
word ‘metaphorical’, which originally means an expression containing metaphor, is often 
used as a synonym for the word ‘figurative’ to denote a non-literal expression – an 
expression that contains other tropes besides metaphor. Aristotle, in his discussions on 
metaphor, believes that simile is a type of metaphor (Anderson, 2000, p. 38) and 
specifically an explicit version of metaphor (Ritchie, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, in 
Aristotle’s definition of metaphor, which is “giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to 
genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy” (cited in Punter, 2007, p. 
12), we can notice that the types of metaphor or ‘metaphorical transference’ he mentions 
belong to other tropes such as synecdoche and metonymy (Leezenberg, 2001, pp. 33-34; 
Al-Sharafi, 2004, p. 13). In other words, the first two transferences, from genus to species 
and from species to genus, apply to the trope known today as synecdoche, whereas the 
third transference, from species to species, applies to metonymy (ibid.). That is to say, 
the attention devoted to metaphor over other tropes is immemorial; nevertheless, 
Aristotle’s views on metaphor in terms to the ‘predominance’ issue cannot be used as a 
yardstick; after all, Aristotle’s concise deliberations on metaphor scarcely “add up to a 
full-fledged theory of metaphorical language” (Leezenberg, 2001, p. 31). In his 
                                                
20 See Dickins (1998) and Israel, et al (2004).   
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discussion of textual metonymy, Al-Sharafi argues that the reason behind this 
predominance of metaphor is that: 
[r]hetoricians and philosophers were interested in the poetic use of 
language they regarded metaphor as primary to the figurative domain and 
neglected metonymy because it does not involve symbolism and double-
unit signification as there is no transfer on the semantic plane. This 
observation applies to the western as well as the Arabic rhetorical 
traditions because both traditions were preoccupied with the study of 
poetic language (2004, p. 11). 
Fass (1997, p. 47) also points out that the connection involved in metaphor is across two 
conceptual domains, whereas in metonymy it is within a single domain. Moreover, Lakoff 
& Johnson (1980, pp. 36-37) believe that understanding is the primary function in 
metaphor, and though metonymy has the same understanding function to some extent, its 
primary function is referential. Accordingly, many scholars, especially in translation 
studies, have the idea that metaphor is the most important trope and that it poses a more 
problematic issue in translation than other tropes. For example, Newmark states that 
“[w]hilst the central problem of translation is the overall choice of a translation method 
for a text, the most important particular problem is the translation of metaphor” (1988, p. 
104). On the other hand, Dickins et al (2002, p. 146) say that all tropes “are of interest in 
translation”, but “metaphor is by far the most important, both because it is the most 
widespread, and because it poses the most challenging translation problems”. To a certain 
degree, theses viewpoints may be true, but the blossoming of linguistic studies after the 
mid-twentieth century, especially cognitive linguistics, yields the insight that other tropes, 
and in particular metonymy have a similar prominence to that of metaphor (see Croft & 
Cruse, 2004; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2000; Dirven & Pörings, (eds.), 2003; Goossens, 
1995), this being one of the reasons why this research has been carried out. However, 
since there are many research works, books, and papers on metaphor, we will only state 
one or two definitions. 
There are several definitions of metaphor, each one being mostly associated with its own 
theory of how metaphors are identified, understood, and used21. On the other hand, most 
of the conventional definitions of metaphor are based on some of the common features of 
metaphor: similarity, comparison, and resemblance. For example, Dickins et al (2002, p. 
147) define metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is used in a non-
                                                
21 See Ritchie (2013, pp. 3-24) 
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basic sense, this non-basic sense suggesting a likeness or analogy with another more basic 
sense of the same word or phrase”. Goatly on the other hand, provides a more 
comprehensive but complex definition, as follows: 
Metaphor occurs when a unit of discourse is used to refer unconventionally 
to an object, process or concept, or colligates in an unconventional way. And 
when this unconventional act of reference or colligation is understood on the 
basis of similarity, matching or analogy involving the conventional referent 
or colligates of the unit and the actual unconventional referent or colligates 
(1997, p. 8). 
Goatly also provides another definition of metaphor, but this time from a cognitive 
perspective; he states that metaphor “can be briefly defined as thinking of one thing (A) 
as though it were another thing (B), and linguistically this will result in an item of 
vocabulary or larger stretch of text being applied in an unusual or new way”22 (2007, p. 
11). 
There are several theories of metaphor, but the turning point in metaphor studies probably 
occurs with the cognitivists. At first, they considered metaphor as a mode of perception, 
and later on as a mode of thought, rather than a rhetorical device, and from here 
conceptual theories of metaphor began to emerge. For example, Burke defines metaphor 
in terms of perspective as “a device for seeing something in terms of something else” 
(1969, p. 502; author’s italics), which is quite similar to Goatly’s definition above. The 
conceptual theory of metaphor became more mature through George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson in their work Metaphors We Live By (1980). According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
metaphors are deeply ingrained in our lives without us noticing them. This can be 
illustrated by the fact that metaphors are very often used in the attempt to define metaphor 
without realising it. For example, terms such as ‘device’ and ‘vehicle’ which literally refer 
to a ‘tool’ or ‘machine’ are used unconsciously in defining metaphor (see Ritchie, 2013, 
pp. 5-7). Lakoff and Johnson believe that metaphors have such a great influence on our 
lives that not only do they form our communications, but they also form the way we think 
and act. The contrast between the traditional and contemporary views of metaphor are 
summed up by Lakoff and Johnson as follows: 
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the 
rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. 
                                                
22 Goatly notes that the term ‘apply’ in his definition “covers various pragmatic and semantic relations 
such as reference, modification, predication and complementation of prepositions” (Goatly, 2007, p. 
11). 
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Moreover, metaphor is typieully [sic] viewed as characteristic of language 
alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most 
people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have 
found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in 
language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms 
of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature 
(1980, p. 3). 
Since this research is related to the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an, it is worth 
noting that Almisned (2001) in his research, Metaphor in the Qur'an: an assessment of 
three English translations of Suurat Al-Hajj, points out that metaphorical expressions 
along with other rhetorical expressions are one of the basic features of the Qur’anic text. 
Hence they should not be neglected while rendering the Qur’an into English (2001, p. 
145). Almisned believes that some Qur’anic features cannot be transferred to the TT, and 
therefore “some translations do not have the same impact as the source text in terms of 
metaphorical usage” (ibid, p. 1). Consequently, explaining or paraphrasing the 
metaphorical expression into English is considered the most appropriate way (Ali, et al., 
2012) to avoid loss of the intended meaning. In addition, Almisned believes that the 
ultimate approach to translating the Qur’an into English is by having an Arabic native 
speaker alongside an English native speaker (2001, pp. 328-331). 
2.6.2 Synecdoche 
The term ‘synecdoche’ is derived from the Greek/Latin term “συνεκδοχή/ intellectio” 
(Anderson, 2000, p. 112; Rowe, 2001, p. 127) which according to Lanham (1991, p. 148) 
means “understanding one thing with another”. Synecdoche, as described by Quintilian, 
“is adapted to give variety to language by letting us understand the plural from the 
singular, the whole from a part, a genus from the species, something following from 
something preceding, and vice versa” (cited in Geeraerts, 2010, p. 6; Murphy, 2003, p. 
220). Traditionally, synecdoche is defined as a substitution where the part stands for the 
whole, genus stands for species, or vice versa (Lanham, 1991, p. 148), for example, 
‘wheels’ for a ‘car’ or ‘creature’ for ‘people’. To put it simply, synecdoche can be 
considered a trope that references a concept by indicating a part or aspect of it. Most 
theorists, however, have suggested that the most obvious case of synecdoche involves a 
part-whole relationship. Nonetheless, it seems that there is a considerable amount of 
confusion,  and obscurity as to both the nature of synecdoche and its relationship to other 
closely related tropes, and particularly metonymy. It is noticed that very often synecdoche 
is either neglected or assimilated to metonymy, and at times is regarded as a subtype of 
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metonymy. Nerlich (2010, pp. 297-298) and Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 122) point out that 
the confusion between synecdoche and metonymy is also mirrored by that between 
synecdoche and metaphor, while the Rhétorique générale of the Groupe de Liège 
considered synecdoche as the master trope “on which metaphor and metonymy both 
depend”23. On account of this, considerable debate exists regarding the definition of 
synecdoche and the way in which it ought to be classified in relation to other related 
tropes; some scholars regard synecdoche as a trope that exists apart from metonymy, 
whereas others regard it simply as a subcategory of metonymy. In his paper, 
Distinguishing Synecdoche from Metonymy, Seto claims that the reason behind this 
confusion is due to the ambiguity of the definitions conventionally employed, and 
therefore it is sometimes difficult to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy or even 
metaphor (1999, p. 91). He ascribes this ambiguousness to the lack of success in 
understanding the ‘whole’ and ‘part’ notions distinctly. Seto argues that the 
comprehension of metonymy, i.e. understanding the differences between ‘taxonomy’ and 
‘partonomy’, leads to the disambiguation of ‘whole’ and ‘part’, and ultimately clarifying 
the differences between metonymy and synecdoche (ibid. pp. 92-95). The difference 
between taxonomy and partonomy, as Seto describes it, is as follows: 
[T]axonomy is a ‘kind-of’ relation while partonomy is a ‘part-of’ relation. In 
other words, taxonomy is the relation between a more comprehensive 
category and a less comprehensive one, while partonomy is the relation 
between an entity and its parts, such as the relation between a table and its 
legs (ibid. p. 93)24. 
In consequence of this, Seto disagrees with traditional views that synecdoche is 
characterized by a semantic or referential relationship of inclusion, and he believes that 
synecdoche is characterized only by semantic inclusion, i.e. he considers that the 
referential relationship is a feature belonging to metonymy and not synecdoche. 
Therefore, Seto removes from synecdoche its long well-known trademark, the part-whole 
relationship, and subsumes it under the metonymic qualities, leaving only the genus-
species relationship for synecdoche. Relying on his postulation of taxonomy and 
partonomy, Seto, therefore, defines synecdoche as “a conceptual transfer phenomenon 
based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive 
                                                
23 For more details on the Groupe de Liège’s theory see (Schofer & Rice, 1977, pp. 130-133; Al-Sharafi, 
2004, pp. 40-45). 
24 For more details on Seto’s theory of taxonomy and partonymy in clarifying the differences between 
metonymy and synecdoche see Seto (1999, pp. 91-120) and Nerlich (2010, pp. 306-316). 
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category”, while metonymy is “a referential transfer phenomenon based on the 
spatiotemporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in 
the (real) world” (1999, pp. 91-92).  
Excluding the well-known trademark of synecdoche, the part-whole relationship, and 
subsuming it under the metonymic qualities, seems to be a trend followed by other 
modern linguists, particularly cognitive linguists, and especially those imitating or 
influenced by Lakoff and Johnson’s proposition that our conceptual system is on the 
whole metaphorical. There are, however, other scholars and linguists who disagree with 
this trend; some even go further to exclude a metonymic character, container for 
contained, and subsume it under the synecdochic qualities as in Schofer & Rice’s (1977) 
attempt in reclassifying tropes. 
The disagreement over characterising and defining synecdoche has had an impact of the 
analysis of other aspects of synecdoche, mainly its types, but also its function in discourse 
(cf. Nerlich & Clarke, 1999 ). Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, the new trend 
represented by cognitive linguists does not include the ‘part-whole’ relationship. The 
following classifications of synecdoche are made by two different approaches, bearing in 
mind that this is not at all exhaustive: 
A- The classification made by Seto (1999), who we can consider as an advocate of 
the new trend. His classification of types of synecdoche is as follows (cited with 
examples in Nerlich, 2010, pp. 311-312): 
1- Genus for species: for example, “man (‘a human being’ → a male)”. 
2- Species for genus: for example, “to earn one’s daily bread (→ food)”. 
3- Type for token: for example, “This jacket is our best-selling item (→ 
this type of jacket)”. 
4- Token for type: for example, “We both drive a Honda Accord (→ two 
tokens of the same type of car)”. 
B- Classification made by Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 142). Their classification of 
types of synecdoche with examples is as follows: 
1- Physical (or spatial) synecdoches: 
a- Physical part for the whole (head for body). 
b- Physical attribute for the whole (black for Negro). 
c- Object or physical attribute for possessor (crown for king). 
d- Material or physical attribute for object (steel for sword). 
e- Container for contained (stein for beer, Paris for Parisians). 
2- Conceptual (or abstract) synecdoches: 
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a- Attribute for possessor (youth for young people). 
b- Singular for plural (man for men). 
c- Species for genus (lion for all animals). 
d- Genus for species (animal for bear). 
e- Common name for proper name (the Trojan for Aeneas). 
It is worth noting that even if the ‘part-whole’ relationship is excluded from synecdoche, 
it seems that it remains an important trope that stands by itself. Nerlich and Clarke point 
out the following: 
In conclusion one can say that the genus-for-species synecdoche plays a vital 
part in language and life. On the conceptual  level  it reflects  and  exploits  
the  order  in our  categories,  on  the  linguistic  or structural  level  it exploits 
semantic  relations,  and on the  communication level it brings order into texts 
and into social relations (1999 , p. 210). 
2.6.3 Metonymy 
As we can notice from the previous sub-sections, the subject of metonymy has been 
broached in several contexts, particularly metaphor and synecdoche, which proves that 
the boundaries between metonymy and its fellow tropes are narrow, especially that with 
synecdoche. It goes without saying that ancient rhetoric as a discipline has played a 
significant role in literary and language studies, namely in tropes or what are known today 
as figures of speech. In spite of that, the features of metonymy were most of the time 
discussed under metaphor, as in Aristotle’s definition of metaphor (see section 2.6.2). It 
is believed that the first definition of metonymy, as a trope on its own, appeared in the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium: “a trope that takes its expression from near and close things 
and by which we can comprehend a thing that is not denominated by its proper word” 
[Koch’s translation] (Koch, 1999, p. 141). ‘Metonymy’ as a term is derived from the 
Greek term ‘μετωνυμία’ (Latin: denomination), and means the “[u]se of one term (of a 
related object or concept) for another, e.g. substitution of Greece for Greeks, container 
for contents” (Anderson, 2000, p. 77). Since then, metonymy has been thought of as a 
concept in a ‘stand for’ relationship based on association or contiguity between two 
referents, the literal word/phrase used (source) and its intended meaning (target). An 
example is, ‘10 Downing Street’, which is the locale address for any British prime 
minister, and more importantly, is his/her official residence and office where crucial 
decisions concerning Britain, whether they are domestic or international, are made. 
Therefore, based on this association or contiguity between the locale and the prime 
minister/British government it may be said that ’10 Downing St.’ (source) is a metonymy 
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that stands for the British prime minister or government (target). Another example is 
‘table five’ in ‘table five wants the bill’, which means the person(s) sitting at table five 
and obviously not the table itself or the person(s) sitting at other tables; hence ‘table five’ 
(the source) in this sentence stands for the person(s) sitting at it (target). This vision of 
metonymy is known as the ‘stand for’ relationship’ or ‘substitutional theory’, where 
someone/something stands for or replaces another person/thing. This prolonged portrayal 
of metonymy as a referential phenomenon remained constant over the past years. Geeraets 
(2010, p. 27) provides a more or less similar definition to the one in Rhetorica ad 
Herennium; he sees metonymy as “a semantic link between two readings of a lexical item 
that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in 
each of those readings”. Geeraerts makes clear that the ‘contiguity’ relationship which 
metonymy is based on “should not be understood in a narrow sense as referring to spatial 
proximity only, but broadly as a general term for various associations in the spatial, 
temporal, or causal domain”.  
However, in the last 30 years or so new disciplines have arisen and became integrated 
within the linguistic field. As a result, studies of tropes have gradually shifted from the 
fields of literature and rhetoric to linguistics, which has led to the emergence of various 
definitions and characterizations of metonymy, each one approaching metonymy from a 
different perspective or revolves around a specific aspect. Yule’s  (2010, p. 121) analysis, 
for example, revolves around the relationship between words which form metonymy. He 
claims that the relatedness of meaning found in metonymy relies on “a close connection 
in everyday experience”; these connections can be built on a “container–contents relation 
(bottle/water, can/juice), a whole–part relation (car/wheels, house/roof) or a 
representative–symbol relationship (king/crown, the President/the White House).” On the 
basis of the assumption that relations in metonymy are formed through ‘everyday 
experience’, one might assume that metonymies are conventionalised and hence easy to 
comprehend. This assumption is nevertheless misleading. For example, ‘Have you 
finished your Halliday?’ or “The strings are too quiet” for a person who is not familiar 
with the linguistic field or orchestral music respectively would be baffling. Therefore, 
Yule states that comprehending such expressions “often depends on context, background 
knowledge and inference” (ibid.). 
In his attempt to distinguish metonymy from synecdoche, Seto (1999, p. 91) focuses on 
the terms ‘contiguity’ and ‘whole-part’. He defines metonymy as “a referential transfer 
phenomenon based on the spatio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker 
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between an entity and another in the (real) world”. Seto points out that the term ‘closely 
associated’ that appears in a typical definition of metonymy needs to be clarified or 
otherwise it will be too broad and may include other tropes such as metaphor or any “other 
rhetorical terms where meaning transfer takes place”. This is true, simply because the 
association in itself is not enough; all figurative expressions in metonymy, metaphor or 
synecdoche have an associative relationship with their literal senses. The differences 
between them is the grounds that their relations rely on, i.e. the relationship between the 
figurative expression and its literal sense is based on either contiguity (metonymy), 
resemblance (metaphor), or inclusion (synecdoche). The terms ‘contiguity’, ‘part’, and 
‘whole’, which commonly appear in discussions on metonymy or synecdoche are, 
according to Seto, often miscomprehended; hence the confusion between metonymy and 
synecdoche25. He claims that this confusion is due to a misunderstanding of the 
differences between partonomy and taxonomy (see 4.33). Both partonomy (also called a 
part-whole relation, part-of relation, or meronymy relation) and taxonomy (also called a 
hyponymy relation, kind-of relation, or class-subclass relations) deal with semantic 
relations based on the senses of expressions through a hierarchical system26. The former 
is “a sense relation between expressions such that the entities denoted by one expression 
represent parts of the entity denoted by another e.g., blade/knife. The relationship can be 
paraphrased as X is a part of Y, thus a blade is a part of a knife” (Delahunty & Garvey, 
2010, p. 271). The latter is “a sense relation between expressions such that the entities 
denoted by one expression are included among the entities denoted by another, e.g., 
teaspoon/spoon. The relationship can be paraphrased as X is a kind of Y, thus a teaspoon 
is a kind of spoon” (ibid, p. 270). According to Seto, metonymic relations are understood 
through partonomy and synecdochical relations through taxonomy. Based on this 
distinction, Seto develops his classifications of synecdochical and metonymic relations.  
However, the ambiguity of the term ‘closely associated’, as Seto claims, is beginning to 
fade, as recent definitions tend to include the type of association or contiguity. For 
example, Bussmann (1996, p. 746), in his definition of metonymy, points out three types 
of semantic connections associated with metonymy: causal, spatial, or temporal. He 
defines metonymy as “[t]he replacement of an expression by a factually related term. The 
                                                
25 The confusion between metonymy and synecdoche that Seto refers to is that synecdoche is frequently 
considered a subtype of metonymy which is characterised by a ‘whole’ and ‘part’ relationship. 
26 For more recent details on ‘taxonomy’ and ‘partonomy’ see Khoo & Na (2006), Delahunty & Garvey 
(2010), and Hahn (2013). 
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semantic connection is of a causal, spatial, or temporal nature and is therefore broader 
than synecdoche, but narrower than metaphor.” Geeraerts (2010, p. 27) holds a similar 
view, and stresses that the contiguity notion associated with metonymy “should not be 
understood in a narrow sense as referring to spatial proximity only, but broadly as a 
general term for various associations in the spatial, temporal, or causal domain.” Further 
to the aforementioned metonymic relations, Preminger and Brogan (1993, p. 783) add to 
their definition of metonymy the notion ‘conceptual’, which alludes to the belief that 
metonymy is not merely a referential phenomenon, but also a conceptual one: metonymy 
is “a figure in which one word is substituted for another on the basis of some material, 
causal, or conceptual relation.”  
It is believed that metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon was first introduced into 
cognitive linguistics by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their work Metaphors We 
Live By (1980). Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual theory touched upon the concept of 
metonymy, and though it was mainly focused on metaphor, it nonetheless provoked 
renewed interest in metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson believe that metonymy, like 
metaphor, is not a matter of a name of a thing, nor is it a purely linguistic device to 
substitute one term for another; metonymies, like metaphors, are deeply embedded in our 
conceptual system without us noticing them, and they therefore influence the way we 
think, act, and communicate. Accordingly, the use of metonymic expressions is mainly a 
reflection of general conceptual metonymies (Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 18) which 
are gained from our experience, physical or causal, in the real world (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980, p. 39). For example, using ‘Hiroshima’ as an expression for the atomic bombing in 
WWII (Place for Event) is, according to Lakoff and Johnson, “grounded in our experience 
with the physical location of events” (ibid, also cf. Truszczyńska, 2003); or for instance, 
using the term ‘Shakespeare’ as an expression for a literary work done by William 
Shakespeare “is based on the causal (and typically physical) relationship between a 
producer and his product”, and so on. Lakoff and Johnson’s discussion of metonymy is 
basically focused on the types of metonymic relations and on the differences between the 
concepts of metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson define metonymy as “using 
one entity to refer to another that is related to it” (ibid. p. 35) which enables us “to 
conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to some-thing else” (ibid. p. 39).   
On the whole, cognitive linguistics has participated quite adequately in the studies of 
metonymy, giving rise to a number of new definitions. For example, Evans (2007, p. 141) 
defines metonymy as “[a] conceptual operation in which one entity, the  vehicle, can be 
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employed in order to identify another entity, the target, with which it is associated”. 
Another, more or less similar, definition is provided by Radden and Kövecses (1999, p. 
21): “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, 
provides a mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized 
cognitive model”. Lakoff (1987) approaches metonymic contiguity and the relations 
between the source/vehicle and target through his theoretical framework of Idealized 
Cognitive Models (ICMs). He believes that the aforementioned relations should belong 
to the same ICM in terms of metonymy, whereas in metaphor, they belong to two different 
ICMs (1987, p. 78). According to Lakoff, his theoretical constructs was inspired by 
Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor and metonymy (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), 
Fillmore's frame semantics (Fillmore, 1982), Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces 
(Fauconnier, 1985), and Langacker's cognitive grammar (Langacker, 1986). In his 
detailed account of ICMs, Cienki points out the following (cf. Evans, 2007, p. 104; Croft 
& Cruse, 2004, p. 7-39): 
ICMs are proposed as a way in which we organize knowledge, not as a direct 
reﬂection of an objective state of affairs in the world, but according to certain 
cognitive structuring principles. The models are idealized, in that they involve 
an abstraction, through perceptual and conceptual processes, from the 
complexities of the physical world. At the same time, these processes impart 
organizing structure – for example, in the form of conceptual categories. The 
use of models in cognitive processing that are idealized … makes sense from 
an evolutionary perspective. They provide an advantageous means of 
processing information because they are adapted to human neurobiology, 
human embodied experience, human actions and goals, and human social 
interaction (2007, p. 176). 
Lakoff (1987, p. 284) itemizes the following as ﬁve types of ICMs: image-schematic, 
propositional, metaphoric, metonymic, and symbolic. However, regardless of various 
terms used in different cognitive theories that correspond to ICM, such as ‘domain’, 
‘schema’ (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), ‘frame’ (Blank, 1999), ‘domain matrix’ (Croft, 2003), 
or ‘scenario’ (Panther & Thornburg, 1999),  they generally concur that metonymy 
involves the exploitation of relations inside one domain, while metaphor involves the 
integration of two disparate domains27 (Nerlich & Clarke, 2003, p. 577). 
Within cognitive linguistics, but from a slightly different perspective, Barcelona provides 
an interesting definition of metonymy, which, according to him, is a ‘schematic 
                                                
27 For more critical discussions on the role of domains in metaphor and metonymy see Panther & Radden 
(eds., 1999), Dirven & Pörings (eds., 2003), and Burkhardt & Nerlich (eds., 2010).   
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definition’. He defines metonymy as “an asymmetrical mapping of a conceptual domain, 
the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional 
domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” 
(Barcelona, 2013, p. 15; cf. Barcelona, 2010, p. 272; Barcelona, 2003, p. 246). Barcelona 
claims that his definition is a “consensus, uncontroversial cognitive linguistic definition” 
(2012, p. 254). Barcelona (2013; 2012; 2010) explains some terms in his definition; for 
example, the term ‘mapping’, which is equivalent to ‘conceptual projection’, pertains to 
the point that the source domain is linked to the target domain by imposing a perspective 
on it. Barcelona further points out that in metonymy the mapping is asymmetrical, 
whereas in metaphor it is symmetrical. As for the notion ‘functional domain’, Barcelona 
indicates that it is similar to Fillmore’s ‘frame’ (1982) and Lakoff’s ‘ICM’ (1987). 
Barcelona adopts Fauconnier’s (1997, p. 11) ‘pragmatic function’, in which the source 
domain is linked to/mapped onto the target domain within the same functional frame by 
means of a pragmatic function. For example, diners are matched with the food they order 
as in ‘The kebab wants an orange juice’, or authors are matched with the books they write. 
This type of mapping, according to Fauconnier (1997, p. 11), “plays an important role in 
structuring our knowledge base and provides means of identifying elements of one 
domain via their counterparts in the other”. As a result, pragmatic function mapping, in 
language use, enables an entity to be recognized through its counterpart (ibid.) as in the 
‘kebab’ example mentioned above, when the waitress uses the type of food (kebab) to 
identify the diner who ordered it. Barcelona’s concept is something of a nutshell 
containing the prominent features of other cognitive scholars in terms of metonymy. 
Regardless of the variety of definitions of metonymy, it is obvious that the essence of 
metonymy is the contiguity/association between the metonymic referents, i.e. the 
contiguity between the literal and figurative expressions. 
2.6.3.1 Classifications of Metonymy 
Classifications of metonymy have increased over the past years, especially with the 
development of linguistics. Doyle (1893, pp. 81-82), in his book An Introduction to the 
Study of Rhetoric, lists six types of metonymic relations: 
 Cause for effect (e.g. “He lives by the labour of his hands.”) 
 Effect for cause (e.g. “Don’t get hot under the collar!’ for ‘Don’t get angry!” 
(example cited in Chandler, 2007, p. 130)). 
 Sign for signified (e.g. “He left the plough, to wield the sceptre.”) 
 Container for contained (e.g. “He made the kettle boil.”) 
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 Abstract for concrete (e.g. “Beauty is usually vain.”) 
 Place for thing (e.g. “He was carried to the house in a sedan.”  
Schofer & Rice (1977, p. 139) suggest the following metonymic relations: 
 Cause for effect 
 Effect for cause 
 Agent for instrument (e.g. “Truman destroyed Hiroshima (the person ordering the 
act for the planes and bombs that performed it)”) 
 Instrument for action (e.g. “Les Fords ont levé le pied (the cars for their drivers) 
/ Il a le pinceau délicate (the painter's brush for his manner of painting)”) 
 Action for instrument (e.g. “vengeance for sword”) 
 Agent for action (e.g. “He pulled a Houdini. (the magician for the disappearing 
act he performed)”) 
 Action for agent (e.g. “Voilà la belle Hélène, l’infamie des Grecs (the crime for 
the criminal)”) 
 Producer for product (e.g. Have you finished your Chomsky. “the author for his 
work”) 
 Product for producer (e.g. “Computers lose 10 points on Wall Street (the product 
for the company that produces it)”) 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) subsume the ‘part for whole’ relationship under metonymy, 
which traditional rhetoricians consider a type of synecdoche. The conceptual theory 
proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has influenced several linguists, and since then most 
linguists have followed Lakoff and Johnson in subsuming ‘part for whole’ under 
metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 38) list the following types of metonymy with 
examples: 
 Part for the whole (e.g. “We don't hire longhairs.”) 
 Producer for product (e.g. “He bought a Ford.”) 
 Object used for user (e.g. “The buses are on strike.”) 
 Controller for controlled (e.g. Nixon bombed Hanoi.”) 
 Institution for people responsible (e.g. I don't approve of the government's 
actions.”) 
 Place for Institution (e.g. Wall Street is in a panic.”) 
 Place for event (e.g. Pearl Harbor still has an effect on our foreign policy.”) 
On the other hand, Chandler (2007, p. 130), who believes that the best definition of 
metonymy is “the evocation of the whole by a connection”, argues that metonymy is 
“based on substitution by adjuncts (things that are found together) or on functional 
relationships.”  Chandler lists the following metonymic substitutions: effect for cause, 
object for user, substance for form (such as “plastic for credit card” or “lead for bullet”), 
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place for event, place for person, place for institution, and institution for people. In 
addition, Chandler notes that “Part–whole relationships are sometimes distinguished as a 
special kind of metonymy or as a separate trope”. Chandler also mentions three types of 
metonymy identified by Lakoff and Johnson: producer for product, object for user, and 
controller for controlled (ibid, p. 130).  
Alm-Arvius (2003, pp. 162-163) identifies several types of metonymic relations under 
what she calls ‘metonymic shortcuts’. According to Alm-Arvius, the most common types 
of metonymic shifts or shortcuts, with examples, are as follows: 
 Place/region—people (e.g. “church, country, England, house, room, school”) 
 Time/period—people (e.g. “the Middle Ages, the nineteenth century, the 
Renaissance”) 
 Place—activity (e.g. “church, college, market, school, theatre, university”) 
 People—activity (e.g. “class, government, meeting, party”) 
 Physical thing(s)—activity (e.g. “bed, football, lunch, meal, table, washing”) 
 People/thing—time (e.g. “the bomb, Hitler, Napoleon, the Vikings”) 
 Activity—establishment (e.g. “business, church, school, theatre”) 
 Activity—product (e.g. “building, composition, drawing, improvement, 
organisation, painting, shopping, speech, writing”) 
 Substance—product (e.g. “glass, iron, linen, marble, paper, tin”) 
 Substance—type of (e.g. “brandy, tea, whisky, wine”) 
 Producer—product (e.g. “Channel, Dior, Ford, Mozart, Porsche, Shakespeare, 
Turner”) 
 Feeling—object of (e.g. “ambition, curiosity, love”) 
 Sense modality—sense impression (e.g. “sight, smell, taste”) 
 Container—contents (e.g. “bottle, box, casserole, cup, glass, purse” 
 Body part—part of article of clothing (e.g. “arm, breast, leg”) 
 About experiencer—about situation or experience (e.g. “angry person—angry 
days/discussion, happy person—Happy New Year, sad person—sad event”) 
 Activity 1—activity 2 (e.g. “cry, synonym of either weep or shout, breathe 
(deeply) or not breathe a word”) 
However, Alm-Arvius points out that many of the foregoing metonymic shifts are 
“generally productive and predictable” due to their common use, and therefore “they can 
be considered cases of regular polysemy” (ibid, p. 163).  
Seto (1999), on the other hand, provides a fairly similar typology of metonymy to that 
provided by some cognitive linguists but under a different categorisation. Seto believes 
that the types of metonymy depend on three major types of entity – spatial, temporal, and 
abstract – and the types of reference these involve (ibid, p. 98). Accordingly, Seto 
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subcategorises the most common types of metonymy under these three major types of 
entity. For example, the ‘whole-part’ relationships (object-component, organisation-
member, and object-material), ‘container-contents’, and other spatial relations referred to 
as ‘adjacency’ are subcategorised under ‘spatial entities’ or ‘spatial metonymies’. Under 
‘temporal entities’ come the ‘whole event-subevent’ type and ‘preceding-ensuing 
situation’. As for abstract entities, these include ‘object-property’ relations such as 
‘abstract for concrete’ (for further details see Seto, 1999).  
2.6.3.2 Functions of metonymy (purposes of use) 
Most if not all linguists agree that the primary function of metonymy is ‘referential’. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 36) point out that in addition to the referential function, 
metonymy also “serves the function of providing understanding”. However, what we 
mean by the term ‘function’ here is the purpose or reason for using metonymy. In other 
words, why do we use metonymy, or what do we gain by using metonymy? 
In classical rhetoric, metonymy, as well as other tropes, are mainly seen as stylistic 
devices to beautify a discourse for persuasive reasons. However, each trope has its 
distinctive features which enable it to serve specific purposes. In other words, metonymy, 
like other tropes, is not used randomly, but to achieve (a) specific purpose(s). Rubba 
(2006) suggests that metonymy serves several purposes, such as clarification, 
abbreviation, pragmatic focus, attribution or mitigation of credit or blame, and lexical 
operation of zero derivation. The purpose of clarification of identity of a referent, 
according to Rubba, is when metonymy is used to pinpoint a specific referent when 
confusion is possible. For example, a waitress distinguishes a specific person by his/her 
order, as in ‘The sheesh kebab wants an extra portion of chips’. Another purpose of 
metonymy is abbreviation. That is to say, metonymy can express or deliver a meaning to 
the addressee by using fewer words, and in some cases one word instead of a whole 
phrase; for example, ‘White House’ instead of ‘President/Administration of the United 
States of America’ or ‘Dickens’ instead of ‘the literary works of the novelist Charles 
Dickens’. Another purpose is pragmatic focus. In other words, metonymy can be used to 
focus on or highlight a specific part, as in the Part for the Whole relation, in order to 
provide understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 37). For example, the term ‘wheels’ 
or ‘ride’ is used metonymically for a car, because it is either an indispensable part of the 
car or the purpose of the car respectively. Rubba (2006) also points out that attribution or 
mitigation of credit or blame is another purpose of metonymy. This type of metonymic 
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expression occurs when we would like to generalise praise or blame, i.e. shift the 
responsibility for something to someone else. For example, when we say that ‘The 
planning committee rejected my application’, it does not mean that all members of the 
planning committee have rejected the application; but since the committee’s approval or 
rejection is based on a majority vote, then any decision, approval or rejection, is referred 
to the body which represents its members. Accordingly, the blame, in the previous 
example, is shifted from the members of the planning committee to the body itself.  
Another example is when we say ‘Harry Truman bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki’; 
though the bombs were not dropped by Truman himself, the blame is shifted to him 
because he was the one who ordered the bombing. The final purpose of metonymy stated 
by Rubba is ‘metonymy as a lexical operation of zero derivation’ or what is known as 
“conversion or functional shift”. This means that metonymy sometimes involves a 
functional shift of a word from one class (verb, noun) to another class (noun, verb). 
According to Rubba (2006), “when the metonymy becomes familiar and 
conventionalized, the new meaning is part of our mental ‘dictionary entry’ for that word.  
To illustrate this, Rubba gives an example of the word ‘butter’ in “to butter toast”; the 
nominal meaning of butter, which is a substance often spread over a toast of bread, is 
converted into a verbal meaning to stand for the action of ‘spreading’ the butter on the 
toast. The literal expression for the metonymic expression ‘to butter toast’ would be ‘to 
spread butter on toast’. So in this case, the noun ‘butter’ is converted to a verb. 
Al-Salem (2008, pp. 53-58), in her PhD thesis, provides six functions (purposes of use) 
of metonymy: fantasy activation, interest arousal, achieving specific goals, expansion, as 
a basis for images, and brevity. The critical issue in Al-Salem’s discussion on the 
functions of metonymy is that she does not point out whether she is dealing with the 
English metonymy or the Arabic trope majāz mursal. 
2.7 Metonymy, synecdoche, kināyah, and majāz mursal 
From the discussion on Arabic rhetoric, we can notice Arabic tropes are discussed under 
the discipline called ᶜilm al-bayān (science of elocution). The main common feature 
between kināyah, tashbīh, istiᶜārah, and majāz mursal is that they all use expressions to 
indicate a meaning other than its true/proper (literal) meaning. The interesting part of this 
branch is that kināyah and tashbīh stand as separate tropes whereas istiᶜārah and majāz 
mursal are categorised under a sub-subcategory called majāz lughawī (lingual 
figurativeness). What differentiates istiᶜārah from majāz mursal pivots on the semantic 
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relationship between the proper and improper meaning, i.e. the literal and the figurative 
meaning, of the utterances; that is to say, if the semantic relationship is based on similarity 
then the figurative expression is considered istiᶜārah, and if not then it is majāz mursal. 
On the other hand, kināyah has nothing to do with similarity or non-similarity in the 
utterances used in an expression (cf. Abu Deeb, 1979, p. 165). Some rhetoricians claim 
that kināyah can be distinguished from other tropes (istiᶜārah and majāz mursal) in that 
the utterance used can denote both meanings, the literal and the figurative. That is to say, 
in addition to the figurative expression/the intended meaning of the kināyah, “the 
language of it does correspond to reality” (Larkin, 1995, p. 87). Larkin comments on the 
language of the kināyah and the possibility of it denoting both literal and figurative 
meanings are: 
The language of discourse, as a language, is doing exactly what is supposed 
to do. Ostensibly, the agreement between language and reality is undisturbed. 
The only thing is that the meaning intended is not ultimately the one conveyed 
by the words, but rather the one that is reasoned to from the meaning of those 
words (ibid.) 
Though this may seem ostensibly true, it is not always so, even if the kināyah sounds 
idiomatic. Firstly, there are kināyah expressions, as pointed out in the section on kināyah 
(section 2.4), where it is impossible to denote the literal meaning. Secondly, the utterance 
in a kināyah is used to entail something semantically concomitant with it and not the 
utterance’s true meaning. Moreover, it is used to attest the meaning intended. Also, the 
purport of the utterance, in kināyah, is of a great importance because it leads the addressee 
to the intended meaning. For example, the expression ‘so-and-so is long of sword-
scabbard’ leads us to understand that the person is of a tall stature, because a short person 
would not wear a long sword-scabbard. In other words, the entailed meaning of ‘a long 
sword-scabbard’ is shifted to the non-mentioned notion, which is tallness in stature. 
Table 2.1: Typical definitions of metonymy, synecdoche, kināyah, majāz mursal, and 
istiᶜārah. 
 
Metonymy “metonymy is the transfer of the name of a thing to something else that is closely associated with it - such as cause and effect, container and 
contained, possessor and possessed, and so on” (Bredin, 1984, p. 45). 
 
Synecdoche “A kind of semantic change … that involves a part-to-whole relationship in which a term with more comprehensive meaning is used for a less 
comprehensive meaning or vice versa” (Campbell & Mixco, 2007, p. 199). 
 
 
Kināyah 
“Kināyah is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a 
specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known 
(original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he opts for a meaning 
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(word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to the true meaning in order to 
allude to and attest the meaning intended” (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my 
translation). 
 
Majāz 
mursal 
“Majāz mursal is the usage of a word in its improper meaning due to a non-
similarity relationship (between the proper and improper meaning) with a  
contextual cue that precludes the proper meaning, such as in: ‘I drank the 
Euphrates’ water’” (Al-Asmar, 1998, p. 74; my translation). 
 
Istiᶜārah 
al-Sakkākī’s definition: “ʾistiʿārah is mentioning one end of the ‘two simile 
ends’ while on the contrary you mean the other end, claiming that ‘the 
likened’ is of the same genus as the ‘likened to’ in order to transfer and 
evoke a specific character from the ‘likened to’ to the ‘likened’” (cited in 
ʻAtīq, 1980, p. 368; my translation). 
From this fairly comprehensive consideration of the Arabic and English figures of speech, 
we can conclude that simile and metaphor are more or less equivalent to tashbīh and 
istiᶜārah respectively. On the basis of its types and purposes of use (functions), we can, 
however, say that there is no equivalent figure of speech for kināyah in English. For 
example, euphemism is one of the purposes of kināyah, and we could even say that it is 
part and parcel of kināyah, specifically in the Qur’an; whereas euphemism in English 
seems to be a separate stylistic usage rather than being an essential feature or element of 
a particular trope as in Arabic. Some Arabic-English dictionaries translate the term 
kināyah as ‘metonymy’, which we have shown to be incorrect, especially given that the 
types and purposes of kināyah are totally different from those of metonymy. The reason 
behind the dictionaries’ error in translation may be the ‘stand for’ notion, which is one of 
the characteristics of metonymy and sometimes kināyah; but this notion may be applied 
to metaphor as well. For instance, metaphorically the term ‘lion’ stands for courage. The 
only feature that kināyah and metonymy might share, as can be noticed from the 
definitions of kināyah and metonymy (see table 2.1), is the notion of 
contiguity/association; apart from that, the concept of kināyah is totally different from 
metonymy. The mechanism of kināyah, according to Abu Libdeh (1991, p. 43), is quite 
similar to metaphor and analogy “in that it evokes a series of associations between two 
entities where A presents the reality of B”. This might be true, but the concepts of the two 
tropes are different, and all this shows is that kināyah is a salient figure of speech as is 
metaphor. 
On other hand, majāz mursal seems to be the closest equivalent in the Arabic tradition  to 
both metonymy and synecdoche in the Western. All three figures of speech share the same 
non-similarity relationship, i.e. the semantic relationship between the figurative 
expression and the intended meaning (see table 2.1). Another mutual feature above all 
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else is their types/semantic relationships (see table 2.2). The semantic relationships in 
majāz mursal (ʾAmīn, 1982, pp. 93-108; ʻAṭīyah, 2004, pp. 117-124; Abdul-Raof, 2006, 
pp. 225-232) such as ‘causality’, ‘result’, ‘whole-to-part’, or ‘place’ relationships are 
more or less similar to ‘cause for effect’, ‘effect for cause’, ‘whole for part’, or ‘place for 
institution/event/thing/activity’ in metonymy. This may also apply to synecdoche, 
considering the disagreement amongst some rhetoricians and linguists over the semantic 
relations involved in metonymy and synecdoche. Thus, Arabic-English dictionaries tend 
to render the term majāz mursal as both synecdoche and metonymy. Moreover, as we 
noted earlier, Larkin, in her discussion of al-Jurjānī’s categorisation of majāz, points out 
that the term in English for majāz mursal is metonymy (1995, p. 87). She also seems to 
realise there is no equivalent term for kināyah in English; she uses transliteration and 
refers to kināyah, between brackets, as ‘descriptive periphrases’ (ibid, p. 86). Overall, this 
demonstrates that there is no equivalent term or figure of speech for kināyah in English 
and, the frequent usage of the term ‘metonymy’ for kināyah is incorrect. 
Table 2.2 Forms and semantic relationships of majāz mursal, metonymy, and synecdoche. 
Majāz mursal Metonymy Synecdoche 
Causality relationship. 
Result relationship. 
Whole-to-part relationship. 
Part-to-whole relationship. 
Generalisation 
relationship. 
Specific relationship. 
Necessary requirement 
relationship. 
Past relationship. 
Future relationship. 
Substituted relationship. 
Instrument relationship. 
Place relationship. 
State relationship. 
Opposite relationship 
Part for the whole. 
Producer for product. 
Product for producer 
Object used for user. 
Controller for controlled. 
Institution for people 
responsible. 
Place for Institution. 
Place for event. 
Cause for effect. 
Effect for cause. 
Sign for signified. 
Container for contained. 
Abstract for concrete. 
Place for thing. 
Agent for instrument. 
Instrument for action. 
Action for instrument. 
Agent for action 
Action for agent 
Place/region—people. 
Time/period—people. 
Place—activity. 
People—activity. 
Physical thing(s)—activity. 
People/thing—time. 
Activity—establishment. 
Activity—product. 
Substance—product. 
Genus for species. Species 
for genus. 
Type for token. 
Token for type. 
Physical part for the 
whole. 
Physical attribute for the 
whole. 
Taking a part for the 
whole. 
The whole for a part. 
The singular for the plural. 
The plural for the singular. 
A certain number for an 
indefinite one. 
The matter out of which a 
Thing is made, for thing 
itself. 
Objector physical attribute 
for possessor. 
Material or physical 
attribute for object. 
Container for contained. 
Attribute for possessor. 
Singular for plural. 
Common name for proper 
name. 
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Substance—type of. 
Producer—product. 
Feeling—object. 
Sense modality—sense 
impression. 
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Chapter three: Qur’an, kināyah, and translation 
3.1 Introduction 
The prime source of data, where the kināyah expressions for this study are extracted from, 
is the Qur’an. Hence, it is vital that we briefly shed light on some issues related to this 
source, such as its nature, status, legitimacy of its translation, historical background of its 
English translations, unique genre, and the significant role of Qur’anic exegeses in its 
comprehension and translation. This chapter will also include a brief overview of the four 
selected translations that will be employed in the TT analysis. This will be followed by 
an overview of the employment of kināyah in Qur’an, then, a brief discussion on kināyah 
in translation studies. 
3.2 The nature and status of the Qur’an 
﴿اﱠنِإ  ُهاَنْلَعَج ًانآُْرق ̒ايِبَرَع  َنوُلِقَْعت ْمُكﱠلَعَل﴾ ]فرخزلا :3[  
(Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur'an that you might understand) [Q. 
43:3] (Saheeh International, 2004) 
(We have made it a Qur’an in Arabic so that you [people] may understand) 
[Q. 43:3] (Abdel Haleem, 2005) 
̒ايِبَرَع ًانآْرُق ُهاَنْلَزَنأ اﱠنِإ﴿  َت ْمُكﱠلَعﱠل﴾َنوُلِقْع ]فسوي :2[ 
(Indeed, We have sent it down as an Arabic Qur'an that you might understand) 
[Q. 12:2] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We have sent it down as an Arabic Qur an so that you [people] may 
understand) [Q. 12:2] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
﴿ ِذ ْمَُهل ُثِدُْحي َْوأ َنوُقﱠتَي ْمُهﱠلَعَل ِديِعَوْلا َنِم ِهيِف اَنْف ﱠرَصَو ا̒يِبَرَع ًانآُْرق ُهَانْلَزَنأ َكِل َٰذَكَواًرْك﴾ ]هط :113[  
(And thus We have sent it down as an Arabic Qur'an and have diversified 
therein the warnings that perhaps they will avoid [sin] or it would cause them 
remembrance) [Q. 20:113] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We have sent the Qur’an down in the Arabic tongue and given all kinds of 
warnings in it, so that they may beware or take heed) [Q. 20:113] (Abdel 
Haleem, 2005). 
The Qur’an is the words of God revealed in Arabic. Lexically, the word Qur’ān means 
‘reading’ or ‘reciting’ (Lane, 1968, p. 2504; Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. xv), but as a proper 
noun, it is known as the scripture or the book that contains the sum of the words of Allah 
which have been revealed in Arabic to His messenger, Prophet Muhammad, peace be 
upon him (PBUH) (Graham, 2001, pp. 159-163) through His angel Jibrīl. There are 
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several āyahs which demonstrates that He is the one who revealed the Qur’an to His 
prophet, for instance: 
﴿ ًﻼيِزَنت َنآُْرقْلا َكَْيلَع اَنْل ﱠزَن ُنْحَن اﱠنِإ﴾ ]ناسنﻻا:23[  
(Indeed, it is We who have sent down to you, [O Muhammad], the Qur'an 
progressively) [Q. 76:23] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We Ourself have sent down this Qur’an to you [Prophet] in gradual 
revelation) [Q. 76:23] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
﴿ ُهﱠل اًصِلْخُم َ ﱠဃ ِدُبْعاَف ِّقَحْلا ِب َبَاتِكْلا َكَْيلِإ اَنْلَزَنأ اﱠنِإ َني ِّدلا﴾ ]رمزلا :2[ 
(Indeed, We have sent down to you the Book, [O Muhammad], in truth. So 
worship Allah, [being] sincere to Him in religion) [Q. 39:2] (Saheeh 
International, 2004). 
(It is We who sent down the Scripture to you [Prophet] with the Truth, so 
worship God with your total devotion) [Q. 39:2] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
﴿ َع ﱡﻞِﻀَي اَمﱠِنإَف ﱠﻞَض نَمَو ۖ ِهِسْفَنِلَف َٰىَدتْها ِنَمَف ۖ ِّقَحْلاِب ِساﱠنلِل َبَاتِكْلا َكَْيلَع اَنْلَزَنأ اﱠنِإ َتَنأ اَمَو ۖ اَهْيَل مِهْيَلَع 
 ٍﻞيِكَوِب﴾ ]رمزلا :41[  
(Indeed, We sent down to you the Book for the people in truth. So whoever 
is guided - it is for [the benefit of] his soul; and whoever goes astray only 
goes astray to its detriment. And you are not a manager over them) [Q. 39:41] 
(Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We have sent the Scripture down to you [Prophet] with the Truth for people. 
Whoever follows the guidance does so for his own beneﬁt, whoever strays 
away from it does so at his own peril: you are not in charge of them) [Q. 
39:41] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
 ﴾ِباَبَْلْﻷا وُلُوأ َرﱠَكَذتَيِلَو ِهِتَايآ اوُرﱠبﱠدَيِّل ٌكَراَبُم َكَْيلِإ ُهاَنْلَزَنأ ٌبَاتِك﴿]ص :29[ 
([This is] a blessed Book which We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], 
that they might reflect upon its verses and that those of understanding would 
be reminded) [Q. 38:29] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(This is a blessed Scripture which We sent down to you [Muhammad], for 
people to think about its messages, and for those with understanding to take 
heed) [Q. 38:29] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
Unquestionably, the Qur’an has to be viewed as an integrative entity. This is to say, 
utterance and meaning have to be joined together in order for the text to be properly 
understood as Qur’anic. By contrast, Prophetic sayings or narrations are not Qur’anic 
despite their divine meanings, because their wording is formulated by the Prophet 
(PBUH). Accordingly, Qur’anic translations and exegesis are not considered Qur’anic; 
and they are even not allowed to be recited in aṣ-ṣalawāt (prayers) [singular: aṣ-ṣalāh] 
(Ibn Taymīyah, 2004, p. 542; also cited in al-ᶜUbayd, 2002, p. 11). 
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For Muslims, the Qur’an is not only the words of Allah and a divine text in all respects, 
but it is also a fundamental source of guidance for all aspects of life: 
﴿...  َكْيَلَع اَنْل ﱠزَنَو ِءﻵُؤ ٰـ َه ٰﻰَلَع ًاديِهَش َِكب اَنْئِجَوٱ َبَاتِكْل  َنيِمِلْسُمْلِل ٰىَرْشُبَو ًةَمْحَرَو ًىدُهَو ٍءْيَش ِّﻞُكِّل ًاناَيْبِت﴾ 
]ﻞحنلا :89[. 
(... And We will bring you, [O Muhammad], as a witness over your nation. 
And We have sent down to you the Book as clarification for all things and as 
guidance and mercy and good tidings for the Muslims) [Q. 16:89] (Saheeh 
International, 2004). 
(...We shall bring you [Prophet] as a witness against these people, for We 
have sent the Scripture down to you explaining everything, and as guidance 
and mercy and good news to those who devote themselves to God) [Q. 16:89] 
(Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
﴿ ًانِمْيَهُمَو ِبَاتِكْلا َنِم ِهَْيدَي َنْيَب اَم ِّل ًاق ِّدَصُم ِّقَحْلاِب َبَاتِكْلا َكْيَلِإ اَنْلَزَنأَو ُ ﱠဃ َلَزَنأ اَمِب مُهَنَْيب مُكْحاَف ۖ ِهْيَلَع  ۖ
 ُ ﱠဃ َءاَش ْوَلَو ۚ اًجاَهْنِمَو ًةَعْرِش ْمُكنِم اَنْلَعَج ٍّﻞُكِل ۚ ِّقَحْلا َنِم َكَءاَج ا ﱠمَع ْمُهَءاَوَْهأ ْعِبﱠَتت َﻻَو ًَةدِحاَو ًة ﱠُمأ ْمَُكلَعَجَل 
 ُكَاتآ اَم يِف ْمُكَوُلْبَي ِّل نِك َٰلَو َنوُفَِلتَْخت ِهيِف ُْمتنُك اَِمب مُُكئِّبَُنيَف ًاعيِمَج ْمُُكعِجْرَم ِ ﱠဃ ﻰَلِإ ۚ ِتاَرْيَخْلا اوُقَِبتْساَف ۖ ْم﴾ 
 :ةدئاملا]48.[  
(And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, 
confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. 
So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their 
inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We 
prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you 
one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has 
given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, 
and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ) 
[Q. 5:48] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We sent to you [Muhammad] the Scripture with the truth, conﬁrming the 
Scriptures that came before it, and with ﬁnal authority over them: so judge 
between them according to what God has sent down. Do not follow their 
whims, which deviate from the truth that has come to you. We have assigned 
a law and a path to each of you. If God had so willed, He would have made 
you one community, but He wanted to test you through that which He has 
given you, so race to do good: you will all return to God and He will make 
clear to you the matters you diﬀered about) [Q. 5:48] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
Thus, Muslims are obligated to read and understand the Qur’an. But since the Qur’an is 
revealed in Arabic and the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs, it has become obvious 
that the translation of the meaning of the Holy Qur’an into different languages is now a 
necessity. As a result, numerous translations have been produced. Some of these were 
made by non-Muslim orientalists and some were by Muslims relying on their independent 
opinion or judgment. Generally, they were individual efforts which contained some errors 
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depending on the translator’s knowledge, goal, and purpose. Hence, most translations 
have been criticised by several Islamic clerics and scholars, which may, in fact, be the 
reason why they initially refused to allow the Qur’an to be translated in the first place.   
3.3 The legitimacy of translating the Qur’an 
The only text that is accepted to be Qur’anic, and is allowed to be used in ṣalāh, is the 
original Arabic text that Allah has revealed to His Prophet (PBUH), which has been 
undistorted and preserved for centuries. According to Allah’s words, it will remain 
undistorted for ever: 
 َانْل ﱠزَن ُنْحَن اﱠنِإ ﴿ٱ َرْك ِّذل  ُظِفاَحَل َُهل اﱠنِإَو﴾َنو  :رجحلا]9 [ 
(Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an and indeed, We will be its 
guardian) [Q. 15:9] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(We have sent down the Qur’an Ourself, and We Ourself will guard it) [Q. 
15:9] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
Accordingly, any translation of the Qur’an into another language, or even an 
interpretation to Arabic itself, will not be considered a Qur’anic text. The Qur’an was 
revealed as a miraculous divine scripture and has its own unique form of discourse that 
no one can ever produce a similar discourse even in Arabic. This uniqueness is part of its 
linguistic challenge to humankind; this challenge is demonstrated in the following āyahs: 
-  ِنآْرُقْلا َاذ َٰه ِْﻞﺜِِمب اُوْتأَي َنأ َٰﻰلَع ﱡنِجْلاَو ُسن ِْﻹا َِتعََمتْجا ِنِئﱠل ﻞُق﴿  ٍضْعَبِل ْمُهُﻀَْعب َناَك َْولَو ِهِْلﺜِمِب َنُوْتأَي َﻻ
 :ءارسﻹا] ﴾ًريِهَظ88.[ 
(Say, “If mankind and the jinn gathered in order to produce the like of this 
Qur'an, they could not produce the like of it, even if they were to each other 
assistants) [Q. 17:88] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(Say, ‘Even if all mankind and jinn came together to produce something like 
this Qur’an, they could not produce anything like it, however much they 
helped each other’) [Q. 17:88] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
- يِف ُْمتْنُك نِإَو﴿  ْنِإ ِ ﱠ๡ٱ ِنوُد ن ِّم مُكَءآَدَهُش ْاوُعْدٱَو ِهِْلﺜ ِّم ن ِّم ٍةَروُسِب ْاُوْتأَف اَنِدْبَع َٰﻰلَع اَنْل ﱠزَن ا ﱠم ِّم ٍبْيَر  ْنُك ُْمت
 :ةرقبلا] ﴾َنيِقِد َٰص23.[  
(And if you are in doubt about what We have sent down upon Our Servant 
[Muhammad], then produce a Surah the like thereof and call upon your 
witnesses other than Allah, if you should be truthful [Q. 2:23] (Saheeh 
International, 2004). 
(If you have doubts about the revelation We have sent down to Our servant, 
then produce a single sura like it - enlist whatever supporters you have other 
than God - if you truly [think you can]) [Q. 2:23] (Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
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-  َص ُْمتنُك ِنإ ِ ﱠဃ ِنُود ن ِّم ُمتْعََطتْسا ِنَم اوُعْداَو ِهِْلﺜ ِّم ٍةَروُسِب اُوْتأَف ُْﻞق ۖ ُهاََرتْفا َنوُلوَُقي َْمأ﴿وي] ﴾َنيِقِدا :سن
38[.  
(Or do they say [about the Prophet], “He invented it?” Say, “Then bring forth 
a surah like it and call upon [for assistance] whomever you can besides Allah, 
if you should be truthful.”) [Q. 10:38] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(Or do they say, ‘He has devised it’? Say, ‘Then produce a sura like it, and 
call on anyone you can beside God if you are telling the truth) [Q. 10:38] 
(Abdel Haleem, 2005). 
-  ُتْعََطتْسٱ ِنَم ْاوُعْدٱَو ٍت َٰيََرتْفُم ِهِْلﺜ ِّم ٍرَوُس ِرَْشعِب ْاُوْتأَف ُْﻞق ُهاََرتْفٱ َنُولوُقَي َْمأ﴿ َص ُْمتنُك نِإ ِ ﱠ๡ٱ ِنوُد ن ِّم ْم ﴾َنيِقِدا
 :دوه]13.[ 
(Or do they say, “He invented it”? Say, “Then bring ten surahs like it that 
have been invented and call upon [for assistance] whomever you can besides 
Allah, if you should be truthful”) [Q. 11:13] (Saheeh International, 2004). 
(If they say, ‘He has invented it himself,’ say, ‘Then produce ten invented 
suras like it, and call in whoever you can beside God, if you are truthful’) [Q. 
11:13] (Abdel Haleem, 2005).  
This clearly suggests that no translation of the Qur’an can match the originality of the 
Arabic text of the Qur’an regardless of how competent and skilful the translator is. From 
this standpoint, there has been an on-going controversy between Islamic clerics on the 
validity of translating the Qur’an into another language. The ruling on this issue varies 
according to the type of translation (Siddiek, 2012, pp. 20-21; al-ᶜUbayd, 2002, pp. 13-
26). To clarify this, it is necessary to look at some of the types of translation related and 
their rulings. 
3.3.1 Ruling of translating the Qur’an word-for-word (interlinear translation) 
In this translation method, the TL words are put immediately below the SL words 
(Newmark, 1988, pp. 45-46). The SL word-order is preserved, and the lexical items are 
translated without paying attention to their contextual meanings. Cultural words are also 
translated literally. Furthermore, this method “does not necessarily respect TL grammar, 
but has grammatical units corresponding as closely as possible to every grammatical unit 
of the ST” (Dickins, Hervey, & Higgins, 2002, p. 15). It is rarely used in translation from 
English into Arabic and vice versa for two reasons. First, English and Arabic differ in the 
direction of writing. Second, they differ in word order and many grammatical and lexical 
aspects. However, this method is effectively used in specific contexts, for example, when 
attempting to demonstrate the structure of the original text. So the translation of the 
Qur’an using the word-for-word method means rendering its system, style, and structure 
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without respecting the TL grammatical structure. This would result in a great deal of 
inappropriateness both in form and content. This can be illustrated by following example: 
[Q. 17:29] :﴿ ََكدَي ْﻞَعَْجت ﻻَو اًروُسْحَم اًموُلَم َُدعَْقتَف ِطْسَبْلا ﱠﻞُك اَهْطُسَْبت ﻻَو َكُِقنُع ﻰَلِإ ًَةلوُلْغَم﴾  
A word-for-word translation would result in: 
(And no make hand-your cuffed/chained to neck-your and no stretch it all the 
stretch then sit blameful bared) 
The prohibition or discouragement of being too mean or too extravagant is expressed by 
the figurative imagery, i.e. the hands chained to the neck or completely stretching it out, 
respectively, which is not conveyed in the word-for-word translation; thus, it is clear from 
the above example that the word-for-word method in translation from Arabic to English, 
especially from the Qur’an, is not only unidiomatic but also unintelligible. Therefore, all 
Islamic clerics strictly prohibit translating the Qur’an word-for-word. 
3.3.2 Ruling of translating the Qur’an literally 
On the face of it, it is appropriate to define the term ‘literal translation’. According to 
Newmark literal translation means translating SL words singly, out of context, whilst 
transforming the SL’s structure as closely as possible to the TL’s structure (Newmark, 
1988, p. 46). Dickins, et al. (2002, p. 16) have aptly pointed out that: 
In literal translation proper, the denotative meaning of words is taken as if 
straight from the dictionary (that is, out of context), but TL grammar is 
respected. Because TL grammar is respected, literal translation very often 
unavoidably involves grammatical transposition - the replacement or 
reinforcement of given parts of speech in the ST by other parts of speech in 
the TT [author’s emphasis]. 
It is obvious literal translation is very similar to word-for-word translation with the 
exception of the issue of grammatical structure. The following literal translation of the 
previous example will exemplify this point: 
Literal translation: (And do not make your hand cuffed/chained to your neck, 
and do not stretch it extremely and then you sit [become] blameful and bared) 
Yet again, the figurative meaning is not quite conveyed, though the grammatical structure 
of the TL is maintained. By the very nature of the case, Islamic clerics and scholars have 
also prohibited this type of translation of the Qur’an. They believe that some implicit 
meanings will not be conveyed through a literal translation, which is true, particularly if 
they are culture-specific and the two languages do not share the same cultural concepts. 
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However, this does not necessarily require generalising the prohibition of literal 
translation. In some cases, especially when the two languages share the same cultural 
concept, a literal translation could convey the actual meaning as the ST does. If for any 
reason there is a loss of meaning or ambiguity in the translation, this could be 
compensated for or clarified through several procedures as we will show later in this 
study. We incline to what Newmark’s suggests, that a combination of more than one 
translation approach is useful and the choice mainly depends on the type of ST expression 
(see Newmark, 1981, p. 40).     
3.3.3 Ruling on explanatory translation of the Qur’an 
An explanatory translation of the Qur’an can be divided into two forms (al-ᶜUbayd, 2002, 
pp. 13-14):  
- The translator renders the contextual meaning directly from the Qur’an into 
another language. This requires that the translator should be competent and has 
complete knowledge of the meanings of the Qur’an. Some Islamic clerics require 
that the translator should be highly qualified not only in both languages but also in 
Qur’anic exegesis. On that account, the translator renders the intended meaning 
into the TT using TL expressions in order to clarify what is ambiguous in the ST. 
Here the translator should not be committed to translating every utterance and to 
find its equivalent in the TL. 
- The translation is done by rendering the Arabic explanatory of the Qur’an into the 
TL rather than directly from the Qur’an. In other words, translating the 
explanations which has been produced by other scholars of Qur’anic exegesis. 
It is clear that any explanatory translation of the Qur’an is a translation of the meaning of 
the Qur’an and not as a Holy book; in fact, no translations of the Qur’an are to be 
considered a Holy book. Explanatory translation is not an attempt to reproduce the Qur’an 
in another language, but simply involves explaining the meaning and clarifying what is 
ambiguous. That is why the majority of Islamic clerics and scholars have agreed on the 
permissibility of this type of translation. However, the translator has to fulfil overriding 
conditions in order to be trustworthy to translate the meaning of the Qur’an. These 
requirements are (al-Luḥaydān, 2002, pp. 12-13): 
- The translator has to be well capable of understanding and explaining the exact 
meaning of each āyah. 
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- The translator has to be linguistically competent in both languages, i.e. they should 
know the exact meaning of different lexical items, sentence patterns, the 
relationship between the sentence elements, and the functional features as well as 
the cultural heritage of both languages. 
- The translator should avoid the employment of illegitimate terms and expressions 
unless their use cannot be avoided. 
Al-ᶜUbayd (2002, p. 31-23) adds that any translator who attempts to render the Qur’an, 
especially if it was directly from the Qur’an, should be competent and familiar with 
required rules of Qur’anic exegeses. The translator should also rely on authoritative 
exegeses and render what the majority of exegetes agree on. If there is more than one 
opinion, it should be clarified in a footnote. Al-ᶜUbayd (ibid; cf. al-Luḥaydān, 2002, p. 
31) highly recommends that any translation of the meaning the Qur’an should include in 
its preface the following: 
- The explanatory translation is based on their best understanding of the meaning of 
the Qur’an. 
- The translation does not include all the possible interpretations of the meaning of 
the Qur’an. 
- The translation of the Qur’an, i.e. the Qur’an itself and not its meaning, is 
untranslatable due to the nature of the Qur’an itself. 
- The explanatory translation does not convey all the Qur’an features, hence, it does 
not replace the Qur’an by any means whatsoever, and the Qur’an will remain 
indispensable. 
- The title of the translation should include expressions, such as a translation of the 
Qur’anic exegesis from Arabic into English or explaining the Qur’an into English. 
Presumably the reason why most scholars, if not all, insist that the title should clarify that 
the translation is an explanatory translation or the translation of the meaning of the 
Qur’an, is that the TT recipient may consider the translation as a replacement for the 
Qur’an like what happened with the translations of the Old and New Testaments.   
3.4 Translation of the meaning of the Qur’an 
The translation of the meaning of the Qur’an is considered an important element in 
stimulating people to enter Islam [daᶜwah]. Some of the Islamic scholars who have 
approved the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an have stated that this type of 
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translation occurred during the Prophet Muhammad’s epoch. They believe it was through 
the letters sent by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to the kings and leaders of other 
nations in his era to stimulate them to embrace Islam. It is believed that these letters, 
which included some āyahs of the Qur’an, must have been translated into the languages 
of those nations, for their leaders to understand (ash-Shāyaᶜ, 2002, p. 16). Furthermore, 
there is an account that Salmān al-Fārisī (one of the companions of the Prophet 
Muhammad [PBUH]) translated the meaning of sūrat al-Fātiḥah into Persian in response 
to some Persian Muslims (ash-Shāyaᶜ 2002, p. 16). The following āyah suggest that even 
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) interpreted the meaning of the Qur’an to his 
companions: 
﴿ ِرُب ﱡزلاَو ِتاَنِّيَبْلاِب اَنْلَزـَْنأَو  َكَْيلِإ  َرْك ِّذلا  َنوُرﱠكََفتَي ْمُهﱠلَعَلَو ْمِهْيَِلإ َل ِّزُـن اَم ِساﱠنلِل َنِّيَُبتِل﴾  :ﻞحنلا)44(  
([We sent them] with clear proofs and written ordinances. And We revealed 
to you the message that you may make clear to the people what was sent down 
to them and that they might give thought) [Q. 16:44] (Saheeh International, 
2004) 
(We have sent down the message to you too [Prophet], so that you can explain 
to people what was sent for them, so that they may reﬂect) [Q. 16:44] (Abdel 
Haleem, 2005). 
In general, the translation of the meaning of the Qur’an into different languages is a 
necessity especially given that the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs. It is also 
indispensable that all non-Arab Muslims should learn Arabic because the recitation of the 
Qur’an in prayers is only permissible in Arabic. 
3.5 Western translations of the Qur’an 
The first translation of the meaning of the Qur’an in a western language appeared in Latin 
after approximately five centuries after Islam came to light. According to at-Tamsamānī 
(2002, p. 15), it all started in al-Andalus  (Islamic Spain) at the beginning of the 12th 
century when Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, wanted to know more about Islam 
from a hostile and a polemical perspective (Tolan, 2002, p. 136). Thus he gave orders to 
translate the Qur’an. At-Tamsamānī claims the first translation was carried out by 
Robertus Ketenensis28, an  Englishman,  in 1130, contrary to what is widely believed 
among scholars that it was in 1143 (2002, pp. 15-16; cf. ash-Shāyaᶜ, 2002, p. 17; cf. ᶜAli, 
2002, pp. 1-7). He adds that a second Latin translation was produced in 1143 by an Abbot 
                                                
28 Also known as Robert of Ketton or Robertus Retenensis. 
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of Cluny’s group (ibid, p. 16). In a footnote, he suggests that the latter translation was 
produced by Petrus Toletanus (Peter of Toledo). His assumptions were based on some of 
Peter the Venerable’s letters sent to Bernard of Clairvaux, in addition to the fact that 
Petrus Toletanus’ name is mentioned on the top of the first page of one of the translation 
manuscripts which are preserved in the National Library of France (Bibliothèque 
nationale de France). It is worth mentioning that John V. Tolan, like most scholars, 
believes that Robertus Ketenensis’ Latin translation of the Qur’an is the first western 
translation of the Qur’an and that it was produced in 1143. That is clear from his following 
statement: 
In 1142–43 Peter travelled to Spain and assembled a team of translators. He 
had Robert Ketton produce a full, Latin version of the Koran, which was 
subsequently given extensive marginal annotations; it is the first translation 
of the Koran into Latin, indeed probably the first complete translation into 
any language (Tolan, 2002, p. 155). 
George Sale (1888, p. vii), who translated the Qur’an and Samuel Zwemer (1915, p. 247) 
even believed that Ketton’s Latin translation in 1143 was produced with the help of his 
German friend Herman of Dalmatia. However, this Latin translation of the Qur’an 
remained concealed until it was published four centuries later in Basel in 1543 by 
Theodore Bibliander (Sale, 1888, p. vii; Zwemer, 1915, p. 247; Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 19). 
It is widely believed that the Crusade’s main interest in Islam was to conquer Muslim 
lands including al-Andalus, to distort the image of Islam and convert Muslims to 
Christianity. In this connection, another Medieval Latin translation was produced in June 
1210 by Mark of Toledo, deacon of the cathedral of Toledo, at the instance of Rodrigo 
Jiménez de Rada, Archbishop of Toledo (1208–47) (Tolan, 2002, p. 183). Furthermore, 
John of Segovia, a theologian, also made a Latin translation of the Qur’an in 1453, but 
there is no trace of it anymore (Almisned, 2001, p. 53). The Latin translations of the 
Qur’an were inspired by a hostile intention with the explicit aim of refuting the beliefs of 
Islam; hence they contained an abundance of erroneousness and misapprehension. Yet, 
they served, particularly Ketton’s translation, as “…the foundation of the earliest 
translations into modern European idioms” (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 19). Ketton’s 
translation was further translated into Italian, German, and Dutch.  
In 1547, Andrea Arrivabene translated Ketton’s Latin translation into Italian, a translation 
which was censured by Sale for its absurdity and faultiness (Sale, 1888, p. vii). A German 
translation was made by Salomon Schweigger in 1616, derived from Andrea’s Italian 
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translation. Schweigger’s translation was in turn translated into Dutch in 1641 and printed 
in Hamburg (Zwemer, 1915, p. 249). 
A more recent Latin translation was probably done by Lewis Marracci in 1698. His 
version included the original text together with explanatory notes and refutations. 
Concerning the rejection of Islam, this Latin translation was no different from previous 
Latin translations, as is evident from the title of the introductory volume, A Refutation of 
the Quran. 
The first French translation of the Qur’an was produced by Andrew du Ryer in 1647. 
Ryer worked as a French consular official in Egypt and he was conversant with the 
Turkish and Arabic languages. Nevertheless, his translation included countless errors. 
Sale criticised Ryer’s rendering, noting: 
... mistakes in every page, besides frequent transpositions, omissions, and 
additions, faults unpardonable in a work of this nature. And what renders it 
still more incomplete is, the want of Notes to explain a vast number of 
passages, some of which are difficult, and others are impossible to 
understand, without proper explications, were they translated ever so exactly 
(Sale, 1888, p. viii). 
Another French version appeared in 1783 by Savary, followed by Kasimirski’s version in 
1840 which was also in French. A Russian translation appeared in 1776 at St. Petersburg. 
In 1857, a Hebrew translation produced by Hermann Reckendorf was printed at Leipzig 
followed a Swedish translation in 1874 by J. T. Nordling. 
3.6 English translations of the Qur’an 
Although the Qur’an is the Holy book of Islam, the early translations of the meaning of 
the Qur’an into English were rendered by non-Muslims. The interest of non-Muslims in 
the Qur’an stemmed from their desire to refute Islam and mainly, as mentioned earlier, to 
convert Muslims to Christianity. English translations of the meaning of the Qur’an can 
be categorised into two groups, by Muslims and by non-Muslims. 
3.6.1 English translations of the Qur’an by non-Muslims 
The Alcoran of Mahomet is the first English translation of the meaning of the Qur’an by 
the Scotsman Alexander Ross in 1649. Ross’s translation was completely based on du 
Ryer’s distorted French translation. By the very nature of the case, Ross’s translation was 
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regarded as “an indifferent translation of an inadequate version” (Arberry, 1983, p. 37). 
Even Sale criticized Ross’s translation, noting: 
The English version is no other than a translation of Du Ryer’s, and that a 
very bad one; for Alexander Ross, who did it, being utterly unacquainted with 
the Arabic, and no great master of the French, has added a number of fresh 
mistakes of his own to those of Du Ryer; not to mention the meanness of his 
language, which would make a better book ridiculous (Sale, 1888, p. viii).  
Ross’s translation remained the only English translation available for English readers for 
nearly a century until a new translation by George Sale was published in 1734. Though 
Sale claims that his translation, The Koran: Commonly called the Alkoran of Mohammed, 
was translated direct from the original Arabic text contrary to Ross’s translation, others 
have suggested that his translation was based on earlier Latin translations (Irving, 1985, 
p. xxii), specifically, Maraccins’ Latin translation (Hosni, 1990, p. 95; Almisned, 2001, 
p. 53; Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 20; ᶜAlī, ᶜAbdullah Yūsuf, 1989, p. xxi). In his translation, 
Sale included a historical background to early translations of the Qur’an, in which he 
criticized all former translations without exception. He himself admits that his translation 
is also not free from errors (Sale, 1888, p. x), which in fact is true due to the fact “it 
abounds in numerous instances of omission, distortion, and interpolations” (Kidwai, 
1987, p. 70). Nevertheless, Sale’s translation, which included explanatory footnotes, 
became renowned until the middle of the 20th century. It was edited and published several 
times. Even other European translations relied heavily on Sale’s rendition. 
A third English translation of the Qur’an entitled The Koran appeared in 1861 by John 
Medows Rodwell, who served as a Rector of St Ethelburga's Bishopsgate in London from 
1843-1900. Rodwell, like his previous fellow translators, was utterly convinced that the 
Qur’an was the production of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam. His preface included 
wild imaginary allegations against the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and the 
Prophet’s companions (see Rodwell, 1909, pp. 1-18). In addition to changing the order of 
the sūrahs to make them chronological, Rodwell’s translation suffers from a great number 
of mistakes and misinterpretations. 
Nineteen years later, the Cambridge scholar Edward Henry Palmer translated the Qur’an 
for Max Muller’s Sacred Books of the East series. Palmer’s translation, The Qur’an, was 
published in London in 1880. According to Kidwai (1987, p. 70), more than 65 instances 
of omissions and mistranslations in Palmer’s translation were pointed out in A. R. Nykl's 
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article that was published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society. Palmer also 
believes that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was the author of the Qur’an.  
From 1937 to 1939, Richard Bell’s translation, The Qur'an translated with a critical re-
arrangement of the Surahs, was published in Edinburgh in two volumes. It seems that 
Bell followed Rodewll’s steps and wild imaginary views in such a manner that he also 
rearranged the order of the sūrahs and also believes the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was 
the author of the Qur’an. 
The early English translations of the Qur’an were questionable, equivocal, and irksome 
until The Koran Interpreted of Arthur John Arberry, a well-known British orientalist and 
professor of Arabic and Islamic studies, appeared in 1955. Despite the fact that Arberry 
was a non-Muslim, many Muslim scholars admired his translation. Arberry understood 
that translating the Qur’an is not an easy task and he aimed as much as he could to 
maintain the style of the original text. Although his translation was not free of mistakes 
and mistranslations, Kidwai (1987, p. 71) points out that Arberry’s translation without 
doubt “… stands out above the other English renderings by non-Muslims in terms of both 
its approach and quality”. 
Nessim Joseph Dawood, a Jew originally from Iraq, moved to England at the age of 19. 
He graduated from the University of London and later in 1956 he produced his translation 
of the Qur’an entitled The Koran. Dawood is possibly the latest non-Muslim translator so 
far. The earlier editions of his translation included a chronological order for the sūrahs 
which was avoided in his latest revised edition (2000). The Arabic text was also included 
in this edition for easy comparison and to present the modern reader with a 
comprehensible translation. Overall, Dawood’s translation does not reflect the prejudice 
of the earlier missionary religious biases, perhaps reflecting the fact that he was not a 
Christian. Many scholars regard Dawood’s translation as the most widely circulated non-
Muslim English translation of the Qur'an. 
3.6.2 English translations of the Qur’an by Muslims 
The attempt to gravely damage the image of Islam by non-Muslim translators and their 
disrespect for the Qur’an encouraged Muslim scholars to take up the challenge and 
translate the meaning of the Qur’an into western languages. According to Nassimi (2008), 
Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Ḥakīm Khān of Patiala (India) was the first Muslim to translate the 
Qur’an into English in 1905. His translation, entitled The Holy Qur’an translated with 
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short notes: Based on the Holy Qur'an or authentic traditions of the Prophet, or New 
Testament or scientific facts, included commentary notes based on sources he mentioned 
in his subtitle. Khān also expressed the fact that he was not able to render the excellence 
and beauty of the language of the Qur'an (ibid, p. 51).  
In 1912, two other translations were produced in the Indian Sub-continet, The Qur'an: 
Arabic text and English translation by Mirza Abū al-Faḍl and The Koran: English 
translation by Mirza Ḥayrat Dehlawi (Delhi, India). Abū al-Faḍl’s first edition included 
the Arabic text and the sūrahs were ordered chronologically. His later editions in 1916 
and 1956 were published without the Arabic text but the sūrahs were presented in the 
traditional order. According to Nassimi (2008, p. 52), Dehlawi’s translation is “easy to 
understand even by those with basic education”. It said that Dehlawi, who was an Islamic 
scholar, had some assistance from other oriental scholars in translating the meaning of 
the Qur’an (Nassimi, 2008, p. 52; cf. Kidwai, 1987, p. 68). Kidwai (1987) also expresses 
the view that Dehlawi’s translation was regarded as an extremely thorough and complete 
reply to the miscellaneous criticisms of the Qur’an made by several Christian authors 
such as Sale, Rodwell, and others (ibid.). Kidwai believes the quality of these early 
translations is not remarkably high, since they were not rendered by well-known Islamic 
scholars, and adds that “these works are of mere historical interest” (ibid.). 
In 1917, an English translation of the Qur’an was produced by Muḥammad ᶜAli who is 
believed to be an Aḥmadi/Qādyānī. The Qādyāniyah have abandoned Islam, according to 
Muslim clerics, because of their heretical beliefs. This is presumably why Muḥammad 
ᶜAli’s translation, The Holy Qur'an: English Translation, is considered by the Muslim 
World League an incorrect and deviant translation (Nassimi, 2008, p. 52). The 
Qādyāniyah have actively participated in translating the Qur’an into several languages, 
especially English. Amongst the popular Qādyāniyah’s distorted English translations are: 
A Running Commentary of the Holy Qur’an, by Khawajah Kamāladdīn in 1948, The Holy 
Qur’an, in 1962 by Mālik Ghulām Farīd, and The Qur’an: Arabic Text and English 
Translation, in 1970 by Ẓafr-Allah Khān (for more details on al-Qādyāniyah’s translation 
of the Qur’an see ᶜAbd-al-Rraḥman, 2002) 
Before the end of the mid-20th century, other translations were produced that had a taste 
of a mature and scholarly effort and unlike the previous attempts are of historical interest, 
for example, Translation of the Holy Qur' an from the original Arabic text in 1920 by 
Hafiẓ Ghulām Sarwār, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur' an (London, 1930) by 
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Muhammad Marmaduke William Pickthall, The Holy Qur'an: Translation and 
Commentary (Lahore, 1934-37) by ᶜAbd-Allah Yūsuf ᶜAli (see section 3.7.1), and The 
Holy Qur'an with English Translation and Commentary (Lahore, 1941) by ᶜ Abd-al-Mājid 
Daryabadi. 
Pickthall was an English novelist and journalist who embraced Islam in 1917. His 
translation of the Qur’an is considered the first English version produced by a Muslim 
whose first language was English. Pickthall produced a translation that was diligently 
close to the original Arabic text. Nonetheless, his translation was not free of mistakes but 
most of them were inconsequential (Nassimi, 2008, pp. 53-54). Also, Abdul Majid 
Daryabadi’s translation is regarded as a faithful translation. It included notes on “… 
historical, geographical, and eschatological issues, particularly the illuminating 
discussions on comparative religion” to help “dispel the doubts in the minds of 
Westernized readers” (Kidwai, 1987, p. 68). 
From the mid-20th century onwards the translation of the Qur’an began to flourish. 
Several translations were produced and became popular and widely used because of their 
relative accuracy and simplicity. Others became popular only within the sectors that the 
translators belonged to. Amongst the popular and widely used translations of the Qur’an 
are those of Muḥammad Taqī-ud-Dīn al-Hilālī and Muḥammad Muḥsin Khān (see section 
3.7.2). Also, The Message of The Qur'an by Muhammad Asad in 1980 is assumed to be 
popular within the academic circles. His translation is presented in a more idiomatic and 
unblemished language (Kidwai, 1987, p. 69; Nassimi, 2008, p. 60). Asad, formerly 
Leopold Weiss, was a Jewish Austrian journalist who converted to Islam and who departs 
from traditional exegetical approaches. This is clear from his translation were he doubts 
some events such as the throwing of Abraham into the fire and Jesus speaking in the 
cradle (Mohammed, 2005, p. 64; Nassimi, 2008, p. 60; Kidwai, 1987, p. 69). There are 
also quite a number of other translations that are considered popular and widely used. For 
instance, The Qur'an: the first American Version by T. B. Irving in 1985, The translation 
of the meaning of the Qur’an: English meanings by Ṣaḥīḥ International in 1997/2004 (see 
section 3.7.3), Qur'an: A Modern English Version by Majid Fakhry in 1997, The Noble 
Qur'an, A New Rendering of its Meaning in English by Abdalhaqq and Aisha Bewley in 
1999, The Qur'an: A new Translation by Thomas Cleary in 2004, and The Qur'an: A new 
Translation by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem in 2004/2005 (see section 3.7.4). 
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3.7 A brief overview of the four selected translations 
The four translations of the Qur’an that will be used in this study, namely in the TT 
analysis, are the translations of ᶜAbd-Allah Yūsuf ᶜAli29 (2001) [Amanah edition], 
Muḥammad Taqī-ad-Dīn Al-Hilāli30 and Muḥammad Muḥsin Khān31 (1417 H. [1996]), 
Şaḥīḥ International32 (2004), and Muḥammad Abd-al-Ḥalīm33 (2005). The rationale 
behind selecting ᶜAli’s translation as well as al-Hilālī and Khān’s translation is due to 
their diffusion among non-Arabs, namely English speakers. Both translations are widely 
accepted by Muslim scholars and were well-known long before their espousal by Saudi 
Arabia. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia played a significant role in their dispersal through the 
King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an in al-Madīnah, distributing 
them free to millions of pilgrims every year as well as to non-Arabic countries. As for 
Ṣaḥīḥ International and Abd-al-Halīm’s renditions, the reason that led to choosing these 
two translations is that they can be seen as current translations, as well as the interesting 
background of the translators. Here is a brief overview of the four selected translations 
arranged chronologically: 
3.7.1 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2001) 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, also known as Yusuf Ali (1872-1952) (for biographical details see 
Sherif, 1994), was an Indian Islamic scholar, who studied English literature at Cambridge 
University (Al-Jabari, 2008, p. 11) and was cultivated and immensely knowledgeable in 
Western culture as he claims in his preface of his first edition of 1937 (Ali, 1937, p. iii). 
Therefore, Ali had a natural bent for the English language. His grasp of the English 
language is praised by several critics. For example, Kidwai, who offered several 
assessments on various English translations of the Qur’an, believes that Ali is 
undoubtedly “one of the few Muslims who enjoyed an excellent command over the 
English language”, which is noticeably reflected in his translation (1987, p. 68). Kidwai 
adds that though Ali’s method of translation “is more of a paraphrase than a literal 
translation … it faithfully represents the sense of the original” (ibid.). Additionally, Sadiq 
(2010, p. 7) claims that Ali’s translation “is couched in chaste English, with a choice of 
                                                
29 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Abdullah Yusuf Ali without transliteration. 
30 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad Al-Hilali without transliteration. 
31 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad Khan without transliteration. 
32 Henceforth, we will refer to them as Saheeh International without transliteration as stated in their 
translation, though the cover states Ṣaḥeeḥ International. 
33 Henceforth, we will refer to him as Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem as written in his translation. 
 -85- 
words that is close to the original and scholarly notes”. This led Ali’s translation to 
become one of the most popular and widely used translations. 
However, like any other English translations of the meaning of the Qur’an, Ali’s 
translation received some criticisms. Some of these criticisms were made by his fellow 
translators of the Qur’an. For example, Thomas. B. Irving (1985) notes that Ali’s 
translation is more acceptable as a commentary, but he accused Ali’s English of being 
overloaded with additional words that neither clarify the text nor embellish the meaning. 
True embellishment, according to Irving, “is a simple telling word that does not detract, 
but carries the mind directly to the meaning”. Furthermore, Marmaduke Pickthall 
disapproved of Ali’s style and some of his chosen vocabulary, such as the word ‘Apostle’ 
instead of ‘Messenger’ to refer to the Prophet Muhammad (Ahmed & Fatima, 2015). It is 
true that ‘apostle’ in old English (or the Latin apostolus) refers to a messenger, but then 
again in contemporary English it refers to “[T]he twelve witnesses whom Jesus Christ 
sent forth to preach his Gospel to the world” (OED). Therefore, Pickthall believes that a 
Muslim translator should not make such a mistake (cited in Nassimi, 2008; Ahmed and 
Fatima, 2015). With regards to Ali’s style and vocabulary, Iqbal (2000, p. 107) suggests 
that Ali’s attraction to the English Romantic poets had a great influence on Ali’s diction 
and choice of vocabulary in his translation. Iqbal additionally points out that Ali’s 
“commentary on the Qur'an includes 6311 footnotes, 300 pieces of running commentary 
in rhythmic prose, written in the style of blank verse” (ibid, p.108).  
An interesting criticism is the one written by Arafat (1991), in which he claims he found 
four hundred incorrect equivalents in Ali’s translation. Kidwai, however, refuted Arafat’s 
claims in his article entitled Review of "Incorrect equivalents chosen by Yusuf Ali in 
translation" (Kidwai, 1992). Kidwai indicates that Arafat’s claims “sets out to find fault" 
and "of four hundred alleged incorrect equivalents there is literally not one worthy of 
serious consideration” (also cited in Nassimi, 2008; Ahmed & Fatima, 2015).  
In addition, Ali’s translation of the Qur’anic text, according to Khaleel Mohammed’s 
view (2005), is acceptable, but there are comments in Ali’s copious footnotes, to be exact 
some of the notes towards the Jews, which are not. Mohammed claims that Ali 
“constructed his oeuvre as a polemic against Jews”, and that the footnoted comments on 
the Jews led the Los Angeles school district to prohibit the use of Ali’s translation at local 
schools. Mohammed argues that Ali’s translation is not popular as it used to be due to its 
outdated language and to the appearance of other contemporary translations. For what it 
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is worth, Ali stresses that in his translation and commentary he adopted the general sense 
of a number of exegeses (tafāsīr) belonging to different schools of thought, and that some 
of them express extreme views that he does not agree with. Among the works he referred 
to are those of aṭ-Ṭabarī, az-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍawī, and ibn Kathīr, and others, as well 
as the Qur’anic dictionary, Mufradāt alfāḍ al-Qurʾān, by al-Asfahāni (Ali, 1937, pp. xii-
xiii; Ali, 1998, pp. xix-xx; Ali, 2001, pp. xvii-xviii). 
Jassem (2001), on the other hand, provides a constructive evaluation of Ali’s translation. 
In his article, entitled Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s Translation of the Quran: An Evaluation, 
Jassem describes Ali’s translation as “sincere and honest”. Jassem indicates that Ali’s 
translation contains 6,306 notes that explain the meanings of the translated verses. Some 
of these notes are linguistic, and provide several interpretations of certain words; some 
simply clarify the meaning of the ʾāyahs, and some are “general and impressionistic”. 
What is constructive about Jassem’s evaluation is that he points out the features of Ali’s 
translation as well as a critical evaluation on the levels of language, discourse, style, 
translation method, writing mechanics, and typography. It is worth noting that Jassem’s 
description and evaluation of Ali’s translation were the editions that were edited and 
revised by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance, Saudi 
Arabia34 (Ali, 1410 H.) and Amana Publications, Maryland, USA (Ali, 1998). 
In general, Ali’s translation of the meaning of the Qur’an remains one of the most popular 
translations regardless of the criticisms mentioned earlier. Apart from the first edition 
published by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, there are two popular editions. The first edition 
is the one published by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, and 
the other is published by Amana Publications (a subsidiary of Amana Corporation) as 
noted earlier. Though the former institute did not mention the translator’s name, i.e. 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, on the cover, it did however mention his name in the preface as well 
as the reason for choosing his translation. The reason is “its distinguishing characteristics, 
such as highly elegant style, a choice of words close to the meaning of the original text, 
accompanied by scholarly notes and commentaries” (Ali, 1410 H., p. vi). According to 
Jassem (2001), the editing and revision made by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, 
IFTA, Call and Guidance on Ali’s translation were in fact marginal. One can notice that 
                                                
34 Edited and revised through four committees appointed by the Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, 
Call and Guidance, and then published by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran, 
Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah, under the auspices of the Ministry of Hajj and Endowments, Saudi 
Arabia. 
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the words ‘Apostle’ and ‘God’, which Ali was criticised for interpreting لوسر and ﷲ have 
been changed to ‘Messenger’ and the transliteration ‘Allah’ respectively. The preface 
included other Arabic words that they believe cannot be translated correctly into English 
and therefore decided to transliterate them with a brief explanatory note for each word at 
its first occurrence in the text (ibid, p. xii; for a list of Arabic words explained see p. xiii). 
The obvious thing about this revised edition is that the poems and introduction for each 
sūrah that appear in the edition of Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf are omitted. However, It 
should be noted that the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an have 
decided recently to espouse and subsidise another translation of the meaning of the Holy 
Qur’an, namely the translation of al-Hilāli and Khān. 
As for the editing and revision made by the latter institute, i.e. Amana Publications, they 
are very similar to that made by the former institute, i.e. the King Fahd Complex for the 
Printing of the Holy Qur’an. The name of the translator, however, is printed on the cover; 
the poems and introductions are left untouched. The revisions were made by several 
committees, and the last review was made by the International Institute of Islamic 
Thought (IIIT, an organisation based in the USA). According to IIIT, they revised both 
the content and form, but most of the substantial changes were made in the explanatory 
footnotes and appendices (for more details see Ali, 2001, pp. ix-x).   
3.7.2 Muhammad Taqi-ad-Din al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1417 
H. [1996]) 
Muhammad Taqi-ad-Din al-Hilali (1894–1987) was a Moroccan-born scholar of Tunisian 
descent. Al-Hilali received his education in Morocco, Egypt, and Germany, where he 
gained his doctorate from Berlin University. He was interested in Arabic grammar and 
tajwīd as well as Hadith, and worked as professor of Islamic Faith and Teachings at the 
Islamic University in al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah, Saudi Arabia. Al-Hilali had a good 
command of both English and German (Darussalam Publications, n.d.).  Muhammad 
Muhsin Khan (born in 1927 in Qasur, Punjab Province, Pakistan, of Afghan descent) 
gained his degree in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Punjab (Lahore, 
Pakistan) and worked at the University Hospital for a period of time. He then went to the 
UK where he obtained his Diploma of Chest Diseases from the University of Wales. 
Later, Khan moved to Saudi Arabia where he worked as the Director of El-Sadad Hospital 
for Chest Diseases in Ta’if, and then as the Chief of the Department of Chest Diseases at 
King Fahad Hospital in al-Madīnah. Finally, Khan worked as Director of the Medical 
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Centre of the Islamic University in al-Madīnah (Dar-us-Salam Publications, n.d). 
According to Nassimi (2008, p. 83), Khan later went back to the UK where he settled. 
The collaboration between the two scholars first began approximately in 1969, in 
Madinah, when al-Hilali assisted Khan by editing his translation of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 
(Nassimi, 2008). Later, they both decided to translate the meaning of the Qur’an based 
on the exegesis of Ibn Kathīr accompanied by notes from Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. This 
translation entitled Explanatory English translation of the meaning of the Holy Qur'an: a 
summarized version of ibn Kathīr supplemented by at-Ṭabarī with comments from Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Bukhārī was, as Nassimi (2008) claims, first published in Turkey in 1974 after being 
“examined by a group of experts consisting of Dr. M. Amin al-Misri, Professor Abdul 
Rahim, and Mohiuddin H. Azami” (ibid, p. 84: cf. Jassem, 2014). According to Jassem 
(2014), this edition was later published in the USA in 1994. Jassem adds that this earlier 
edition “was later removed from circulation” and substituted by the one published in 
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) in 1994 by Darussalam Publications after several editions and 
reprints. Regardless of this issue, what is sure is that both scholars continued to revise and 
edit their latest translation which came out (Nassimi, 2008) in 1985, with two revised 
editions, a detailed edition in nine volumes and a summarised edition in one volume. The 
latter was printed under the title of Interpretation of the meanings of the Noble Qur'an in 
the English language: a summarized version of al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi, and ibn Kathir with 
comments from Sahih al-Bukhari Summarized in One Volume (ibid; cf. Jassem, 2014). 
It appears that later al-Hilali and Khan’s translation gained the admiration of the King 
Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran, which therefore decided to adopt and 
subsidise al-Hilali and Khan’s translation instead of Ali’s (Wild, 2015). Al-Hilali and 
Khan’s translation was revised by a panel of four PhD holders, Faḍl ʾIlāhī Ẓahīr, ʾAmīn 
ad-Dīn abū Bakr, Wajīh ᶜAbd-ar-Raḥmān, and F. ᶜAbd-ar-Raḥīm, appointed by the King 
Fahd Complex (al-Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996], p. II). It was then published under the 
title of The Noble Quran: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary (al-
Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996]) after gaining approval from the Saudi Presidency of 
Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance (ibid, p. I). Jassem (2014, p. 238) believes 
that the changes made by the four PhD holders “were few and non-substantial”; hence, 
the main text is no different from the one published by Dar-us-Salam Publications. 
Though this edition (as well as the previous editions) is considered one of the most widely 
disseminated translations of the meaning of the Qur’an throughout the English-speaking 
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world, it was criticised like Ali’s and other translations. That said, one should take into 
consideration the constructive criticisms and pay no attention to those that seem 
destructive, biased against a specific religious denomination, or which do not add 
significance to the field of translation studies. It is unfortunate that there are some who 
might criticise a translation to achieve a hidden agenda, or just because it does not comply 
with his/her ideology. Lance Hewson (2011, p. 2) notes the following: 
Highly negative comments are not just the prerogative of reviewers. Scholars 
who address the issue of translation from a wide variety of perspectives are 
also prone to pouring scorn on the translator’s work when the published 
translation does not conform to the scholar’s own poetics. 
An example of a destructive criticism can be seen in Stefan Wild’s (2015) article entitled 
Muslim Translators and Translations of the Qur’an into English. Wild notes that Ali’s 
translation, which was adopted and subsidised by the King Fahad Complex, was 
grievously criticised by, what he calls, “Saudi Salafī scholars” without giving an example 
or even naming one of the so-called scholars. Furthermore, Wild states that Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali is a ‘Bohra Shi'ite’ and that Shi'ites are very unwelcome in Saudi Arabia. If 
that was true, as he claims, then why did the King Fahad Complex adopt and subsidise 
Ali’s translation in the first place? Moreover, while Wild agrees with Khaleel Mohammed 
(2005) comments on Ali’s work of being “a polemic against Jews”, he, himself, later 
accuses al-Hilali and Khan’s translation of being anti-Semitic and anti-Christian. In his 
attempt to prove his view, he compares al-Hilali and Khan’s translation of [Q. 1:6-7] to 
Ali’s translation indicating that the latter translation did not mention anything about Jews 
or Christians whereas as the former did, totally forgetting his previous comments on Ali. 
Wild should recognise that al-Hilali and Khan’s interpretation were based on traditional 
exegetical literature, and most importantly during the exegetes’ epoch, denominational 
conflicts did not exist like nowadays. Overall, it seems that Wild’s criticism towards al-
Hilali and Khan’s work may be one-track minded, and is based mainly on Khaleel 
Mohammed’s views. He did, however, mention one assessment by Kidwai (1987) and 
another by Ahmad Zaki Hammad, after describing them as ‘conservative Muslims’. The 
only remarks made by Kidwai (1987) on al-Hilali and Khan’s work, in his Survey of 
English translations of the Quran, is that he did not consider them as well as some other 
works as significant ventures in the field of Qur’anic translations. 
At this point we have to aver that this study is not in favour of a specific translation. One 
cannot say that al-Hilali and Khan’s translation, or any other translation, is flawless, since 
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“[t]here is no such thing as perfect, ideal, or ‘correct’ translation” (Newmark, 1988, p. 6). 
The former Saudi Minister for Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wah and Guidance, and 
the Supervisor General of the King Fahad Complex, Dr Abdullah al-Turki, elucidates in 
the foreword of al-Hilali and Khan’s translation the following: 
We are aware of the fact that the translation of the meaning of the Glorious 
Qur’an, however accurate it may be, must fall short of conveying the meaning 
that the miraculous text of the original conveys; and that the meaning 
conveyed by translation is only the sum total of what the translator has 
understood from the text of the Glorious Book of Allah, and cannot escape 
the defects and drawbacks that are inherent in every human endeavour (al-
Hilali & Khan, 1417 H. [1996], p. iii). 
Furthermore, al-Turki clearly requests every reader to provide “the Complex with any 
mistakes, omission or addition that he [sic] may find” in al-Hilali and Khan’s translation 
so that they be removed in following editions (ibid.).   
As for constructive criticism, this can be seen in the works of Jassem (2008; 2014). 
Jassem’s views on al-Hilali and Khan’s work are based on academic analysis. In 2008, 
Jassem analysed the use of discourse markers in al-Hilali and Khan’s translation, and in 
2014, he conducted a linguistic, stylistic, and discourse analysis. He reached the 
conclusion that al-Hilali and Khan’s work is filled with grammatical, lexical, stylistic, 
and discourse errors. Jassem argues that the translators were too faithful in adhering to 
SL norms, linguistically and stylistically, to the detriment of the TL norms. Therefore, 
the translation, in Jassem’s view, is too literal, fiddly, and unlike the original text, 
significantly detracting from the joy of reading and comprehension. He draws attention 
to the necessity of revising and reconstructing the translation according to the TL structure 
and, at the same time, maintaining the intended meaning of the source text (for more 
details see Jassem, 2008; 2014). 
3.7.3 Saheeh International (1997/2004): 
Saheeh International is group of three women residing in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It 
comprises Umm Muhammad, Aminah Assami (believed to be the primary translator), 
Amatullah J. Bantley (the executive director of Dar Abul-Qasim Publishing House), and 
Mary M. Kennedy (an English editor). They were respectively born in southern California 
in 1940, Rochester, Minnesota in 1966, Orlando, Florida in 1965, and embraced Islam in 
1974, 1986, and 1985 (Saheeh International, 2010). It looks like all three are well 
educated. Umm Muhammad attended a two years intensive Arabic course and a one-year 
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Arabic grammar course at Damascus University (Syria) as well as adopting a self-learning 
process in the field of Islamic studies, such as tafsīr and fiqh. Umm Muhammad has been 
lecturing in tafsīr and the basics of fiqh at an Islamic centre in Jeddah since 1991, and has 
authored and revised several Islamic books in English (ibid.). Bantley holds a degree in 
Business Management, while Kennedy holds a degree in English/Business Pre-Law 
major from Florida State University. 
In an interview, Saheeh International point out that when they commenced their 
translation project, they had two main objectives. The first was to present meanings 
compatible with the creed of the people of the tradition of Muhammad and the consensus 
of the community of Muslims ( ﻞهأ ةديقع ةنѧѧѧѧѧѧѧسلا ةعامجلاو ).  The second objective, was to 
present a simple and clarified rendition, which was ‘as close as possible to the Arabic 
wording’ for the students’ interest (Abul-Majd, 2012) 35 . Their translation, which is 
entitled The Qur’an: English Meanings, is not based on any other translation as some 
may believe it to be36; in fact, they preferred to start from scratch avoiding personal 
interpretations and relying on authentic explanations and Hadiths by the most 
knowledgeable of the Companions and followers of the Prophet Muhammad (ibid). They 
believe that they tried their best to avoid errors made by other translators, such as placing 
Hadiths or explanations within the text, which could cause some confusion. Additionally, 
Saheeh International draw attention to the significance of using proper grammar and 
punctuation in presenting an accurate meaning. 
It is worth noting that there are three editions of Saheeh International’s translation. The 
first edition was published by Abul-Qasim Publishing House between 1997 and 2001. 
The second edition has been published by al-Muntada al-Islami Trust in 2001. The third 
edition is edited by A. B. al-Mehri, and published in 2010 by Maktabah Booksellers and 
Publishers in Birmingham (U.K.). 
 
                                                
35 Another Interview was made with the primary translator (Umm Muhammad) by Faraz Omar (2015), 
which is available at: https://www.muslimink.com/feb-2015/180-interview-umm-muhammad-saheeh-
intl  
36 A couple of people based in Copenhagen (Denmark) claim in their online Quran Project that Saheeh 
International have based their work on al-Hilali and Khan’s translation (available at: http://al-
quran.info/pages/language/english). Also, Clay Chip Smith, an American who converted to Islam, 
includes in his notes on English Quran translations the same view. He does, however, state that Saheeh 
International’s rendition is attractive and useable. 
     (available at: http://www.claychipsmith.com/English_Translations.htm). 
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3.7.4 Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem (2005): 
Muhammad Abd-al-Wahhab Muhammad Saeed Abd-al-Ḥaleem, who is mostly known 
as Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem, was born in Egypt and received his education at al-
Azhar (Egypt) and the University of Cambridge (U.K.). He is currently a professor of 
Islamic studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), director of the 
Centre of Islamic Studies, member of the Centre for Translation Studies (CTS) at the 
University of London, and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Qur'anic 
Studies. Abdel Haleem’s interest in Qur’anic studies can be noticed through his several 
publications, such as Context and Internal Relationships: Keys to Qur'anic Exegesis 
(Abdel-Haleem, 1993), Understanding the Qur'an: Themes and Style (Abdel Haleem, 
1999), and Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic usage (Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 
2008). It appears that Abdel Haleem’s interest in the Qur’an is not something new. It is 
believed that his father, Muhammad Saeed, who was one of al-Azhar scholars, had a great 
influence on him, and was the person who encouraged him to memorise the whole Qur’an 
from his early years. 
In 1965, Abdel Haleem began his academic career teaching Arabic at the University of 
Cambridge, where he gained his PhD degree in Arabic literature. After two years, he 
moved to SOAS and began teaching Arabic literature. In the mid 80’s, Abdel Haleem 
decided to devote most of his time to Qur’anic studies. He contributed to establishing the 
Centre of Islamic Studies at SOAS in 1995, and the Journal of Qur'anic Studies in 1999. 
In 2004, Abdel Haleem published his translation of the Qur’an and another edition was 
published the following year with some corrections. In his introduction, Abdel Haleem 
proclaims that this translation is meant to go further than the previous translations “in 
accuracy, clarity, flow, and currency of language” (Abdel Haleem, 2005, p. xxix). He 
asserts that he tried to avoid the use of cryptic language or archaisms and opted to use 
contemporary language along with an easy style, so that every English speaker can 
comprehend the translation without difficulty (ibid.). An example of his use of 
contemporary language, compared to some other previous works, can be seen in his 
interpretation of the kināyah phrase مِهِرا َѧѧѧѧبَْدأ ٰﻰَلَع اوﱡد َѧѧѧѧتْرا in [Q. 47:25]. Abdel Haleem’s 
rendition is ‘those who turn on their heels’ (back translation:  نيذلا ءﻻوهنوولي ﻰلع مهلوحك ), 
while Saheeh International, al-Hilali and Khan, and Ali’s renditions are ‘those who 
reverted back [to disbelief]’ (back translation:  نيذلا ءﻻوه[ناميﻹا مدعل] فلخلل نودوعي ), ‘those 
who have turned back (have apostated)’ (back translation:  نيذلا ءﻻوه اودترا] فلخلل نولبلقي
[ةديقع وأ نيد نع), and ‘those who turn back as apostates’ (back translation:  نيذلا ءﻻوه
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ةديقع وأ نيد نع نودترملاك فلخلل نولبلقي) respectively. The phrase ‘spin/turn on one’s heel’ is 
a contemporary expression referring to a person who all of a sudden turns away from 
someone, especially in an angry or rude way. Therefore, Abdel Haleem’s choice is 
contemporary, and can be easily comprehended within the context unlike the other 
translations, where some had to include explanations between brackets to convey the 
meaning.      
Abdel Haleem did not only chose contemporary language, but style too, i.e. paragraphing 
and punctuation. He states that “[i]n order to clarify the meaning and structure of thoughts 
and to meet the expectation of modern readers, the present translation divides the material 
into paragraphs” (ibid, p. xxxiv). He also points out the Qur’an has its own system of 
marking pauses, which is different from today’s conventional system of commas, full 
stops, colons and semicolons, question marks, dashes, quotation marks, and suchlike. 
Therefore, he decided to introduce today’s conventional system of punctuation to make 
the translation more comprehensible.   
Abdel Haleem’s introduction, in general, includes useful information on the importance 
of context, identifying aspects of meaning, Arabic structure and idioms, and pronouns 
while interpreting the meaning of the Qur’anic discourse. It includes information on some 
of the methods and tools that he used in his translation. For example, the classical Arabic 
dictionaries and exegetes consulted in his translation were Lisān al-ʿArab, al-Qamūs al-
Muḥīṭ, Muʿjam al-Wasīṭ (ibid, p. xxxiii) and ar-Rāzī, Abū Ḥayyān, and al-Bayaḍawī 
respectively (ibid, p. xxxv). 
Abdel Haleem’s translation has been admired by several scholars and intellectuals. For 
instance, Shah (2010) notes that one of the features of Abdel Haleem’s work is the brevity 
he applied in his translation, both in the number of words used in the rendition and 
footnotes. Correspondingly, in her review on Abdel Haleem’s work, Kolkailah (2010) 
believes that his translation transcends previous translations’ flaws in clarity, accuracy, 
and contemporaneity of language. She argues that unlike previous translators, Abdel 
Haleem avoids using archaic language or direct and literal translations that hinder the 
reader’s comprehension. Therefore, Kolkailah surmises that the language used by Abdel 
Haleem in his work is possibly one of his utmost endeavours. In her view, Abdel Haleem 
was able to merge ‘authenticity with originality’ and convey the meaning of the Qur’an 
from what she calls ‘classical Islamic works’ in a comprehensible language. Kolkailah is 
also impressed by the way Abdel Haleem deals with the shifts in pronouns that sometimes 
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exist within an ʾāyah that cannot be translated into English. She points out that Abdel 
Haleem tends to clarify these pronouns by inserting “bracketed notes of who is being 
addressed”. Rippin (2004) too is impressed by Abdel Haleem’s translation and seems to 
concur with its devotees, particularly Abdel Haleem’s avoidance of archaic words, such 
as the King James’s English “thee” and “thou,”.      
Khaleel Mohammed (2005), in his assessment of some translations of the Qur’an, is also 
impressed with Adel Haleem’s command of the English language, yet he expresses some 
criticism that can be seen as bizarre. For example, Mohammed disapproves of Abdel’ 
Haleem’s approach in writing his introduction, particularly the contents included in the 
introduction. In Mohammed’s view, Abdel Haleem’s introduction “reflects the old-age 
Muslim tradition”. Above all, Mohammed questions the authenticity of the Muslim 
stories mentioned in the introduction, and posits that Abdel Haleem, who is a Professor 
of Islamic studies, was not conscious of “the haziness of early Islamic history”. He claims 
that Abdel Haleem incorporated his doctrinal bias into his translation; while on the 
contrary, it looks as if Mohammed is the one who is incorporating his doctrinal bias in 
his assessment. It also appears that Mohammed is influenced by the revisionist theories 
of Patricia Crone and Michael Cook (1976), John Wansbrough (1978), Andrew Rippin 
(1988), Michael Cook (2000), and Christoph Luxenberg (2000), and insists on the 
importance of incorporating such theories in elucidating the Qur’an. In addition, it seems 
that Mohammed misinterprets Fazlur Rahman’s argument regarding the meaning of the 
word سفن in the Qur’an (see Mohammed, 2005 and Rahman, 1980, p. 12). To elaborate, 
Mohammed claims that the word سفن should be rendered as ‘self’ instead of ‘soul’. He 
wrongly disapproves of Abdel Haleem’s translation of سفن and accuses him of rendering 
it as ‘soul’ throughout his work, which is untrue. For instance, Abdel Haleem translates 
سفن in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 2:72] and [Q. 2:155] as ‘soul’, ‘someone’, and ‘lives’ respectively 
drawing on their different contexts. It is worth pointing out that the word ‘soul’ in English, 
according to some dictionaries like Oxford English Dictionary (OED) or Longman 
Dictionary of Contemporary English can mean a person. Likewise, Rahman (1980, p. 
120) points out in his glossary that سفن not only means ‘self’ but also ‘person’. 
Additionally, we would like to point out that, throughout his translation, Abdel Haleem 
translates the Devine name ‘Allah’ as ‘God’, which may be satisfying to some, such as 
Mohammed (2005). Mohammed claims that it is a clever choice and wonders why many 
Muslims do not accept the word ‘God’ as a ‘functional rendition’. According to his 
judgement, this refusal has led to the misapprehension that Muslims worship a different 
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God than the Judeo-Christian creator. This may not be true; a quick look at some 
dictionaries, for instance, OED, Cambridge English Dictionary, or Merriam-Webster, will 
show that the word ‘Allah’ is the name of God used by Muslims and Arab Christians. If 
Mohammed’s judgement were true, the majority of dictionaries would refer to the word 
‘Allah’ as the God of Muslims only, which is not the case.  Accordingly, we believe that 
there is nothing wrong with transliterating the Arabic Divine name ﷲ as ‘Allah’, 
especially if we take into consideration that the aim of translating the Qur’an, in the first 
place, is for non-Arabic speakers to perceive and appreciate its meanings (for information 
on the Divine names of Allah and their translations see Gamard, 1996/2010; Amjad & 
Farahani, 2013; Hashemi, 2014; Al Ghamdi, 2015). 
3.8 Comprehension, the Qur’an’s genre, translation, and Qur’anic 
exegeses 
The term ‘genre’ is commonly used within the linguistic sphere “to refer to a distinctive 
type of text” (Baker, et al., 2006, p. 77). Within the field of TS, concerning the translation 
of the Qur’an, the phrase ‘genre of the Qur’an’ is also widely used. Muslims, in general, 
whether translators, scholars, linguists, scientists, or theologians strongly aver the Qur’an 
is inimitable and has its own unique genre (cf. Abdul-Raof, 2001; Saeed, 2008; Khan and 
Jabir, 2016). The reason behind this is simply that the Qur’an is not the production of 
humankind, but the words of the Almighty Allah, as shown in the āyahs mentioned earlier 
in this chapter. 
Abdul-Raof (2001) asserts that Qur’anic discourse is full of linguistic and rhetorical 
devices that interlock with each other to form its unique and eloquent genre (cf. Khan and 
Jabir, 2016). These linguistic and rhetorical features, of which kināyah is one, are Qur’an-
specific, which makes them difficult or probably impossible to render in another 
language. Saeed (2008, p. 128) clarifies “that even if it were possible to translate 
individual words into another language, other stylistic, linguistic and rhetorical features 
of the Qur’an which are essential to its meaning would be lost”. Therefore, Muslim 
scholars, such as ᶜṭṭiyah Ṣaqr, former head of the Azhar Fatwa Committee of Egypt, 
explains that the “translations of the Qur’an can never be considered as a Qur’an in itself, 
in its rulings and sacredness”. He adds that no matter how great an effect a translation has 
on one, “it can never have the same grandiloquent effect and beauty of the Qur’an itself” 
nor does it “enjoy the same lofty standard of the original one; it does not bear the sense 
of miracles initiated by Allah Almighty” (ibid.). This view is also appreciated by some 
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non-Muslim scholars, such as Forster Fitzgerald Arbuthnot, a British translator and 
orientalist, who states “ … that though several attempts have been made to produce a 
work equal to it as far as elegant writing is concerned, none has as yet succeeded” (cited 
in Risha, 2015). Arthur J. Arberry, a British orientalist and former Professor of Arabic at 
Oxford, mentioned in the preface to his translation of the meaning of the Qur’an that “the 
rhetoric and rhythm of the Arabic of the Koran are so characteristic, so powerful, so 
highly emotive, that any version whatsoever is bound in the nature of things to be but a 
poor copy of the glittering splendour of the original” (Arberry, 1955, p. 24). Last but not 
least, Jacobus Naudé states that “[m]uch of the majesty and aesthetic appeal of the Qur’ān 
resides in its sound. No existing translation in English reflects the language-dependent 
nature of the performance of the Qur’ān” (Naudé, 2006, p. 462; 2010, p. 291). 
In the light of the above, translating the Qur’an into another language and, at the same 
time, maintaining its whole style of discourse, including its syntactic, phonetic/prosodic, 
rhetorical, and structural features is quite impossible, and no one has ever fulfilled the 
challenge presented in the Qur’an. Correspondingly, translating the meanings of the 
Qur’an and maintaining its whole style is quite impossible too. However, translating the 
meanings and sacrificing some stylistic features, or vice versa, seems quite possible, but 
daunting. That is to say, one must lay out his/her priorities according to the purpose of 
one’s translation. The interlock of context and purpose of translation have an impact on 
the translation process (cf. Dickins et al., 2002, p. 25), as it “will often rule out some 
strategies and favour others” (Baker, 2011, p. 18). To put it differently, a competent 
translator with proper knowledge of both the SL and the TL, in terms of their linguistic, 
rhetorical, and cultural features, should identify the type of ST, fully understand it, 
recognise its salient features, and then clarify the purpose of the whole translation (cf. 
Dickins et al., 2002). Once these procedures have been pinpointed, the translator can 
ascertain what to translate, what to sacrifice, and how, according to the purpose of the 
translation. However, the translator should always remember that languages are in general 
asymmetrical, i.e. there is no such thing as “a perfect match between languages” (Nida & 
Taber, 1969, p. 5). This asymmetry is what causes the translator to come upon situations 
in the source language text (SLT) that are untranslatable into the target language text 
(TLT) or can be translated but poorly, which in both cases are a loss in translation. 
Therefore, it is said that loss in translation is generally inevitable (ibid., p.21-25; cf. Adab, 
1996, p. 32), let alone the translation of the inimitable language of the Qur’an (for further 
information on loss in translation of the Qur’an see As-Safi, 2006; Abdelwali, 2007; 
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Abdul-Raof, 2011). However, such situations of non-equivalence can be managed by 
several translation techniques or procedures to compensate or reduce the amount of loss 
(see Baker2001, p. 18-44; Dickins, et al., 2002, pp. 18-25). One of the common translation 
procedures in Qur’an translations is using a loan word plus explanation as in the 
translation of the word ‘ملاظلا’ in [Q. 25:27] by Al-Hilālī and Khān (1996): 
 َمَْويَو﴿ :ناقرفلا] ﴾... ِهَْيدَي ﻰَلَع ُمِلا ﱠظلا ﱡضََعي27[ 
(And the Day when the Zalim (wrongdoer, oppressor, polytheist, etc.) ...) [Q. 
25:27]. 
Another common translation procedure that can be found in Qur’anic translation is 
explanatory translation (also known as translation by exegesis or translation by 
paraphrase). This method is useful to clarify certain phrases in a ST phrase that holds two 
meaning at once, or is not lexicalized in the TL. The explanation may be presented within 
the text or in footnotes. For example, the phrase ‘ ِبَطَحْلا ََةلا ﱠمَح’ (lit. carrier of firewood) in 
[Q. 111:4], according to the exegetical literature, it can refer to its literal meaning, and it 
could be a kināyah for back-stabbing/slander. Al-Hilālī and Khān (1996) present their 
explanation of the phrase between brackets and within the text, while Abdel Haleem 
(2005) presents his explanation in a footnote. Abdul-Raof (2001, p. 140) notes that “[a] 
footnote or even  an  extended  commentary  can  function  as  a  torch  that  can penetrate  
the  fog  of both  language  and  culture-specific  religious  words and concepts;  by  doing  
so,  we  can  guarantee  that  at  least  some misconceptions  diminish”. 
The loss in translation cannot be managed without fully understanding the ST. In the case 
of Qur’anic translation, understanding the context is of paramount importance. Von 
Denffer (1984) stresses that decoding the words of the Qur’an is one of the essential steps 
to understand the message of the Qur’an. There are two main methods to decode and 
understand the meanings of the Qur’an: through the Qur’an itself and through Prophetic 
Hadiths. The contribution of the Prophet Muhammad in the explanation and interpretation 
of the Qur’an is clearly stated in [Q. 16:44], which says ﴿ َل ُِّزن اَم ِساﱠنلِل َّنِيَُبتِل َرّْكِذلا َكَْيلِإ اَنْلَزَْنأَو
 ْمِهَْيِلإ﴾  “We have revealed to you the Qur’an so that you can explain to people what was 
sent down for them” (Abdul-Raof, 2010, p. xv). In addition to the Qur’an and the 
Prophetic Hadith, classical Arabic lexicons and specialised Qur’anic dictionaries are of 
great assistance in understanding the Qur’anic phrases. On this account, this study has 
decided to consult one of the pre-eminent classical Arabic lexicons, Lisān al-ᶜArab by Ibn 
Manẓūr (1980). This not only provides semantic details on a lexical level, but in some 
cases, it presents details on a figurative level. Another dictionary used in this study and 
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having a similar eminency to Lisān al-ᶜArab is An Arabic-English Lexicon by Edward 
Lane (1968). Other dictionaries used in this study are Muᶜjam al-Lughati al-ᶜArabīyati al-
Muᶜāṣirah (ᶜUmar, 2008), and al-Muᶜjamu al-Wasīṭ (Muṣṭafa, et al., 2004). The 
specialised Qur’anic dictionaries used here are Muᶜjam ʾal-fāḍ al-Qur’ān al-Karīm 
(Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabīyah, 1989), A Dictionary and Glossary of the Kor-ān: 
with copious grammatical references and explanations of the text (Penrice, 1991), 
Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an: With References and Explanation of the Text (Farid, 
2006), and Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage (Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 
2008). Such Qur’anic dictionaries provide the intended meaning of a phrase in various 
parts of the Qur’an.  
Despite the great assistance such dictionaries provide in understanding Qur’anic phrases, 
of paramount importance is the exegetical literature. If dictionaries are seen as the 
soulmates of a translator, then exegetical literature is the ultimate soulmate while 
translating the meaning of the Qur’an. The pre-eminence of the exegetical literature is 
because the majority of such literature, if not all, includes all the elements required to 
comprehend the Qur’an: intertextual references, i.e. ʾāyahs explaining other ʾāyahs, 
Prophetic Hadiths, linguistic and rhetorical explanations, and in some cases the 
circumstances of the revelations (asbāb al-nuzūl) are included. Abdul-Raof (2001; 2010) 
notes that there are three prominent schools of exegesis: the Meccan School, the Medinan 
School, and the Iraqi School, led by ᶜAbd Allah bin ᶜAbbās, Ubay bin Kaᶜb, and ᶜAbd 
Allah bin Masᶜūd respectively. Abdul-Raof (ibid.) also explains that the main categories 
of exegesis are linguistic, philosophical and rationalistic, historical, intertextual, 
jurisprudential, and independent judgemental. Since this study is related to the translation 
of kināyah, the concentration will be mainly on exegetes who shed light on the semantic 
and rhetorical features of the Qur’anic discourse. This study will consult the following 
exegetical literature: 
1- Tafsīr az-Zamakhsharī (1998a): One of the well-known linguistic exegetes is 
Jār-Allah ʾabū al-Qāsim Muḥammad az-Zamakhsharī (467 H. - 538 H.), the 
author of al-Kashshāf ᶜan Ḥaqāʾiq Ghawāmiḍ at-Tanzīl wa ᶜUyūn al-ʾAqāwīl fi 
Wujūh at-Taʾwīl. Abdul-Raof points out that az-Zamakhsharī “stresses the 
aesthetic values of Qur'anic discourse and provides interesting rhetorical and 
semantic analysis of the Qur'an” (2001, pp. 176-177; cf. Ibraheem, 2003; adh-
Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 373). 
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2- Tafsīr at-Ṭabarī (2001): Muḥammad bin Jarīr at-Ṭabarī (224 H. – 310 H.) is one 
of the eminent exegetes and the author of Jāmiᶜ al-Bayān ᶜan Taʾwīl ʾāyi al-
Qurʾān. In his explanations, at-Ṭabarī tends to focus on the semantic features 
together with the shades of meaning of the words and structures of the Qur’an via 
“linguistic and syntactic analyses with heavy reference to classical poetry and 
grammarians’ views” (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 176). 
3- Tafsīr ar-Rāzī (1981): Muḥammad ar-Rāzī (544 H. – 606 H.) also known as 
Fakhr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī (503 H. - 606 H.), a theologian, philosopher and the author 
of the well-known exegesis Mafātīh al-Ghayb, also known as Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Ar-
Rāzī’s exegesis falls under the type of exegesis known as philosophical and 
rationalistic exegesis, that is “concerned with explaining and refuting 
philosophers’ views and arguments” (ibid.). Nevertheless, his exegesis sheds light 
on several rhetorical features of the Qur’an. He was interested in showing the 
elegance of style and composition in the Qur’an. Ar-Rāzī was influenced by al-
Jurjānī’s theory of Qur’anic composition and this is reflected in his exegesis (al-
Khāldī, 2008, pp. 483-484). One of the many books he wrote is Nihāyat al-Ījāz fi 
Dirāyat al-Iᶜjāz (ar-Rāzī, 2004) on Arabic rhetoric and its relation with the 
inimitability of the Qur’an. As a theologian and philosopher, ar-Rāzī was 
interested in several fields, such as Islamic Jurisprudence, Qur’anic exegesis, 
science of discourse (ᶜilm al-kalām), and Arabic rhetoric (adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 
253).  
4- Tafsīr Abū Ḥayyān (1993): Muḥammad bin Yūsuf bin Ḥayyān (654 H. – 745 
H.), also known as abū Ḥayyān al-Gharnāṭī/al-ʾAndalusī, was a notable linguist 
and the author of al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. In his exegesis, Abū Ḥayyān provides a 
comprehensive syntactic and semantic explanation of Qur'anic structures and 
words. An-Najdī (1412 H., p. 38) argues that abū Ḥayyān expatiated on syntactic, 
morphological, and grammatical explanation of the Qur’anic structure to such an 
extent that his book seems as if it were a book of syntax rather than a Qur’anic 
exegesis. Nonetheless, abū Ḥayyān does not neglect jurisprudential matters and 
rhetorical aspects of the Qur’an (ibid.; Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 90). Moreover, he 
explains the different views of exegetes on these matters. He makes his exegetical 
approach clear to the reader in his preface (see Āl Jaʿfar & al-Sarḥān, 1980, p. 
130; Abū Ḥayyān, 1993, pp. 99-101; al-Khāldī, 2008, pp. 443-446; adh-Dhahabī, 
2012a, pp. 272-274). 
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5- Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (2006): Muḥammad bin Aḥmad al-Ansārī, also known as abū 
ᶜAbd-Allah Muḥammad al- al-Qurṭabī (d. 671 H.). His twenty-volume exegesis 
on the Qur’an is called al-Jāmiᶜu li ʾAḥkāmi al-Qurʾān, wa al-Mubayyinu limā 
Taḍammanahu min al-Sunnati Waʾāyi al-Furqān (al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Al-
Qurṭubī’s work is considered a comprehensively detailed exegesis that 
concentrates mainly on jurisprudential issues with reference to Hadith and 
explicates the different views of other exegetes and theologians on these matters. 
However, his exegesis includes semantic/syntactic matters with some reference to 
classical poetry (an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 25; adh-Dhahabī, 2012b, p. 402). 
6- Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī (1998): ᶜAbd-Allah bin ᶜUmar bin Muḥammad bin ᶜAlī al-
Bayḍāwī ash-Shirāzī ash-Shāfiᶜī, also known as al-Qāḍī Naṣir ad-Dīn abū al-
Khayr al-Bayḍāwī. His explanation on the Qur'an entitled ʾAnwār al-Tanzīl wa 
ʾAsrār at-Taʾwīl is considered a condensed version of az-Zamakhsharī, ar-Rāzī, 
and ar-Rāghib’s exegeses (see Maḥmūd, 2000, p. 243; al-Khāldī, 2008, p. 427; 
Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 84; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, pp. 254-255). 
7- Tafsīr ash-Shawkānī (2007): Muḥammad bin ᶜAli bin ᶜAbd-Allah ash-Shawkānī 
(1173 H. – 1250 H.). From the title of his commentary on the Qur’an, Fatḥ al-
Qadīr, al-Jāmiᶜu bayna al-Riwāyah wa ad-Dirāyah min ᶜilm at-Tafsīr, ash-
Shawkānī combines two methods of Qur’anic exegesis, ar-riwāyah and ad-
dirāyah. The former is the act of explaining the Qur’an through traditional 
sources. Thus, it involves explaining the Qur’an through other parts of the Quran, 
Prophetic Hadith, or the sayings of the Companions. The latter is what is known 
as ijtihād (use of reason and mind) based on the aforementioned traditional 
sources to form an opinion-oriented exegesis (see ᶜAwaḍ, 2010, p. 209). Though 
the greater portion of ash-Shawkānī’s exegesis is on jurisprudential matters, it also 
takes interest in linguistic matters with reference to classical poetry (al-Najdī, 
1412 H., p. 53; cf. Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 107; adh-Dhahabī, 2012b, pp. 250-252). 
8- Tafsīr al-Alūsī (1994): Maḥmūd bin ᶜAbd-Allah al-Alūsī, also known as Shihāb-
addīn al-Alūsī (1217 H. – 1270 H.) Al-Alūsī’s exegesis entitled Rūḥ al-Maᶜānī fī 
Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ᶜAḍīm wa as-Sabᶜ al-Mathānī combines a summary of a 
number of previous exegetes, such as az-Zamakhsharī, ar-Rāzī, abū Ḥayyān, al-
Bayḍāwī, ibn ᶜAṭīyah, and abī as-Saᶜūd (al-Khāldī, 2008, p. 460; Mārdīnī, 2009, 
pp. 96-97; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, pp. 303-304). He does not entirely rely on these 
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exegetes, but also provides his personal views, especially when he disagrees with 
them (ibid.). Abdul-Raof (2001, p. 178) believes that al-Alūsī’s exegesis “is a 
mixture of a linguistic, intertextual, and jurisprudence type of exegesis, and it 
offers “a thorough syntactic account of Qur'anic structures with ample reference 
to classical poetry and proverbs” (cf. al-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 57-58). 
9- Tafsīr ash-Shinqīṭī ([2005] 1426 H.): Muḥammad al-ʾAmīn bin Muḥammad al-
Mukhtār ash-Shinqīṭī (1305 H. – 1393 H.) is considered one of the most eminent 
contemporary exegetes (cf. al-Khāldī, 2008, p. 569). Ash-Shinqīṭī’s approaches 
his exegesis, ʾAḍhwāʾ al-Bayān fī ʾIyiḍāḥ al-Qurʾān bil Qurʾān through the 
traditional methods (al-Khāldī, 2008, p. 584; al-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 89), and offers 
some linguistic analysis with reference to classical poetry (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 
178; an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 92). The only issue is that ash-Shinqīṭī passed away 
before he could complete the exegesis of the whole Qur’an. 
10- Tafsīr ibn ᶜAshūr (1984): Muḥammad at-Ṭahir bin ᶜAshūr (1296 H./1879 A.D. – 
1393 H./1973 A.D.) is also an eminent contemporary exegete (cf. al-Khāldī, 2008, 
p. 569; Mārdīnī, 2009, p. 159). Apart from his exegesis entitled At-Taḥrīr wa at-
Tanwīr, ibn ᶜ Ashūr has several published works, for example Mawjiz al-Balāghah 
(Rhetoric Outlined) and ʾUṣūl al-ʾInshāʾ wal Khaṭābah (Principles of 
Composition and Discourse) (al-Khāldī, 2008, pp. 587-589). Ibn ᶜAshūr’s 
exegesis highlights the inimitable, linguistic, semantic, and rhetorical aspects, and 
shades of meaning of Qur'anic phrases as he mentioned in the preface to his 
Qur’anic exegesis (Ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984, p. 8; cf. Maḥmūd, 2000, pp. 336-337; al-
Khāldī, 2008, pp. 590-591). 
11- Tafsīr as-Ṣābūnī (1981): Muḥammad bin ᶜAlī as-Ṣabūnī, is a contemporary 
Qur’anic scholar and exegete. He is the author of several theological books, one 
of which is his commentary on the meaning of the Qur’an entitled Ṣafwat at-
Tafāsīr. Though his exegesis is based on various previous exegetes, such as az-
Zamakhsharī, at-Ṭabarī, ibn Kathīr, al-Alūsī, abū Ḥayyān, and others, his 
explanation of the meaning of the Qur’an is simplified and presented in a 
comprehensible manner. As-Ṣābūnī points out that one of his methods in 
explaining the meaning of the Qur’an is by highlighting the linguistic and 
rhetorical aspects (as-Ṣābūnī, 1981, p. 20). As-Ṣābūnī also wrote another book, 
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Al-ʾIbdāᶜu al-Bayānī fī al-Qurʾāni al-ᶜAḍīm (2009), devoted exclusively to the 
discussion on the rhetorical features of the Qur’an. 
12- Tafsīr Riḍā (1947): Muḥammad Rashīd bin ᶜAlī Riḍā bin Muḥammad Shams-
addīn al-Qalmūnī al-Ḥusaynī, known as Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1282 H./1865 
A. D. – 1354 H. – 1935 A.D.), is one of the well-known modern exegetes. Riḍā 
studied the Qur’an under his mentor Sheikh Muḥammad ᶜAbduh and then wrote 
his Qur’anic exegesis, Tafsīr al-Qur’an aI-Ḥakīm, also known as Tafsīr al-Manār. 
Though Riḍā studied the Qur’an under his mentor, he admits after the death of his 
mentor he took a different approach in explaining the Qur’an. Riḍā adds that he 
began to rely more on the authentic Sunna while explaining an āyah in terms of 
jurisprudential matters or linguistic structures (ar-Rūmī, 1983, p. 176). Riḍā’s 
exegesis is not an extensively detailed exegesis in terms of linguistic matters; 
however, he reveals the meanings of the āyahs in a simple and comprehensible 
manner (an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 64) by shedding light on some of the rhetorical 
aspects. Riḍā did not have the chance to complete his exegesis; [Q. 12:101] was 
the last āyah he explained before he died. 
13- Tafsīr ath-Thaᶜālabī (1997): ᶜAbd al-Raḥman bin Muḥammad ath-Thaᶜālabī al-
Mālkī; his exegesis entitled al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān fi Tafsīr al-Qurʾān is a 
combination of a linguistic, intertextual, and jurisprudential type of exegesis with 
some reference to classical poetry (al-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 42; cf. adh-Dhahabī, 
2012a, pp. 215-217). 
14- Tafsīr ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002): ʾAḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Ibrāhīm an- Naysābūrī 
ath-Thaᶜlabī, also known as ʾ abū ʾ Isḥāq ath-Thaᶜlabī (d. 427 H.). It is believed that 
al-Thaᶜlabī, the Islamic scholar and the author of the well-known Qur’anic 
exegesis entitled al-Kashf wa al-Bayān, was the greatest exegete of his time (Al-
Thaʿlabī, 2002, p. 5; adh-Dhahabī, 2012a, p. 197). In his introduction, al-Thaᶜlabī 
explains that his work is based on the works of several well-known Islamic 
scholars, such as the exegeses of ibn ᶜAbbās, ᶜ Ikramah, al-Kalbī, Mujāhid, and the 
lexicons of al-Farrāʾ, al-Kisāʾī, az-Zajjāj, and other scholarly works (ath-Thaᶜlabī, 
2002, pp. 75-85). In his exegesis, ath-Thaᶜlabī provides thorough details on 
jurisprudential issues with reference to Hadith, and on syntactic, semantic, and 
morphological issues with reference to classical poetry (ibid., p. 9; adh-Dhahabī, 
2012a, p. 200).  
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15- Tafsīr ibn Kathīr (2000): Ismāᶜīl bin ᶜUmar bin Kathīr al-Basnawiyy al-Qurashī 
ash-Shāfiᶜī (700 H. – 774 H.), known as Shihāb-addīn abū al-Fidāʾ ibn Kathīr, is 
one of the pre-eminent Islamic scholars and exegetes. His work Tafsīr al-Qurʾān 
al-ᶜAẓīm is so widely accepted that several scholars have studied it and 
summarised it, for example, Mukhtaṣar ibn Kathīr by as-Ṣābūnī, ᶜUmdat at-Tafsīr 
by Aḥmad Shākir, and Taysīr al-ᶜAliyy al-Qadīr li Ikhtisār Tafsīr ibn Kathīr by 
Muḥammad ar-Rifāᶜī. His method in explaining the meaning of the Qur’an is 
through the traditional Sunni approach by referring to other parts of the Qur’an, 
the Hadith, the sayings of the Companions, and the sayings of the Tābiᶜūn (the 
generation of Muslims who were born after the passing of the Prophet but who 
were contemporaries of the Companions) (Maḥmūd, 2000, p. 223; Mārdīnī, 2009, 
p. 71). Ibn Kathīr’s exegesis provides simplified but detailed exegesis on 
jurisprudential matters, and rarely sheds light upon syntax or provides reference 
to classical poetry (Abdul-Raof, 2001, p. 177; an-Najdī, 1412 H., p. 40). However, 
there are a very few cases where ibn Kathīr sheds light on some rhetorical issues, 
including figures of speech. 
16- Tafsīr ibn al-Jawzī (2002): ᶜAbd-al-Raḥman bin ᶜ Ali bin Muḥammad al-Qurashī, 
known as Jamāl-addīn abū al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzī (510 H. -597 H.). His exegetical 
work is called Zād al-Masīr fī ᶜIlm at-Tafsīr (āl-Jaᶜfar & al-Sarḥān, 1980, p. 157). 
Āl Jaᶜfar and al-Sarḥān point out that al-Jawzī summarised his major exegetical 
work al-Mughnī fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān in Zād al-Masīr fī ᶜIlm al-Tafsīr (ibid.). Al-
Jawzī provides simplified exegesis on jurisprudential matters with reference to the 
views of previous scholars. He also provides some linguistic and syntactic 
analyses with reference to classical poetry and the views of grammarians', such as 
ibn Qutaybiyah, al-Farrah, al-Zajjāj, al-Farisī, abī ʿUbaydah, and others.  
17- Tafsīr Ṭanṭāwī (1992): Muḥammad Sayyid Tanṭāwī (28 October 1928 – 10 
March 2010) is an Islamic scholar and one of the most recent exegetes; his 
exegesis is at-Tafsīr al-Wasīṭ lil Qurʾān al-Karīm. Ṭanṭāwī had a doctorate of 
philosophy in Hadith and Qur’anic exegesis and was the Grand Mufti of Egypt 
and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar Mosque. In his exegesis, Ṭanṭāwī follows the 
traditional Sunni approach in explaining the Qur’an. In addition, Ṭanṭāwī provides 
a thorough semantic analysis and highlights the rhetorical features of the Qur’an. 
Ṭanṭāwī’s exegesis also provides some details about jurisprudential issues (cf. 
Ṭanṭāwī, 1992, p. 10). 
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3.9 Kināyah and Qur’an 
Arabic scholars, particularly in the rhetorical field, assert that kināyah is one of the most 
eloquent and elegant rhetorical and stylistic instruments used in the Qur’an (cf. Shaykhūn, 
1978; ᶜAtīq, ᶜAbd-al-ᶜAzīz, 1980; al-Qatān, 1993; Lāshīn, ᶜAbd-al-Fattāḥ, 1998; as-
Suyūṭī, 1426 H.; ᶜAṭīyah, 2004; Qaṣṣāb, 2012). One of the main distinctive features of a 
kināyah expression, apart from conveying a specific meaning implicitly, is the ability to 
depict the meaning intended eloquently through an expression which not only alludes to 
the intended meaning but substantiates or attests this meaning. Furthermore, the rhetorical 
image portrayed by the kināyah enables the recipient to imagine and comprehend the 
intended meaning expressively and clearly.  
Let us take for instance the expression بطحلا ةلاّمح (firewood carrier) as in [Q. 111:4]. This 
expression, according to (al-Qatān, 1993, p. 208) and several exegetical works, refers to 
the person who spreads rumours or makes defamatory remarks about people in order to 
cause feuding and enmity amongst others (cf. al-Jurjānī, 1908, p. 8; al-Jurjānī, 2003, p. 
54). The expression provides the recipient with an image of a person who carries firewood 
in the intent to inflame hatred between people, since the flames of fire are known to spread 
rapidly and destroy everything in its path. The fate of such a person will eventually be as 
fuel for Hell, that is to say, they will go to Hell. There is, however, another exegetical 
version which suggests that the wife of Abu Lahab used in fact to throw bunches of 
firewood-thorns into the path of the Prophet [PBUH] in order to harm him, and for that 
and other reasons she will be punished by being sent to Hell. 
Some Kināyah expressions even depict certain meanings through corporeal gestures 
which normally accompany a specific psychological state. For example,  ِدَيلا ﱡضَع (biting 
one’s own hand) in [Q. 25:27] and  ْصت ِع َخلا ريد  (bending/turning one’s own cheek away 
from others) in [Q. 31:18] refer to a person who is filled with remorse and a person who 
is arrogant respectively (for more details on theses expressions see kināyah 9/29 in 
chapters five and six). These physical gestures are typical reactions that normally come 
from a person who is remorseful or arrogant. Not only do such expressions or descriptions 
guide the recipient to the intended meaning, but they aesthetically substantiate and attest 
the meaning intended and simultaneously appeal to the senses. 
Another example of a kināyah expression employed in the Qur’an is the word ةعراقلا (the 
thundering strike [referring to the Day of Resurrection]) in [Q. 101:1-3]. ᶜAtīq suggests 
that ةعراقلا is one of the kināyah expressions that amplifies the meaning and stimulates the 
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mind of the recipient and evokes their fear of the Day of Resurrection. He adds that ةعراقلا 
does not only refer to the Day of Resurrection, but it substantiates this sense by depicting 
one of its traits so that the recipient could imagine how intense that Day is (1980, pp. 224-
225). 
Apart from an aesthetic purpose, Kināyah like other figures of speech, is used in the 
Qur’an to appeal to the senses and deliver the intended meaning in a rhetorical manner. 
One of the most common purposes or functions of kināyah in the Qur’an is euphemism. 
ᶜAtīq (1980, p. 226) and al-Qaṭān (1993, p. 209) argue that out of all the figures of speech 
kināyah is the most convenient, if not the only, trope to express taboo expressions. 
Unpleasant, socially unaccepted, or impolite words/acts are mainly expressed in the 
Qur’an through kināyah expressions (see Shaykhūn, 1978, pp. 101-107). Besides, the 
purpose of euphemism, kināyah in the Qur’an has other purposes that are no less 
important than euphemism (see the purposes of kināyah in the previous chapter; cf. 
Qaṣṣāb, 2012, pp. 248-257)  
3.10 Kināyah and translation studies 
Regrettably, kināyah has not received as much attention in the realm of TS as much as its 
fellow tropes, metaphor in particular. As far as Arabic-English translations are concerned, 
there are insufficient works that focuses on the translation of kināyah. To our knowledge, 
there are only a handful of such works, such as Al-Hajjaj (2004), Bani Khalid (2010), 
Shehabat (2010), Al-Barakati (2013; 2014), and Muhammad (2017), and they all refer to 
kināyah in their disquisitions as metonymy. This naming error is common amongst 
scholars. For example, Abdul-Raof uses the word ‘metonymy’ for kināyah (2001) but 
refers to majāz mursal as ‘hypallage’ (2006), though the forms of his hypallage and their 
semantic relationships he presents are all similar to the English tropes, metonymy and 
synecdoche (see ibid, p. 225; cf. Mahdi, 2009). Some other scholars interestingly use the 
term ‘metonymy’ to cover both kināyah and majāz al-mursal as if the two Arabic figures 
of speech are the same, or as if the English metonymy covers all the features of the two 
Arabic tropes. For instance, in her study on translating majāz mursal from the Qur’an into 
English, Al-Salem confusingly uses the word ‘metonymy’ for both kināyah and majāz 
mursal despite her knowledge of the differences between the two: 
The phenomenon labeled “metonymy” covers a wide range of categories. 
However, the data extracted will be representative of only the ten types … 
These do not include logical metonymies, complex metonymies, or cases of 
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metonymy where the literal meaning can be true (called as kinaayahs [sic] in 
Arabic) (2008, pp. 8-9) 
One main difference between what is commonly known as “metonymy” and 
its Arabic correspondent ﻞسرملازاجملا is that the latter does not include cases 
where the literal meaning is not true. These are considered as belonging to 
another trope termed ةيانكلا. As-Sakkaakiy … took concern to distinguish 
between metonymy and kinaayah. In the latter, the original meaning of the 
words is not against the facts of reality … In other words, in kinaayah [sic], 
both the literal and figurative meanings are true, whereas in metonymy, only 
the figurative meaning is true. In the Western literature on metonymy, such a 
distinction is not made and the corresponding examples of kinaayah are 
considered as clear-cut metonymies (ibid, pp. 45-46). 
Others even address kināyah as metaphor, as Ali (2012) did in his article, ʾIshkālāt 
Tarjamat Mafhūm al-Kināyah fi ʾ Āyāt al-Qurʾān al-Karīm ʾ ilā al-lughati al-mallāwiyah: 
Dirāsah Taḥlīliyah, published in what is claimed to be a periodical peer-reviewed journal. 
However, since there is no exact equivalent term for kināyah in English, naming it 
metonymy may not be that of an issue as long as one recognises: (1) the differences 
between kināyah and metonymy in terms of their distinctive features and functions, (2) 
the differences between kināyah and its fellow Arabic tropes, specifically majāz al-
mursal, (3) kināyah stands alone as an independent figure of speech (4) majāz al-mursal 
is the closest equivalent Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche rather than 
kināyah. The only concern is that Western recipients who are not conversant with Arabic 
figures of speech may get confused or misled. Another concerning matter is this would 
mislead others who are interested in the translation of kināyah to rely only on/compare 
with theories specified for metonymy.   
Probably the only scholar who does not refer to kināyah as metonymy is Abu Libdeh 
(1991). As a matter of fact, his study (1991), A Discourse Perspective on Figurative 
Expression in Literary Works with Reference to English/Arabic Translation, does not 
focus entirely on kināyah, nor is it related to the translation of the Qur’an, as its title 
specifies. Nevertheless, throughout his discussion on figures of speech, Abu Libdeh refers 
to metaphor proper, simile, metonymy, and analogy as istiᶜārah, tashbīh, al-majāz al-
mursal, and tamthīl respectively and vice versa (ibid, p. 11). With regard to synecdoche, 
Abu Libdeh discusses this trope under the section entitled ‘(Al-Majāz al-Mursal) 
Metonymy’ as if the two are the same (ibid, pp. 38-39). Quite possibly, like several 
Western scholars, he believes that synecdoche is part of metonymy, especially given that 
they both are based on similar types of semantic relationships (relations of similarity and 
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contiguity), which is fairly reasonable. As far as kināyah is concerned, he writes it down 
as it is pronounced in Arabic, i.e. through transliteration, without providing an English 
equivalent figure of speech for it (ibid, p. 42-46). This clearly indicates that Abu Libdeh 
realises that kināyah has no equivalent term, word, or figure of speech in English. He 
argues that kināyah is “half literal, half figurative” (ibid, p. 49) and sees it as “a rather 
‘fluid’ figure that belongs to neither [al-Majāz al-Lughawī nor al-Majāz al-ᶜAqlī] but 
which is not less interesting” (ibid.). Additionally, He posits that between the figures of 
speech, “kināyah is the most deeply culture-based” trope. Abu Libdeh provides a full 
description of kināyah, which demonstrates that he has a thorough grasp of the trope: 
Kināyah is a FOS [figure of speech] based on the same mechanism as 
metaphor, analogy, etc. in that it evokes a series of associations between two 
entities where A presents the reality of B. It also derives its logic from the 
meaning of the speaker rather than the meaning of the sentence. However, in 
kināyah the latter is invariably literally true, though insignificant. This 
insignificance creates some sort of irrelevance (when it is interpreted against 
its context) pushing the audience to burrow for some relation between the two 
layers of meaning: the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the 
speaker. This relation is one of entailment, with the second being a (malzūm) 
corollary of the first, which is, in its own right, (lāzim) factual and can be 
intended. Thus kināyah is a FOS based on a “smoother” kind of transference 
and which has one foot in (Ḥaqīqa) literal language and another in (majāzi) 
figurative language. For this reason the ES [enunciating speaker] has the 
status of someone who claims something and provides the evidence for its 
substantiation (ibid, pp. 43-440). 
One of the substantial works that is related to the translation of Qur’anic kināyah 
expressions is that of Al-Barakati (2013; 2014). His study, however, only focuses on a 
specific part of one of the kināyah functions, which is euphemism, specifically sex-related 
euphemisms. Al-Barakati agrees with ᶜAtīq (1980) and al-Qatān (1993) that euphemism 
in the Qur’an is expressed through kināyah, and concurs with Abu Libdeh that kināyah is 
culture-based: 
For the Qur’an never elaborates explicitly on what are considered to be 
distasteful themes such as sexual matters and body effluvia, but rather 
employs a number of linguistic tools such as kināyah and taʿrīḍ which fulfil 
euphemistic functions. These are very culture-and language-specific, and 
their transfer to English inevitably poses a special difficulty for translators 
(2013, p. 1). 
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Also, in a roughly similar manner to Abu Libdeh, Al-Barakati refers to kināyah through 
transliteration in most parts of his study. However, in some other parts he refers to kināyah 
as metonymy (see ibid, pp. 21/23-26; 2014, pp. 148-149). Furthermore, surprisingly, he 
refers to majāz as metaphor rather than ‘figurative language’ or ‘figure of speech’ (2013). 
This clearly suggests that, unlike Abu Libdeh, Al-Barakati to some extent fails to 
distinguish kināyah from other different English tropes and overlooks the fact that it has 
no equivalent figure of speech in English. Perhaps the reason for this oversight is due to 
the lack of comparison between the features of the Arabic figures of speech on the one 
hand and between their equivalents in English on the other hand. Another reason could 
possibly be that Al-Barakati looks at euphemism from the English perspective where the 
euphemistic function is not specific to a particular figure of speech, unlike the Arabic, 
particularly in the Qur’an, where euphemism is mainly expressed through kināyah. 
Nonetheless, this does not by any means undermine the significance of Al-Barakati’s 
works. They remain a notable and fruitful pieces of work particularly for Qur’anic TS. 
From a communicative, pragmatic and functional perspective, Al-Barakati succeeds in 
examining and evaluating the translations of twenty-nine Qur’anic sex-related 
euphemisms into English. He determines that the predominant procedure used in 
rendering these euphemistic expressions is literality (2013, pp. 198-199). According to 
Al-Barakati, “literality worked efficiently in fulfilling the euphemistic effect in the 
translations which could be attributed to the fact that euphemisms are often created by 
procedures such as generalisation which is lexical-based” (ibid, p. 199). He adds that a 
literal translation is the most appropriate procedure to adopt, in terms of functionality, 
when the expressions in the two languages “share similar meaning senses” (2014, p. 149). 
Al-Barakati concludes that when some translators fail to comprehend the SL message 
they tend to convey the meaning of the SL expression semantically without preserving 
the euphemistic function (ibid, cf. 2013). 
Another interesting disquisition is that of Al-Hajjaj (2004). His discussion of the 
translation of kināyah may seem generic, since his analysis of the kināyah expressions 
are extracted from Qur’anic, Prophetical and poetic texts. Nonetheless, in his attempt to 
search for effective procedures and strategies to employ in the translation of kināyah, Al-
Hajjaj provides some noticeable insights. He concludes that the treatment of kināyah by 
Arab rhetoricians involves a semantic-oriented approach. That is to say, they focus on the 
semantic relationship between the literal and figurative meanings of the kināyah. He also 
believes the treatment of metonymy by English rhetoricians “is inflicted with many 
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drawbacks especially in its underlying theoretical framework” (ibid, p. 100). Hence, he 
asserts that now and then people are not able to distinguish “between metonymy, 
metaphor proper, and synecdoche in western rhetoric”. Conversely, he posits that the 
theoretical framework employed by Arab rhetoricians to differentiate between different 
types of figurative expressions is more adequate than the one employed by English 
rhetoricians. Moreover, Al-Hajjaj maintains that culture-specific kināyah expressions are 
difficult to translate and believes it is inevitable that some kind of semantic loss will 
occur. Regarding the translation of Qur’anic kināyah expressions, he declares that 
“readers can very easily feel that the spirit of the original is scarified or that the translation 
is full of inadequacies” (ibid.). 
The sacrifice of this spirit or the ability not to maintain one of the kināyah functions, i.e. 
purposes of use, such as euphemism, in translation is possibly due to the fact that some 
translators are interested in conveying the exact message rather than style. In his 
examination of two Qur’anic translations, Muhammad believes that in most cases the 
translators were able to maintain lexical, semantic, and grammatical equivalences, “but 
without fully conveying the metonymic function produced by the formal structure of the 
SL (2017, p. 87). He asserts that this is mainly due the unique features that some of the 
Arabic expression have as well as to linguistic limitations of English (ibid.) Muhammad 
concludes that adopting ‘an exegesis-like translation style’ could solve some of the 
problematic issues related to the translation of kināyah, but it would come at “the expense 
of the metonymic effect and eloquence as provided by the SL” (2017, p. 87).  
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Chapter four: The concept of equivalence in translation 
4.1 Introduction 
Translation in general is not as easy a task as it may seem, especially when it includes 
translating from one language to another that belong to different and distant language 
families, such as Arabic and English. The differences are not confined to one factor, such 
as sentence structure, but involve also other factors, such as social, historical, and cultural 
that have a great impact on shaping our language. Bickley, et al. (2014) posit that 
“[L]anguage and culture are deeply connected, in that culture shapes language use and 
language conveys cultural meanings”. The translation task becomes even harder when it 
involves translating the Holy Qur’an as it is full of linguistic and figurative expressions 
that are considered culture-specific and may be difficult to render into the TL or are even 
probably untranslatable due to non-equivalence or lack of equivalence (cf. Abdul-Raof, 
2001). Therefore, translators of the Qur’an should pay a great deal of attention to such 
expressions and aim for the intended meaning of the ST rather than merely finding the 
equivalent of a single word/phrase. In other words, a translator should try to make sure 
that their translations are semantically equivalent to that of the ST, namely in terms of 
conveying the same meaning/message. 
This chapter will discuss and review the concept of equivalence in the realm of TS and 
how various translation theories conceive and approach this concept. However, it will not 
be possible to touch upon every theory of equivalence due to the profuse theories. 
Therefore, this chapter will try to cast light on the theories or approaches of the most 
prominent and innovative scholars in TS, such as Vinay and Darbelnet, Jakobson, Nida, 
Newmark, and Baker. This chapter will also pay specific attention to the theories of the 
John Beekman and John Callow (1974) and Mildred Larson (1998). Their theoretical 
aspects will contribute to facilitating and forming the foundation of an eclectic approach 
to be followed in this study concerning the translation of kināyah expressions. We would 
like emphasise that this study is concerned with the translation of the kināyah on the 
lexical (word/phrasal) and semantic level, i.e. on the micro-level, not the overall text 
where the expression is located. 
4.2 Introduction to equivalence 
According to Windle and Pym (2011, p. 16) and probably most translation scholars, the 
term ‘equivalence’ in relation to translation was first introduced by the works of Vinay 
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and Darbelnet (1958/1995) ‘Stylistique Comparée du Français et de l'Anglais’ 
(Comparative Stylistics of French and English). For others like Wolfram Wilss (1977), 
the roots of this relationship go back to ancient times (cited in Leal, 2012), perhaps way 
back to the days of Cicero and his translation principle, which was ‘sense-for-sense’ 
instead of ‘word-for-word’, a principle that the famous Bible translator St. Jerome 
believed in and employed in his translations. Cicero’s words concerning his translation 
of Demosthenes were as follows: 
I translate the ideas, their forms, or as one might say, their shapes; however, 
I translate them into a language that is in tune with our conventions of usage. 
Therefore, I did not have to make a word-for-word translation but rather a 
translation that reflects the general stylistic features and the meaning of 
foreign words (quoted in Kregor, 2010, p. 13; Calaway, 2016, p. 261; cf. 
Long, 2007, p. 69; Munday, 2014 , pp. 71-72). 
Irrespective of the date or time the concept began, what is for sure is that the concept of 
equivalence has become a debatable and controversial issue in TS over the past fifty eight 
years, namely after Roman Jakobson’s 1959 seminal essay ‘On Linguistic Aspects of 
Translation’. According to Mary Snell-Hornby (1988/1995, pp. 18-19), it was Jakobson’s 
“enigmatic statement”, which is: “[e]quivalence in difference is the cardinal problem of 
language and the pivotal concern of linguistics. Like any receiver of verbal messages, the 
linguist acts as their interpreter” (my italics) that unleashed the heated debate over the 
concept of equivalence. What is also for sure is that equivalence as a concept has been 
exhaustively discussed in TS. Peter Fawcett states that the amount of work written on this 
concept “has probably cost the lives of more trees than any other in translation studies” 
(1997, p. 53). Andrew Chesterman (1997, p. 9) too comments on the copious amount of 
discussions over equivalence and sees it as “the big bugbear of translation theory, more 
argued about than any other single idea”. So what is equivalence in TS? There is no one 
definition for the concept of equivalence that all theorists or scholars in TS can agree on. 
It is as Wilss describes it, “a vague, hard-to-define concept” (1996, p. 3). Nord also seems 
to agree with Wilss’ description when she posits that it “is one of the most ambiguous 
concepts in translation studies, and consequently has been interpreted in very different 
ways” (2005, p. 25). The term itself has also been referred to at times as ‘correspondence’ 
and at other times as ‘accuracy’, ‘adequacy’, or ‘fidelity’ (cf. Wilss, 1996, pp. 3-4). This 
ambiguity is probably due to the number of translation schools and theoretical 
backgrounds, since TS is a discipline (or interdiscipline) that borrows much from other 
academic disciplines, such as linguistics, literature, and even computer science. However, 
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‘equivalence’ as a common term in TS that can be defined generally as a “term used by 
many writers to describe the nature and the extent of the relationships which exist between 
SL and TL texts or smaller linguistic units” (Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, p. 49). It is a 
relationship that many theorists or scholars base their translation theories on and perhaps 
also their definitions of translation, such as Nida and Taber (cf. 1969/1982, p. 12) and 
Catford (cf. 1965, p. 20), regardless of the type or nature of equivalence. That said, not 
every translation scholar or theorist believes in the importance of equivalence in 
translation theory or practice. For example, Snell-Hornby scathingly notes that 
“equivalence is unsuitable as a basic concept in translation theory”. She adds that the term 
itself is “imprecise and ill-defined” and “presents an illusion of symmetry between 
languages which hardly exists beyond the level of vague approximations and which 
distorts the basic problems of translation” (1988/1995, p. 22). Baker and Zijian (2004) 
assume that much of the criticism or the rejection of the concept of equivalence began 
because equivalence was mostly dealt with as a ‘semantic category’; a category which 
they see as ‘static’. They do, however, point out that this criticism continued even with 
the emergence of various approaches which do not confine the concept of equivalence to 
the meaning of the content but extend it to include other aspects, such as equivalence of 
response (effect) or equivalence of functions and suchlike. Therefore, it seems the debate 
over equivalence will most likely continue no matter how the concept of equivalence is 
approached or whatever translation theory emerges. 
4.2.1 Vinay and Darbelnet’s concept of equivalence 
Based on a comparative discussion of French and English, Vinay and Darbelnet proposed 
two methods or strategies of translation along with seven procedures that can be employed 
in rendering from one language to another after carrying out specific analytical steps (for 
the initial analytical steps see Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 30; Munday, 2016, p. 94). The 
two main methods are called direct and oblique translation; the former is what some refer 
to as literal translation and the latter as free translation. The two methods include seven 
procedures, or as Pym (2014, p. 12) likes to call them ‘translation solutions’. The first 
three translation procedures, which are covered by direct translation method, are 
borrowing, calque, and literal translation. The other four procedures are covered by 
oblique translation, and they are transposition, modulation, equivalence and adaptation. 
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Table 4.1: Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures. 
Direct Procedures 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Borrowing 
(Loan) 
 
A word or expression is transferred directly from the SL into the 
TL, in its form and meaning. This procedure is normally used 
when the TL has no equivalent word/expression for that in the 
SL. For example the words or expressions Hajj and 
kiblah/qiblah, and Eid al-Fitr/Eid al-Adha. Vinay and Darbelnet 
(1995, p. 32) posit that this procedure is useful when a translator 
would like to add some flavour or elements of the SL culture or 
style into the TT. For example, the words ‘falafel’, ‘hummus’, 
and ‘kebab’.   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Calque 
(Foreign word/phrase 
translated and 
incorporated into the 
TT) 
 
“A borrowing of a foreign syntagm whose elements have 
undergone literal translation” (ibid, p. 340). Vinay and 
Darbelnet state that calque is a special kind of borrowing 
whereby a SL expression or structure transferred to the TT and 
then translated literally (cf. Dickins, et al., 2002, p. 31). 
According to them, there are two types of calques, lexical calque 
and structural calque. In the former, the TL syntactic structure is 
respected, for example the English expression ‘Compliments of 
the Season!’ is rendered into French as ‘Compliments de la 
saison!’; while in the latter, the SL construction is introduced 
into the TL as in the rendition of ‘science-fictions from English 
to French (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 32). Vinay and 
Darbelnet mention that both calques and borrowing sometimes, 
namely after a period of time, become ‘an integral part’ of the 
TL (ibid.) 
 
3 
 
Literal 
(Word-for-word) 
Word-for-word translation, but the TL grammar is respected. 
Vinay and Darbelnet note that this procedure is a ‘unique 
solution’ and common when rendering between two languages 
that belong to the same family, particularly when they share the 
same culture.   
Oblique Procedures 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
Transposition 
(Shift in grammatical 
categories) 
 
A translation process that involves changing the form/class of 
the SL word into another form/class in the TL but without 
changing the meaning of the SL message. For example, a SL a 
noun becomes an adjective in the TL. Though Vinay and 
Darbelnet note that transposition is sometimes obligatory and 
sometimes optional, it is very often a necessary procedure, 
particularly when translating between two languages that do not 
belong to the same family like Arabic and English.   
 
5 
 
Modulation 
(Shift in cognitive 
categories) 
“A variation of the form of the message, obtained by a change 
in the point of view” (ibid, p.36). In other words, a translation 
procedure that involves a change of the semantics and point of 
view of the SL, through a manipulation of thought rather than 
grammatical forms/classes as in transposition. This procedure is 
usually employed when a literal translation or a transposition 
would sound awkward or not natural in the TL, though 
grammatically it is correct (ibid, pp. 36-37/246-254; 
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Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, pp. 107-108; Munday, 2016, pp. 
90-91). Such a procedure can be considered useful when 
rendering expressions that are culture-specific. For example, it 
is probably better to render  َكُِقنُع ﻰلإ ًةَلُولْغَم ََكدَي ْﻞَعَْجت َﻻ as ‘do not be 
tight-ﬁsted’ instead of ‘do not make your hand shackled/tied up 
to your neck’ because a literal or transposition rendition would 
not sound natural nor would it convey the SL message 
idiomatically though grammatically is correct.  
 
 
6 
 
 
Equivalence 
(Functional 
replacement) 
A translation procedure that reproduces the same situation as in 
the SL by using different wording (Vinay & Darbelnet, 1995, p. 
342). It involves rendering the sense of the SL message with a 
different image. It is useful in rendering expressions that are 
culture-specific, for example, ‘those who turn on their heels’ for 
ٱ َنيِذﱠل ٱ ْاوﱡَدتْر  ْمِهِراَبَْدأ ٰﻰَلَع  or ‘let bygones be bygones’ for تام تاف يللإ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adaptation 
(Shift in cultural 
aspects) 
Adaptation is producing “an equivalence of the same value 
applicable to a different situation” than that of the SL (ibid, p. 
338). 
Vinay and Darbelnet refer to this procedure as “a special kind of 
equivalence, a situational equivalence” (ibid, p. 39). That is to 
say, adaptation seeks to render the SL message into the TL using 
a different situation than that of the SL but it is just as relevant 
and meaningful as the SL. Vinay and Darbelnet claim that this 
procedure is employed when the “type of situation being 
referred to by the SL message” does not exist or is unfamiliar in 
the TL culture (ibid.), or it does not have a similar relevance or 
connotations as it does in the SL (Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, 
p. 4; cf. Munday, 2016, p. 91). To put it differently, it is used 
when sociocultural realities are not shared between the two 
languages. An owl, for instance, in many Western cultures, is a 
symbol of wisdom, good luck, or femininity while in most 
Arabic cultures it represents bad luck, stupidity, or something 
whose image and sound are ugly. In this case, it would be 
awkward and incomprehensible to render ‘owl’ literally. 
Therefore, the cultural connotation of a reference to the owl in 
an English text should be rendered into Arabic using another 
reference that is accepted and known in the Arabic culture.  
Vinay and Darbelnet believe that these seven procedures can be applied on three linguistic 
levels: lexis, grammar (syntactic structure), and text (message). They postulate that these 
procedures will enable translators to have control over their work to achieve natural 
equivalence. They suggest that translators should start with the direct method, namely 
literal translation, and work up and down the table to develop naturalness. Apart from 
these seven basic translation procedures, Vinay and Darbelnet also introduce a number of 
other procedures, most of which are considered as opposing pairs except for 
compensation and dislocation (inversion). Examples are explicitation and implicitation; 
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the former is a procedure that involves rendering what is implicit in the ST as explicit in 
the TT whereas in the latter is exactly the opposite. Vinay and Darbelnet note that an 
excessive use of explicitation could lead to what they refer to as ‘overtranslation’ (Vinay 
& Darbelnet, 1995, p. 342). Another example is generalisation and particularisation, 
where the former consists of rendering a specific word/phrase with a more general 
word/phrase whilst particularisation is the reverse process (for more examples see 
Fawcett, 1997; Molina & Albir, 2002; Pym, 2014). 
As far as equivalence is concerned, the table above clearly shows that equivalence for 
Vinay and Darbelnet is a merely a procedure that belongs to the ‘oblique’ translation 
method which unlike the ‘direct’ method does not depend on the use of parallel categories 
existing in the SL and TL. It is a procedure that consists of only conveying the sense of 
the ST expression but not its image with completely different wording and an image 
known to the TL culture. Vinay and Darbelnet’s methodology for translation may seem, 
in general, to provide useful tools for a translator to the extent that it is believed it has 
inspired or influenced many others such as Alfred Malblanc (1961), Gerardo Vázquez-
Ayora (1977), and probably Peter Newmark (1981), who retain similar procedures and 
perhaps even similar terminology. Yet, it has been criticised by others like Pym (2016), 
who questions Vinay and Darbelnet’s epistemology and describes their translation 
procedures as “distasteful” (ibid, p. xii). Another criticism is that of Jean Delisle (1988, 
pp. 72-73), who claims that their translation procedures are not convenient in finding 
‘translation equivalents’ and believes that they cannot be applied to the “analysis of an 
expression” or the “verification of equivalences” (for a summary of criticisms of Vinay 
and Darbelnet’s translation procedures see Fawcett, 1997, pp. 50-52).  Delisle’s words 
are as follows: 
Vinay and Darbelnet’s translation procedures do not help the translator to find 
translation equivalents. A procedure is a method to obtain a result, a way of 
doing something, of carrying activity through to its conclusion. But these 
‘procedures’ are in fact labels attached to results; the authors describe 
structural changes that occur in the translation process, or point out what does 
not change … the categories of comparative stylistics (and particularly the 
so-called translation procedures) cannot really be applied to the analysis and 
re-expression of messages, or even the verification of equivalences (cited in 
Pym, 2016, p. 205; Also see Martin, 2000; cf. Zabalbeascoa, 2000). 
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4.2.2 Roman Jakobson’s equivalence: 
The arguments of the Russian-born linguist, Roman Jakobson, on the nature of meaning 
and equivalence have acted as a stimulus to theoretical approaches in translation ever 
since he introduced his concept of ‘equivalence in difference’ (Leonardi, 2000). In his 
essay, ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’,  Jakobson posits that the meaning of any 
word or phrase is a linguistic feature or to be more precise a semiotic fact (Jakobson, 
1959/2000, p. 113). Following Saussure’s theory that language is “a system of signs that 
express ideas” (Saussure, 2004, p. 60), Jakobson states that there is no meaning 
(signatum) without a sign (signum). The ‘sign’, according to Saussure (ibid.), is arbitrary 
or unmotivated, and it is composed of a signified (concept) and signifier (sound-image 
or, as Munday (2016, p. 60) calls it, “the spoken and written signal”). Jakobson states that 
a meaning of a word cannot be deduced from a nonlinguistic acquaintance but through 
“the assistance of the verbal code”, and when there is an unfamiliar word a number of 
linguistic signs is required to unravel its meaning (1959/2000, p. 113). In other words, the 
meaning of a word is defined/explained through the word itself or other verbal signs. 
Consequently, it is the linguistic sign which provides the meaning of an object. Jakobson 
provides three ways of interpreting a verbal sign: intralingual translation, interlingual 
translation, and intersemiotic translation (ibid, p. 114). It is through his illustration of the 
first two of the three types in particular where he touches upon the term ‘equivalence’. 
His translation categories are as follows (1959/2000, p. 114): 
1- Intralingual translation or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of other signs of the same language. 
2- Interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal 
signs by means of some other language. 
3- Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs 
by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. 
 Intralingual translation occurs within the same SL through the employment of 
synonyms, similar words, or the resort to a circumlocution or paraphrasing to describe 
the original word/phrase. With regards to the use of synonyms, Jakobson points out that 
they do not always provide complete equivalence. He exemplifies his statement with two 
words that are related to an unmarried man, ‘celibate’ and ‘bachelor’. Jakobson argues 
that “every celibate is a bachelor, but not every bachelor is a celibate” (ibid.). He believes 
that the only way to interpret a word or an idiomatic expression (which he refers to as ‘a 
code-unit of the highest level’) comprehensively is through “an equivalent combinations 
of code-units”. In other words, using the message that describes the code-unit, for 
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instance, “every celibate is bound not to marry, and everyone who is bound not to marry 
is a celibate” or “every bachelor is an unmarried man, and every unmarried man is a 
bachelor” (ibid.). Al-Barakati (2013, p. 93) disagrees with Jakobson and argues that 
complete synonyms do exist, and that they can provide complete equivalence if they are 
carefully chosen after taking into consideration their contexts of occurrence. Al-Barakati 
states the following: 
In  translation,  we  are  normally  dealing  with  a  defined  context; therefore,  
synonyms  can  easily  act  like  full  equivalents  if carefully  picked. 
Therefore, approaching equivalence by taking such a narrow view will only 
lead to drawing general and inaccurate assumptions. For example, to refute 
Jakobson's notion of equivalence … the verbs ‘begin’, ‘start’, and 
‘commence’ may also be used interchangeably in various contexts without 
any noticeable loss of meaning as long as they collocate with the occurring 
lexical items in the sentence (ibid.). 
Al-Barakati even supports his argument with some citations from John Lyons’ views 
(1981) on lexical meanings and synonymy, which seems quite odd because Lyon, 
himself, acknowledges that complete synonymy is quite rare among natural languages 
and it almost does not exist (cf. Lyons, 1981, p. 148). 
Jakobson’s second type of translation, interlingual translation, is similar to intralingual 
translation in terms of how the SL word/phrase is rendered. The difference between the 
two translations is that the verbal sign in interlingual translation is replaced by another 
verbal sign in another language. That is to say, the rendition takes place between two 
different languages. This type of translation is the type which reflects the common 
understanding of the term ‘translation’. This probably explains why Jakobson also calls 
it ‘proper translation’. With this type of translation, Jakobson stresses that normally there 
is no complete equivalence between code-units (words) of different languages (Jakobson, 
1959/2000, p. 114). This is mainly because languages differ from one another in one way 
or another. To overcome this problem of equivalence, Jakobson suggests that “messages 
may serve as adequate interpretations of alien code-units or messages”. The rendition 
involves replacing one entire message from one language in another rather than replacing 
separate code-units. So, in this type of translation, the translator attempts to recode the 
SL message using a different TL code that conveys the original message. It is a process 
that Jakobson describes as a type of ‘reported speech’ and which “involves two equivalent 
messages in two different codes” (ibid.). To illustrate his argument that there is no 
complete equivalence between words, Jakobson uses the word ‘cheese’ in English and its 
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Russian heteronym ‘сыр’ [syr]. He notes that the two words are not equivalent, 
particularly when referring to ‘cottage cheese’. That is because in Russian ‘cottage 
cheese’ is not ‘сыр’ (syr), whereas in English it is ‘cheese’. According to Jakobson, the 
common word for ‘cottage cheese’ in Russian would be ‘творог’ [tvorog] rather than 
‘сыр’. 
On the whole, Jakobson puts significant weight on grammar and structure to ascertain 
how languages differ from each other. He points out that some grammatical and structural 
differences can occur at the levels of gender, aspect, and semantic fields (Munday, 2014 
, p. 61; Jakobson, 1959/2000, pp. 117-118). Despite the differences between languages, 
Jakobson believes equivalence in translation is attainable. He presumes that every 
cognitive experience can be conveyed in any existing language (1959/2000, p. 115), and 
if by any chance there is a state of deficiency then this could be solved through the 
employment of “loan-words or loan-translations, neologisms or semantic shifts”, and 
circumlocutions (ibid.). For Jakobson, only poetry is ‘untranslatable’ but can be re-
expressed through ‘creative transposition’ (ibid, p. 118). He posits that that each syntactic 
and semantic form used in poetry is there for a specific purpose and that they “carry their 
own autonomous signification” (ibid.). 
4.2.3 Eugine Nida’s theory of equivalence 
One cannot speak about ‘equivalence’ in translation without mentioning the works of 
Eugine Nida. There is no doubt that his ‘formal’ and ‘dynamic’ equivalence theory has 
played an important role in the heated debate on equivalence, and to be more precise his 
views on dynamic equivalence. Nida’s translation theory, according to Smith (2000, p. 
11), is a major turning point for religious translation in general. It is his practical work 
and experience in Bible translation and mainly his aversion to “what he saw as classical 
revival in the nineteenth century, an emphasis on technical accuracy, an adherence to 
form, and a literal rendering of meaning” that led him to form and develop his equivalence 
theory (Gentzler, 2001, p. 45). Nida believes that as languages differ from each other 
there can be no absolute correspondence between languages. Hence, he posits that a fully 
exact translation is impractical (1964, p. 156). Yet, according Smith (2000, p. 11), Nida 
makes two underlying premises based on the ‘prevailing code-model of communication’. 
First, he postulates that any message can be transferred or communicated to any recipient 
as long as it is performed through the most effective form of expression. Second, he 
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claims that people share a core of universal experience that makes such communication 
feasible. This is clear in De Ward and Nida’s words (1986, pp. 43-44): 
All people share far more similarities than is usually thought to be the case. 
What binds people together is much greater than what separates them. In 
adjustments to the physical environment, in the organization of society, in 
dealing with crucial stages of life (birth, puberty, marriage and death), in 
elaborate ritual and symbolism, and in a drive for aesthetic expression 
(whether in decorating masks or in refining poetic forms), people are 
amazingly alike. Because of all this, translating can be undertaken with the 
expectation of communicative effectiveness (cited in Cuellar, 2008, p. 144). 
In addition to linking ‘communication’ to the theory of translation, Nida also believes that 
the principles of a translation theory or model should be ‘primarily sociolinguistic’: “The 
model for such activity must be a communication model, and the principles must be 
primarily sociolinguistic in the broad sense of the word” (Nida, 1976, p. 78). As far as 
equivalence in translation is concerned, Nida argues that there are two theoretical 
approaches to translational equivalence: formal and dynamic. Nida and Taber describe 
formal equivalence/correspondence37 as a quality of translation “in which the features of 
the form of the source text have been mechanically reproduced in the receptor language” 
(1969/1982, p. 201). It pivots on “the message itself, in both form and content” (Nida, 
1964, p. 159). This approach is considered more of a source oriented translation and 
closely resembles what Nida calls ‘gloss translation’ as it is concerned with rendering the 
form and content of the ST as literally as possible. According to De Waard and Nida, both 
form and content play a significant role in the overall message (De Waard & Nida, 1986, 
p. 13; Nida, 1976, p. 48), but apparently one can rarely reproduce both form and content 
in translation (Nida, 1964, p. 157). That is to say, trying to maintain the stylistic qualities 
of the ST will most likely sacrifice much of the meaning and also trying to rigorously 
adhere to the literal content will most likely sacrifice much of the stylistic flavour (ibid, 
p.2). The reason for this is mainly that no two languages are the same, particularly when 
the two languages belong to different families, such as Arabic and English. Therefore, the 
form is mostly sacrificed in order to maintain the content (message) (see Nida & Taber, 
1969/1982, pp. 4-6). Nida goes on to say that there are, however, some cases in translation 
where the form is given a higher priority than the content (Nida, 1964, pp. 156-157), such 
as in poetry, but even in this case, the outcome will mostly fall short of reproducing an 
                                                
37 In his book, Toward a Science Translating (1964), Nida uses the term ‘equivalence’, and in his book 
with Charles Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (1969) they replace this with the term 
‘correspondence’.   
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equivalent emotional intensity and flavour to that of the ST (see Nida & Taber, 
1969/1982, p. 5/13-14). That said, Nida argues that one should opt for formal equivalence 
when the translated text is going to be used for specific reasons, for example, obtaining 
some linguistic, structural, or cultural knowledge of the SL. This, however, will involve 
using a great number of footnotes for the TT audience to understand, which heavily 
depends on how distant the two languages are from one another in terms of culture, 
linguistics, and formal structure. An example of using such numerous footnotes can be 
found in Al-Hilali & Khan’s (1417 H. [1996]) rendition of the meaning of the Qur’an, 
which many might see as distracting and probably hindering the intensity and flavour of 
that of the ST.        
Nida’s other approach towards translational equivalence is dynamic 
equivalence/correspondence38, which is the opposite principle to formal equivalence. It 
is depicted as a “quality of a translation in which the message of the original text has been 
so transported into the receptor language that the RESPONSE of the RECEPTOR is 
essentially like that of the original receptors” (Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, p. 200). In such 
a translation, the focus is not on matching the TT with the different elements of the ST 
including form and context, but on matching the dynamic relationship of the text 
audience, i.e. the TT audience and ST audience, to the context/message. The dynamic 
relationship, according to Nida’s view, is that relationship which exists between the text 
audience and the message. In other words, the reaction of the TT audience towards the 
context/message should be to a great extent similar to that which existed between the ST 
audience and the context/message regardless of how the context is translated. In fact, Nida 
argues that in order for the TT audience to have a similar response to the original 
audience, the ST message should be rendered naturally and idiomatically according to the 
TL culture so that it could be fully comprehended, and this will happen if the translation 
reflects both the meaning and intent of the ST. Nida stresses that a dynamic equivalence 
approach achieves: 
[c]omplete naturalness of expression, and tries to relate the receptor to modes 
of behavior relevant within the context of his own culture; it does not insist 
that he understands the cultural patterns of the source-language context in 
order to comprehend the message (1964, p. 159). 
                                                
38 It is worth noting that in their book, From One Language to Another (1986), De Waard and Nida decide 
to replace the term ‘dynamic equivalence/correspondence’ with ‘functional equivalence’. The reason for 
their doing so is that they believe “the expression ‘dynamic equivalence’ has often been misunderstood” 
and, hence, misused.   
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This may be true to a great extent, namely when rendering culture-specific expressions. 
Let us take, for instance, the Arabic kināyah expression دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت (lit. to wry-cheek) 
mentioned in [Q. 31:18] for showing contempt with haughtiness, which is mainly culture-
specific. A literal rendition probably would not convey the correct figurative image that 
would allude to and attest the meaning intended because such an expression is not known 
or used in English. Therefore, one can notice that some of the translators who went for a 
more or less literal rendition, such as Ali (1998), Al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), 
and Saheeh International (2004) had to include either an addition or footnote in their 
translations and some even used both techniques. On the other hand, if this figurative 
expression was rendered into English by using a natural and idiomatic expression within 
English culture, such as ‘turning one’s nose up at’ as Abdel Haleem (2005) did, then both 
a figurative image and the intended meaning would be grasped by the TT receptor without 
any complications or any additions and footnotes. Another example is the translation of 
‘owl’, as used metaphorically. As we previously explained (see the above section on 
Vinay and Darbelnet’s adaptation procedure), it would be absurd to translate this literally 
from English to Arabic when it is used as a symbol of wisdom, good luck, or femininity. 
This is because in most Arabic cultures the owl represents bad luck, stupidity, or 
something whose image and sound are ugly. Hence, one must search for another word 
that is accepted and established in the Arabic culture. 
For all that, achieving complete equivalence may seem quite impossible. Nida 
acknowledges this as can be noticed in his definition of the nature of translation in which 
he uses the expression ‘closest natural equivalence’ (Nida & Taber, 1969/1982, p. 12). 
There is, however, a serious issue with his dynamic approach, which has received a great 
amount of criticism, and to be specific, the cornerstone of his theory which is the 
‘principle of equivalent effect/response’. This is a principle that, according to Newmark 
(1981, p. 132) was first coined by Paul Cauer (1896), though Nida only ascribes it to Dr 
Emile Rieu.  Dr Rieu’s words regarding whether or not he had set for himself specific 
translational principles while translating the Gospels were as follows: 
When I came to the translation of the Gospels, I had already, through a great 
deal of practice in translation, equipped myself with at least one very general 
principle, the lodestar of the translator’s art, I call it, and that is the principle 
of equivalent effect; the idea being, that that translation is the best which 
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comes nearest to giving its modern audience the same effect as the original 
had on its first audience. (Robertson, et al., 1954, p. 758) 39 
Regardless of who coined this principle, ascribing the success or quality of a translation 
to whether or not it is comprehensible to an audience might seems quite reasonable, but 
to ascribe it completely to the response of the audience looks highly dubious. Therefore, 
the latter criterion has been criticised by several scholars. Qian Hu, for example, considers 
it ‘implausible’ and dedicated five papers (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994) to proving 
its implausibility. Whang argues that theoretically it may appear smart, but in reality it 
seems impractical (1999, p. 52). He also believes that Nida’s functional equivalence does 
not have a sufficient ‘concrete method of comparison’ (ibid, p. 54). Marlowe describes 
Nida’s theory as ‘half-baked ideas’ and believes that Nida’s focus was “myopic and 
narrowly linguistic” (2012). Broeck (1978: 40) and Larose (1989: 78) believe it to be 
impossible (cited in Munday, 2016, p. 69). Scholars such as Venuti (1995), Gentzler 
(2001), and Chesterman (2002) too criticise Nida’s functional equivalence, with most of 
the criticism revolving around the following: 
1- How is it possible to measure an equivalent effect if both the ST and TT readers 
have different cultures and exist in different time periods (see Whang, 1999; 
Chesterman, 2002, pp. 11-12; Broeck, Raymond van den, 1978, p. 40, cited in 
Panou, 2013, p. 3; Van Leeuwen, 2001; Porter, 2005; Marlowe, 2012)? 
2- Which person’s ‘response’ or ‘effect’ is to be measured and how (see Whang, 1999: 
Chesterman, 2002)? Not to mention, people differ from each other, for example, 
one might be moved by a specific expression, or let us say a verse or ʾāyah, while 
another might not. This can be clearly noticed during the late prayers in Ramadan. 
3- In many cases, form and content are inseparable and there are meanings and 
messages that rely heavily on the form itself; hence, it should not be overlooked. 
Also, owing to the fact that languages are formed differently from one another, for 
instance Chinese and English, it is logical to say that translation cannot produce 
‘identical equivalence’ and to believe otherwise is merely “an unrealistic dream”. 
                                                
39 This is originally a discussion conducted by Edwin Robertson from the BBC with Dr Emile Rieu and 
Rev. John Phillips. Rieu was a translator and the founding editor of the Penguin Classics series and a 
translator of the classics who also undertook the translation of the four Gospels. Phillips was a well-
known translator of the New Testament.   
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If this is the case, equivalent response or effect is too an unrealistic dream, hence, 
attainable in translation (see Qian, 1993b; see Van Leeuwen, 2001). 
4- Nida’s theory is not based on science, but merely on a ‘Christian dogma’ “in order 
to proselytize readers, regardless of their culture, to endorse the ideas of Protestant 
Christianity” (Panou, 2013; see Venuti, 1995; Gentzler, 2001; Marlowe, 2012). 
5- Some believe “there is a quality of cavalier spontaneity to” Nida’s work, which 
gives the “impression that he is often ‘winging it’” (Marlowe, 2012), particularly 
his ‘kernel-based model’ (deep structure analysis) (see Gentzler, 2001; Porter, 
2005; Marlowe, 2012). 
6- Too much space for subjectivity is given in a dynamic equivalence approach as it 
allows personal judgment and interpretation on the conception of the message (see 
Gentzler, 2001; Marlowe, 2012; Munday, 2016). 
Furthermore, Whang (1999, pp. 55-58) points out that the ‘principle of ambiguity’, which 
by the way may include or lead to multiple interpretations, should be maintained in 
translation, and its comprehension should be left to the reader and not to the translator. 
This principle will obviously not be maintained if a translator were to choose a dynamic 
approach. This is because a translator who chooses a dynamic equivalence approach gets 
to decide for the readers which expressions need to be decoded and do it for them in any 
way he/she sees fit just to get the response required. Gentzler (2001, p. 59) posits that 
Nida “does not trust the readers to make up their own minds” and “in order to achieve the 
intended response, he has licence to change, streamline, and simplify”. In actual fact, any 
type of artistic licence is unacceptable when it comes to rendering scriptures, and no one 
has the right to change or elide the words of God for whatever reason. We sympathise 
with Marlowe’s opinion that one should provide “an accurate translation which requires 
the reader to do some thinking and learning” instead of keeping the reader in‘perpetual 
tutelage’ (2012). Marlowe, the editor of Bible Research (a free educational site for 
students of the Bible), enunciates that he recommends the more literal and traditional 
translations of the Bible to all those who often ask him about which version should they 
use. Moreover, in his illustration of how Nida’s dynamic equivalence distorts the 
meanings of the Bible, Marlowe includes this interesting statement: 
I would describe Nida’s theory as Quixotic, in the sense that it leads to many 
incongruous identifications. A translator should not be trying to bring the 
original message into a present-day context to make it directly ‘relevant,’ if 
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in fact it does not belong in the present. Cultural differences are not just an 
inconvenient barrier to conveying “the message” to modern people. The 
original message itself pertains to the original situation, and it cannot always 
be abstracted from its situation and transferred to another setting, as if the 
cultural context were just some accidental stage-scenery. The attempt to 
‘naturalize’ a text that comes from so long ago, and so far away, is bound to 
come to grief. Readers should instead be conscious of a distance between 
themselves and the original receptors of the biblical writings, because an 
awareness of the differences as well as the similarities is necessary for right 
interpretation and application. Whether they realize it or not, all Bible-readers 
are interpreters of the Bible, and they must take into consideration the 
historical context. This is one more reason why the Bible should not be 
‘naturalized’ in a translation (ibid, italics as in original). 
In spite of the criticism Nida’s theory has received and the heated debate it has 
engendered, his translation theory has influenced several subsequent scholars in the field 
of translation studies.   
4.2.4 Peter Newmark’s theory of equivalence 
It seems that Newmark greatly admired Nida and was amongst those who were influenced 
by his work. He even got Nida to write the foreword to his book, Approaches to 
Translation (1981). However, as far as the concept of equivalence is concerned, 
Newmark’s major contribution is through his two suggested approaches to translation: 
semantic and communicative translation. In a semantic translation the “translator 
attempts, with the bare syntactic and semantic constraints of the TL, to produce the 
precise contextual meaning of the author”, whereas in a communicative translation, “the 
translator attempts to produce the same effect on the TL as was produced by the original 
on the SL readers” (1981, p. 22). A prima facie reading of Newmark’s description of 
semantic and communicative translation suggests it bears a resemblance to Nida’s formal 
and dynamic equivalence respectively. In truth, Newmark is not completely in line with 
Nida, particularly in terms of equivalent effect/response. He believes that the full 
achievement of an equivalent effect is ‘illusory’ (ibid, p. 39). In his opinion, it is “the 
desirable result, rather than the aim of any translation” keeping in mind that it is an 
improbable result “in two cases: (a) if the purpose of the SL text is to affect and the TL 
translation is to inform (or vice versa); (b) if there is a pronounced cultural gap between 
the SL and the TL text” (1988, p. 48). Additionally, Newmark criticises Nida’s dynamic 
approach and rejects “the increasing assumption that all translating is (nothing but) 
communicating, where the less effort expected of the reader, the better” (1981, p. 51). To 
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be more specific, Newmark does not disagree with the importance of intelligibility, 
especially while translating any performatives, but his main concern is that generalising 
such a method to all types of texts may seem paradoxical, as it might lead to ignorance. 
This is due to the fact that if everything is handed to the TT reader on a plate then we can 
expect that no effort will be made by the reader whatsoever, not even looking a word up 
in a dictionary or encyclopaedia. To put it in a different way, Newmark acknowledges the 
importance of striving for equivalent effect but not at all times and particularly not in all 
types of texts. He suggests that for each certain type of text there is a suitable translation 
method. That is probably why he omits the sense of producing the same effect while 
defining communicative translation in his book, A Textbook of Translation: 
“Communicative translation attempts to render the exact contextual meaning of the 
original in such a way that both content and language are readily acceptable and 
comprehensible to the readership (1988, p. 47) [my italics]. 
Newmark’s theory is, therefore, concerned with the function of language (1988, p. 9) and 
draws on the ideas of Karl Bühler’s three basic functions of the linguistic sign, as 
modified by Roman Jakobson (ibid, p. 39). The three basic functions are: the expressive, 
the informative or ‘representation, and the vocative or ‘appeal/conative’ (ibid; for a précis 
of Bühler’s functional theory see Parpalea, 2011). The other three functions extended by 
Jakobson (Newmark, 1981, p. 16), which Newmark sees as minor functions are: the 
aesthetic, or ‘poetic’, the phatic, and the metalingual (1981, pp. 21-22; 1988, pp. 42-44). 
The expressive function is associated generally with the addresser (the mind of the 
speaker/the writer/the originator of the utterance), while the informative and vocative 
functions are related to objects and facts of the real world and to the addressee(s) and 
determine their behaviour respectively (ibid, p. 39-41). Newmark maintains that most 
texts usually have aspects of all three main language functions, but the significance of 
each function in may differ from one text to another. He does, however, underline that 
“the expressive function has no place in a vocative or informative text”; “it is there only 
unconsciously, as ‘underlife’” (ibid, p. 42). That being so, texts can be categorised as 
either expressive, informative, or vocative, according to the dominant function in each 
text. Newmark points out that expressive texts include serious imaginative literature (such 
as lyrical poetry, novels, and plays), authoritative statements (such as political speeches, 
documents, and the like made by ministers or party leaders; statutes and legal documents; 
scientific, philosophical and academic works written by acknowledged authorities), 
autobiography, and personal correspondence. Informative texts “are concerned with any 
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topic of knowledge, but texts about literary subjects, as they often express value-
judgments, are apt to lean towards ‘expressiveness’” (a textbook, a technical report, a 
scientific paper, a thesis, an article in a newspaper or a periodical, and the like). Vocative 
texts can be found in “notices, instructions, publicity, propaganda, persuasive writing 
(requests, cases, theses) and possibly popular fiction, whose purpose is to sell the 
book/entertain the reader, as the typical ‘vocative’ text” (ibid.). As far as translation is 
concerned, conveying the nuance of meaning in expressive texts is far more important 
than the reader’s response, while in both informative and vocative texts, the priority is 
towards the response of the reader. 
Knowing the type of text enables the translator to decide on which translation method to 
use. Certainly, there are several methods a translator can employ, but Newmark postulates 
that the semantic and communicative translation are the two methods that are suitable for 
all types of texts. He suggests semantic translation for expressive texts and 
communicative translation for informative and vocative texts (1988, p. 47), but because 
texts normally share aspects of all three functions at once, the translator is inclined to shift 
from one method to the other. Hence, his belief that semantic and communicative 
translations are suitable for all types of texts. Apparently, Newmark is not like most 
theorists who tend to favour one side of the translation pole/continuum over the other, 
usually towards a TL bias, i.e. free over literal, dynamic equivalence over formal 
equivalence, and the like; as a matter of fact, he inclines to both sides of his methods 
equally. This can be deduced from his following words: 
Communicative and semantic translation may well coincide – in particular, 
where the text conveys a general rather than a culturally (temporally and 
spatially) bound message and where the matter is as important as the manner 
– notably then in the translation of the most important religious, 
philosophical, artistic and scientific texts, assuming second readers as 
informed and interested as the first. Further, there are often sections in one 
text that must be translated communicatively (e.g. non-lieu – ‘nonsuit’), and 
others semantically (e.g. a quotation from a speech). There is no one 
communicative nor one semantic method of translating a text – these are in 
fact widely overlapping bands of methods. A translation can be more, or less, 
semantic – more, or less, communicative – even a particular section or 
sentence can be treated more communicatively or less semantically (1981, p. 
40). 
To see if this is reasonable, let us take the Qur’an for an example, where the data of this 
research, i.e. kināyahs, will be taken from. All Arabic linguists and exegetes agree on the 
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following characteristics of the Qur’an: it is a religious text and above all the words of 
God, the quality of its literature is superior and authoritative, its manner and matter are 
fused, its expressions are ‘packed’ or ‘charged’ with meaning, and so is its style. Thus, if 
we were to follow Newmark’s criteria, the Qur’an may be generally classified as an 
expressive text, which means that it should be rendered semantically in order to convey 
every subtle nuance of meaning. Having said that, the Qur’an is also loaded with the 
following: standardized language, figurative expressions that have a communicative 
purpose and double meanings, such as kināyah, recommendations, instructions, and 
scientific subjects. Such features, according to Newmark, are aspects of either an 
informative or vocative text-type and they should be rendered communicatively. In this 
case, Newmark’s presumption may seem reasonable, that is, both methods coexist, and 
with respect to translating scriptures, he draws attention to the fact that “Bible translation 
should be both semantic and communicative” (1981, p. 45). For what it is worth, if there 
is any sort of partiality on the part of Newmark it would probably be his urge to put literal 
translation to use. He even devotes a whole chapter to literal translation (see 1988, p. 68-
80). Newmark trusts that literal translation is ‘always the best’ as long as it offers the 
same semantic and communicative effect as the ST (1981, p. 21). He also affirms that it 
is “correct and must not be avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to 
the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). Needless to say, there is a difference between word-for-
word translation and literal translation. In a word-for-word translation, the SL word-order 
is maintained and the words are rendered singly out of context into their most common 
meanings. The prime use of word-for-word translation, as Newmark indicates, is either 
to comprehend the mechanics of the SL or “to construe a difficult text as a pre-translation 
process” (ibid, p. 45-46). A literal translation is very much the same as a word-for-word 
one in terms of translating lexical words, but the SL grammatical formations, on the other 
hand, are translated into their closest TL equivalents. This, according to Newmark is 
useful as a pre-translation process to indicate the problems to be solved (ibid.). 
Additionally, Newmark distinguishes a semantic translation from a literal translation in 
that the former respects contexts, i.e. attempts to convey the exact contextual meaning of 
the original, while the latter does not. As Newmark explains, the translator’s prime 
concern or unswerving loyalty, in semantic translation, is with the author, but in literal 
translation, it is generally with the ‘norms of the SL’ (1981. P. 63). 
On that account, if a semantic translation is somehow faithful to the ST, then what 
differentiates it from a faithful translation? Newmark expounds that both methods are 
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very much alike, but semantic translation is “more flexible, admits the creative exception 
to 100% fidelity and allows for the translator's intuitive empathy with the original”, while 
faithful translation is ‘uncompromising and dogmatic’ (1988, p. 46). On the other side of 
the translation pole, another distinction is made between two other translation methods 
which are also alike: communicative translation and idiomatic translation. Both methods 
are oriented towards the TT reader; a communicative translation, however, has more 
respect for ST’s form than idiomatic translation, as the latter “tends to distort nuances of 
meaning by preferring colloquialisms and idioms where these do not exist in the original” 
(ibid, p. 47). All in all, semantic translation and communicative translation belong to two 
opposite sides of the translation spectrum, i.e. SL bias or TL bias, just like their 
counterparts, such as faithful translation and idiomatic translation respectively. What 
differentiates them from the rest of their counterparts is that they are, in Newmark’s view, 
a type of conflict resolution for what he refers to as ‘the overriding problem in translation 
theory and practice’, which is ‘the conflict of loyalties, the gap between emphasis on 
source and target language’. Newmark believes that the gap could be narrowed by 
replacing the old terms with those of ‘semantic’ and ‘communicative’ translation (1981, 
p. 38). He draws the following diagram to show this gap (see 1981, p. 39; 1988, p. 45): 
   SL Bias                                                                                                         TL Bias 
 Literal translation                                                                                      Free translation                                
             Faithful translation                                                        Idiomatic translation 
Semantic translation/Communicative 
Above all, Newmark argues that semantic and communicative translation are the most 
suitable methods to achieve the aim of translation, which according to him, is accuracy 
and economy (ibid, p. 47). As to the differences between semantic and communicative 
translation, Munday (2016, p. 72) provides a concise comparison of the two methods: 
Table 4.2: Comparison of Newmark’s semantic and communicative translation 
Parameter Semantic translation Communicative translation 
 
Transmitter/ 
addressee focus 
Focus on the thought processes 
of the transmitter as an 
individual; should only help TT 
reader with connotations if they 
are a crucial part of message. 
Subjective, TT reader focused, 
oriented towards a specific 
language and culture. 
Culture Remains within the SL culture Transfers foreign elements into  
the TL culture 
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Time and 
origin 
Not fixed in any time or local 
space; translation needs to be 
done anew with every generation 
Ephemeral and rooted in its own 
contemporary context 
 
Relation to ST 
Always ‘inferior’ to ST; ‘loss’ of 
meaning 
May be ‘better’ than the ST; 
‘gain’ of force and clarity even if 
loss of semantic content 
 
Use of form of 
SL 
If ST language norms deviate, 
then this must be replicated in 
TT; ‘loyalty’ to ST author 
Respect for the form of the SL, 
but overriding ‘loyalty’ to TL 
norms 
 
Form of TL 
More complex, awkward, 
detailed, concentrated; tendency 
to overtranslate 
Smoother, simpler, clearer, more 
direct, more conventional;  
tendency to undertranslate 
Criterion for 
evaluation 
Accuracy of reproduction of the 
significance of ST 
Accuracy of communication of 
ST message in TT 
With respect to translating the Qur’an, Abu-Milha (2003) posits that a semantic approach 
is more appropriate than a communicative approach because it pays proper attention to 
the linguistic aspect “without losing sight of the contextual aspect”. To substantiate his 
assertion, he adds that the Qur’an’s message is universal and is not restricted to a specific 
time or place – a belief shared by all Muslims similar to the beliefs of Christians and Jews 
towards the Bible and Torah respectively – which means that its rendition should be 
addressed to all people – something which can only be attained through a semantic 
approach. Abu-Milha expresses the view that a communicative approach in terms of 
maintaining an effect on TT readers similar to that of original readers is dubious due to 
its inaccessibility – the same collective criticism highlighted previously. Abu-Milha’s 
substantiation might not be that firm, namely towards Newmark’s communicative 
approach, for a number of reasons. First, Newmark’s concept of equivalent effect is not 
exactly like Nida’s and he admits that the success of equivalent effect “can hardly be 
verified” (1981, p. 10). Additionally, Newmark avers that literal translation is the best 
procedure in both semantic and communicative translation and asserts there is “no licence 
to change words that have plain one-to-one translations just because you think they sound 
better than the original, though there is nothing wrong with it” (1988, p. 36). Secondly, 
there are parts of the Qur’anic text which can be categorised as either informative or 
vocative text-types and, according to Newmark’s views, the appropriate way to render 
such texts is through a communicative approach. That is to say, both translation 
approaches can be used in rendering the Qur’anic text and choosing which approach 
depends on the type of expression. As Newmark says: “There is no one communicative 
nor one semantic method of translating a text … A translation can be more, or less, 
semantic – more, or less, communicative” (1981, p. 40), it is just “a matter of difference 
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of emphasis” (ibid, p. 62). Thirdly, we should always take into consideration that any 
translation of the Qur’an is not a Qur’an, and the renditions are merely a way for non-
Arabic speakers or readers to understand the meaning of the Qur’an. No one can or will 
be able to produce an identical text to this Holy Scripture. Therefore, the translator’s 
concern, i.e. translating the Qur’an, should always be to convey the exact meaning 
whether through a semantic or communicative approach and try to compensate for any 
loss that may occur in the translation process. 
Translating a ST into a TL semantically or communicatively and compensating any loss 
that might exist may involve different types of translation procedures. Newmark draws 
attention to the fact that translation methods are related to whole texts while “translation 
procedures are used for sentences and the smaller units of language” (1988, p. 81). The 
translation procedures that he suggests are as follows (1981, p. 30-32/75-76; 1988, p. 81-
93): 
Table 4.3: Newmark’s translation procedures. 
 
1 
 
Transcription 
(transfer, loan words, 
adoption) 
A process that involves transferring a SL word to a TT. 
Newmark points out that this is similar to Catford’s 
transference and it includes transliteration (cf. Catford, 
1965, p. 43). A translator my resort to this procedure when 
the TL does not have a lexicalized correspondence, or for 
stylistic and rhetorical reasons. 
 
2 
 
Literal translation 
The SL word-orders are translated into their closest TL 
equivalents, but the lexical words are rendered singly out 
of context. It may include one-to-one correspondence (for 
example, ‘the house’ for لزنملا), clause to clause, or 
sentence to sentence as long as they have accurate TL 
correspondents.  
 
3 
 
Naturalisation 
Involves ‘anglicising’ foreign names. “This procedure 
succeeds transference and adapts the SL word first to the 
normal pronunciation, then to the normal morphology 
(word-forms) of the TL”. 
 
4 
 
Cultural equivalent  
An approximate translation in which a SL cultural word is 
rendered by TL cultural word. Newmark notes that cultural 
equivalents ‘are not accurate’, hence, ‘their translation uses 
are limited’; “the main purpose of the procedure is to 
support or supplement another translation procedure in a 
couplet” (1988, p. 83). 
  The use of ‘a culture-neutral word’ in rendering cultural 
words. According to Newmark, this “procedure occupies 
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5 
 
Functional equivalent 
the middle, sometimes the universal, area between the SL 
language or culture and the TL language or culture. If 
practised one to one, it is an under-translation … If 
practised one to one, it may be an over-translation. For 
cultural terms, it is often combined with transference” 
(ibid.). 
6 Descriptive equivalent A SL word is neutralised or generalised by explanation. 
 
7 
 
Synonymy 
The use of a close TL equivalent. This procedure, 
according to Newmark, “is used for a SL word where there 
is no clear one-to-one equivalent, and the word is not 
important in the text, in particular for adjectives or adverbs 
of quality (which in principle are 'outside' the grammar and 
less important than other components of a sentence)” (ibid, 
p.84).   
8 Through-translation 
(loan translation) 
“The literal translation of common collocations, names of 
organizations, the components of compounds, and perhaps 
phrases” (ibid.). 
9 Transposition (shifts) It involves “a change in the grammar from SL to TL” (ibid, 
p. 85) 
10 Modulation This involves a variation in point of view (see Vinay and 
Darbelnet’s translation procedures).  
 
11 
 
Recognised translation 
According to Newmark, one should support the use of an 
official or generally accepted translation of any 
institutional term, unless he/she disagrees with that version. 
If he/she does not agree with that version a footnote is 
required (see Newmark, 1981, p. 76; Newmark, 1981, p. 
89). 
 
 
12 
 
Translation label 
This is an ‘approximate equivalent’ or ‘a provisional 
translation’ of a new institution. Such translation “should 
be made in inverted commas, which can later be discreetly 
withdrawn” if the term becomes acceptable. It could be 
done through literal translation” (see Newmark, 1981, p. 
76; Newmark, 1988, p. 90).  
 
13 
 
Paraphrase 
“An amplification or explanation of the meaning of a 
segment of the text. It is used in an ‘anonymous’ text when 
it is poorly written, or has important implications and 
omissions” (Newmark, 1988, p. 90). 
 
 
 
 
“These are rather imprecise translation procedures, which 
you practise intuitively in some cases, ad hoc in others. 
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14 
 
Reduction and 
Expansion 
However, for each there is at least one shift which you may 
like to bear in mind, particularly in poorly written texts: 
a- SL adjective of substance plus general noun, TL noun: 
atteintes inflammatoires et infectieuses, 
‘inflammations and infections’; science linguistique 
(etc.), ‘linguistics’. 
b- For expansion, a not uncommon shift, often neglected, 
is SL adjective, English TL adverb plus past 
participle, or present participle plus object: cheveux 
egaux, ‘evenly cut hair’; belebend, ‘life-giving’” 
(Newmark, 1988, p. 90). 
15 Couplets and triplets Combining two different procedures (couplets) or three 
different procedures (triplets). 
16 Notes, additions, and 
glosses 
Additional information in a translation, whether within the 
text or at the end of the text, such as a footnote, endnote, or 
glossary.  
Choosing the optimal method of translating a text, according to Newmark, can be 
extremely challenging but the most challenging part is translating metaphorical 
expressions. By a ‘metaphorical expression’, Newmark means any figurative expression 
(1988, p. 104). He sees a metaphor as a “figurative word used, which may be one-word, 
or ‘extended’ over any stretch of language from a collocation to the whole text” (ibid, p. 
105). In his attempt to provide translation procedures for a metaphor, Newmark proposes 
a typology of metaphors40. First, he divides metaphors into five types: dead, cliché, stock, 
recent, and original (1981, p. 85), while later on he adds ‘adapted metaphor’ to his 
typology to make six types of metaphors (1988, p. 106). In Newark’s perspective, the 
type of metaphor and the type of texts they are found in (expressive, informative, or 
vocative) have a great effect on how they can be translated. For instance, according to 
Newmark, a cliché metaphor41 should be retained in a vocative text, but in an informative 
text “where only facts or theories are sacred and, by agreement with the SL author, in 
public notices, instructions, propaganda or publicity” it should be reduced to sense or 
                                                
40 The focus of this study is not on the typology of metaphor as much as the strategies of translating 
figurative expressions, namely, kināyah. Therefore, we will not discuss in detail Newmark’s typology. 
It is worth noting that some may disagree with Newmark’s typology or his concept of metaphor in 
respect of translation studies, such as Snell-Hornby (1988/1995), or Dickins, who provides a critique 
and revision of Newmark’s metaphor typology while providing both his full and simplified models for 
the textual analysis of metaphor in a translation context (2005; cf. Dickins, et al., 2017, pp. 194-210).  
41 Newmark definition of cliché metaphors is “metaphors that have perhaps temporarily outlived their 
usefulness, that are used as a substitute for clear thought, often emotively, but without corresponding to 
the facts of the matter” (1988, p. 107).  
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replaced “with a less tarnished metaphor” (ibid, p. 107). He also suggests that original 
metaphors should be rendered literally in authoritative and expressive texts, whether they 
are cultural, universal, or obscurely subjective and that is because Newmark believes 
they: “(a) contain the core of an important writer's message, his personality, his comment 
on life, and though they may have a more or a less cultural element, these have to be 
transferred neat; (b) such metaphors are a source of enrichment for the target language” 
(ibid, p. 112). However, in most informative texts, original metaphors “are open to a 
variety of translation procedures, depending, usually, on whether the translator wants to 
emphasise the sense or the image” (ibid, p. 113). In general, Newmark proposes a number 
of procedures for translating metaphors: 
1- Reproducing the same figurative image in the TL, “provided it has comparable 
frequency and currency in the appropriate TL register” (ibid, p. 108). For instance, 
ﻞمﻷا نم صيصب (lit. glow of hope) could be reproduced in the TL as ‘ray of hope’ 
instead of ‘glimpse of hope’ or a literal translation. Another example is the Arabic 
word ةشق (lit. straw), which can be reproduced by using ‘thread’ as in ( ةيانعلا يف لازام
هتايحو ةزكرملا ةشقب ةقلعم  / He is still in intensive care and his life is hanging by a thread) 
.  
2- Rendering the SL figurative image with another standard or established TL form, 
particularly when there is no similar image to that of the SL or it is not acceptable 
in the TL culture. For example, ‘selling coals to Newcastle’ for مك عﻀبتسﻰلإ ًارمت رجه 
(اربيخ ضرأ وأ) (carrying dates to Hajr (or Khaibar)42 to sell). 
3- Converting the SL metaphor into a TL simile. 
4- Converting the SL metaphor into a TL simile and also adding the metaphor’s 
sense43. 
5- Maintaining the SL metaphor and adding its sense; the addition is usually made to 
avoid any confusion or misinterpretation of the metaphor. 
6- Converting the SL metaphor into sense. For instance, كلﻞ ةوبك داوج  (lit. Every horse 
has a stumble) as in كلﻞ ةوبك داوجحجنتسو ىرخأ ةرم لواج اذل ،  can be rendered as ‘we all 
have off days sometimes, therefore, try again and you will succeed’.   
                                                
42 In the old days, both Hajr (a place in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia) and Khaibar (a small town 
in Madinah province) were well known for their great production of dates just as is al-Qaseem province 
currently. Therefore, such an expression is said to indicate taking something to a place where there is 
already plenty of it available.   
43 What Newmark means by sense is “the literal meaning of the metaphor; the resemblance or the semantic 
area overlapping object and image” (1988, p. 105). 
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7- Deleting the metaphor including its sense, usually due to redundancy. 
As to criticism, Munday argues “Newmark has been criticized for his strong 
prescriptivism” (2016, p. 74). Ghazala, on the other hand, disagrees with Newmark’s 
traditional typology of metaphor and believes such a classification “is not very useful, 
superficial and lacks in depth with regards to language analysis as much as translation” 
(2012, p. 58). He also disagrees with Newmark’s opinion that metaphor “always involves 
illusion; like a lie where you are pretending to be someone you are not, a metaphor is a 
kind of deception, often used to conceal an intention” (Newmark P. , 1988, p. 104). 
Ghazala states that “[w]e do not lie when we use metaphors; we make concepts and 
thoughts clearer and sharper” (2012, p. 59). It should be noted that Ghazala’s comments 
are made from a cognitive stylistic perspective. He exemplifies his view using the 
expressions كةبيط ةرجشك ةبيط ةمل  (a good word is like a good tree) and كةرجشك ةﺜيبخ ةمل ةﺜيبخ  
(an evil/malicious word is like an evil/malicious tree) from [Q.14: 24-26]: 
[T]he ‘good word’ (ةبيطلا ةملكلا) is set in similitude to the ‘good tree’ ( ةرجشلا
ةبيطلا) whose roots are firm, and branches in Heaven, and gives its fruits every 
now and then by the will of its Lord. On the other hand, the ‘evil word’ ( ةملكلا
ةﺜيبخلا) is resembled to the ‘evil tree’ (ةﺜيبخلا ةرجشلا) which is uprooted from the 
earth and has no bed … … This exquisite similitude has not only clarified the 
concept of a ‘good word’, but extended it in an unprecedented way into a 
multi-productive concept of a uniquely ‘good, fruitful, and heavenly tree’, a 
completely different domain that has mapped, stretched, illustrated and 
encapsulated the conceptual domain of the ‘good word’. The same argument 
applies to the second similitude of ‘evil word’ and ‘evil tree’ (ibid.). 
From a similar perspective to that of Ghazala, i.e. a cognitive-pragmatic perspective, 
Maalej too criticises both Newmark’s typology of metaphor and his procedures for 
metaphor translation. Maalej claims that Newmark’s typology is not useful in practice 
because the boundaries between each type are often fuzzy. He describes Newmark’s list 
of procedures as “a prescriptive recipe that offers very little in the sense of how any of 
the proposed procedures is motivated or justified”. He adds that “the translation of 
metaphor as a matter of procedures is not realistic” (2008, p. 62) and supports his claim 
with Snell-Hornby’s statement that the translation of metaphor “cannot be decided by a 
set of abstract rules, but must depend on the structure and function of a particular 
metaphor within the text concerned” (1988/1995, p. 58). Regardless of such criticisms, 
Munday posits that Newmark’s work, in general, provides significant insights into 
translation (Munday, 2016, p. 74). 
 -135- 
4.2.5 Beekman and Callow’s notion of equivalence 
Within the realm of TS, John Beekman and John Callow are mostly known for their 
contribution to Bible translation, namely through their co-authored book, Translating the 
Word of God (1974). It has been widely postulated that they are not only advocates of 
Nida’s dynamic approach but their theory of Bible translation is based on the principles 
of translation and foundations laid by Nida (see Smith, 2000; Weber, 2003; Doty, 2007; 
Floor, 2007; Foley, 2009; Gutt, 2010; Kerr, 2011; Marlowe, 2012). However, Beekman 
and Callow’s approach may differ slightly from that of Nida’s in that they ascribe the 
success or quality of a translation to the naturalness of language used in the TT and to the 
ease of its reader’s comprehension rather than to receptor’s response/effect. These two 
aspects, i.e. ‘naturalness of language use’ and ‘ease of comprehension’, constitute what 
Beekman and Callow refer to as a dynamically faithful translation (cf. Beekman & 
Callow, 1974, pp. 40-41; Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, p. 48), which is an essential part 
of their defintion of a faithful translation: 
A translation which transfers the meaning and the dynamics of the original 
text is to be regarded as a faithful translation. The expression transfers the 
meaning, means that the translation conveys to the reader or hearer the 
information that the original conveyed to its reader or hearer. The message is 
not distorted or changed; it has neither unnecessarily gained nor lost 
information. The expression, the dynamics, means that (1) the translation 
makes a natural use of the linguistic structures of the RL [receptor language] 
and that (2) the recipients of the translation understands the message with ease 
(1974, pp. 33-34, author’s italics).  
According to Beekman and Callow, the appropriate way to achieve such a faithful 
translation is through adopting an idiomatic approach, which basically means relying 
more on the TL ‘natural and grammatical forms’ to render the meaning/message of the 
ST. Evidently, they do not provide a clear definition of ‘meaning/message’, but their 
elucidation of the expression ‘transfers the meaning’ suggests it is ‘the information that 
the ST conveys to its recipients’. The idiomatic approach is one of two basic translation 
approaches that are based on the type of linguistic form used in a translation. The other 
approach is the literal approach, which unlike the idiomatic approach adheres more to the 
linguistic form of the ST. Within the framework of these two basic approaches, Beekman 
and Callow suggest four types of translation, two of which are considered acceptable and 
the other two unacceptable (1974, p. 21): 
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Table 4.4: Beekman and Callow’s four types of translation. 
Highly Literal Modified Literal Idiomatic Unduly Free 
Unacceptable Acceptable Translations Unacceptable 
The two unacceptable types of translation, highly literal and unduly free, stand polar 
opposite ends of a translation continuum. Beekman and Callow explicate that a highly 
literal translation reproduces the linguistic features of the SL with high consistency, 
ignoring the obligatory grammatical rules of the TL, such as adhering too closely to the 
word structure of the SL as in an interlinear translation. They argue this translation type 
would sound awkward and give rise to either ambiguity, balderdash, or wrong sense. 
Hence, it is an unacceptable type of translation for general use. They posit its usefulness 
is possibly limited only to demonstrating the structure of the original text, but one has to 
keep in mind that it “has the lowest communication value to those readers” who are not 
familiar with the original language (ibid, p. 22). On the polar opposite end of the 
continuum lies the other unacceptable type of translation, the unduly free, and though it 
fully exploits the linguistic features and grammatical rules of the TL it is still 
unacceptable. This is due to the distortion of content caused by the extraneous and 
unnecessary information the TT contains that was not in the ST and which the ST did not 
intend to convey or imply to its original recipients. Beekman and Callow assert that both 
highly literal and unduly free translations “share the same unacceptable characteristic of 
failing to communicate what the original communicated” (ibid, p. 23).  
In between the highly literal and unduly free translations, on Beekman and Callow’s 
translation continuum, are the modified literal and idiomatic translations, which they 
consider acceptable translations. For Beekman and Callow, a modified literal translation 
is more of a slight deviation from the form of the ST by making minor or partial changes, 
possibly lexical or grammatical, to the TT that meets some of the compulsory 
grammatical rules of the TL. These changes assist in avoiding any grammatical errors in 
the structure of the TT. However, Beekman and Callow argue this type of translation does 
not entirely convey the ST message to the TT reader. They believe it will still produce a 
TT with some superfluous ambiguities and obscurities that may make it harder for some 
addressees, such as the uneducated or those who have just gained the ability to read and 
write, to fully comprehend the original message on due the following (ibid, pp. 23-24): 
- The TT generally adheres more towards “the same grammatical forms as those 
that are found” in the ST. 
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- Numerous occurrences of a given word are rendered “consistently without 
adequate regard to the context”. 
- Numerous word collocations or combinations in the ST are ‘awkwardly retained’ 
in the TT. 
- Some parts of the ST message or information that are implicit and are built on the 
SL linguistic features may be neglected or get lost in the TT. 
Notwithstanding the professed shortcomings, Beekman and Callow deem this type of 
translation acceptable, chiefly for those who are well-educated or willing to access further 
reference works. For other addressees, they recommend an idiomatic translation, which 
enables the meaning of the ST to be conveyed accurately and naturally to the recipients 
by employing the natural lexical and grammatical forms of the TL. They accentuate that 
certain expressions in the ST could be rendered in a number of ways into the TT “so as 
to give the most accurate sense and the most natural word combination in each context” 
(ibid, p. 25). They suggest that this type of translation does not only enable the 
exploitability of the ‘discourse and stylistic features’ of the TL in a natural way, minimise 
‘ambiguity and obscurity’, but most of all it produces a text for everyone, including the 
uneducated, to comprehend the ‘essentials of the message’ that of the ST (ibid.). 
Therefore, Beekman and Callow strongly recommend the idiomatic approach to be used 
in translations that are aimed for general use. In general, they believe this method achieves 
the goal of translation, especially in translating the word of God: 
[T]he goal should be a translation that is so rich in vocabulary, so idiomatic 
in phrase, so correct in construction, so smooth in flow of thought, so clear in 
meaning, and so elegant in style, that it does not appear to be a translation at 
all, and yet, at the same time, faithfully transmits the message of the original 
(ibid, p. 32). 
So, from Beekman and Callow’s discussions, one can deduce that the modified literal 
approach may render the same meaning as the ST, but it may not convey it as clearly and 
idiomatically as the ST does. By contrast, the idiomatic approach is the method that is 
able to achieve accuracy, clarity, and idiomaticness, the key features of fidelity. 
With respect to fidelity in scriptural translation, Beekman and Callow state that it involves 
both fidelity to the meaning and to the dynamics of the ST. The latter relies on exploiting 
the linguistic features of the TL to deliver a natural rendition and ease of understanding 
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similar to that of the ST, as pointed out earlier. The former relies heavily on exegesis44 
and includes fidelity to historical and didactic references. Any ST information, such as 
objects, places, persons, animals, customs, and suchlike, related to historical references 
should not be substituted by local TL equivalents, because, according to Beekman and 
Callow, the “Christian faith is firmly rooted in history” (ibid, p. 35). Additionally, any 
scriptural information that has a didactic function should also be preserved. However, 
Beekman and Callow indicate that sometimes it is not that simple: “[o[ften a translator 
realises that an attempt to be faithful both to the historical and to the didactic function of 
a cultural referent will inevitably lose some of the dynamics of the original illustration. 
He will find himself in a dilemma” (ibid, p. 36). Therefore, they claim that cultural 
substitutions or adjustments to the ST cultural items are permissible only if they cause 
ambiguity or obscurity and hinder communicating the didactic information to the TL 
addressee. In their discussion on ‘Lexical equivalence across languages – when things or 
events are unknown to the RL [receptor language]’ (ibid, pp. 191-211), Beekman and 
Callow suggest that a cultural substitution should be a last resort. Footnotes or slightly 
modifying the substituted expression can be used together with substitution to 
compensate for any loss of fidelity to meaning. The first two options in approaching 
lexical equivalence, aside from cultural substitution, are the use of a generic word and the 
use of loan words. Both approaches may very much involve some addition of descriptive 
modification to provide specific meanings absent from either the generic word or the loan 
word. Beekman and Callow stress that the translator should bear in mind that “didactic 
fidelity takes precedence over fidelity to the historical nature of the imagery” and 
remember that “fidelity to meaning takes precedence over dynamic fidelity” (ibid, p. 37). 
In so far as expressions with multiple senses, and specifically figurative expressions, are 
concerned, Beekman and Callow have devoted almost four chapters to discussing some 
of their translation issues. They provide a general guideline which suggests that rendering 
a figurative expression may involve one of the following (ibid, p. 104): 
1- The sense of the figurative expression can be rendered straightforwardly. 
2- The original figurative expression can be maintained along with a direct rendition 
of its sense. 
                                                
44 In so far as the Qur’an is concerned, the decoding of the meaning of the Qur’an is principally through 
itself and the Hadith. However, authoritative exegeses are also an essential tool to completely 
comprehend its meaning and are part and parcel of the translation task (see the section 3.8 on Translation 
and Understanding the Qur’an’s Genre in chapter three). 
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3- The original figurative expression can be replaced by a TL figurative expression 
that has the same meaning. 
The figurative expressions that Beekman and Callow deal with are metonymy, 
synecdoche, hyperbole, euphemism, idiom, metaphor, simile, and symbolic action. Two 
of the four chapters that discuss the translation of figurative expression are dedicated to 
metaphor and simile, which is not a surprise, since the two figures of speech are tight-
knit even in Arabic. Hyperbole, euphemism, and symbolic actions are discussed 
separately as if they were independent figures of speech, though Beekman and Callow do 
state that hyperbole is metonymy or synecdoche and that euphemism is generally based 
on metonymy and occasionally on metaphor (ibid, p. 118/119). What is remarkable, 
however, is that it seems as if hyperbole has a specific function of its own, which is to 
produce ‘vivid effect’: 
The ‘exaggeration’ [hyperbole] is deliberately used for effect, and is not to be 
understood as if it were a literal description … hyperbole is often based on 
the group of part-whole relations, but in reverse order, i.e. the whole is used 
for the part … … This45 is why, of course there is liable to be confusion 
between hyperbole and synecdoche, as both are based on the same 
relationship. It is difficult to make any rigid distinction; all one can say is that 
when there is an element of ‘overstatement’ for vivid effect, the figure is 
hyperbole (ibid, p. 118).    
In Arabic, hyperbole and euphemism are simply aspects of kināyah, as pointed out earlier 
in this study, and not so often euphemism in particular may be an aspect of ʾistiʿārah 
(Arabic metaphor). Based on Beekman and Callow’s definition, English and Arabic may 
share similar concepts about euphemism: “[euphemism is] the substitution of an 
acceptable, inoffensive expression for one that is socially unacceptable, offensive, or 
which my suggest something unpleasant” (ibid, p. 119). Yet, they are not entirely the 
same with respect to their use in the Bible and the Qur’an. Beekman and Callow state that 
euphemistic expressions, in the New Testament, “are mostly used to refer to God, death, 
the Gentiles, and sex” (ibid.). The use of euphemism for death or anything related to sex 
is impeccable logic and very common in the Qur’an, but it seems quite bizarre to use 
euphemism for God or any person who is not Jewish. Beekman and Callow do, however, 
mention that numerous languages do not use euphemistic expressions for God or the 
Gentiles as in the Bible. Still, we believe it is outrageous, especially in Islam, to think that 
mentioning God (Allah) or one His names is unacceptable, offensive, or unpleasant and 
                                                
45 This comment is stated in a footnote.   
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needs to be euphemised. Also, there is completely nothing offensive or unpleasant about 
people who are not Jewish; therefore, they do not need to be euphemised too. In the 
Qur’an, God is referred to by either His name or one of His qualities, known in Arabic as 
ﻰنسحلا ﷲ ءامسأ and in English as ‘The ninety-nine attributes/most beautiful names of 
Allah’. What is mystifying is that the examples of euphemistic expressions used for God 
provided by Beekman and Callow do not seem euphemistic rather than attributes of God, 
for example, ‘Blessed’ and ‘most High’: 
John 19:11 where Jesus tells Pilate that he would have no power over him 
‘except it were given thee from above,’ where ‘from above’ is euphemistic 
for God (ibid, p. 20).   
In translation, it is important to have good knowledge of the cultures of both languages 
in order to recognise what should be expressed euphemistically and what should not be 
in the TL. Some languages may share similar expressions and some might not, but if they 
share similar expressions that does mean they have the same meanings. For instance, 
according to Beekman and Callow’s illustration, adultery is not euphemised in the New 
Testament and is referred to directly, whereas, in other languages, such as Chinantec and 
Trique of Mexico, Zouque of Mexico46, or Tagabili of Philippines47, it is referred to as 
‘to talk to another women or to another man’, ‘to deceive her husband or his wife’, or 
‘stepping on his or her partner’ respectively (ibid, p. 105). In Arabic, adultery may be 
referred to in different ways, such as انز or ةشحاف. Beekman and Callow also demonstrate 
the following: 
The opposite process, i.e. of rendering a euphemistic statement with one that 
is not euphemistic, is often necessary. For example, the euphemism in Acts 
1:25; ‘he went to his own place’, needs to made specific in most translations 
or it is understood to mean he went to his home or farm” (ibid.). 
Some gestures and symbolic actions are also similar to other figures of speech because 
their primary or literal senses are not the intended sense but, rather, a figurative sense is 
intended. In translating these gestures, Beekman and Callow suggest that one should pay 
attention to the fact that some of these actions may represent a historical reference; hence, 
one should denote the actual form of the gesture (ibid, p. 121).  
In some cases, however, this could be tricky. Sometimes referring to the actual form or 
action may misinform the TT recipient. As a matter of fact, some cultures may share the 
                                                
46 Chinantec, Trique, and Zoque are languages used by particular people in specific regions of Mexico.     
47 Tagabili or Tboli is a language spoken in southern Philippines. 
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same significant gesture but not the same meaning or function associated with it. For 
instance, ‘sitting in sackcloth and ashes’ in [Luke 10:13] is considered a token of 
penitence, while among the Cuicateco speakers in Mexico ‘sitting in ashes’ is a token of 
laziness (ibid, p. 122). Another example is ‘reviled him, wagging their heads’ in [Mathew 
27:39] where shaking the head is a token of hate or derision and insult, or even mockery 
as in [Psalm 22:7], but amongst Ch'ol speakers in Mexico it indicates a firm ‘no’, the 
shaking is from side to side, and a sign of ‘joy’ if it is up and down (ibid.). In Arabic, 
wagging the head from side to side would probably be a sign of ‘no’, ‘disapproval’, or 
‘sympathy’ depending on the context.  
On this account, a literal rendition of the form of the symbolic gesture may convey a 
whole different meaning than that of the original. Adding the intended meaning to the 
literal rendition is probably not an ideal solution as well, and perhaps will bewilder the 
TT reader even more due to what Beekman and Callow call ‘a semantic clash’ (ibid.). To 
exemplify, let us take for instance عبصﻻا/ديلا ضع (biting one’s hand/finger). In the Qur’an, 
such an expression is used to express rage or remorse, whereas amongst most English 
cultures it is more of a sign of anxiety or emotional stress. That is to say, the symbolic 
action in the TL culture has a different meaning than that in the SL culture. In Beekman 
and Callow’s view, a literal rendition would not convey the intended meaning, i.e. rage 
or remorse, because the recipient would understand it as a sign of anxiety or emotional 
stress rather than remorse or rage. Also adding the intended meaning to the literal 
translation, as in ‘he bit his hand in remorse’, would not erase the sense of anxiety or 
emotional stress. It would probably confuse the TL recipient even more, since the 
association between biting one’s hand/finger and anxiety or emotional stress are already 
firmly established in the TL culture.  
Beekman and Callow suggest two ways to solve such an issue. One way requires the 
translator “to drop specific reference to the symbolic action” and use instead a generic 
term that covers the action, such as ‘he showed’, ‘he did that which showed’, or ‘he 
expressed’. Simultaneously, one can keep explicit the intended meaning of the action 
(ibid.). For example, ‘he showed that he was remorseful’ instead of ‘he bit his hand in 
remorse’; the same could be said for ‘wagging/shaking the head’ in the biblical verses 
[Mathew 27:39] and [Psalm 22:7]: ‘reviled him, expressing their derision’ and ‘they 
express their mockery’ respectively. According to Beekman and Callow, using such a 
generic expression “still leaves it possible for teachers and preachers to explain the 
different customs prevailing elsewhere without introducing a semantic clash into the 
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translation itself” (ibid.). An alternative solution is to render the symbolic gesture literally 
and clarify in a footnote that this gesture is used in the SL culture to refer to such-and-
such. 
On the other hand, if the gesture does not have a symbolic significance in the TL culture 
or has not been heard of before, then the form of the action should be rendered literally. 
It is more than likely the TT recipient will comprehend the intended meaning from the 
context, because there is no other established meaning for this action in the TL culture to 
get confused with. Nonetheless, if a translator thinks that the intended meaning is yet not 
clear then she/he should add the intended meaning after the literal translation or clarify it 
in a footnote. 
As to metaphor and simile, Beekman and Callow have also paid a great deal of attention 
to their translation issues. They believe that at times literal translations of metaphors and 
similes found in the Scriptures have a propensity to be misunderstood in the recipient 
language version. According to Beekman and Callow, this misunderstanding could be for 
various reasons. For instance, the TL culture is unfamiliar with the ‘vehicle’ (which 
Beekman and Callow refer to as the ‘image’), or has a specific meaning/several meanings 
different from the one in the SL culture. Also, the implicitness of the ‘tenor’ or ‘subject’ 
(which Beekman and Callow refer to as the ‘topic’) can cause a misunderstanding. 
Specifically, Beekman and Callow presuppose that any misunderstanding that may come 
up can be related to following (ibid, p. 137-141): 
1- “The image [vehicle] may be unknown”. 
2- “The topic is implicit”. 
3- “The point of similarity [also known as ‘grounds’] is implicit”. 
4- “The items compared have no plausible resemblance in the RL”. 
5- “The metaphorical meaning is excluded in the RL”. 
6- “New metaphors are no longer being formed in the RL”. 
Beekman and Callow, therefore, recommend that a translator should avoid a literal 
translation whenever he/she realises that it communicates wrong, obscure, or ambiguous 
meanings. One way to figure this out is by carefully asking the TT recipients. Once this 
failure of communication has been confirmed, then the translator can ascertain whether 
the problem derives from the parts of the figure of speech, i.e. the subject, the vehicle, the 
grounds, or something else related to the TL and try to solve it. 
Beekman and Callow maintain that the status of metaphor and simile being dead, alive, a 
thematic image, and symbol have a great impact on their translation. For instance, they 
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believe that there is no point in retaining the ‘image’ in the TL if a metaphor is dead, 
because it is of no value, hence, it can be left out and the translator can only express 
explicitly the ‘subject’ and ‘point of similarity’. On the other hand, if at all possible, the 
‘image’ should be maintained whenever the metaphor is alive or is considered to be a 
thematic image or symbol (ibid, p. 144). Beekman and Callow state that in some cases it 
is permissible to modify the literary form of a metaphor or make “explicit some part of 
the implicit information” carried by the figurative expression to convey the exact message 
(ibid.). They also propose the following guideline, taking into consideration that the first 
three factors are sequential: 
1- Maintaining the metaphorical form in the TL. 
2- Transforming the metaphor into a simile. 
3-  Employing a nonfigurative form. 
4- Combining any two forms of the above. 
On the whole, we believe Beekman and Callow’s translation approach is reasonable 
compared to that of Nida, especially the way they deal with holy figurative expressions, 
namely symbolic gestures. Unlike Nida, they call attention to the TT recipient’s 
understanding of ST message with ease, rather than their response. In addition, they 
provide some guidelines or procedures that seem useful in translating such expressions. 
One may criticise Beekman and Callow’s work as being limited only to Bible translation, 
i.e. they do not try to generalise their approach, as Zahri assumes (1990, p. 59). However, 
Larson’s (1998) work is believed to be an expansion of Beekman and Callow’s approach 
to cover non-biblical literature as well (cf. Gutt, 1990). 
4.2.6 Mildred Lason’s concept of equivalence 
The works of Beekman and Callow as well as Nida had a profound influence on Larson, 
especially the former (see Larson, 1998, p. x). Her book (1998) ‘Meaning-Based 
Translation: A Guide to Cross-Language Equivalence’, closely resembles Beekman and 
Callow’s (1974) ‘Translating the Word of God’, except that it covers other literature 
translation besides Bible translation. As a matter of fact, Beekman and Callow and Larson 
have much in common, in that they both believe the meaning or message of the ST should 
be rendered in an idiomatic manner by exploiting the linguistic features and grammatical 
rules of the TL. However, Larson, unlike Beekman and Callow, refers to the facet of 
‘recipient’s response’ while explaining what is meant by the ‘dynamics’ of the ST in her 
idiomatic approach: 
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The underlying premise upon which this book is based is that the best 
translation is the one which (1) uses the normal language forms or the receptor 
language, (2) communicates, as much as possible, to the receptor language 
speakers the same meaning that was understood by the speakers of the source 
language, and (3) maintains the dynamics of the original source language text. 
Maintaining the ‘dynamics’ of the original source text means that the 
translation is presented in such a way that it will, hopefully, evoke the same 
response as the source text attempted to evoke (1998, p. 6; cf. p. 36). 
From the title of Larson’s book, it is self-evident that she is not an advocate of any sort 
of literal translation. She suggests there are two main kinds of translation: form-based and 
meaning based translation. The former is also known as literal translation and it strives to 
follow the form of the SL. The latter, on the other hand, strives to convey the meaning or 
message of the SL using the natural forms of the TL and is known as idiomatic translation 
(ibid, p. 17). Literal translations, according to Larson, “often change the meaning, or at 
least result in a form which is unnatural in the second language” (ibid, p. 10). Therefore, 
she states that as far as translation is concerned, meaning should always have precedence 
over form: “It is meaning which is to be carried over from the source language to the 
receptor language, not the linguistic forms” (ibid, bold as in original). Larson believes 
this can be achieved only by adopting an idiomatic approach. That is because 
implementing an idiomatic translation allows the translator to exploit the natural forms 
of the TL, not only in grammatical constructions but also in the choice of lexical items 
(ibid, p. 18). 
Larson puts forward a translational continuum consisting of seven types of translation, 
ranging from very literal, to literal, to modified literal, to inconsistent mixture, to near-
idiomatic, to idiomatic, to unduly free. 
Table 4.5: Larson’s seven types of translation. 
very 
literal literal 
modified 
literal 
inconsistent 
mixture 
near-
idiomatic idiomatic 
unduly 
free 
     Translator’s 
goal 
 
There is something rather curious about Larson’s translational continuum, and to be 
precise, it is her listing of ‘very literal’. Although she places this type of translation on 
her continuum, she does not define it or at least clarify the difference between it and literal 
translation. Even if we would like to think that what she means by ‘very literal’ is an 
interlinear translation we cannot because she states that “interlinear translation is a 
completely literal translation” (ibid, p. 17). So, what precisely is a ‘very literal’ 
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translation? We believe it remains elusive. The same could be said regarding Larson’s 
‘inconsistent mixture’ and ‘near-idiomatic’ translations. Larson claims it is not that easy 
to constantly translate idiomatically and even if a translator would like to do so, he/she is 
bound to go back and render some parts literally (ibid, p. 19), which means that the 
outcome is a mixture of idiomatic and literal translations. If that is the case, then what is 
a ‘near-idiomatic’ translation? We presume that it is a translation which is not entirely 
idiomatic, in other words, a mixture of literal and idiomatic translations. Therefore, it 
seems as if both ‘inconsistent mixture’ and ‘near-idiomatic’ translations are alike.  
The rest of the translations on Larson’s continuum, however, are clarified and it looks as 
if most of them are very much the same as those of Beekman and Callow. For example, 
Larson’s ‘literal’ translation is similar to Beekman and Callow’s ‘highly literal’. Also, 
her ‘modified literal’, ‘idiomatic’, and ‘unduly free’ translations are similar to Beekman 
and Callow’s ‘modified literal, ‘idiomatic’, and ‘unduly free’ translations respectively. 
There is, however, a difference between Larson and Beekman and Callow in terms of 
what is an acceptable or unacceptable translation. Larson clearly proclaims that an 
idiomatic translation should be the translator’s only goal. She also overtly states that 
unduly free translation is unacceptable and, by implication, the rest of the translation types 
are too unacceptable. Beekman and Callow, on the other hand, assert that highly literal 
and unduly free translations are unacceptable while modified literal and idiomatic 
translations are acceptable. 
It is worth noting that though Larson refers to the facet of ‘recipient’s response’ in her 
definition of ‘dynamics’, she does not prefer the pursuit of such a response at the expense 
of conveying the same meaning as that of the ST. This can be deduced from her comments 
on unduly free translations: 
Unduly free translations are not considered acceptable translations for most 
purposes. Translations are unduly free if they add extraneous information not 
in the source text, if they change the meaning of the source language, or if 
they distort the facts of the historical and cultural setting of the source 
language text. Sometimes unduly free translations are made for purposes of 
humor or to bring about a special response from the receptor language 
speakers. However, they are not acceptable as normal translations. The 
emphasis is on the reaction of those reading or hearing it and the meaning is 
not necessarily the same as that of the source language (ibid, p. 19, italics are 
mine). 
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Besides types of translations, Larson suggests that there are three kinds of meanings that 
are of great interest to translation. The first type is called ‘referential’ meaning, and this 
can be defined as the sense of a word or phrase that “refers to a certain thing, event, 
attribution, or relation which a person can perceive or imagine” (ibid, p. 41). The second 
type is ‘organizational’ meaning, which refers to the organisation of the referential 
meaning into a semantic structure, putting “referential information together into a 
coherent text”. According to Larson, organizational meaning is “signaled by deictics, 
repetition, groupings, and by many other features in the grammatical structure of the text” 
(ibid, pp. 41-42). The third type of meaning is called ‘situational’ meaning, which Larson 
believes is essential to the comprehension of any text. It refers to the situation 
encompassing the production of the message. Thus, it is related to the relationship 
between the author and the recipient, their age, sex, social status, and cultural 
backgrounds, when and where the communication takes place, and “the presuppositions 
that each brings to the communication” (ibid, p. 42). All three types of meaning can 
contain or communicate either explicit or implicit information, that is, information or 
meaning which is “overtly stated by lexical items and grammatical forms” or information 
which “is not stated in an explicit form in the text” but it is “part of the total 
communication intended or assumed by the writer” respectively (ibid, pp. 43-44). 
Therefore, a translator should always take into consideration that, in some cases, he/she 
needs to make such implicit information explicit in the TT, because leaving it implicit 
would produce an unintelligible text. Whether this is the case all depends on the 
information and concepts shared between the SL/SC and TL/TC, such as language 
structure, common experience, culture, and suchlike. Thus, when two languages do not 
have anything in common, then it is more than likely the translator is required to render 
implicit information that is in the ST explicitly to make the TT intelligible. 
Larson’s views are broadly similar to those of Beekman and Callow. For instance, in her 
discussion of finding lexical equivalents for concepts that are unknown in the TL culture, 
Larson suggests three basic ways to provide an equivalent expression (ibid, p. 179): 
1- The use of a generic word with a descriptive phrase. 
2- The use of a loan word with a descriptive phrase. 
3- Cultural substitution. 
She also agrees with Beekman and Callow that cultural substitution should only be used 
as a last option, i.e. when neither a generic word nor a loan word is possible as a 
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translation equivalent. Larson also stresses that one should be fairly cautious when 
translating documents that are of a historical nature. That is to say, historical facts should 
not be distorted, and as Larson maintains, the use of cultural substitution with historical 
documents could be ‘anachronistic’, in other words, “something is introduced which did 
not even exist at the time or in the place referred to in the” ST (ibid, p. 188). The 
employment of cultural substitution is more likely acceptable with documents that are of 
a didactic nature. That said, Larson notes that when a document contains both historical 
and didactic references one should be consistent in how to choose a lexical equivalent: 
If there is a historical part of the document which refers to fig trees, and so 
they are going to be introduced by a descriptive phrase of some kind [instead 
of cultural substitution to avoid distorting historical facts], then the same may 
as well be used in the didactic portion of the same document. There should 
be concordance of lexical equivalents (for the same sense of a word) 
throughout the document (ibid, p. 189, author’s italics). 
In respect of translating expressions that are of a figurative nature, i.e. metonymy, 
synecdoche, hyperbole, euphemism, idiom, metaphor, simile, or a symbolic action, 
Larson shares the views of Beekman and Callow. She even uses the same definitions and 
frequently refers the reader to the works of Beekman and Callow. For instance, Larson’s 
defines euphemism as “the substitution of one word for another or one expression for 
another … euphemism is used to avoid an offensive expression, or one that is socially 
unacceptable, or one that is unpleasant” (ibid, p. 126; cf. Beekman & Callow, 1974, p. 
119). Larson does, however, indicate that euphemism is also used to substitute certain 
words for the ‘supernatural’ and illustrates that Jews avoid the mention of the name of 
‘God’ using the word ‘heaven’. She also points out that the phrase ‘senior citizen’ is used 
euphemistically for the elderly in the United States. On the other hand, we believe the 
words ‘God’ or ‘old people’ are certainly not among the unpleasant, offensive, taboo, or 
socially unacceptable expressions to be euphemised. Therefore, in our opinion, using the 
word ‘heaven’ for ‘God’ or the phrase ‘senior citizen’ for the elderly could be out of 
respect, but by no means is it a euphemism. Nonetheless, Larson proposes three general 
ways in which figurative expressions are to be translated (ibid, p. 124): 
1- The sense of the expression could be rendered directly. In other words, the 
intended meaning is rendered plainly in a non-figurative sense. 
2- The original figurative expression can be maintained along with a direct rendition 
of its sense. According to Larson, this is a better procedure “if there seems to be 
 -148- 
a component of emotions or impact which might otherwise be lost, as in poetry” 
(ibid, p. 124). 
3- The original figurative expression can be replaced by a TL figurative expression 
that has the same meaning. 
With regards to translating metaphors and similes, Larson suggests that finding out 
whether the metaphor (or simile) is ‘live’ or ‘dead’ is the first step to providing an 
adequate translation. She believes that if the metaphor is ‘dead’ (as in an idiom) “then the 
image [the thing that is being compared with] does not need to be kept, but the meaning 
can be translated directly, i.e. nonfiguratively” (ibid, pp. 177-18). We, on the other hand, 
would probably disagree and believe that if the TL has an equivalent ‘dead’ figurative 
expression, then why not use it instead of translating the meaning directly. As for ‘live’ 
metaphors, Larson puts forward the following guidelines: 
1- “The metaphor may be kept if the receptor language permits (that is, if it 
sounds natural and is understood correctly be the readers); 
2- A metaphor can be translated as a simile (adding like or as); 
3- A metaphor of the receptor language which has the same meaning may 
be substituted; 
4- The metaphor may be kept and the meaning explained (that is, the topic 
and/or point of similarity may be added); and 
5- The meaning of the metaphor may be translated without keeping the 
metaphorical imagery” (ibid, p. 179; italics as in original) 
As we described before, in general, Larson’s views are similar to those of Beekman and 
Callow, if not the same. There are, however, certain aspects of Larson’s work that may 
distinguish the two works from each other. The first is that Larson frequently highlights, 
in most of her discussions, the element of culture and its significance for translation and 
communication. There are several expressions in one language which may seem to have 
equivalents in another language while in fact they do not, because they have different 
connotations due to different cultural backgrounds (ibid, p. 149). Larson indicates, “When 
a source language text is from a culture very different from the culture in which the 
receptor language is spoken, it is often difficult to translate in such a way that the results 
will communicate the same message” (ibid, p. 36). Consequently, translators should 
always take into consideration they are not only dealing with two languages but also with 
two cultures. Larson’s argues that: 
All meaning is culturally conditioned. And the response to a given text is also 
culturally conditioned. Each society will interpret a message in terms of its 
own culture. The receptor audience will decode the translation in terms of its 
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own culture and experience, not in terms of the culture and experience of the 
author and audience of the original document. The translator then must help 
the receptor audience understand the content and intent of the source 
document by translating with both cultures in mind (ibid, p. 470). 
The second aspect which Larson highlights is the significance of form and function48 
while searching for lexical equivalents when concepts are unknown in the receptor 
culture. According to Larson, a translator should first understand clearly the ST word or 
phrase and its use in the context. To do so he/she should provide answers to the following 
questions: 
1- “What are the most important meaning components of the word or phrase 
being translated?” 
2- “What is the original author trying to communicate in that particular 
context?” 
3- Is the author more concerned with the form or function of the thing or 
event? 
The answers to these questions provide a clear insight into the word or phrase and its use 
in the context, which will also assist in the method of using a generic word as a basis for 
constructing an adequate equivalent, as discussed earlier. According to Larson, there are 
four possibilities in relation to form and function. The first is when a ‘thing’ or ‘event’ in 
one language and culture has the same form and function in another language. For 
instance, ‘ear’ has the same function, which is ‘hearing’, in all languages and cultures 
(ibid, p. 181). In this case, there is no difficulty in finding an equivalent word for ‘ear’. 
The second possibility is when the form could be the same but the function is different. 
For example, the word ‘bread’. Larson illustrates this as follows: 
“Bread may be found in two cultures and a word for bread in both. However, 
in one culture it may be the main food, the staple that is eaten at every meal; 
whereas, in another culture it may be a special treat and served only as dessert 
or as a food for parties. The form is the same but the function is different. In 
a context like the Lord’s Prayer ‘Give us this our daily bread’, the word bread 
with the function of ‘party food’ would not be appropriate. It would be better 
to translate with the more generic word food to avoid a wrong significance” 
(ibid, emphasis as in original). 
                                                
48 Larson believes that comprehending the correspondence of form and function is of crucial importance 
in finding accurate lexical equivalents. What is meant by ‘form’ is ‘the physical aspects of a particular 
thing or event’, not the linguist form, and what is meant by function is “the significance of the thing or 
event, that is, the reason for it or its purpose, or in some cases, the usage of the thing” (1998, pp. 180-
181). 
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The third possibility is when the same form of a thing or event does not occur but the 
function does. For instance, ‘bread’ and ‘manioc/cassava49’. They both have the same 
function in both cultures but with different forms. The fourth possibility is that a word for 
a thing or event in one language and culture may not have an equivalence of form or 
function in another language and culture. The sacrifice of a sheep or camel in Eid al-
Aḍha, for example, does not exist in other cultures, and, as Larson claims the animal sheep 
does not occur in the tropical forests of the Amazon. In such a situation, the appropriate 
method in translation, according to Larson, is to “use a descriptive phrase for both the 
form and function” (ibid, p. 182). As a consequence, the use of a generic word (and its 
modification) as an equivalent lexical item may involve one the following (ibid, p. 183): 
1- The form is made explicit. 
2- The function is made explicit. 
3- Both the form and function are made explicit. 
4- Modification with a comparison to some ‘thing’ or ‘event’ that does exist 
or is known in the TL. 
The third distinctive aspect of Larson’s work is that she provides useful steps to take 
before commencing a translation project. Before taking on any translation work, Larson 
stresses that answers should be provided to the following questions: What is to be 
translated? For whom? By whom? With what resources? She discusses these steps under 
what she refers to as ‘the four T’s’, the text, the target, the team, and the tools (see Larson, 
1998, chapters 5 & 35). What is meant when talking about ‘text’ is that the translator 
should determine the “reasons for choosing the text and the potential for its use” (ibid, p. 
51) by the TL recipient. Knowing who the translation is for and whether or not it is going 
to be used in a school, office, mosque, or at home is also essential. Larson states 
“[q]uestions of dialect, educational level, age level, and bilingualism affect the form of 
the receptor language which will be chosen for the translation” (ibid, p. 510). ‘Team’ 
refers to the persons that are going to be involved in the translation project. Even if the 
work is going to be translated by one person who is competent in both the SL and TL and 
their cultures, Larson suggests that others should be available for evaluation and 
consultation (ibid, p. 52). The tools include the written materials needed for references in 
                                                
49 According to Larson, the staff of life for many language groups of the tropical forest area in South 
America is ‘manioc’. 
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studying the ST and culture, such as exegetical literature, in addition to dictionaries, 
lexicons, cultural descriptions, and suchlike of both the SL and TL (ibid, p. 52/517). 
The fourth distinctive aspect is that Larson provides certain steps related to the translation 
process, which include preparation, analysis, transfer, initial draft, reworking the initial 
draft, testing the translation, polishing the translation, and preparing the manuscript for 
the publisher (see Larson, 1998, chapters 36 & 37). What is notable in Larson’s 
discussions is that she reiterates the importance of the ST, not only in the analysis process 
but in the whole translation procedure. It is crucial that the ST is placed under rigorous 
scrutiny in order to recognise the exact meanings of the key words or figurative 
expressions which will enable choosing the appropriate lexical equivalents in the TL. 
Evidently, in this step, the consultation of dictionaries, lexicons, encyclopaedias, and, in 
the case of Qur’anic texts, authoritative exegetical literature is often required (cf. ibid, p. 
521). Larson underlines the following: 
The analysis of the source text will include resolving ambiguity, identifying 
implicit information, studying key words, interpreting figurative senses, 
recognizing when words are being used in a secondary sense, when 
grammatical structures are being used in a secondary function, etc. … … The 
translator carefully studies the source language text and, using all the 
available tools, determines the content of the source language message, the 
related communication situation matters, and all other factors which will need 
to be understood in order to produce an equivalent translation (ibid, p. 53). 
The ST is also relevant in the testing or evaluation process, and as it happens, it is a 
process which is among the aspects that distinguishes Larson’s work from that of 
Beekman and Callow, particularly Larson’s testing techniques. Her evaluation is based 
on a threefold purpose: accuracy, clearness, and naturalness (see ibid, pp 529-547). That 
is, the translation should (1) communicate the same meaning as the ST, (2) be 
comprehensible to the TT recipients, (3) and have natural form and vocabulary that is 
easy to read and does not sound foreign. For accuracy, Larson urges translators to 
compare their translations with the ST constantly “to be sure no additions, deletions, or 
change of information have crept in” (ibid, p. 54). Translators should also aim for clarity. 
According to Larson, a translation may be accurate but not clear enough to communicate 
to the TT recipient. Furthermore, translators should check whether the expressions and 
grammatical forms used in the translation are idiomatic and typically used in the TL or 
not. That is because, as Larson explains, a translation could be accurate and clear, possibly 
even comprehensible, yet not easy to read and possibly not sound right or as natural as 
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the ST was for its recipients (ibid, p. 531). Larson suggests a number of evaluation 
techniques: comparison with the ST, back-translation, comprehension checks, naturalness 
and readability testing, and consistency checks (see ibid, pp. 533-546). Of most interest 
to this study are probably the comparison with the ST, back-translation, and consistency 
checks. A brief overview of Larson’s testing techniques is as follows:  
Comparison with the ST: Comparing the translation with the ST is done to make sure 
that the exact message is conveyed, and to ensure that no information is added, omitted, 
or is different from the original.   
Back-translation into the SL: According to Ivir (1981), back-translation is “a check on 
the semantic context” (cited in Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997, p. 15), “which can be used 
to reveal instances of formal correspondence” (ibid). However, Larson points out that 
back-translation helps the translator and whoever is reviewing the translation, such as a 
consultant, to make a careful comparison with the ST, in search of differences in meaning. 
Back-translation is a useful tool for those who do not speak the SL in order to comprehend 
“what is being communicated by the translation”, but one has to keep in mind that “back-
translation focuses on meaning rather than naturalness” (Larson, 1998, p. 536). 
Comprehension checks: According to Larson, performing a sufficient comprehension 
test is “the key to good translation” (ibid, p. 537). The aim of this test to ensure whether 
the TT recipients understand the translation as they should in a clear and natural form, or 
not. It can be conducted by the translator him/herself or by someone else as long as the 
person is well aware of the translation principles and the goals of an idiomatic translation 
and most of all avoids subjectivity. The test is done by asking a set of questions to the TL 
recipients provided that they are fluent speakers (for more details and the type of 
questions see ibid. pp. 537-542).   
Naturalness and readability testing: It is always useful to have fresh pairs of eyes to 
look at the translation. The aim of this test is twofold, as suggested by the terms 
‘naturalness’ and ‘readability’. First, the test ensures that the form employed in the 
translation is natural and the style is appropriate. Accuracy can also be checked at this 
point too. Second, the test makes sure that the translation can be read and understood 
easily. Whoever is doing the naturalness test should have sufficient knowledge or training 
about translation principles, in addition to a certain amount of skill in writing in the TL. 
As for the readability test, it can be done by the translator or by someone else, though it 
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is more useful if it is done “with persons who will be the users of the translation” (ibid, 
p. 545; for more details see pp. 542-545). 
Consistency checks: One of the objectives of consistency checks is to ensure that the 
lexical equivalents used for certain expressions or key terms are the same elsewhere in 
the text, when they refer to the same meaning. Larson states:  
“If the meaning is the same and there is nothing in the context to indicate that 
a different term should be used, the translator will want to use the same term 
in each occurrence. A check should be made of such terms to be sure that the 
same term is indeed used or that there is a special reason for using a different 
term in a certain context” (ibid, p. 546). 
4.2.7 Mona Baker’s notion of equivalence 
[T]he term equivalence is adopted in this book for the sake of convenience – 
because most translators are used to it rather than because it has any 
theoretical status (Baker, 2018, p. 5, author’s italics). 
The first impression that might come to one’s mind while reading this statement in the 
introduction of Baker’s book (2018), In Other words, is that she may not consider the 
notion of equivalence that significant, or as Mannaa (2011) puts it, she is ‘rather 
dismissive’ of this notion. Panou (2013), on the other hand, believes that Baker adopts a 
neutral approach in her argument over equivalence. The truth is probably quite the 
opposite, and apart from the fact that Baker discusses several types or levels of 
equivalence (equivalence at word level, equivalence above word level, grammatical 
equivalence, textual equivalence, pragmatic equivalence, and semiotic equivalence), she 
acknowledges the significance of equivalence in TS and asserts the following: 
The notion of equivalence is important because it is used in defining 
translation itself. This also makes it problematic because it is circular – 
translation is defined in terms of equivalence and equivalence is at the same 
time used for assessing and describing actual translation acts … … Given 
that the notion of equivalence has been so central in translation studies (it is 
both used to define translation itself and is taken as a given in attempts to 
elaborate other theoretical notions), it is somewhat worrying to find it 
discredited in so much of the recent literature on translation (2004). 
Baker discusses translation problems that may come up due to lack of equivalence at each 
level and suggests several translation procedures to overcome these problems, but for the 
purpose of this study we will only throw light on her views concerning equivalence at 
word level. A ‘word’, according to Baker, is the smallest unit or “any sequence of letters 
with an orthographic space on either side” that has an individual meaning (2018, p. 10). 
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In a bottom-up approach to translation, Baker implies that a translator probably focuses 
first on seeking equivalence at word level. That is to say, during the translation process 
or analysing the ST, translators are likely to look first at individual words in search for 
their equivalents in the TL. At this stage, translators may experience some difficulties 
where some SL expressions do not have direct equivalents in the TL. Baker outlines the 
most common types of non-equivalence (see 2018, pp. 19-24) and suggests some 
translation procedures, which she refers to as ‘strategies’, to overcome such difficulties. 
Table 4.6: Some of Baker’s common types of non-equivalence. 
 
 
 
Culture-speciﬁc 
concepts 
A SL word that expresses a concept which is unknown to the TL 
culture. Baker explains that the concept of the English word ‘speaker’ 
(of the House of Commons), for instance, is unfamiliar to many 
languages, such as Russian, Chinese and Arabic. It is frequently 
translated into Russian as ‘chairman’, but “does not reﬂect the role 
of the speaker of the House of Commons as an independent person 
who maintains authority and order in Parliament” (ibid, p. 19). 
Another example is the Arabic word مرْحَم, which refers to a person 
who is unmarriable due to either kinship relations, such as a nephew 
and aunt, or relatives on the maternal side, such as a husband and 
mother-in-law. 
The SL concept is 
not lexicalized in 
the TL 
A SL word that expresses a concept which is known to the TL culture, 
but has no equivalent TL word. For example, the word ‘standard’ 
“meaning ‘ordinary, not extra’, as in standard range of products” 
conveys a concept which is easily understood, but there is no 
equivalent word for it in Arabic (ibid, p.20). Another example is the 
Arabic word ة ﱠرَض, which refers to a fellow wife of a polygamous 
marriage, but has no equivalent word in English. 
 
The SL word is 
semantically 
complex 
A SL word that expresses a more set of meanings, sometimes, than a 
whole sentence. For instance, the Arabic word ةﱠدِع regarding women, 
which refers to a specific period of time during which a divorcee or 
widow is not allowed to remarry. Another example is the word ةَقيِقَع, 
which refers to the parents’ sacrifice of a sheep/camel when they are 
blessed with a newborn child. 
 
The SL and TL 
make different 
distinctions in 
meaning 
The TL “may make more or fewer distinctions in meaning than the” 
SL. “What one language regards as an important distinction in 
meaning another language may not perceive as relevant” (ibid, p. 20). 
For instance, Arabic makes a distinction between the sister of one’s 
father (ة ﱠمَع) and the sister of one’s mother (َةلاخ) or the brother of one’s 
father ( ْمَع) and the brother of one’s mother (لاخ), whereas English 
uses only ‘aunt’ and ‘uncle’. On the other hand, English makes more 
distinctions when referring to temperature degrees than Arabic. For 
example, the words ‘cold’ and ‘cool’ are typically described in 
Arabic through only one word دِراب.  
The TL lacks a 
superordinate 
A TL may have a word of more specific meaning but no general or 
superordinate word to head the semantic ﬁeld (ibid, p. 21). Compared 
to English ‘uncle’ Arabic lacks a superordinate, requiring the 
English-Arabic translator to choose either لاخ or مع. 
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The TL lacks a 
speciﬁc term 
(hyponym) 
A TL may have general words but do not have specific ones. For 
instance, the words ﻰحﱡﻀلا, رَْصعلا, برْغَملا, ءاَشِعلا, which refer to specific 
times during the day (related to prayer times), have no equivalents in 
English. Also, the words حلَب, بَطُر, and ةرَْمت that refer to specific 
growth phases of dates have no equivalents in English and they are 
referred to as only ‘dates’.   
It is worth noting that more than one type of non-equivalence may occur in one single 
word. For instance, the concept of ةَقيِقَع is cultural-specific, and not lexicalized in the TL, 
and the word itself is semantically complex. The following are common translation 
procedures that Baker believes are used by professional translators, which are not far from 
the ones proposed by Newmark, Beekman and Callow, or Larson (for more details see 
ibid, pp. 25-46). They are: 
1- Translation by a more general word (superordinate). 
2- Translation by a more neutral/less expressive word. 
3- Translation by cultural substitution. 
4- Translation using a loan word or loan word plus explanation. 
5- Translation by paraphrase using a related word. 
6- Translation by paraphrase using unrelated words. 
7- Translation by omission. 
8- Translation by illustration. 
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Chapter five: ST Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the Qur’anic kināyah expressions before 
investigating their translations in the following chapter. This examination will hopefully 
provide us with the necessity information in perceiving the intended meaning of each 
kināyah used in the Qur’an and their purposes. It is worth mentioning that the kināyah 
expressions extracted from the Qur’an are pursuant to al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah50 
presented earlier in this study. There are two main reasons for choosing al-Jurjānī’s 
definition. Firstly, modern rhetoricians agree that al-Jurjānī laid the grounds of Arabic 
rhetoric, which is not a surprise since he was the first rhetorician to present a clear 
comprehensive rhetorical definition of kināyah. Secondly, some prominent rhetoricians 
following al-Jurjānī , such as al-Qazwīnī, believe that kināyah can carry both meanings, 
the literal and figurative sense. That is to say, the literal meaning of the kināyah is true, 
and the implicit figurative meaning, which is the intended meaning, is also true. This is 
sometimes the case, but as we stated before there are examples where the literal meaning 
of the kināyah could never be true, specifically with attributes related to God. 
Nonetheless, in order to understand the meaning and purpose of use (function) for each 
kināyah, we have to look at the kināyah and its surrounding context, i.e. the meaning of 
the whole āyah and not the kināyah on its own. Therefore, we will resort to authoritative 
Arabic and English dictionaries (including Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, 
especially those exegeses that approach the Qur'anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical 
perspective. Furthermore, whenever the same kināyah expression is used in a different 
ʾāyah (Qur’anic verse), we will point out these āyahs and examine them to see whether 
they differ from each other or not in terms of meaning and purpose of use. Bear in mind 
the arrangements of the chosen kināyah extracts in this chapter and the following chapter, 
i.e. chapter six, are not based on a specific categorisation. The only recognised 
categorisation of  kināyah are those which are proposed by as-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī 
(see 2.4.1). However, in an attempt to cover all types of kināyah, and to present the layout 
of the ST and TT analysis in a comprehensible manner, we have tried as possible as we 
                                                
50 “Kināyah is the process in which the text producer seeks to substantiate a specific meaning without 
mentioning it directly through its known (original/conventional) word in the language. Instead, he opts 
for a meaning (word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to it in order to allude to and attest the meaning 
intended. For example, ‘He is long of sword-scabbard’ to indicate that he is tall in stature, ‘[having] a lot 
of cooking-pot ashes’ meaning very generous, and ‘forenoon sleeper’ to indicate a person who is self-
indulgent living in great luxury and being served” (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my translation). 
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can to place kināyah expressions that have similar intended meanings or functions close 
to each other51.  
Kināyah 1 and 2 
Kināyah 1: ﴾ٍةَدِحاَو ٍسْفﱠن ن ِّم﴿ in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6: 98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6] 
Kināyah 2:  ﴾اَهاﱠشََغت ا ﱠمَلَف﴿ in [Q. 7:189] 
 مَُكقَلَخ يِذﱠلا ُمُكﱠبَر اوُقﱠتا ُساﱠنلا اَهﱡَيأ َاي﴿ ٍةَدِحاَو ٍسْفﱠن ن ِّم  اًريِﺜَك ًﻻاَجِر اَمُهْنِم ﱠَثبَو اَهَجْوَز اَهْنِم َقَلَخَو
 مقر ةيآ ﴾اًبيِقَر ْمُكْيَلَع َناَك َ ﱠဃ ﱠنِإ ۚ َماَحَْرْﻷاَو ِِهب َنُولَءاََست يِذﱠلا َ ﱠဃ اوُقﱠتاَو ۚ ًءاَسِنَو1 ءاسنلا ةروس نم 
[Q. 4:1] 
1 
 مَُكأَشَنأ يِذﱠلا َوُهَو﴿ ٍسْفﱠن ن ِّم ٍةَدِحاَو  ةيآ ﴾َنوَُهقَْفي ٍمَْوقِل ِتاَيْﻵا َانْل ﱠصَف ْدَق ۗ ٌَعدَْوتْسُمَو ﱞرََقتْسُمَف98 ةروس ،
ماعنﻷا ]Q. 6: 98[ 
2 
﴿ مَُكقَلَخ ٍةَدِحاَو ٍسْفﱠن ن ِّم  ِنوُُطب يِف ْمُُكقُلْخَي ۚ ٍجاَوَْزأ ََةيِناََمث ِماَعَْنْﻷا َن ِّم مُكَل َلَزَنأَو اَهَجْوَز اَهْنِم َﻞَعَج ﱠُمث
 ِإ َه َٰلِإ َﻻ ۖ ُكْلُمْلا ُهَل ْمُكﱡبَر ُ ﱠဃ ُمُكِل َٰذ ۚ ٍثََﻼث ٍتاَمُلُظ يِف ٍقْلَخ ِدْعَب ن ِّم اًقْلَخ ْمُِكتاَه ﱠُمأ َأَف ۖ َوُه ﱠﻻوُفَرُْصت ٰﻰﱠن َن﴾  ةيآ
6رمزلا ةروس ، ]Q. 39:6[ 
3 
﴿ مَُكقَلَخ يِذﱠلا َوُهن ِّم  ٍسْفﱠن  ٍةَدِحاَو  ا ﱠَملَف اَهْيَلِإ َنُكْسَيِل اَهَجْوَز اَهْنِم َﻞَعَجَواَها ﱠَشَغت  ْت ﱠرَمَف ًافيِفَخ ًﻼْمَح ْتَلَمَح 
اَمُهﱠبَر َ ﱠဃ اَوَعﱠد تَلَقَْثأ ا ﱠمََلف ۖ ِِهب  َنيِرِكاﱠشلا َنِم ﱠنَنوَُكنﱠل اًحِلاَص اََنتَْيتآ ِْنئَل﴾  ةيآ189فارعﻷا ةروس ، ]Q. 
7:189[ 
4 
The word سفن occurs in the Qur’an in different āyahs and with various meanings (cf. 
Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, pp. 954-955). Linguistically, one of its general and 
conventional senses are: “a soul, a living soul, or person” (Penrice, 1991, p. 149; cf. Ibn 
Mandhoor, 1980, pp. 4500-4501; Lane, 1968, pp. 2827-2828 ). However, on its own, i.e. 
out of context, the word سفن or even the phrase ةدحاو سفن (one soul/person) may not refer 
to a certain thing/person, while in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6: 98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6] it refers 
to Adam. Apart from pretty much all exegeses stating that the phrase ةدحاو سفن means 
‘Adam’52, one can deduce this just by reading the ʾāyah(s). That is to say, the surrounding 
context, such as the ن ِّم مُكَقَلَخ or ن ِّم مَُكأَشَنأ (created/produced you from) will lead the ST 
recipient to comprehend the intended meaning of ةدحاو سفن in these āyahs as Adam.      
                                                
51 For example, kināyahs 5 and 6 refer to miserliness and generosity, kināyahs 9, 11, 12, refer to remorse 
and sorrow, kināyahs 13-28 (apart from kināyahs 19, 25, and 23) refer to sexual intercourse and have 
the same function, kināyahs 29-34 refer to contempt or arrogance, and suchlike. That said, there are 
some āyahs that include kināyahs with different referents and functions as in [Q. 7:189] (see kināyah 1 
and 2). 
52 It is worth noting that some online dictionaries prove to be helpful and identify the intended meaning of 
the words and phrases in the Qur’an directly, especially given that some of them rely on authoritative 
exegeses. For example, almaany.com gives the meaning (i.e. referent) of سفن in سفن نم as ‘Adam’ 
(Available at: http://www.almaany.com/quran/4/1/ ٍسَْفن/#.VTZ9mOlwbIU)  
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Moreover, the exegetical literature infers that the purpose of use for the phrase ةدحاو سفن 
as an expression for Adam is admonition, or to more precise, a warning and reminder of 
Allah’s greatness and ability. For instance, the general understanding of [Q. 4:1] is that 
Allah is urging us to remember what He is capable of. Though people may not look alike, 
all humanity are created from one soul, one person that is Adam, even Eve herself. To put 
it another way, Allah has created Adam and then from Adam He created Adam’s wife 
(Eve), and from them He then produced the rest of humankind. Therefore, human beings 
should respect one another as they all descend from the same person, Adam, and keep in 
mind that since God has the power to create the human race from one soul they should 
always fear His punishment and try not to disobey Him. The other three āyahs are quite 
similar in terms of God reminding humankind of His capability, powers, and creation of 
humankind from only one soul (Adam). 
The last and fourth ʾ āyah, i.e. [Q. 7:189], contains also the kināyah expression ﻰﱠشغت, which 
linguistically means ‘to cover’, or ‘to come upon’ (Ibn Mandhur, 1980, pp. 3261-3262; 
Penrice, 1991, p. 2261). Muʿjam Alfāḍ al-Qurʾān al-Karīm [A dictionary of Qur’anic 
expressions] (1989, p. 815), and all exegetes indicate that what is meant by  ﱠشََغتﻰ  in this 
context is sexual intercourse. Similarly to the previous kināyah (ةدحاو سفن), taking  ﱠشََغتﻰ  
out of context may not lead to its intended meaning, and the same may apply to most of 
the kināyah expressions except for those which are lexicalised, such as طئاغلا. Anyhow, 
the reader can reach the sense of having sexual intercourse through the context, that is, 
through the phrases اَهَْيلِإ َنُكْسَيِل and اًفيِفَخ ًﻼْمَح ْتَلَمَح. The purpose, however, of using ﻰﱠشََغت as 
a kināyah for sexual intercourse is euphemism (Riḍā, 1947; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 
1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a; 
al-Qurtubī, 2006). It goes without saying, one can never find any taboo words or terms 
that are culturally or socially unaccepted in the Qur’an. Any such words are replaced by 
kināyah expressions (cf. Al-Barakati, 2013) 
Kināyah 3 and 4 
Kināyah 3:  ﴾اوُلَعَْفت نَلَو اوُلَعَْفت ْمﱠل نَِإف ﴿ in [Q. 2:24] 
Kināyah 4:  ﴾َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتَاف﴿  in [Q. 2:24] 
﴿ ُد ن ِّم مُكَءَادَهُش اوُعْداَو ِهِْلﺜ ِّم ن ِّم ٍةَروُسِب اُوْتَأف اَنِدْبَع ٰﻰَلَع َانْل ﱠزَن ا ﱠم ِّم ٍبْيَر يِف ُْمتنُك ِنإَو ِقِداَص ُْمتنُك ِنإ ِ ﱠဃ ِنو َني
۝ اوُلَعَْفت نَلَو اُولَعَْفت ْمﱠل نَِإف  َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتاَف  ِحْلاَو ُساﱠنلا اَُهدُوقَو يِتﱠلا َنيِرِفاَكْلِل ْتﱠدُِعأ ۖ ُةَراَج﴾  ةيآ23-24  ةروس
ةرقبلا ]Q. 2:23-24[ 
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In order to appreciate the two kināyah expressions, it is essential to understand both āyahs 
[Q. 2:23-24]. According to exegetical literature, the two āyahs were revealed because the 
unbelievers in Madinah claimed the Qur’an is Muhammad’s words and not Allah’s, 
similarly to what the unbelievers of Makkah claimed. In [Q. 2:23], Allah is addressing 
those who do not believe the Qur’an is His words and claim that it is the words of the 
Prophet Mohammad. Therefore, Allah is challenging those unbelievers, polytheists, and 
whoever doubts the Qur’an is not His words to come up with a sūrah similar to the one 
in the Qur’an. Allah asks them to seek help from their idols (statues) that they worship to 
come up with a similar sūrah. Challenges of this kind can also be found in different sūrahs 
of the Qur’an, namely in [Q. 10:38], [Q. 11:13], [Q. 17:88] and [Q. 52:33]. Needless to 
say, the Qur’an is regarded as one of the signs of Allah’s inimitability and miraculousness; 
therefore, no one whatsoever can produce such sūrahs. In [Q. 2:24], Allah continues to 
dare and excite these disbelievers, and says: ‘if you would not produce/come up with a 
comparable sūrah [in terms of merit, excellence, and eloquence,] and you will never 
produce/come up with a comparable sūrah, then fear the fire prepared for the unbelievers 
[on Judgment Day] whose fuel is people and stones’. In other words, since you are not 
able to produce a similar sūrah and have, therefore, lost the challenge then leave aside 
the pertinacity and wilfulness of making false accusations, i.e. claiming that the Qur’an 
is not Allah’s words; otherwise you will face the consequences on Judgment Day. 
As far as the kināyah expressions is concerned, they are إاوَُلعَْفت نَلَو اوُلَعَْفت ْمﱠل ن  (lit. if you do 
not and you will never do) and  َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتا (lit. fear the fire). The exegetes explain that both 
expression are used figuratively for the purpose of brevity (al-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 
1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍawī, 1998; cf. 
Badawi, 2005, p. 174). To be specific, the verb ‘to do’ (the deed/act), in the former 
kināyah, is used in lieu of the performance itself, which is ‘coming up with a comparable 
sūrah. So, rather than repeating the act, as in ‘if you do not come up with a similar sūrah 
and you will never come up with a comparable sūrah’, the expression إاُولَعَْفت َنلَو اُولَعَْفت ْمﱠل ن  
will suffice. This process, if we recall Al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah, is to substantiate 
the activity of ‘coming up/producing a similar sūrah’ without stating it directly. Instead, 
the act (verb) of doing, which leads to the activity, is used to allude and attest to the 
activity itself, especially given that the activity is part of the doing, and therefore they are 
associated and adjacent to each other.  
The same applies to the other kināyah expression,  َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتا. Rather than saying ‘[Obey 
Allah and] refrain from your pertinacity and wilfulness regarding the false accusations 
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that the Qur’an is not from Allah’, the phrase َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتا will suffice. It is believed that such 
pertinacity and wilfulness is a deed that leads to the fire of Hell on Judgment Day, and 
evidently anyone who would obey Allah will refrain from such acts. In his exegesis, az-
Zamakhsharī  (1998a), explicates that fearing the fire of Judgement Day is associated 
with obeying Allah and evidently refraining from such pertinacity and wilfulness. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that  َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتا is used in order to substantiate, allude to, and attest 
the intended meaning, which is ‘(obeying Allah by) refraining from pertinacity and 
wilfulness regarding the false accusations that the Qur’an is not from Allah’. In addition 
to the purpose of brevity, exegetes argue there is a rhetorical image through picturing and 
relating the gravity of such gross pertinacity and wilfulness with the fire of Hell on 
Judgement Day. 
Kināyah 5 and 6 
Kināyah 5: ديلا لغ in [Q. 5:64] and [Q. 17:29] 
Kināyah 6: ديلا طسب in [Q. 5:64] and [Q. 17:29] 
﴿ ُدوُهَيْلا ِتَلاَقَو ٌَةلُولْغَم ِ ﱠဃ َُديۚ  ْﻞَب ۘ اُولاَق اَمِب اوُنِعُلَو ْمِهيِدَْيأ ْتﱠلُغ  ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهاََدي  َشَي َفْيَك ُقِفُني ۚ ُءا
 َوَادَعْلا ُمُهَنْيَب اَنْيَقَْلأَو ۚ اًرْفُكَو ًاناَيْغُط َكِّب ﱠر نِم َكْيَلِإ َلِزُنأ ا ﱠم مُهْن ِّم اًريِﺜَك ﱠَنديِزََيلَو َي َٰﻰلِإ َءاَﻀْغَبْلاَو َة ِمْو
 ُ ﱠဃ اََهأَفَْطأ ِبْرَحْل ِّل اًراَن اُودَقَْوأ اَمﱠلُك ۚ ِةَماَيِقْلاۚ  َنيِدِسْفُمْلا ﱡبِحُي َﻻ ُ ﱠဃَو ۚ ًاداَسَف ِضَْرْﻷا يِف َنَْوعْسَيَو ﴾  ةيآ
64  ةدئاملا ةروس[Q. 5:64] 
 
1 
﴿  ْﻞَعَْجت َﻻَو ًَةلُولْغَم َكََدي  َﻻَو َكُِقنُع ﻰلإ ِطْسَبْلا ﱠلُك اَهْطُسَْبت اًروُسْح ﱠم اًمُولَم َدُعَْقتَف ﴾  ةيآ29 ءارسﻹا ةروس  
]Q. 17:29[ 
2 
According to the Qur’anic exegeses, [Q. 5:64] was revealed when some of the noblemen 
of Judaism and their followers (during the era of the Prophet Muhammad) accused Allah 
of miserliness. Most of the Jews, at that time, were blessed with wealth and prosperity, 
and later that blessing began to vanish after disobeying Allah and denying excessively 
the prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. Accordingly, they said in a mocking way that 
Muhammad’s God has deprived them of wealth, blessing, and prosperity and insolently 
accused Allah of being miserly. Allah then says اوُلاَق اَمِب اوُنِعُلَو ْمِهيِدَْيأ ْتﱠلُغ as a prayer or 
supplication against the Jews who insolently accused Him of miserliness. There are two 
interpretations regarding what is meant by  ْمِهيِدَْيأ ْتﱠلُغ. The first interpretation is that it is a 
prayer, supplication, or curse against the Jews to be miserly in their lifetime. The other 
version is that those who insolently accused Allah will indeed be presented on Judgment 
Day with their hands shackled/tied up. 
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The clause  ُءاَشَي َفْيَك ُقِفُني ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهَادَي ْﻞَب refutes the previous insolent accusations and 
informs us, through the expression  ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهَادَي, that to the contrary of what has been said, 
He (Allah) is extremely generous and bountiful. Naturally, the meaning of the word ‘ ُهَادَي’ 
(His hands) is not Allah’s physical organ, since it is beyond our imagination to depict 
God’s physical image (cf. Ridha, 1947; Al-Tha’alabi, 1997); therefore, it is used 
figuratively with  ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم (laid out/spread out) to indicate the sense of generosity. In 
addition, the phrase  ُءاََشي َفْيَك ُقِفنُي (He graces/blesses as He wishes) should help in deducing 
the intended meaning of the figurative expression. There are, however, several 
interpretations for the duality of  ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم. According to Qur’anic exegeses, such as the 
ones produced by ath-Thaᶜālabi (1997) and abu Ḥayyān (1993), one of the interpretations 
is that it refers to Allah’s blessing and graces in this life and the hereafter. Another version 
is that it refers to both patent and latent blessings and graces of Allah. A third version is 
suggests that is dual and not singular because Allah’s blessings and graces are 
uncountable (aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001). Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) argues that طسبلا in 
 ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهَادَي is dual while ديلا ﻞغ in  ٌةَلوُلْغَم ِ ﱠဃ ُدَي is singular is to refute the insolent accusations 
made by the Jews against Allah. He adds that repudiating such accusations is more 
eloquent and attests to Allah’s utmost degree of generosity and disproof of miserliness. 
Az-Zamakhsharī ’s view might be more accurate since one of the purposes of using 
kināyah is to achieve eloquence and hyperbole.  
The expressions of ديلا ﻞغ and ديلا طسب in the other ʾāyah, [Q. 17:29] are also the same in 
terms of meaning, i.e. miserliness and generosity. This ʾāyah urges thriftiness. That is, it 
interdicts niggardliness and urges generosity but not to the extent of profligacy. This sense 
can be deduced from context of the āyah, such as  َكُِقنُع ﻰلإ (to your neck) and  ِطْسَبْلا ﱠﻞُك 
(spread it all/lay it all out). That is to say, when your hand is tied it prevents you from 
moving it freely, let alone when it is tied to your neck. Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, 
just as the shackling of a hand represents miserliness, the shackling to the neck represents 
excessive miserliness. On the other hand, since the laying out or spreading of the hand 
represents generosity, then obviously laying it out completely represents profligacy. 
However, both peculiarities, i.e. miserliness and profligacy, are generally unaccepted. 
Therefore, whoever is miserly or profligate will be left blameworthy or destitute 
respectively as Allah says: اًروُسْح ﱠم اًمُولَم َُدعَْقتَف (then [you] become blamed and denuded 
[insolvent]). 
From a linguistic perspective, ةَلوُلْغَم derives from the verb  ّﻞغ, which means ‘to shackle/to 
tie up’, whereas نَاتَطوُسْبَم or  َهْطُسَْبتا  derives from the verb  َطَسب, which means ‘to spread 
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out/lay out (Lane E. W., 1968; Wehr, 1976; ibn Manẓūr, 1980; Penrice, 1991; Farid, 
2006). When the words ﻞغ or طسب collocate with ديلا they indicate the meaning of 
‘niggardliness’ or ‘to give generously’ respectively (ibid.; Riḍa, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; aṣ-
Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭantāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍāwī 1998). 
That is because the nature of being generous or miserly is to do with giving or not giving; 
and normally the physical act of giving is associated with hands. Through this association, 
in addition to other words in the context, the addressee can comprehend this figurative 
expression. Therefore, we can notice that all Qur’anic exegeses agree that ديلا ﱡﻞغ 
(shackling of a hand) and اهطْسب (spreading/laying it out) are figurative expressions for 
miserliness and generosity respectively. It is worth mentioning that a quite similar 
association between hands and miserliness or generosity exists in English. For example, 
the idiomatic expressions ‘tight-fisted’ represents miserliness and ‘open-handed’ 
represents generosity. 
Kināyah 7 and 8 
Kināyah 7: ديلا طسب in [Q. 5:11] and [Q. 5:28] 
Kināyah 8: ناسللا طسب in [Q. 60:2] 
﴿ آَهﱡَيأ اَيٱ َنيِذﱠل  ْاُونَمآٱ ْاوُرُْكذ  َتَمْعِنٱ ِ ﱠ๡  َنأ ٌمْوَق ﱠمَه ْذِإ ْمُكَْيلَع ْمُكْيَِلإ ْاوُطُسْبَي ْمَُهيِدَْيأ  َو ْمُكنَع ْمَُهيِدَْيأ ﱠفََكفٱ ْاوُقﱠت 
ٱ َ ﱠ๡  ﻰَلَعَوٱ ِ ﱠ๡  ِﻞﱠكََوتَيْلَفٱ َنوُنِمْؤُمْل﴾  ةيآ11  ةدئاملا ةروس نم[Q. 5:11] 
1 
﴿ نِئَل َكََدي ﱠيَلِإ َتطَسَب يَِنُلتَْقتِل  َْاَنأ آَم َكْيَلِإ َيِدَي ٍطِساَبِب َكَُلتَْقﻷ  ُفاََخأ ۤيِّنِإٱ َ ﱠ๡  ﱠبَرٱ َنيَِملاَعْل﴾  ةيآ28  نم
ةروس ةدئاملا ]Q. 5:28[ 
2 
﴿ ًءآَدَْعأ ْمَُكل ْاوُنوُكَي ْمُكوَُفقْﺜَي نِإ ْمُكَْيلِإ ْاۤوُطُسْبَيَو  ْمَُهيِدَْيأ  ْمَُهتَنِسَْلأَو  ِبﭑ ِءۤوﱡسل  َنوُرُفَْكت ْوَل ْاوﱡدَوَو﴾  ةيآ2  نم
ةنحتمملا ةروس  [Q. 60:2]  
3 
We have just shed light upon the phrase ديلا طسب and pointed out that it is a kināyah 
expression for generosity in [Q. 17: 29] and [Q. 5:64]. However, this does not indicate 
that the expression ديلا طسب or its derivatives are always a kināyah for generosity. So, apart 
from its literal sense (to spread/lay out the hand), at times it may refer to another kināyah, 
which is ‘to assault’ as in [Q. 5:11]. This interpretation, however, depends mainly on the 
Qur’anic exegetical literature and on the surrounding context of the expression. That is to 
say, the addressee could comprehend whether the meaning of ديلا طسب, is literal, generosity, 
or assault, through its surrounding context. Of course, the exegetical literature will clear 
up any ambiguity.  
For example, in and the words يَِنُلتَْقتِل/ َكَُلتَْقﻷ (to kill me/to kill you) in [Q. 5:28] and  ِب ِءۤوﱡسلﭑ  
(with evil) in [Q. 60:2] should lead the addressee to understand that the intention of 
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spreading out the hand is to make some sort of assault. Another way to realise that  طسب
ديلا is a kināyah for ‘some sort of an assault’ and not ‘generosity’ is through the 
prepositional phrase ‘ﻰلإ + pronoun’, such as  ﱠيَلِإ (towards me) or  ْمُكَْيِلإ (towards you). 
Therefore, whenever the expression ديلا طسب is collocated with such prepositional phrases 
then it is a kināyah for an assault as in [Q. 5:11], [Q. 5:28], and [Q. 60:2]. Speaking of 
collocation, the word ‘طسب’ and the aforesaid prepositional phrases also collocate with the 
word ناسللا (the tongue) to form a kināyah for insult or verbal assault as in [Q. 60:2] (see 
the exegesis on [Q. 5:11] by ar-Rāzī , 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 
1994; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a). In order to identify the exact type of assault or insult, if 
not mentioned in the ʾāyah, one must turn to the Qur’anic exegesis. For example, the 
exegetes point out that the type of attempted assault in [Q. 5:11] was intended to 
kill/assassinate (Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 
1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī 1997; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a; ibn Kathīr, 2000; Aa-Ṭabarī, 2001; 
ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002). Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and al-Alūsī (1994) add the attempt ‘to destroy’ too. 
Based on this, the interpretation of  ْمَُهيِدَْيأ ْمُكْيَلِإ ْاوُُطسَْبي َنأ ٌمَْوق ﱠمَه ْذِإ will be ‘when people 
intended/planned to kill/assassinate [and destroy] you). Furthermore, almost all exegetes 
agree that the type of evil assault and insult in [Q. 60:2] is ‘to kill’ and ‘to swear and 
blaspheme’. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981) adds to the physical assault ‘to beat’ also ‘to kill’, whereas 
abū Ḥayyān (1993) adds ‘to torture’. Ar-Rāzī  (1981), on the other hand, only mentions 
‘to beat’. In view of this, the interpretation of  ِب ْمَُهتَنِسَْلأَو ْمُهَيِدَْيأ ْمُكَْيلِإ ْاۤوُطُسْبَي ِءۤوﱡسلﭑ  will be ‘they 
will [beat you] kill you and swear at you [verbally insult you]’. 
Kināyah 9 and 10 
Kināyah 9:  ﱡﺾَع  َيلا ِد  in [Q. 25:27] 
Kināyah 10:  ﱡﺾَع لِماََنْﻷا  in [Q. 3:119] 
﴿  َمَْويَو ِهْيََدي َﻰلَع ُمِلا ﱠظلا ﱡﺾَعَي  ًانَﻼُف ْذِخﱠ َتأ ْمَل ِيَنتْيَل َٰﻰتَلْيَو َٰي ۝ًﻼيِبَس ِلوُس ﱠرلا َعَم ُْتذَخﱠتا ِيَنتْيَل اَي ُلُوقَي
 ًﻼيِلَخ ﴾  ةيآ27-28] ناقرفلا ةروس ،Q. 25:27-28[ 
1 
﴿  ... اَْولَخ اَذِإَو اﱠنَمآ اوُلاَق ْمُكُوقَل َاذِإَو َلِماََنْﻷا ُمُكْيَلَع او ﱡضَع  ْلا َنِم ْمُكِظْيَغِب اُوتوُم ُْﻞق ۚ ِﻆَْيغ…﴾  ةيآ119 ،
 نارمع لآ ةروس[Q. 3:119] 
2 
In general, āyah [Q. 25: 27] indicates whoever abandons the path of Islam will, on 
Judgment Day, be filled with remorse. The majority of exegetes believe that the 
wrongdoer (ملاظلا) in this āyah refers to ᶜUqbah bin abi Muᶜīṭ (a man from same tribe that 
the Prophet Muhammad belonged to, which is Quraysh). It is said that after   ᶜUqbah 
announced his embracement to Islam, his best and closest friend (ﻞيلخلا) (most reports say 
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it was ʾUbay bin Khalaf and others say it was ʾUmayyah bin Khalaf) became infuriated. 
Thus, ᶜUqbah apostatised in order to please his best friend; not only this, but he also he 
went and insulted the Prophet. Both ᶜUqbah and his friend were later killed, in the battles 
of Badr and Uḥud respectively. The exegeses goes on to say that this wrongdoer will, on 
Judgement Day, face his consequences and wish that he had never followed his friend’s 
wishes, by deserting and turning down the Prophet Muhammad. It is worth noting that 
some exegetes believe that ملاظ refers to any wrongdoer, in general, and that ﻞيلخ refers to 
Satan. That is to say, any person who fulfils the desire of Satan and deserts the path of the 
Prophet Muhammad will eventually regret their actions on Judgement Day (see ath-
Thaᶜalabi, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a: ibn Kathīr, 2000; al-Qurṭubī, 2006). As regards 
to [Q. 3:119], it demonstrates one of the characters that belong to hypocrites who pretend 
to be sympathetic, friendly, and followers in the presence of Muslims, while in fact they 
are merely concealing their true feelings, which are full of bemoaning and rage in every 
respect.  
The depiction of remorse in [Q. 25:27] and rage in [Q. 3:119], according to the majority 
of exegetes and lexicons53, is demonstrated through the kināyah expressions ديلا ضع 
(biting one’s own hand) and ﻞمانﻷا ضع (biting one’s own fingertips) respectively. Ṭanṭāwī 
(1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a)54, claim the gestural expression 
of ديلا ضع is not only a kināyah for remorse/regret, but it can be used as a kināyah for 
anger/rage as well, or for both remorse and rage together, just like biting one’s own 
fingertips, falling onto one’s hand (ديلا يف طوقسلا), and gnashing one’s own teeth (نسلا عرق). 
They also add that these kināyah expressions are used for eloquence reasons. Whether 
biting one’s own hands/fingertips or gnashing one’s own teeth, all of these are considered 
a reality-based physiognomy or mien of a remorseful person or who is full of rage. 
Sometimes when people recognise that they have done something wrong or feel fury they 
unintentionally bite either their hand, fingertips, or lower lip. In other words, such 
psychological body gestures do exist in real life. To tell whether the kināyah is for 
remorse, rage, or both one needs to consider the context. For instance, the particle of 
desire يَِنتْيَل اَي’ ‘I wish that I’ or ‘would that I’ (Penrice, 1991, p. 135; cf. Lane, 1968, p. 
                                                
53 For exegetes, see the explanation of  ِهْيَدَي َﻰلَع ُمِلا ﱠظلا ﱡَضَعي in [Q. 25:27] and  َﻞِمَاَنْﻷا ُمُكَْيلَع او ﱡﻀَع in [Q. 3:119] 
by aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981), ibn ᶜ Āshūr (1984), Ṭantāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), al-Bayḍāwī 
(1998), az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), ibn Kathīr (2000), ash-Shanqītī ([2005] 1426 H.), and ash-Shawkānī 
(2007). For lexicons, see Lane (1968, p. 2000,  p. 2069; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah (1989, p. 
770), Mustafa, et al. (2004, p. 607), Badawi & Abdel Haleem (2008, p. 627), and ᶜUmar (2008, p. 1512). 
54 Riḍā (1947) and ar-Rāzī (1981) claim the same in their explanation of [Q. 3:119].  
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2683) in [Q. 25:27] would suggest a deep feeling of being sorry or guilt for wrong doing, 
and the prepositional phrase  ِﻆَْيغْلا َنِم ‘out of/in rage’ following ﻞمانﻷا ضع in [Q. 3:119] 
would imply a sense of rage. 
Kināyah 11 
Kināyah 11:  ُبِّلَُقي  ِهْيﱠفَك  in [Q. 18:42] 
﴿ ََحبَْصَأف ِهِرََمﺜِب َطيُِحأَو ِهْيﱠفَك ُب ِّلَقُي ْكِرُْشأ ْمَل يَِنتَْيل َاي ُلوُقَيَو اَهِشوُرُع ٰﻰَلَع ٌَةيِواَخ َيِهَو اَهيِف ََقفَنأ اَم ٰﻰَلَع
ًادََحأ ِّيبَرِب﴾  ةيآ42فهكلا ةروس ، ]Q. 18:42[ 
One of the four stories reported in sūrat al-Kahf is about two men – a poor man and a rich 
man. Allah has granted and blessed the rich man with both prosperity and beautiful and 
fruitful gardens. Unfortunately, this rich man became extremely engrossed in his wealth 
and completely forgot that this wealth was a gift and blessing from God. So, the poor man 
told him to thank God, but the rich man became ostentatious, self-conceited, and 
overweening and claimed that his prosperity would never perish. Moreover, not only did 
he have doubts about Judgment Day but he also claimed if that day were to come he 
would find even better wealth. The next day, the rich man realised his two gardens had 
been completely destroyed due to his ungratefulness to God. So, he began bewailing and 
felt remorseful over what he had spent on his gardens and wished he had not associated 
others with God in worship. 
All exegetes agree that the emotion of bewailing and especially remorse in this ʾāyah is 
conveyed through the expression of  ِهْيﱠفَك ُب ِّلَُقي (lit. turning the palms [of his hand] inside 
out). However, some note it is a kināyah for contrition and remorse55 (see ar-Rāzī , 1981; 
aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a), some for 
remorse only (see abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998, ash-Shawkānī, 2007), and 
others, such as ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), see it as a kināyah for contrition alone. This 
differentiation is probably marginal and insignificant, since contrition, remorse, sorrow, 
repentance, and regret are near-synonyms. After all, let us not forget that some words in 
one language could convey more senses or less than their putative equivalents in another 
language (cf. Baker equivalence at word level). What is significant and interesting, and 
may be relevant to the translation analysis in the next chapter, is the differentiation 
between some exegetes on how they depict the movement of the hand itself. Abu Ḥayyān 
(1993) provides a comprehensive commentary. Apart from twisting the palms [of the 
                                                
55 Some rhetoricians too like al-Ḥayānī, (2014, p. 142) and aṣ-Ṣābūnī (2009, p. 193). 
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hand] inside out repeatedly, he points out that some suggest that نيفكلا بيلقت is either placing 
or clapping the palm of one hand on the back of the other and vice versa. Al-Alusi does, 
however, affirm that regardless of how the gesture is physically performed, نيفكلا بيلقت 
remains a kināyah expression for contrition and remorse.  
As far as linguists or rhetoricians are concerned, they too indicate that this phrase 
represents grief, sorrow, repentance, or penitence (see Lane, 1968; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati 
al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989; Penrice, 1991; ᶜUmar, 2008; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998b [Part 1]; aṣ-
Ṣābūnī, 2009; al-Ḥayānī, 2014). Lane even points out that it is like other expressions that 
represent repentance or grief, such as  ِدَيلا يِف ُطوقﱡسلا, similar to what most of the exegetes 
have highlighted: 
 ُبِّلَقُي ََحبَْصأَف ِهْيﱠفَك  … means فا ّلقي حبصهيّفك ب  ٍنْطَبِل ًارْهَظ  [And he began to turn his 
hands upside-down, or to do so repeatedly,] in grief, or regret: … or he 
became in the state, or condition, of repenting, or grieving: for  ِنْ̒يفَكلا ُبيِلَْقت is 
an action of him who is repenting, or grieving; … and therefore 
metonymically [sic] denotes repentance, or grief, like  ِّفًكلا ﱡضَع and  يِف ُطوقﱡسلا
 ِدَيلا (1968, p. 2553). 
Kināyah 12 
Kināyah 12:  ْمِهيِدَْيأ يِف َطِقُس in [Q. 7:149] 
﴿ ا ﱠَملَو َطِقُس  ْمِهيِدَْيأ ِيف  َنيِرِساَخْلا َنِم ﱠنَنوَُكنَل َانَل ْرِفْغَيَو اَنﱡبَر اَنْمَحَْري ْمﱠل نِئَل اوُلاَق اوﱡلَض ْدَق ْمُهﱠَنأ اَْوأَرَو﴾  ةيآ
149فارعﻷا ةروس ، ]Q. 7:149[ 
The people of Prophet Mūsā (Moses) decided to make a statue of a calf out of their trinkets 
to worship during the time Moses was away in the mountain (believed to be Mount Sinai) 
talking to God. When Moses returned from the mountain his people realised they had 
committed a huge mistake and that they had gone astray. Therefore, they felt deep 
remorse for their wrongdoing. The feeling of remorse is conveyed through the kināyah 
expression ديلا يف طٌوقُسلا. As we have previously highlighted, several exegetes, rhetoricians, 
and lexicons point out that this kināyah is similar to ديلا ضع, ﻞمانﻷا ضع, and نيفكلا بيلقت. 
That is, they are all kināyah expressions for regret and remorse. The difference between 
‘ديلا يف طوٌقُسلا’ and the aforementioned expressions is that this is only a spoken expression 
which cannot be performed physically like the rest. 
Literally, the meaning of ديلا يف طٌوقُسلا is ‘fall into the hand’. Aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001) explains 
that هيدي يـف طقس دق and طقسأ are eloquent and that the Arabs used to say them to whoever is 
in a state of regret or helpless to do anything. He states that the expression comes from 
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راسئتسﻻا (surrender). راسئتسﻻا is when one man hits another or brings him down to the 
ground, captures him, and ties him up. The person who has been thrown down becomes 
in the hands of his thrower. Hence, every person who is incapable of doing anything or is 
struggling because of his inability is described as a person remorseful for his neglect. Az-
Zamakhsharī  (1998a) adds another interpretation and reveals that whoever is in a state 
of contrition or remorse usually bites his hand in anguish, which originally means that the 
mouth or bite fell into the hand, but the subject ‘hand’ or ‘mouth’ is omitted (also stated 
in al-Alūsī, 1994 and ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 2038-2039). He expounds that  ﻰَف َطِقُس ا ﱠَملَو
 ْمِهيِدَْيأ demonstrates the intense contrition and remorse of the people of Moses for 
worshiping the calf. In addition, az-Zajjāj notes that مهيديأ يف طقس means the emotion of 
remorse fell in their hearts and soul, but because a person’s fate is a usually a consequence 
of their own doing, in other words, by their own hands, this is expressed through ‘fell into 
their hands’ (stated in az-Zamakhsharī , 1998; ar-Rāzī , 1981; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 
2038-2039). Regardless of how the expression originated, what is for sure is that it is 
culture-specific, and more importantly exegetes and rhetoricians agree that it is an 
expression for contrition and remorse. Some exegetes, such as Riḍā (1947), aṣ-Ṣābūnī 
(1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a), al-Bayḍāwī 
(1998), even say it is a kināyah for intense contrition and remorse. Various lexicons, such 
as Lisān al-ᶜArab (ibn Manẓūr, 1980), al-Muᶜjamu al-Wasīṭ (Mustafa, et al., 2004), 
Muᶜjam al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyati al-Muᶜāṣirah (ᶜUmar, 2008), Muᶜjam al-fāḍ al-Qurʾān 
al-Karīm (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989), A Dictionary and Glossary of the 
Kor-ân (Penrice, 1991), and Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an (Farid, 2006), also agree with 
the rhetoricians and exegetes.   
However, speaking of culture-specific features, Lane provides a comprehensive comment 
on مهيديأ يف طقس in which he remarkably believes that this phrase was unknown to the Arabs 
before the revelation of the Qur’an: 
هِدَي يِف َطِقُس, and هدي يف َطِقُْسا, but the former is more common, and better ... [lit. 
There was a falling, and there was a making to fall, upon his hand; i.e., of his 
hand upon his hand, or of his teeth upon his hand, by reason of repentance, 
and grief, or regret; meaning] he repented, of what he had done; and grieved 
for, or regretted, an act of inadvertence; or, and became confounded, or 
perplexed, and unable to see his right course: or both signify, or signify also, 
or the former signifies also, he slipped; fell into an error, or  a fault; 
committed a mistake. Hence the saying in the Ḳur [vii. 148],  ْمِهيِدَْيأ يِف َطِقُس ا ﱠمَلَو 
And when they repented: or struck their hands upon their hands, by reason of 
repentance; or repented greatly; because he who repents, and grieves, or 
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regrets, bites his hands in sorrow, so that his hand is fallen upon [by his teeth]: 
the phrase was not known to the Arabs before the time of the Ḳur-ān: … 
it has also been read مهيديا يف َطَقَس, as though  َُمدﱠنلا were understood; i.e.  َُمدﱠنلا ََطقَس; 
like as you say,  هوُرْكَم اَذه ْنِم ِهِدَي يِف َﻞَصَح ْدَق , likening what comes into the heart, 
and into the mind, to what comes into the hand, and is seen with the eye: and 
this, as well as the former, is tropical” (1968, p. 1380, author’s italics, bold is 
mine).     
Kināyah 13 and 14 
Kināyah 13:  ُثَف ﱠرلا in [Q. 2:187] and [Q. 2:197] 
Kināyah 14: ةَرَشابُم ةأرَملا  in [Q. 2:187] 
﴿  ِمَاي ِّصلا َةَلْيَل ْمُكَل ﱠﻞُِحأ ْمُكِئآَِسن ﻰَلِإ ُثَف ﱠرلا  ﱠنُهﱠل ٌساَبِل ُْمتَنأَو ْمُكﱠل ٌساَبِل ﱠنُه  َْخت ُْمتنُك ْمُكﱠَنأ ُဃّ َمِلَع َنوُنات
 َنﻵاَف ْمُكنَع اَفَعَو ْمُكْيَلَع َبَاتَف ْمُكَسُفَنأ ﱠنُهوُرِشاَب  ﱠيََبتَي ﻰﱠتَح ْاوُبَرْشاَو ْاوُلُكَو ْمَُكل ُဃّ ََبتَك اَم ْاوَُغتْباَو َن
 َفْلا َنِم ِدَوَْسﻷا ِطْيَخْلا َنِم ُضَيَْبﻷا ُطْيَخْلا ُمَُكل َﻻَو ِﻞْيلﱠلا ﻰَِلإ َماَي ِّصلا ْاو ﱡِمَتأ ﱠُمث ِرْج ﱠنُهوُرِشاَُبت  َو ُْمتَنأ
 ْمُهﱠلَعَل ِساﱠنلِل ِِهتاَيآ ُဃّ ُِّنيَُبي َكَِلذَك اَهوُبَرَْقت َﻼَف ِဃّ ُدُودُح َكْلِت ِدِجاَسَمْلا ِيف َنوُفِكاَع وُقﱠتَين﴾  ةيآ187 ،
ةرقبلا ةروس ]Q. 2:187[ 
 
1 
﴿  ﱠجَحْلا ﱠنِهيِف َضَرَف نَمَف ٌتاَموُلْع ﱠم ٌرُهَْشأ ﱡجَحْلا َثَفَر َﻼَف ... ِّجَحْلا ِيف َلَادِج َﻻَو َقوُسُف َﻻَو﴾  ةيآ187 ،
] ةرقبلا ةروسQ. 2:197[ 
2 
Āyah [Q. 2:187] clearly identifies for those who are fasting when they are allowed to eat, 
drink, and copulate during Ramadan, i.e. during fasting. Fasting, however, does not 
pertain only to Ramadan; Muslims can fast voluntarily on other days besides Ramadan. 
The main point is that during fasting, Muslims refrain from eating, drinking, and sexual 
relations just before dawn until sunset. When Muslims were first ordered to fast, they 
thought they could perform such actions only between sunset (maghrib) and when the red 
thread or twilight has disappeared from the sky ( ᶜishāʾ). There are some versions that say 
a Muslim was allowed to eat, drink, or have sexual relations with his/her spouse after 
maghrib until ᶜishāʾ or he/she sleeps, i.e. if he/she sleeps before ʾishāʾ then they are not 
allowed to perform such actions until the next sunset, which was a great hardship for 
many Muslims (az-Zamakhsharī M. , 1998a; ibn Kathīr, 2000; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; ath-
Thaᶜālabī, 1997; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001). It is said that some of the Companions of the Prophet 
(Ṣaḥābah) contravened this order by having sexual relations with their wives after ᶜishāʾ; 
accordingly, some repented of what they had done and came to the Prophet to enquire 
how to be granted remission [from Allah] for their sins. On this account, it is believed 
that this ʾāyah was revealed to show that fasting starts from dawn (fajr) and continues 
until sunset (maghrib) (ibid.). In other words, eating, drinking, or having sexual relations 
with a spouse are permissible between maghrib and fajr. 
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As to the kināyah expressions used in this āyah, they are  ْمُكِئآَِسن ﻰَلِإ ُثَف ﱠرلا and  ﱠنُهوُرِشاَب. 
According to the exegetical literatures56, the first expression  ْمُِكئآَسِن َﻰلِإ َُثف ﱠرلا is a kināyah 
for ‘sexual intercourse’. Some exegetes believe it is/includes any type of erotic talk or 
amatory behaviour that usually happens between husband and wife (see Riḍā (1947), al-
Qurṭubī (2006), and ash-Shawkānī (2007). That is because, linguistically, one of the 
meanings of the word ثفر is obscene and amatory behaviour (Lane, 1968; Wehr, 1976; 
Penrice, 1991; Farid, 2006). Farid adds “all acts and talks leading to and including coition 
such as amatory talk, kissing, caressing, embracing, compressing, etc.” (2006, p. 334). 
However, some exegetes explain that since ثفر is followed by the preposition ﻰلإ then it 
means he went to (ﻰلإ ﻰﻀفأ) or approached [his wife] which he lead to the sense of 
performing sexual intercourse. Hence, it used as a kināyah for sexual intercourse for 
euphemistic purposes just like  ﱠنُهوُرِش ٰـ َب in this same āyah or like: ﴿ ٍضَْعب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُﻀْعَب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ ْدَقَو﴾  
[Q. 4:21], ﴿ ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت َﻻَو﴾  [Q. 2:222], ﴿ ْمَُكثْرَح ْاُوْتأَف﴾  [Q. 2:223], ﴿ ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت َنأ ِﻞْبَق نِم﴾  [Q. 2:237], 
﴿ ﱠنِهِب ُْمتْلََخد﴾  [Q. 4:23], ﴿ اَمَفٱ ُْمتَْعتَْمتْس  ﱠنُهْنِم ِِهب﴾  [Q. 4:24], ﴿ ُُمتْسَم ٰـ َلٱءاَّسنل﴾  [Q. 4:43], ﴿اَها ﱠشََغت ا ﱠمَلَف﴾  [Q. 
7:189] (Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; abū Ḥayyān 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; az-Zamakhsharī , 
1998a; al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Moreover, az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) argues that the reason for 
using ثفر as a kināyah for sexual intercourse despite its possible original vulgar meaning, 
and contrary to the other euphemistic expressions, is to censure the act of those who were 
unfaithful to themselves ( ْمُكَُسفَنأ َنوُناتَْخت ُْمتنُك) before lawfulness. 
The word ثفر appears again in [Q. 2:197], an āyah related to Hajj. Exegetes, such as ar-
Rāzī  (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), ath-Thaᶜālabī (1997), ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002), and ash-
Shawkānī (2007), imply that the great majority of authorities believe that ثفر here is also 
used for sexual intercourse. The exegetes do, however, point that some believe that it is 
only related to lewd/erotic talk or amatory behaviour. Abū Ḥayyān (1993), ibn Kathīr 
(2000), aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001), and ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002) explain that some say that ثفر is a 
comprehensive word that encompasses whatever a man wants from his wife and could 
include embracing, flirtation, or foreplay. Abū Ḥayyān argues that all the suggested 
previous meanings revolve around sexual intercourse or something that is not decent for 
a person in iḥrām (garment of a Makkah pilgrim)/performing Hajj due the sanctity of the 
Hajj, which we believe is a logical opinion similar to that of az-Zamakhsharī . 
                                                
56 Riḍā (1947), ar-Rāzī (1981), aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981), ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), 
al-Alūsī (1994), ath-Thaᶜālabī (1997), az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a), al-Bayḍāwī (1998), aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001), 
ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002), al-Qurṭabī (2006), and ash-Shawkānī (2007).  
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The other kināyah in [Q. 2:187] is  ﱠنُهوُرِشاَب, and while talking about ثفر earlier, we 
mentioned that some exegetes pointed out that ثفر is a kināyah for sexual intercourse 
similar to other euphemistic expressions which included  ﱠنُهوُرِش ٰـ َب. Linguistically, the verb 
رشاب has several meanings, such as to undertake, pursue, practice, perform, or carry out 
(Lane, 1968, p. 207). However, the object that occurs with the verb رشاب determines its 
meaning. For example, when the word ةفيظو (job) occurs with رشاب as in ةفيظولا رشاب, then 
the meaning of رشاب will be one of the aforementioned conventional meanings; but with 
the word ةجوز (spouse/wife) as in هتجوز رشاب then the meaning of رشاب refers to sexual 
intercourse. As a result, the phrase  ﱠنُهوُرِشَاب in this context apparently means ‘to have 
sexual intercourse’ because  ﱠنُهـ in this word is an Arabic plural feminine object pronoun 
‘them’ that refers to ‘spouses’.  
Some exegetes suggest that the sense of intercourse in رشاب comes from the fact that رشاب 
derives from the word هرشب (skin), and the meaning of ةأرملا رشاب originally is touching the 
skin of the woman, which surely happens with intercourse (ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; 
abū Ḥayyān, 1993, al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; at-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002; 
al-Qurṭubī, 2006). Therefore, a few suggest that رشاب in this āyah refers to touching rather 
than intercourse (cf. ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 207), but the exegetes confirm it is used for 
intercourse.     
Most dictionaries also indicate that رشاب in this context refers to sexual intercourse (see 
ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 287; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 133; Penrice, 
1991, p. 17; Farid, 2006, p. 70). Lane provides the following: 
ةأرملا رشاب, َابُمةرَش , and راشِب he was, or became, in contact with the woman, skin 
to skin: he enjoyed [contact with] her skin: both being in one garment or piece 
of cloth: he lay with her, [skin to skin; or in the sense of]” (Lane, 1968, p. 
207, author’s italics). 
Kināyah 15, 16, and 17 
Kināyah 15: ءاَسِّنلا ْاوُلَِزتْعا; Kināyah 16:  ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت ﻻ;  
Kināyah 17:  ّنُهُوتْأ (لجرلا وأ ةأرملا نايتإ) 
﴿ ًىَذأ َوُه ْﻞُق ِضيِحَمْلا ِنَع ََكنوَُلأْسَيَوءاَسِّنلا ْاُولَِزتْعاَف  ِضيِحَمْلا يِف ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت َﻻَو  َنْر ﱠهََطت َاِذإَف َنْرُهْطَي َﻰﱠتَح
 ُّنهُوْتأَف  ُဃّ ُمُكَرََمأ ُثْيَح ْنِم  َنيِر ِّهََطتُمْلا ﱡبِحُيَو َنيِبا ﱠوﱠتلا ﱡبُِحي َဃّ ﱠِنإ  ٌثْرَح ْمُكُؤآَسِن ۝  ْمُكﱠل  ْاُوْتأَف ْمَُكﺛْرَح  ﻰﱠَنأ
 ُْمْتﺌِش  َنيِنِمْؤُمْلا ِر ِّشَبَو ُهُوَقﻼ ﱡم مُكﱠَنأ ْاوُمَلْعاَو َဃّ ْاوُقﱠتاَو ْمُكِسُفَنﻷ ْاوُم ِّدَقَو   ﴾ ةيآ222-223ةرقبلا ةروس ، ]Q. 2: 
222-223[ 
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The kināyah expressions here are ءاَسِّنلا ْاوُلَِزتْعا,  ﻻ ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت , and  ّنُهُوْتأ. Similarly to فرث  and 
ةجوزلا ةرشابم, all three expressions here are too related to sexual intercourse, which means 
that euphemism is also the purpose of usage (Riḍā, 1947; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 
1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Baḍāwī, 1998; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). 
Az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) and other exegetes or rhetoricians have pointed out that such 
expressions and other similar ones are one of the courteous kināyah expressions and 
favourable indirect references used in the Quran for sexual intercourse (cf. al-Ḥayānī, 
2014, pp. 82-109; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 2009). This is evident in most of the exegetical literature. 
Some dictionaries also show that what is meant by these expression is sexual intercourse. 
For example, Farid mentions that اَهَاَتا means either “[h]e came to her” or “he lay with her” 
and that  َناَرْكﱡذلا َنُْوْتَاَتا means “[d]o you commit sodomy with males” (2006, p. 5; cf. Lane, 
1968, p. 15; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 14; ᶜ Umar, 2008, p. 58; Mustafa, 
et al., 2004, p. 4). Additionally, for  ّنُهوُبَرَْقت Lane state that  َةأْرَملا ُتْبِرَق is “a metonymical 
[sic] phrase, meaning I compressed the woman” (1968, p. 2504; cf. Farid, 2006, p. 689; 
Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 889; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 723).   
As to the brief understanding of the whole context, various exegetes suggest the men of 
the pre-Islamic age used to distance themselves from their spouses during their menstrual 
period just like the Jews used to do (cf. abū Ḥayyān, 1993; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a; ath-
Thaᶜālabī, 1997; ibn Kathīr, 2000). That is to say, a man would refrain from sitting, eating, 
drinking, sleeping in the same bed, and some even say living in the same house with his 
spouse when she was going through menstruation. The Prophet Muhammad was asked 
by his Companions about this situation and therefore āyah [Q. 2: 222] was revealed to the 
Prophet to show that the discharge of the menstrual period is squalid and harmful. Hence, 
sexual intercourse during menstruation is prohibited, and is only permitted once the wife 
takes a shower after the end of her menstruation. Apart from intercourse, there is no harm 
or reason for the husband to abandon his wife. Some exegetes, such as ath-Thaᶜlabī 
(2002), az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), and abū Ḥayyān (1993), claim that there is another 
version regarding the revelation of this ʾāyah. They asserted that the Christians used to 
pay no heed to menstruation and continue to have intercourse with their wives during 
their menstrual period whereas the Jews (ath-Thaᶜlabī and az-Zamakhsharī included the 
Majus) used to distance themselves and leave their wives in the lurch without help. On 
account of that, the āyah was revealed to guide men to be moderate, that is to say, neither 
should they totally distance themselves from their wives during their mensturation nor 
leave them in the lurch nor should they have sexual intercourse. In other words, men 
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should live together with their wives during their menstruation as usual but without any 
physical intercourse. Furthermore, aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001) adds another version for the 
revelation of this āyah. He states that men used to avoid having sexual intercourse with 
their wives through the vagina during menstruation, and perform anal intercourse instead. 
So, they asked the Prophet regarding this matter and, therefore, the ʾāyah was revealed to 
the Prophet. 
The expressions ءاَسِّنلا ْاوُلَِزتْعا (lit. seclude yourselves from women), and  َﻻ ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت  (lit. do 
not approach/come near or close to them [women]) could literally refer to the sense of 
distancing oneself from the spouse during her menstruation if the expressions were taken 
out of context. Doing so would in fact support the actions of the men during the pre-
Islamic era, hence the āyah was revealed to prohibit such actions. However, the clauses 
ا ُဃّ ُمُكَرََمأ ُثْيَح ْنِم ّنُهُوت  (lit. approach them [have intercourse] from where Allah has ordered 
you] and  ُْمْتئِش ﻰﱠَنأ ْمَُكثْرَح ْاُوْتأَف ْمُكﱠل ٌثْرَح ْمُكُؤآَسِن (lit. your women are [like] tilth [place of 
cultivation] for you, so come to your tilth however you wish) can serve as indicators or 
clues for the recipient to comprehend the actual intended meaning. The women are 
likened to cultivated land in terms of producing babies, or as Lane describes it: the wives 
“are thus likened to places that are ploughed for sowing” (1968, p. 542). This shows that 
the main purpose of having intercourse is to have children, and since the vagina is the 
only place where the sperm can be ejaculated for pregnancy, then that should help in 
understanding that the intended meaning of ةجوزلا نم بارتقﻻا, تعاةجوزلا لاز , and ةجوزلا نايتا 
is sexual intercourse. It also demonstrates that intercourse is permitted only through the 
woman’s vagina, which is also evident in the Prophet’s saying (Sunni ḥadīth) mentioned 
in the exegetical literature. The clause  ُلَِزتْعاءاَسِّنلا ْاو  ِضيِحَمْلا يِف  could also help the addressee 
reach the intended meaning. According to abū Ḥayyān (1993), some say that  ِضيِحَمْلا يِف 
refers the place of menstruation, i.e. the vagina during menstruation, rather than period 
itself (cf. ar-Rāzī  1981). It is worthy to mention that the word ﻰتأ in the sense of 
performing intercourse (but with men, i.e. sodomy) also occurs in the following āyahs: 
﴿ ْمُكﱠنِإ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأَتل ٌمَْوق ُْمتَنأ ْﻞَب ۚ ِءاَسِّنلا ِنُود ن ِّم ًةَوْهَش َنوُفِرْس ﱡم﴾  ةيآ81فارعﻷا ةروس ،  ]Q. 7:81[ 
﴿ ْمُكﱠنَِئأ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأتَل  َنُولَهَْجت ٌمَْوق ُْمتَنأ ْﻞَب ۚ ِءاَسِّنلا ِنُود ن ِّم ًةَوْهَش﴾  ةيآ55ﻞمنلا ةروس ، [Q. 27:55]  
﴿ ْمُكﱠنَِئأ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأتَل  َﻞيِبﱠسلا َنوُعَطَْقتَو  ...﴾  ةيآ29س ،توبكنعلا ةرو ]Q. 29:29[ 
﴿ َنيِمَلَاعْلا َنِم َناَرْكﱡذلا َنُوْتَأَتأ﴾  ةيآ165ءارعشلا ةروس ، ]Q. 26:165[ 
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Kināyah 18 and 19 
Kināyah 18: طِئآَغْلا in [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] 
Kināyah 19: سَمَﻻ in [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] 
﴿  ًُبنُج َﻻَو َنُولُوَقت اَم ْاوَُملَْعت َﻰﱠتَح ىَراَكُس ُْمتَنأَو َةَﻼﱠصلا ْاوُبَرَْقت َﻻ ْاوُنَمآ َنيِذﱠلا اَهﱡَيأ اَي ِباَع ﱠﻻِإ ا ٍِيبَس يِر
 ن ِّم مُكن ِّم ٌدََحأ ءاَج َْوأ ٍرَفَس ﻰَلَع َْوأ ﻰَضْر ﱠم ُمتنُك ِنإَو ْاوُلَِستَْغت َﻰﱠتَح ِِطئآَغْلا  َأ ْو ُُمتْسََمﻻ  ْمَلَف ءاَسِّنلا ْاُودَِجت 
اًروُفَغ ا̒وُفَع َناَك َဃّ ﱠنِإ ْمُكيِدَْيأَو ْمُكِهوُجُِوب ْاوُحَسْماَف ًابِّيَط ًاديِعَص ْاوُم ﱠَمَيَتف ءاَم﴾  ةيآ43 ءاسنلا ةروس ،
]Q. 4:4[ 
 
1 
﴿ ِةﻼﱠصلا ىَلِإ ُْمتُْمق اَذِإ ْاوُنَمآ َنيِذﱠلا اَهﱡَيأ اَي ْمُكِسوُؤُرِب ْاوُحَسْماَو ِقِفاَرَمْلا ىَلِإ ْمُكَيِدَْيأَو ْمُكَهوُجُو ْاوُلِسْغاف
 ََحأ ءاَج َْوأ ٍرَفَس ىَلَع َْوأ ىَضْر ﱠم ُمتنُك نِإَو ْاوُر ﱠهﱠطاَف ًابُنُج ُْمتنُك نِإَو ِنيَبْعَكْلا ىَلِإ ْمُكَلُجَْرأَومُكن ِّم ٌد  َن ِّم
 ِطِئاَغْلا  َْوأ ُُمتْسََمﻻ ا ُديِرُي اَم ُهْن ِّم مُكيِدَْيأَو ْمُكِهوُجُِوب ْاوُحَسْماَف اًبِّيَط اًديِعَص ْاوُم ﱠمََيتَف ًءاَم ْاوُدَِجت ْمَلَف ءاَِّسنل
 ُكَْشت ْمُكﱠلَعَل ْمُكْيَلَع َُهتَمْعِن ﱠمِتُيِلَو ْمُكَر ِّهَطُيِل ُديُِري نِكَلَو ٍجَرَح ْن ِّم مُكْيَلَع َلَعْجَيِل ُစّ َنوُر﴾ ةيآ 6 ةروس ،
ةدئاملا  ]Q. 5:6[ 
 
2 
Both [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] are quite similar in terms of meaning related to the 
requirements of performing prayer. That is to say, they both instruct Muslims about what 
state they should be in in terms of purity (ablution) before performing prayers. The first 
āyah slightly differs from the second by including the prohibition of performing prayers 
while being intoxicated (drunk), because in a drunken state a person would not understand 
the meaning of what he/she is saying. It is worth mentioning that this āyah was revealed 
before the complete prohibition of alcoholic consumption as in [Q. 2: 219] and [Q. 5: 90-
91]. However, Muslims are obligated to be in a purity state to perform prayer, and 
therefore there are some actions that are known to revoke this purity. For example, the 
discharge of urine, excrement, or wind, which are known in the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence as ḥadath aṣghar (minor ritual impurity), revokes a person’s state of purity 
and requires that person to wash some parts of his body which is known as waḍūʾ 
(performance of ritual ablution) before performing prayers. Also, menstrual and postnatal 
periods, sexual intercourse, discharge of semen, and suchlike, which are known in the 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence as ḥadath akbar (major ritual impurity) revoke a 
person’s state of purity, but in this situation that person must wash his/her complete body 
in order to perform prayers. It is worth mentioning that sexual intercourse, the discharge 
of semen (due to sexual intercourse or not), or the woman’s ejaculation of fluid due to 
orgasm (due to sexual intercourse or not) are called janābah. In this case, he/she is 
obligated to perform a “total ablution” (Lane, 1968, p. 465) which is known as ghusl or 
ightisāl (ibid: 2259) in order to perform prayers. Both [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6], however, 
instruct Muslims to perform tayammum (dry ablution), if water is not available or there 
is a serious reason for not being able to use water, in both types of ritual ablution, i.e. 
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waḍūʾ or ghusl. Tayammum is to strike both palms of your hand on clean ground, sand, 
soil, rock, stone, or suchlike and then swipe your palms on your face from the top of the 
forehead, and then swipe the hands from the wrist to the tip of the fingers. 
As we have noticed in previous kināyah examples, the Qur’an never uses filthy, indecent, 
and immodest words, or terms that are culturally or socially unacceptable. On that 
account, the discharge of urine or excrement is referred to by the kināyah expression طئاغلا 
(see Riḍā, 1947; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; aṭ-
Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). According to Lane (1968, p. 
2309), ibn Manẓūr (1980 ،p. 3316), Mustafa, et al., (2004, p. 666), and Farid (2006, p. 
628) the original meaning of طئاغلا is a wide low piece of ground. In former times, when 
a person wanted to discharge any type of excrement, i.e. urine or faeces, he/she used to 
go to a low depressed area of ground away from the eyes of others. From that sense, the 
word طئاغلا became a kināyah for the discharge of urine, excrement, and wind (ibid.) and 
through time it became lexicalised. So, the clause ‘ ِطِئآَغْلا ن ِّم مُكن ِّم ٌدََحأ ءاَج’ (lit. one of you 
came from low depressed area of ground) refers to the discharge of any type of excrement 
including wind (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 828; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 1651).  
The other kināyah is ءاَسِّنلا ُُمتْسََمﻻ (lit. you touched women). According to ibn Manẓūr 
(1980, p. 4072), one of the main literal meanings of the word سْمَل,  َسَمَﻻ, or  َسَمَل is ‘to 
touch’, and it is also used as a kināyah expression for sexual intercourse. The majority of 
the Qur’anic exegetes agree that  َسَمَﻻ in this context is a kināyah for sexual intercourse, 
but they do, however, point out that there are a few scholars who argue that  َسَمَﻻ is not 
used figuratively, and the intended meaning is its actual literal meaning, i.e. to touch 
(Riḍā, 1947; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭawī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-
Bayḍāwī, 1998; ibn Kathīr, 2000; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabi, 2002; ash-Shawkānī, 
2007). Those who support the latter opinion have also different views. Some argue that 
the meaning of ‘touching’ in both āyahs comprises any type of touching between a male 
and female, including a kiss, and that they have to perform waḍūʾ to regain purity. Others 
claim that it is touching with sexual desire (without intercourse). Some believe that it is 
the touching of a man’s skin to a woman’s skin (for example, a handshake) who he can 
be married to (a non-maḥram), and vice versa.  
On the other hand, the majority, who believe that  َسَمَﻻ in this context is a kināyah for 
sexual intercourse, claim that the Qur’an never contains taboo words or words that are 
not socially or culturally acceptable and they are replaced by kināyah expressions for 
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euphemistic reasons. They believe that  َسَمَﻻ as a kināyah for sexual intercourse is not only 
used in the above to āyahs, but also in [Q. 2: 237] and [Q. 33: 49] through the synonym 
 ﱠسم (as we will later see). Furthermore, they provide several statements that support their 
argument. For example, one of the traditional Sunni sayings from ᶜĀʾisha (one of the 
Prophet’s wives) says that the Prophet sometimes used to kiss her after performing waḍūʾ 
which indicates that touching or even a kiss does not revoke waḍūʾ. The following popular 
archaic Arabic expression for a woman who engages in adultery and fornication supports 
the former opinion of scholars due to the use of one of the derivatives of the word lams 
to refer to sexual intercourse: 
 َناكَو"  ْبا ُن  َع ّب ٍسا  َي ُق ُلو ﱠللا : ْم ُس  ِّللاو ُسام  ُملاو َمﻼ َس ُة  ِكَن ٌةيا  َع ِن  ِجلا ِعام َو ، ِم ﱠم ُي ا ْس َت ﱡلد  ِب ِه  َع َل ِص ﻰ ﱠح ِة 
 َق ْو َق هل ْو ُل  َعلا َر ِب  َملا يف ْر َأ ِة  ُت َز ﱡن  ِب ُفلا ُج ِرو : ِه َي  َت ﻻ ُر ﱡد  َي َد  ِمﻻ ٍس" (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 
4072, my emphasis) 
One says, of a woman who commits adultery, or fornication, or acts viciously, 
 دي درت ﻻ ةنﻼفسمﻻ  or سمﻻ دي عنمت ﻻ, but the latter is at variance with the 
authorities, the former being the phrase commonly known, [properly 
signifying, Such a woman does not repel the hand of a feeler;] meaning, such 
a woman commits adultery, or fornication, and acts viciously, not repelling 
from herself anyone who desires of her that he may lie with her; and she is 
suspected of easiness, or compliance, towards him who desires of her that he 
may lie with her” (Lane, 1968, p. 2674, author’s italics). 
Additionally, if we go back to al-Jurjānī’s definition of kināyah we can notice that 
‘touching’ is associated with sexual intercourse, especially given that there is no 
intercourse without one touching the other. Besides, janābah or its derivative junub, as 
mentioned in the āyahs, is one of the results of intercourse. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the word  َسَمَﻻ in this context is used in order to allude to and attest the sense of 
‘intercourse’. 
Kināyah 20 
Kināyah 20:  ﱠسَم in [Q. 3:47], [Q. 19:20], [Q. 2:236-237], [Q. 33:49], and [Q. 58:3-4] 
﴿  َو ٌدَلَو يِل ُنوَُكي ﻰﱠَنأ ِّبَر ْتَلاَق ٌرََشب يِنْسَسَْمي ْمَل ُهَل ُلُوقَي اَمﱠِنَإف اًرَْمأ ﻰَﻀَق َاذِإ ُءاَشَي اَم ُُقلْخَي ُဃّ ِكِلَذَك َلاَق
 ُنوَُكيَف نُك﴾  ةيآ47 ةروس ،نارمع لآ ]Q. 3:47[  
1 
﴿  َو ٌمَﻼُغ يِل ُنوُكَي ﻰﱠَنأ ْتَلاَق ٌرَشَب يِنْسَسْمَي ْمَل̒ايَِغب َُكأ ْمَلَو  ةيآ ﴾20ميرم ةروس ، ]Q. 19:20[ 2 
﴿ اَم ءاَسِّنلا ُُمتْقﱠلَط ِنإ ْمُكَْيلَع َحاَنُج ﱠﻻ ﱡنُهوﱡسََمت ْمَل  َﻰلَعَو ُهَُردَق ِعِسوُمْلا ﻰَلَع ﱠنُهوُِّعتَمَو ًةَﻀيِرَف ﱠنَُهل ْاوُضِرَْفت َْوأ
 نِم ﱠنُهوُُمتْقﱠلَط ِنإَو ۝ َنيِنِسْحُمْلا ﻰَلَع ا̒قَح ِفوُرْعَمْلاِب اًعَاتَم ُهُرْدَق ِِرتْقُمْلا ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت َنأ ِلْبَق  َل ُْمتْضَرَف ْدَقَو ﱠنُه
 ِْصنَف ًةَﻀيِرَف َوْقﱠتلِل ُبَرَْقأ ْاُوفَْعت َنأَو ِحاَِّكنلا َُةدْقُع ِهِدَيِب يِذﱠلا َُوفْعَي َْوأ َنوُفْعَي َنأ ﱠَﻻإ ُْمتْضَرَف اَم ُفى  ْاُوَسَنت َﻻَو
 َب َنوُلَمَْعت اَمِب َဃّ ﱠنِإ ْمَُكنْيَب َﻞَْﻀفْلا ﴾  ةيآ236-237 ةرقبلا ةروس ]Q. 2:236-237[ 
 
3 
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﴿اَهﱡَيأ اَي  نِم ﱠنُهوُُمتْقﱠلَط ﱠُمث ِتَانِمْؤُمْلا ُُمتْحََكن َاذِإ اوُنَمآ َنيِذﱠلا ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت َنأ ِلْبَق  اَهَنوﱡَدتَْعت ٍةﱠدِع ْنِم ﱠنِهْيَلَع ْمَُكل اَمَف
 ًﻼيِمَج اًحاَرَس ﱠنُهوُح ِّرَسَو ﱠنُهوُِّعتََمف﴾  ةيآ49] بازحﻷا ةروس ،Q. 33:49[ 
4 
﴿ ن ِّم ٍَةبَقَر ُريِرَْحتَف اوُلاَق اَمِل َنوُدُوعَي ﱠُمث ْمِِهئاَِّسن نِم َنوُرِهاَظُي َنيِذﱠلاَو اﱠساََمتَي َنأ ِلْبَق ُ ﱠဃَو ِهِب َنوُظَعُوت ْمُكَِلذ 
 نِم ِنْيَعِبَاَتتُم ِنْيَرْهَش ُماَيِصَف ْدِجَي ْمﱠل نَمَف ۝ ٌريِبَخ َنُولَمَْعت اَِمب َنأ ِلْبَقا ﱠساََمتَي  ِْطَإف ْعَِطتْسَي ْمﱠل نَمَف َنيِّتِس ُماَع
 ٌميَِلأ ٌباَذَع َنيِرِفاَكْلِلَو ِ ﱠဃ ُدُودُح َكِْلتَو ِهِلوُسَرَو ِ ﱠ๡اِب اوُنِمُْؤتِل َكَِلذ ًانيِكْسِم﴾  ةيآ3-4ةلداجملا ةروس ، ]Q. 
58:3-4[  
 
5 
The first two āyah extracts, i.e. [Q. 3:47] and [Q. 19:20], show Mary’s astonishment when 
she was told by one of God’s angels that she was going to get pregnant with a boy called 
Jesus. Obviously, Mary was astounded to hear this news especially given that she had 
never got married and neither had she slept with any man in her entire life. That is to say, 
Mary had never experienced any type of intercourse, and since pregnancy normally 
occurs only through intercourse, she questioned, in an astonished way, how she got 
pregnant while she was still a virgin. 
As for the third extract, [Q. 2:236-237], it discusses an issue related to one of the woman’s 
rights after divorce. It elucidates what the bridegroom owes his bride if the divorce occurs 
before they have slept together, i.e. copulating with each other, in terms of mahr (Islamic 
dowry or bridal gift)57. The difference between the two is whether the amount of mahr 
has been decided on or not before copulation. For instance, if a man and woman get 
married legally (obtain a contract of marriage) and they have agreed on a specific mahr, 
then decide not to go through the marriage and get a divorce before they copulate (have 
intercourse) with each other, the bride is entitled to half the mahr. On the other hand, if 
they have not agreed on a specific mahr then the groom shall grant the bride whatever he 
considers is acceptable depending on his capability. However, the key issue here is 
whether they had sexual intercourse or not. That is because if they did have sexual 
intercourse it would affect the adjudication according to the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
The fourth extract, [Q. 33:49], is also pertinent to the adjudication of divorce in general 
and to the previous extract in particular. As we pointed out in the previous extract, 
copulation is the key factor and it would affect the adjudication according to the principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence, namely the ᶜiddah of the woman58. Accordingly, this āyah 
                                                
57 Mahr or “bridal gift” is “the gift which the bridegroom has to give to the bride when the contract of 
marriage is made and which becomes the property of the wife” (Bosworth, et al., 1991, p. 78) 
58 ᶜIddat al-marʾah is “[t]he days of menstruation of a woman, which she numbers, when she has been 
divorced, or when her husband has died; [until expiration of which she may not marry again; the period 
being; in case of a divorced woman, not pregnant, that of three menstruations]; or [in case of a pregnant 
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extract explains that there is no ᶜiddah for a divorced woman if no sexual intercourse was 
performed between the husband and wife. 
Again the fifth extract, [Q. 58:3-4] is related to the adjudication of divorce. During the 
pre-Islamic period, some men who wanted to divorce their wives used to liken their wives 
to their mothers by saying the following: ‘you are to me as the back of my mother’ which 
is called ẓihār (Lane, 1968, p. 1927; see ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2770). That is to say, “the 
man who uttered this sentence estranged himself from his wife” (Lane, 1968, p. 1927). 
According to the Qur’anic exegetes, a woman came to the Prophet Muhammad and 
complained to him that her husband said to her the aforementioned sentence and the 
Prophet said to her that she was no longer marriageable to him. The discussion between 
the woman and the Prophet went on and the Prophet insisted that she was unmarriageable 
to her husband anymore, so she forwarded her complaint to God to seek help to resolve 
the situation. On account of this, sūrat al-Mujādilah was revealed and presented a solution 
for ẓihār. The solution states that if a man utters ẓihār and then decides to go back on it, 
he should pay kaffārah (atonement) before he is allowed to return to his wife and perform 
copulation. The atonement required by the husband is to free a slave, or if one cannot do 
that then he should fast for two months continuously, and if he also cannot do that, then 
he is required to feed 60 persons who are poor before the couple are allowed to perform 
intercourse. 
Based on the above, and according to the exegetes, the expressions  ٌرَشَب يِنْسَسَْمي ْمَل (no person 
has touched me),  ﱡنُهوﱡسََمت ْمَل اَم (you have not yet touched them),  ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت َنأ ِلْبَق (before you 
touch them), and اﱠساََمتَي َنأ ِﻞَْبق (before they touch each other) are kināyah expressions for 
sexual intercourse (ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 
92-95; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 1044). 
Consequently, the word ‘massa’ (to touch; to feel) and some of its derivatives are used as 
a kināyah for sexual intercourse (Lane, 1968, p. 2711; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4201) and it 
is considered a synonym of the word ‘lams’. The use of both words as a kināyah for sexual 
intercourse is obvious and logical in Qur’anic discourse since touching is unavoidable in 
intercourse.  
                                                
woman] the days of her pregnancy; or [in case of a widow not pregnant] four months and ten nights: or  
the woman’s waiting the prescribed time after divorce, or after the death of her husband, until she may 
marry again” (Lane, 1968, p. 1970; see ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2834). 
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Kināyah 21 
Kināyah 20: ةأرملاب لوخدلا in [Q. 4:23] 
﴿ ا ُتاََنبَو َِخْﻷا ُتاَنَبَو ْمُُكتَﻻاَخَو ْمُُكتا ﱠمَعَو ْمُُكتاَوََخأَو ْمُُكتاَنَبَو ْمُُكتاَه ﱠُمأ ْمُكْيَلَع ْتَم ِّرُح َُكنْعَضَْرأ يِت ﱠﻼلا ُمُُكتاَه ﱠُمأَو ِتُْخْﻷ ْم
 ﱠﻼلا ُمُُكبِئاَبَرَو ْمُِكئاَسِن ُتاَه ﱠُمأَو ِةَعاَض ﱠرلا َن ِّم مُُكتاَوََخأَو يِت ﱠﻼلا ُمُكِئاَسِّن ن ِّم مُكِروُجُح يِف ِيت ﱠنِهِب ُمتْلَخَد  ﱠل ِنإَف اوُنوَُكت ْم
 ﱠنِِهب ُمتْلَخَد  ﱠِﻻإ ِنَْيتُْخْﻷا َنَْيب اوُعَمَْجت َنأَو ْمُكِبَﻼَْصأ ْنِم َنيِذﱠلا ُمُكِئاَنَْبأ ُﻞِئَﻼَحَو ْمُكَْيلَع َحاَنُج َﻼَف ِإ ۗ َفَلَس ْدَق اَم َ ﱠဃ ﱠن 
اًميِح ﱠر اًرُوفَغ َناَك ﴾  ةيآ23 ءاسنلا ةروس ،]Q. 4:23[ 
This āyah pertains to the marriage law in Islam. It sheds light on the women whom men 
are forbidden to marry due to parentage, kinship, affinity, and relations the like, such as 
mothers, stepmothers, sisters, stepsisters, aunts, daughters, stepdaughters, daughters’ in-
law, nieces, and so on. The kināyah expression stated in this āyah is  ﱠنِهِب ُمتْلََخد (lit. you 
entered in to them) and it is to indicate having ‘sexual intercourse’ with the women you 
have married (al-Ḥayānī, 2014, p. 96). Generally, the phrasal verb  ِـب ﻞخد (to enter into …), 
used with a female object, indicates the meaning of sexual intercourse as in هتجوزب ﻞخد (he 
entered in to his wife) or ةأرمإب ﻞخد (he entered in to a woman). 
As we mentioned earlier, this āyah pertains to judgments related to laws of marriage; 
therefore, there is no room for misinterpretation. Yet, some scholars suggest that  ُمُكِئاَسِّن
 ﱠنِهِب ُمتْلَخَد يِت ﱠﻼلا indicates marriage; others say that it refers to disrobing and not necessarily 
having intercourse. Lexicons provide various meanings. For instance, Mujammaᶜ al-
Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah say it means becoming alone with them in a married state (1989, p. 
396). Mustafa et al. indicate that when ﻞخد collocates with ‘bride’ (سورعلاب) as in  ﻞخد
سورعلاب it refers to being alone with her (2004, p. 275). ᶜUmar provides two meanings: he 
was alone with her and he got married to her and had sexual intercourse (2008, p. 727). 
Badawi and Abdel Haleem believe it means to consummate marriage (2008, p. 301). 
Lane, on the other hand, provides a detailed explanation that supports the view هأرمإب لوخدلا 
refers to the sense of performing intercourse: 
 […  ِهْيَلَع َﻞََخد He came in upon him: and also he came upon him: i.e. invaded 
him.] And  ِهِتأَرْماِب َﻞَخَد, and اَهْيَلَع … [like  ِهِلْهِأب َﻞَخَد and اَهْيَلَع i.e. He went into his 
wife or woman,] is a metonymically [sic] phrase, denoting عاَمِجلا, ءْطَولا, 
whether it be such as is allowed by the law or such as is forbidden, generally 
such as is lawful [see what is said in explanation of the term  ٌةَوْلُخ …] (1968, 
p. 858). 
In his explanation of  ٌةَوْلُخ, Lane provides the following: 
And one says,  ِهِتَجْوَزِب َﻼَخ, inf. n.  ٌةَوْلَخ He was, or became, alone with his wife: 
but [properly speaking, according to the law,] the term  ٌةَوْلَخ [or ةَحيِحَص ٌةَوْلَخ, in 
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this case] is not used unless it be with the enjoyment of ةَذَخاَفُملا, and then it has 
the effect upon the circumstances of the marriage [by its rendering obligatory 
the payment of the dowry, though consummation has not taken place]: if with 
consummation, the act is termed لوُخُد” (ibid, p. 803, author’s italics, my 
boldness)  
Al-Ḥayāni (2014, p. 97) asserts  ﱠنِهِب ُمتْلََخد is clearly a kināyah for sexual intercourse, but at 
the same time the sense of لوخدلا (entering/going in) in this expression holds both the 
canonical (basic non-figurative) meaning and the figurative meaning. The true meaning 
is in ‘entering/going into’ which, according to al-Ḥayāni, refers to ‘going into bed with 
your wife’, which leads to the figurative meaning ‘having sexual intercourse’. In other 
words, the canonical meaning here is a medium to reach the intended meaning. (ibid.).  
Nonetheless, those who suggest that لخد refers to marriage and not ‘sexual intercourse’ 
should take into consideration [Q. 2: 236-237], [Q. 33: 49], and [Q. 58: 3-4] (discussed 
in the previous kināyah), which shows the importance of ‘having sexual intercourse’ in 
decisions related to the state of marriage. As a whole, the majority of exegetes (see ar-
Rāzī , 1981; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; az-Zamakhsharī, 
1998a; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998), however, agree that ةأرملاب لوخدلا indicates ‘having sexual 
intercourse’. 
Kināyah 22 
Kināyah 22: ةأرملا ﻰلإ ﻰَضفأ in [Q. 4:21] 
﴿  َأ ۚ ًائْيَش ُهْنِم اُوذُْخَأت ََﻼف اًراَطنِق ﱠنُهاَدْحِإ ُْمتَْيتآَو ٍجْوَز َناَك ﱠم ٍجْوَز َلَادْبِتْسا ُمﱡتدََرأ ْنِإَو۞ اًنيِب ﱡم اًْمثِإَو اًنَاتُْهب ُهَنُوذُْخَأت 
 ْدَقَو َُهنُوذُْخَأت َفْيَكَو ٍﺾْعَب َٰﻰلِإ ْمُكُضْعَب ٰﻰَضَْفأ  ِّم مُكنِم َْنذََخأَواًظيِلَغ ًاقَاﺜي ﴾  ةيآ20-21 ءاسنلا ةروس ، [Q. 4:20-
21] 
The above āyahs makes clear that no man has the right to take back from his wife the 
mahr or any wealth given if he chooses to divorce her and marry another woman unless 
she has committed an evident act of adultery with substantiation. Without such a shameful 
act, the husband has no justification to claim the mahr, specifically after intimacy and 
sexual relations between the couple, not to mention the covenant between the two. 
The sexual relation is expressed through  ْدَق ٰﻰَضَْفأ  ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُﻀَْعب  (lit. trans.: you have 
[already] came to be in the space of one another). Linguistically, the word ﻰَﻀَْفأ is derived 
from the word اﻀف, which is ‘a spacious empty space or place’ (Lane, 1968, p. 2414; ibn 
Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 3430-3431). However, when the verb ﻰَﻀَْفأ is connected to the 
preposition ﻰلإ (to) it means ‘to reach’ as in نﻼف ﻰلإ نﻼف ﻰﻀفأ (X reached Y), which 
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originally means that X came to be in the sight, place, or quarter of Y (ibid.). Additionally, 
if X is considered as a male person and Y as a female person that means that X secluded 
himself with Y, that is to say, he came to be alone with her in a private place. This sense 
suggests that X had some sort of skin-to-skin contact with Y in private, which implies 
sexual intercourse, as in هتأرما ﻰلإ ﻞجرلا ﻰﻀفأ (he copulated with his wife) (ibid.; Farid, 
2006, pp. 656-657). In virtue of this construal, the great majority of exegetes believe that 
‘ ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُﻀَْعب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ’ is a kināyah for sexual intercourse (see Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; 
aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; ibn Kathīr, 200; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; 
ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002). Therefore, some dictionaries give the same sense (cf. ibn Manẓūrr, 
1980, p. 3430; Penrice, 1991, p. 111; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 1720; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 
2008, p. 716). In spite of the unanimous agreement above that the expression is a kināyah 
for intercourse, ar-Rāzī (1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), Riḍā (1947), al-Alūsī (1994), ibn al-
Jawzī (2002) and others point out that there are some clerics who relate it only to 
‘seclusion’ (ةولخ), irrespective of whether sexual intercourse occurs or not. Still, they 
assert that it is a kināyah for sexual intercourse. 
Ar-Rāzī  provides a convincing argument as to why  ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُﻀَْعب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ is not ةولخ but a 
kināyah for intercourse. He claims that ةأرملا ﻰلا ﻞجرلا ءاﻀفإ means that the man came to be 
in the quarter of that woman or her lap, which, in reality, only happens during sexual 
intercourse. Additionally, ar-Rāzī  explains that the preposition ﻰلإ after the word ءاﻀفإ 
interprets an action that is done and finished, while in a mere ةولخ there is no action 
completed from one person to another (cf. Lane 1968, p. 2414). Ar-Rāzī  also clarifies 
that the phrase ﻰلإ ءاﻀفﻻا is stated in an admonitory manner within an exclamatory 
sentence ( ٍضَْعب ٰﻰَِلإ ْمُكُﻀَْعب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ ْدَقَو َُهنُوذُْخَأت َفْيَكَو). He believes that intercourse is one of the 
signs that reflects a strong bond and affection between a husband and wife, which would 
not occur in a mere khalwah; hence the censure and exclamation regarding those men 
who dare take back what they have given after this intimate relationship. Therefore, ar-
Rāzī  affirms that this is a kināyah for sexual intercourse. 
Al-Alūsī makes a similar argument. He explicates that the Arabs tend to state implicitly 
any words that are rude, shameful, taboo, or socially unacceptable, such as those referring 
to sexual intercourse, i.e. they express such notions through kināyah. Accordingly, he 
believes there is nothing wrong with khalwah (ةولخ), hence no need to express it through 
a kināyah. That is to say, people are not abashed by uttering khalwah explicitly, while on 
the contrary they would be in relation to sexual intercourse. Therefore, al-Alūsī believes 
that there is no doubt that  ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَِلإ ْمُكُﻀْعَب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ is a kināyah for sexual intercourse. 
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Al-Ḥayānī (2014, pp. 86-87) also agrees that  ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُﻀَْعب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ is a kināyah for 
intercourse without question. However, al-Ḥayānī points out that sexual intercourse is not 
the only sense conveyed through this figurative expression. He argues that the act of 
intercourse conveyed here is mutual. In addition to this mutuality, the image of intimacy, 
affection, and passion, which is gained through marital companionship, is conveyed too. 
On the other hand, these images of marital companionship do not exist in a mere khalwah, 
which demonstrates that the expression is a kināyah for intercourse, especially given that 
the context is related to divorce. As a result, the āyah expresses censure of those men who 
decide, after all this companionship, to slander their wives in order to take back the mahr 
or any wealth given to them. 
Kināyah 23 and 24 
Kināyah 23:  زوشنلا)جوزلا/ةجوزلا(  in [Q.4:34] and [Q.4:128] 
Kināyah 24: عجضملا يف ةجوزلا رجه in [Q.4:34] 
﴿ۚ ْمِهِلاَوَْمأ ْنِم اوُقَفَنأ اَمِبَو ٍضْعَب َٰﻰلَع ْمُهَﻀَْعب ُ ﱠဃ َﻞﱠﻀَف اَِمب ِءاَسِّنلا َﻰلَع َنوُما ﱠوَق ُلاَج ِّرلا  ِنَاق ُتاَحِلا ﱠصلاَف ٌتَات
 َنوُفاََخت يِت ﱠﻼلاَو ۚ ُ ﱠဃ َﻆِفَح اَِمب ِبْيَغْل ِّل ٌتاَِظفاَح ﱠُنهَزوُُشن  ﱠنُهوُظِعَف ِعِجاَضَمْلا ِيف ﱠنُهوُرُجْهاَو  ﱠنُهوُبِرْضاَو ۖ 
اًريِبَك ̒ايِلَع َناَك َ ﱠဃ ﱠنِإ ۗ ًﻼيِبَس ﱠنِهَْيلَع اُوغَْبت ََﻼف ْمُكَنْعََطأ ِْنإَف﴾  ةيآ34ءاسنلا ، ]Q.4:34[ 
 
1 
﴿ اَهِلْعَب نِم َْتفاَخ ٌَةأَرْما ِِنإَو اًزوُُشن َع َحاَنُج َﻼَف اًضاَرِْعإ َْوأ ۗ ٌرْيَخ ُحْل ﱡصلاَو ۚ اًحْلُص اَمُهَنَْيب اَحِلْصُي َنأ اَمِهْيَل
 ةيآ ﴾اًريِبَخ َنُولَمَْعت اَمِب َناَك َ ﱠဃ ﱠِنإَف اوُقﱠ َتتَو اوُنِسُْحت نِإَو ۚ ﱠحﱡشلا ُُسفَنْﻷا ِتَرِﻀُْحأَو128ءاسنلا ، ]Q.4:128[ 
2 
In general, both āyahs are related to the relationship between husband and wife. The first 
āyah, according to the exegetes, illustrates that men in the main are responsible for the 
protection and sustaining of women. This is mainly due to the general nature of men, in 
terms of physical or mental endurance and suchlike. This dominion given to men, 
however, should be used according to the Sharia. That is to say, men should not abuse 
this authority and oppress, scorn, or disparage women in any way. In return, women 
should be loyal, compliant and dutiful to their husbands as long as this does not involve 
wrongdoing in terms of the Sharia. Furthermore, they should preserve their chasteness, 
and maintain their husbands’ wealth and rights, especially during their absence. If by any 
chance, a wife becomes vainglorious, insolent, egocentric, or defiant to her husband, he, 
the husband, then should take three disciplinary measures. At first, he should advise her 
and remind her to fear God and not to disobey His directives concerning the woman’s 
obligation towards her husband. It is said that the husband should remind her of the 
Prophetic Hadith that says: “If I were to command anyone to prostrate themselves 
(ةدجس/دوجس: kneeling with both hands and forehead touching the ground) before anyone, I 
would have commanded the wife to prostrate herself before her husband, because of the 
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enormity of his right upon her” (abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; ibn Kathīr, 2000). If 
she fails to comply, then he should opt for the second step which is to avoid sleeping with 
her, i.e. having intercourse with her. If she still insists in her ill-mannered behaviour 
towards him, then he should go for the third step which permits him to strike her. The 
third step, however, should be according to the Sharia, that is to say, the striking should 
not be on the face, nor intensely, and definitely not injuring her. Ibn ᶜAbbās states that the 
striking should be via a siwāk (a small twig the size of a pencil used as a toothbrush) or 
something similar (abū Ḥayyān, 1993 ; al-Alūsī, 1994). This shows that by no means is 
the husband allowed to injure his wife. If the wife, at any stage, returns to her senses, i.e. 
stops her misbehaviour towards her husband, then he should forgive her and not take any 
advantage of the whole situation. However, the āyah following the first extract, i.e. [Q.4: 
35], demonstrates that if the couple fear that their dispute may lead to a divorce, then they 
should resort to two wise men, one from each side, to arbitrate their dispute. 
The defiance of the wife is conveyed through the kināyah expression زوشن (nashūz). 
Linguistically, زوشن is derived from the word زشن, which is more or less similar in terms 
of sense to ‘high ground’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4425), in other words, “a high, or an 
elevated, place; … high, or elevated ground; … what rises from a valley to the [adjacent] 
ground” (Lane, 1968, p. 2795). Accordingly, when a woman is depicted as زشان it means 
that she is defiant, especially with her marital obligations. That is because normally when 
a woman sees herself more elevated than her husband, in an ill-mannered way, her actions 
become vainglorious, insolent, or egocentric which leads to her to being disobedience. 
Similarly, when a man is depicted as زشان it means that he sees himself more elevated than 
his wife, hence dislikes or mistreats her and neglects to fulfil his marital responsibilities, 
such as protection and provision. Therefore, according to the exegetes, the expression of 
زوشن in the first extract is for a disobedient wife, and in the second extract is for husband 
who mistreats his wife and distances himself from his marital duties. The way that زشان is 
used as a kināyah for defiance reminds us of how طئاغلا became a kinayah for the discharge 
of urine or excrement. One is from high ground while the other from low ground. 
The other kināyah expression is  ِعِجاَﻀَمْلا ِيف ﱠنُهوُرُجْها (lit. forsake them in bed). 
Linguistically,  ُرْجَهلا is the antonym of ﻞصولا ‘to connect; to join; to unite’ (Lane, 1968, p. 
3054; Wehr, 1976, p. 1072; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4616). In other words,  ُرْجَهلا means 
“abandonment, forsaking …; avoidance, abstention” (Wehr, 1976, p. 1019). In addition, 
linguistically the word عجﻀم is “a place in which, or which, one lies upon his side [or in 
any manner, or sleeps]; … [a bed]” (Lane, 1968, p. 1770). Although the majority of the 
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exegetes agree that what is meant by forsaking a wife in bed is mostly avoiding 
intercourse, some exegetes, if not all, shed some light on other explanations made by 
some clerics. The other explanations, apart from avoiding intercourse, are as follows: 
- You should turn your back towards your defiant wife in bed; some add to this 
explanation the avoidance of copulation, and some argue that you should not 
speak with them too.  
- You should only avoid speech and it should not exceed more than three days; 
some include the avoidance of copulation 
- You should not lay down with your wife in the same bed; some even believe that 
you should abandon the room where she sleeps. 
The word رْجَه with its current diacritical marks has several meanings in the Arabic 
lexicon, a fortiori with different diacritical marks. For example, رْجُه ‘hujr’ means ‘to 
speak harshly’, and thus some clerics argue that the above expression means ‘to speak 
harshly to your defiant wife in bed’ (see abū Ḥayyān, 1993). Furthermore, one of the 
meanings of hajr with a different diacritical mark as in ر ﱡجه ‘hajjur’ is ‘to tie, or restrain’. 
Accordingly, some believe that the expression means ‘to coerce your defiant wife to have 
intercourse’ (see az-Zamakhsharī, 1998; Riḍā, 1947). Nonetheless, Riḍā (1947) argues 
that the expression is clearly a kināyah for avoiding ‘sexual intercourse’ (cf. aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 
1981; al-Alūsī 1994; az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a); al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; al-Shawkānī, 2007), 
and therefore other explanations besides this are unacceptable. He adds that any other 
punishment, such as abandoning the bed itself or the whole room, is not authorised by 
Allah and it may in fact increase the aversion or estrangement between the couple instead 
of strengthening the relationship. 
Kināyah 25 and 26 
Kināyah 25: فْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق in [Q. 37:48], [Q. 38:52], and [Q. 55:56]  
Kināyah 26: طةأرملا ثم  in [Q. 55:56] and [Q. 55:74] 
﴿  ْمَُهدنِعَو ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق  ٌنيِع ﴾  ةيآ48 ، تافاصلا[Q. 37:48] 1 
﴿  ْمَُهدنِعَو ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق  ٌباَرَْتأ  ﴾ ةيآ52ص ةروس ، ]Q. 38:52[ 2 
﴿  ﱠنِهيِف ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق  ْمَل ﱠنُْهثِمْطَي  ﱞناَج َﻻَو ْمُهَلْبَق ٌسنِإ ﴾  ةيآ56نمحرلا ةروس ، ]Q. 55:56[ 3 
﴿  ْمَل ﱠنُْهثِمْطَي  ﱞناَج َﻻَو ْمُهَلْبَق ٌسنِإ ﴾  ةيآ74 نمحرلا ةروس ،]Q. 55:74[ 4 
The above Qur’anic extracts describes one of the characters of women in heaven. Apart 
from being extremely beautiful, they are believed to be loyal, pure, and chaste. The 
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contentment, faithfulness, and modesty of these women in heaven are expressed through 
 ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق. Linguistically, the word رصاق is derived from رصق, which has several 
meanings, one of its typical meanings being ‘to shorten’, ‘to confine’, or ‘to restrain’ 
(Lane, 1968, p. 2532). As for the word فرطلا, it holds the meanings of ‘closing the eyelids 
on to each other’, ‘the movement of the eyelids while looking’ or mainly ‘sight’ (ibn 
Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2657), as well as the sense of ‘an eye’, ‘a glance’, or ‘sight of the eyes’ 
(Penrice, 1991, p. 90; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 562). However, when the two 
words collocate, they describe a person who restrains his/her sight, a trait that usually 
belongs to a person who is faithful and modest (see Lane, 1968, p. 2535; Mujammaᶜ al-
Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 706; Penrice, 1991, p. 90; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 739; 
Farid, 2006, p.696; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 760; ᶜUmar, 2008, pp. 1821-
1822;). In other words,  ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق in this context describes the women in Heaven, who, 
in spite of their outstanding beauty, do not look at anyone else besides their husbands, 
due to their faithfulness and modesty (aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; ar-Rāzī , 1981). Al-Ḥayānī (2014, 
p. 102)  argues that controlling the emotions and behaviour, of those women in heaven, 
is one of the physical characteristics of being content and modest. He believes that the 
kināyah expression in فرطلا تارصاق is an affective image of faithfulness and modesty of 
women in heaven and allows us to picture such contentedness. This visualisation is one 
of the features of kināyah that enables the addressee to picture one of the characters of 
women in heaven. 
Another quality that women of heaven are known for is their continuous virginity. The 
notion of virginity, i.e. not having had intercourse before, is conveyed through the kināyah 
expression,  ﱠنُهْﺜِمْطَي ْمَل (no one has deflowered them). According to ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 
2701), the original meaning of ثمطلا is ‘menstruation’, and sometimes it refers to ‘the 
beginning of menstruation’. He also states that ‘touching’ is one of the meaning that ثمطلا 
holds, which touching itself is an expression for sexual intercourse (cf. Badawi & Abdel 
Haleem, 2008, p. 571). Moreover, ibn Manẓūr points out that ثمطلا also signifies ‘blood 
and sexual intercourse’, i.e. intercourse with the causing of bleed, or, to put it in another 
way, sexual intercourse with a virgin, considering that the breakage of a hymen normally 
causes bleeding and deprives a woman of her virginity. This understanding is also widely 
held by some dictionaries; for instance, Penrice describes ثمط as deflowering a virgin 
(1991, p. 91). Farid states that the meaning of  ُةأرَمْلا تﺜمط is: 
The woman mensruated or menstruated for the first time (the primary 
signification being that of ‘devirgination’ i.e. coition with the causing to 
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bleed). اَهﺜَمَط: He devirginated her causing her to bleed or simply he cohabited 
with her (اَهَعَماَج) (2006, p. 526).  
Other lexicons also describe (ةأرملا) ثمط, as in  ﱞناَج َﻻَو ْمُهَلْبَق ٌسنِإ ﱠنُْهﺜِمْطَي ْمَل, as sexual 
intercourse (see Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 713; Mustafa, et al., 2004, 
p. 565; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 1414). 
Although the majority of the exegetes consider ثمطلا in this context as an expression for 
sexual intercourse with a virgin, ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002) suggests that it refers to touching. 
aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001), in his discussion, indicates that some construe ثمطلا as touching but the 
majority as sexual intercourse. However, touching, as we have seen earlier, is used as a 
kināyah for intercourse. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981) believes that  ﱠنُهْﺜِمَْطي ْمَل means ‘no one has 
touched nor had sexual intercourse with them before’, but these females are actually 
maidens. However, in his explanation, ar-Rāzī (1981) argues that the Qur’an expresses 
the act of sexual intercourse through various kināyah expressions, for example, سم (to 
touch) in [Q.2: 237], but none of them encompass the notion of ‘virginity’ that the women 
of heaven own. Therefore, he believes that the word ثمطلا in this context is not a figurative 
expression. This may be true, since the word itself is not a shameful or taboo word, and 
at the same time holds the notion of virginity. However, according to the explanations of 
[Q.56: 36], this notion of ‘virginity’ is not any typical virginity; it is an eternal virginity 
(see aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997). That is to say, in heaven, each 
time husbands approach their wives they find them in a state of virginity. 
Kināyah 27 
Kināyah 27: سفنلا نع ةدوارملا in [Q. 12:23], [Q. 12:26], [Q. 12:30], [Q. 12:32], [Q. 
12:51], [Q. 12:61], and [Q. 54:37] 
﴿  َو ُهْتَدَواَر  اَهِتْيَب ِيف َوُه يِتﱠلا ِهِسْفﱠن نَع  َغَو ََكل َتْيَه ْتَلاَقَو َباَوَْبْﻷا َِتقﱠل ...﴾  ةيآ23فسوي ةروس ، ]Q. 
12:23[ 
1 
﴿  َيِه َلَاقيِسْفﱠن نَع ِيْنتَدَواَر ...﴾  ةيآ26فسوي ةروس ،  ]Q. 12:26[ 2 
﴿  يِف ٌةَوِْسن َلاَقَوٱ ِةَنيِدَمْل ٱ ُ َةأَرْم ٱ ِزيِزَعْل  ِهِسْفﱠن نَع اَهَاتَف ُدِواَُرت ...﴾  ةيآ30 ] فسوي ةروسQ. 12:30[ 3 
﴿ ْدََقلَو ... ِهِسْفﱠن نَع ُهﱡتدَواَر ... َمَصَْعتْسَاف﴾  ةيآ32فسوي ةروس ، ]Q. 12:32[ 4 
Sūrat Yūsuf, [Q. 12] recounts the story of Prophet Yūsuf (Joseph), the son of Prophet 
Yaᶜqūb (Jacob). According to the Qur’anic exegetes, one night in his sleep, Yūsuf saw a 
vision in which eleven stars, the sun, and the moon prostrated before him, and later told 
his father about this vison. His father, Jacob, knew that his son Yūsuf would become of 
great eminence and therefore told Yūsuf not to mention this vision to his brothers. It is 
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believed that Yusuf had eleven brothers and that his father loved him more than the rest. 
His brothers were so jealous of Yūsuf that they wanted to separate him from their father 
out of spite. Some of his brothers thought of killing him, but they agreed to take him far 
away and throw him into a well. They went ahead with their plot and told their father that 
a wolf had attacked them and eaten Yūsuf. Later, a caravan of travellers on their way to 
Egypt stopped to get some water from the well and found Yusuf. They took him with 
them to Egypt and sold him as a slave to a high-ranking minister named ᶜAziz. It is 
believed that Yusuf was quite personable and exceedingly good-looking. This 
handsomeness of Yūsuf attracted the minister’s wife and drove her to try and seduce him 
into performing an immoral act with her, i.e. she fell in love with Yusuf and tried to entice 
and tempt him into having sexual intercourse with her. According to al-Jurjānī (2003, p. 
54), سفنلا نع ةدوارملا is a kināyah that expresses sexual temptation. In their explanations on 
[Q. 12:23], abū Ḥayyān (1993) and al-Alūsī (1994) believe that  ِهِسْفﱠن نَع ُْهتَدَواَر is a kināyah 
for requesting or seeking sexual intercourse through deception. Ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), 
Ṭanṭāwī (1992) and ath-Thaᶜālabī (1997) see it as a kināyah for sexual intent. The 
opinions of Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons are also similar. For example, Penrice 
states that يسفن نع ينتدوار means “[s]he desired to lie with me”. He also adds that “it means 
simply to solicit” (1991, p. 61). Farid suggests that هسفن نع هتدوار means “[s]he desired or 
sought of him a sinful act against his will, using blandishment or artifice for that purpose 
against his will, or she induced or tempted him to do the sinful act against his will; she 
endeavoured to entice him and to make yield to her gainst [sic] his will” (2006, p. 249). 
Ibn Manẓūr (1980, p. 1774), Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah (1989, p. 521), Mustafa, 
et al. (2004, p. 381), and ᶜUmar (2008, p. 958) all suggest that it holds the sense of 
requesting sexual intercourse through temptation, apart from Mustafa et al. who just say 
that it is a request for intercourse. Lane provides the following senses:  
هسفن نع هتدوار [in the Ḳur xii. 23] She desired, or sought, of him, copulation,  
or his lieing with her, using blandishment, or artifice, for that purpose; she 
tempted himto lie with her [more literally, she endeavoured to turn him, by 
blandishment, or deceitful arts, from his disdain, or disdainful incompliance, 
and to make him yeild himself to her:] and اهسفن نع اهدوار he desired, or sought, 
of her, copulation (1968, p. 1184, author’s italics).  
We need to bear in mind that سفنلا نع ةدوارملا is not always used in the sense of seeking 
sexual desire through temptation. It can also be used in the sense of ‘to endeavour’ or ‘to 
 -187- 
persuade’ someone to do something by blandishment, deceitful, or artifice manner as 
Lane explained and similar to its usage use in [Q. 12:61]59, and [Q. 54:37]60. 
Linguistically, the root of the word  َدََوار is دور, which means ‘to ask/to want’ (ibn Manẓūr, 
1980, p. 1771). Ar-Rāzī  (1981) points out that ةدارﻹا, a derivative of دور, is a near 
synonym for ةبلاطملا (asking someone to do something). Ar-Rāzī , in his comments on [Q. 
12:23], illustrates that ةبلاطملا is used when asking for tangible items, as in  ًارمع دمحم بلاط
مهاردلاب (Muhammad asked Omar for the Dirhams), whereas هدوارملا is only used for an act, 
as in هدعاسملا نع هدوار (he asked him to help); the former uses the preposition ‘ـب’ while the 
latter uses the preposition ‘نع’. Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah (1989: 521-522) 
shows that رءيشلا ﻰلع هدوا  means ‘he asked him to do something’, and that رع هدوان ءيشلا  
means ‘he endeavoured in asking’ with the sense of ‘luring’, that is to say, through 
blandishment or deceitfulness. To be clearer, if هدوارملا is between a male and female and 
vice versa then ‘coaxingly request’ usually refers to seduction, i.e. persuading someone 
to have sexual intercourse; otherwise it only means ‘coaxing’ or ‘to endeavour by 
blandishment’. 
Kināyah 28 
Kināyah 28: ﻆفح/جرفلا نصح  in [Q. 21:91], [Q. 66:12], [Q. 23:5], [Q. 70:29], and [Q. 
24:30-31] 
﴿  َوٱ ۤيِتﱠل اَهَجَْرف ْتَنَصَْحأ  َو اَهاَنَْلعَجَو اَنِحو ﱡر نِم اَهيِف اَنْخَفَنَفٱآَهَنْب  َنيَِملاَعْل ِّل ًةَيآ﴾  ةيآ91ءايبنﻷا ، ]Q. 
21:91[ 
1 
﴿  َمَيْرَمَوٱ ََتنْب  َناَرْمِعٱ ۤيِتﱠل اَهَجَْرف ْتَنَصَْحأ ...﴾  ةيآ66 ، ميرحتلا ]Q. 66:12[ 2 
﴿  َوٱ َنيِذﱠل  ْمُه۞َنوُِظفاَح ْمِهِجوُرُفِل ... ْمِهِجاَوَْزأ ٰﻰَلَع ﱠﻻِإ﴾  ةيآ5نونمؤملا ، ]Q. 23:5[ /  ةيآ29 ،
جراعملا ةروس ]Q. 70:29[ 
3 
﴿  ْمِهِراَصَْبأ ْنِم ْاو ﱡُﻀغَي َنيِنِمْؤُمْل ِّل ُْﻞق ْمُهَجوُُرف ْاوُظَفْحَيَو  َنْﻀُﻀْغَي ِتاَنِمْؤُمْل ِّل ﻞُقَو ۞...ْمَُهل ٰﻰَكَْزأ َكِلٰذ
 ﱠنِهِراَصَْبأ ْنِم ﱠنُهَجوُرُف َنَْظفْحَيَو ...﴾  تايﻵا30-31رونلا ةروس ،  ]Q. 24:30-31[ 
4 
﴿... َوٱ َنيِظِفاَحْل  ُف َو ْمُهَجوُرٱ ِتاَظـِفاَحْل  َوٱ َنيِرـِكاﱠذل ٱ َ ﱠ๡  َو ًاريِﺜَكٱ ِتاَرِكاﱠذل  ﱠدََعأٱ ُ ﱠ๡  ً اميِظَع ًارَْجأَو ًةَرِفْغ ﱠم مَُهل﴾ 
 ةيآ35بازحﻷا ، ]Q. 33:35[ 
5 
Linguistically, the word جْرف (plural: جوُرُف) originally refers to a slit, cleave, orifice, or 
opening between two things (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 3370). Accordingly, it is used 
euphemistically as a kināyah for the private parts for both male and female. However, 
though the word جْرف is actually a kināyah, most people would not even notice that due to 
                                                
59 ﴾َنُولِعاَفَل اﱠنِإَو ُهَاَبأ ُهْنَع ُدِواَُرنَس اُولَاق﴿ 
60 ﴾ْمُهَنُيَْعأ َانْسَمََطف ِهِفْيَض نَع ُهُودَواَر ْدَقَلَو﴿ 
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its common use in everyday language (see al-Alūsī, 1994 regarding [Q. 21:91] and [Q. 
66: 12]). That is to say, جْرف has become a conventional kināyah (lexicalised) for the 
private parts in general, and the female’s vulva in particular. 
The word جْرف, together with its plural form جوُُرف, as a kināyah for the private parts, occur 
in the Qur’an seven times. However, the kināyah جْرف or its plural form جوُُرف transforms 
into another kināyah for chastity or restraining from carnal desires whenever it is 
collocated with words referring to preservation, maintaining, or keeping, such as ﻆْفح or 
 َنُصَح. For example, in [Q.21: 91] and [Q.66: 12] the expression اَهَجْرَف َْتنَصَْحأ refers to the 
fact that Mary preserved or guarded her chastity; in [Q. 23: 5] and [Q. 70: 29] the 
expression  َنوُِظفاَح ْمِهِجوُُرفِل indicates the meaning of restraining their carnal desires or 
refraining from extramarital sexual intercourse. Concerning the exegesis of [Q. 24: 30], 
az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) points out that ibn Zayd believes that all the expressions of  ﻆفح
جرفلا (preserving the private parts) in the Qur’an are about fornication except for the one 
mentioned in [Q. 24: 30] which refers to maintaining modesty in terms of covering 
oneself. 
Kināyah 29 and 30 
Kināyah 29: دخلا ريعصت in [Q. 31:18] 
Kināyah 30:  ًاحرم يشملا in [Q. 31:18] and [Q. 17:37] 
﴿  َﻻَو ِساﱠنلِل َكﱠدَخ ْر ِّعَُصت  َﻻَو ِيف ِﺶَْمتٱ ِضَْرﻷ  ً احَرَم  ﱠِنإٱ َ ﱠ๡  ٍروَُخف ٍلَاتْخُم ﱠﻞُك ﱡبِحُي َﻻ﴾  ةيآ18، ةروس 
نامقل  [Q. 31:18] 
1 
﴿  َﻻَو ِيف ِﺶَْمتٱ ِضَْرﻷ  ًاحَرَم  َقِرَْخت نَل َكﱠنِإٱ َضَْرﻷ  َغُلَْبت نَلَوٱ َلاَبِجْل  ًﻻوُط﴾  ةيآ37 ءارسﻹا ،]Q. 
17:37[ 
2 
The above excerpts from the Qur’an clearly condemn the act of being disdainful and 
arrogance. This inadmissible act is depicted through a physical behaviour that usually 
emanates from persons with this character, which is turning their face away from people 
or putting on a contemptuous mien while someone is talking to them. Not only that, but 
this movement of the face or the contemptuous mien is compared to a disease known as 
torticollis that some camels may be affected with (al-Ḥayānī, 2014, p. 176). It is believed 
that when this disease strikes the neck of a camel it causes obliqueness in the camel’s 
face, i.e. the head becomes persistently turned to one side (cf. ibn Manẓūr, 1980, pp. 2447-
2448; Lane, p. 1689). Therefore, the expression of هّدخ ّرعص as in  ِساﱠنلِل َكﱠدَخ ْر ِّعَُصت َﻻَو [lit. 
and do not bend your cheek] is used to censure such an abhorrent act which is considered 
that of a social pariah (cf. ibn ᶜĀshūr 1984). 
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The act of being disdainful, arrogant, and conceited is depicted through another physical 
movement,  ًاحرم ضرﻻا يف يشملا [lit. walking on earth exultantly]. What is meant by 
walking exultantly is actually strutting/swaggering, i.e. striding or swinging the shoulders 
while walking in a way that shows self-importance or arrogance. Such a walk or manner 
usually comes from a person who is very confident or conceited. In general, these 
behaviours are unacceptable; therefore, Islamic precepts and mores censure such attitudes 
completely and on the other hand encourage humbleness and modesty (see ibn Kathīr, 
2000). That is evident in both the Qur’an61 and the Sunna of the Prophet. 
Kināyah 31 
Kināyah 31: ﻰنﺛ فْطِعلا  in [Q. 22:9] 
﴿ ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاﺛ  ةيﻵا ﴾ِقيِرَحْلا َبَاذَع ِةَمَايِقْلا َمْوَي ُهُقيُِذنَو ٌيْزِخ اَيْنﱡدلا يِف َُهل ِ ﱠဃ ِﻞِيبَس نَع ﱠﻞُِﻀيِل9 ،جحلا ]Q. 
22:9[ 
The trait of vanity and arrogance is once again depicted but this time through the kināyah 
expression  ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاث (lit. turning his side) (Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; al-Alūsī, 1994; 
al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 179-180). In [Q. 22:9], the kināyah phrase  ِنَاث ِهِفْطِع َي  refers to that 
person who arrogantly disputes monotheism, i.e. the unity of Allah, without even any 
rational cognizance, logical facts, or a Holy Book from God to demonstrate his pretext. 
The aim of his pretext, which is based on ignorance, is to mislead others so that they can 
go astray from the Path of Allah. His arrogant action or posture by turning away and 
disregarding the facts of Allah’s unity is conveyed through the kināyah phrase  ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاث.  
Linguistically, one of the common meanings of ﻰنث is ‘to bend’, ‘to turn’ ‘to turn away’ 
(Lane, 1968, p. 356). As for the word  ُفْطِعلا, one of its basic meanings is ‘the side’ or “the 
side of a human being, from the head to the hip” (ibid., p. 2080; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 
2997). As a result, the literal meaning of  ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاث would be ‘turning his side (away)’, 
which, according to the majority of exegetes, is a body gesture of vanity and arrogance. 
Ar-Rāzī  (1981), ath-Thaᶜālabī (1997), and az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) point out that  ﻰنث
فطِعلا is similar to دخلا ريعصت and ديجلا ّيل (ديجلا is the neck) in terms of their intended 
meaning (cf. al-Bayḍāwī, 1998). To put it in another way, they are all gestures or, to be 
more accurate, kināyah expressions for vanity and arrogance. 
Although exegetes highlight other explanations, they all lead to the same meaning, which 
is vanity and arrogance. The difference between these explanations is related to which 
                                                
61 For example, ﴾ريِمَحْلٱ ُتْوََصل  ِتاَوَْصﻷٱ َرَكَنأ ﱠنِإ َِكتْوَص نِم  ْضُﻀْغٱ َو َكِيْشَم يِف  ْدِصْقٱ َو﴿ [Q. 31:19] 
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part of the body that is twisted or turned away. For example, some, such as ibn Zayd, 
believe that the phrase  ِهِفْطِع َِينَاث used in the āyah means the person arrogantly refused to 
accept the facts of Allah’s unity by turning his head away (cited in aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001). 
Others, such as Mujāhid and Qutādah, believe it is by twisting the neck away (cited in 
abū Ḥayyān, 1993; ībn Kathīr, 2000; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 2002). Another 
difference is that some believe it is a kināyah for rejection (cf. al-Qurṭabī, 2006), and 
some believe it is for rejection along with vanity and arrogance. Nonetheless, the majority 
of exegetes agree that  ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاث is an expression that visualises the trait of vanity and 
arrogance. Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons also express the same view, though some 
add the sense of rejection to arrogance (cf. Lane, p. 2080; ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 2997; 
Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 209; Penrice, 1991, p. 25; Farid, 2006, p. 
578; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 101; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 149; ᶜUmar, 2008, 
p. 330). 
Kināyah 32 
Kināyah 32: بناجلاب يأنلا  
﴿ َو َضَرَْعأ ِناَسنِﻹا ﻰَلَع َانَْمعَْنأ َآذِإَو ِِهبِناَجِب َىَأناًسوَُؤي َناَك ﱡرﱠشلا ُهﱠسَم َاِذإَو﴾  ةيآ83 ءارسﻹا ،[Q. 17:83] 
The context of [Q. 17:83] displays the state of some human beings during times of well-
being and distress. There are some people, who when they are blessed or gifted by God 
with good things, such as welfare, success, or prosperity, become arrogant and start to 
abandon God and deny that such well-being is God’s blessing. What is meant by 
abandoning God is to abstain from thanking, obeying, and worshiping God, and probably 
abjuring faith in Him. Furthermore, when they fall into a state of hardship or privation 
they experience great despair. 
According to the majority of exegetes, the state of abandonment is clear in the word  َضَرَْعأ 
and that ‘بناجلاب ُىأنلا’ is to attest and visualise this abandonment (cf. al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 
181-182). Linguistically,  ُىأنلا is ‘to go far away’ or ‘to distance oneself from’, but it is 
used together with بناجلا to convey the sense of a person who rejects something and turns 
away in an arrogant manner (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4314; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 895; 
ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 2151). Some Qur’anic dictionaries also indicate that بناجلاب ُىأنلا refers to 
arrogance or haughtiness (Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 1072; Badawi & 
Abdel Haleem, 2008, p.913). The exegetes suggest that بناجلاب ُىأنلا is a kināyah for the 
trait of vanity and arrogance and it visualises that person who despises or disregards 
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God’s grace (ar-Rāzī, 1981; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 
1994; az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Qurṭabī, 2006). Moreover, ar-Rāzī  (1981), Ṭanṭāwī 
(1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), ; al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) indicate that 
بناجلاب ُىأنلا is similar to  ُفطِعلا ينث. In other words, the two kināyahs, بناجلاب ُىأنلا and  ينث
 ُفطِعلا, are synonyms. For those, who believe that بناجلاب ُىأنلا indicates only rejection and 
not arrogance should know that the word  َضَرَْعأ on its own conveys that sense. The phrase 
بناجلاب ُىأنلا shows a physical gesture or movement that is commonly done by a person who 
rejects something in an arrogant manner. 
Kināyah 33 
Kināyah 33: سأرلا ْيَل  
﴿ ِ ﱠဃ ُلوُسَر ْمَُكل ْرِفَْغتْسَي اْوَلاََعت ْمَُهل َﻞيِق َاذِإَو ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠوَل  َنوُرِبَْكتْس ﱡم مُهَو َنوﱡدُصَي ْمَُهتَْيأَرَو ﴾ ةيآ5 ةروس ،
 نوقفانملا[Q. 63:5] 
Hypocrites in Islam are those who pretend to be true believers while deep in their hearts 
they are not. Therefore, the Qur’an touches on some characteristics of the hypocrites in 
Islam and forewarns us of the dangers of those hypocrites, as in sūrat ‘The Hypocrites’. 
Āyah [Q.63:5], for example, demonstrates one of the personality traits of the hypocrites 
that proves their stubbornness and persistence in incredulity towards Islam and disbelief 
in God. This is clear in the hypocrites’ refusal to come before the Prophet and declare 
their repentance so that he can ask God to forgive them. The hypocrites’ refusal was 
associated with contempt, disdain, and presumption. This is all expressed through the 
kināyah expression  ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠَول. 
Linguistically, the word ىََول on its own means ‘to twist’ (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4107). In 
addition, the word ىَوَل together with the word سأر (head) forms a phrase that refers to the 
twisting of the head and turning away. It also means that the person twisted, i.e. shook, 
his head from side to side (ibid., p. 4108) as if he/she were saying ‘no’ with his/her head. 
However, this gesture of twisting the head from side to side is associated with a sense of 
contempt, disdain, and presumption. It is a common physical movement that is performed 
by an arrogant person, similar to the ones we mentioned earlier. Therefore, Ṭanṭāwī 
(1992) and al-Alūsī (1994), clearly state that  ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠوَل is a kināyah for turning away 
from advice with disdain and presumption (also see al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 177-178; cf. az-
Zamakhsharī, 1998a; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; ibn Kathīr, 2000). Al-Alūsī adds that some 
believe the intended meaning of  ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠوَل is its canonical (non-figurative) meaning. That 
is to say, the hypocrites actually moved their heads away but in a ridiculing manner. 
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Hence, some exegetes, such as abū Ḥayyān (1993) and ash-Shawkānī (2007) suggest that 
the expression refers to derision. Aṣ-Ṣābūnī, in his explanation, believes that it includes 
both the senses of derision and mockery. However, even if mockery was the intended 
meaning, the āyah clearly indicates that the hypocrites turned away arrogantly ( َنوﱡدُصَي
 َنوُرِبَْكتْس ﱡم مُهَو). 
To a certain extent, this kināyah is similar to the kināyah دخلا ريعصت in [Q. 31: 18] in terms 
of meaning and physical action. The difference between the two is that in سأرلا يل the 
head is twisted or turned from side to another, while in دخلا ريعصت the head is only turned 
to one side. Both kināyahs convey the sense of disdain and arrogance but the former also 
includes the sense of refusal or turning away from the truth. In addition, both meanings 
enable the addressee to visualise a personality trait of a hypocrite.  
Kināyah 34 
Kināyah 34: ﻰﱠطََمت in [Q. 75:33] 
 ِهِلَْهأ ﻰَلِإ َبََهذ ﱠُمث۞ﻰﱠلََوتَو َبﱠذَك نِكَلَو۞ٰﻰﱠلَص َﻻَو َقﱠدَص َﻼَف ﴿ﻰﱠطََمتَي تايﻵا ﴾31-33ةمايقلا ، [Q. 75:31-
33] 
The āyahs 31-33 of sūrat al-Qiyāmah reports the state of a non-believer, i.e. a person who 
denies the existence of Allah and His Prophet, and visualises how that non-believer walks 
in a self-conceited manner. Exegetes believe these āyahs were revealed in relation to abū 
Jahal who was known for his arrogance and undue pride in himself for defying the 
Prophet. According to exegetes, not only did abū Jahal deny the existence of Allah and 
the prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad, but he went on swaggering and bragging, i.e. in 
an arrogant and self-conceited manner, about his denial and defiance. This swaggering of 
abū Jahal, according to the exegetes, conveys the sense of arrogance, since this type of 
walking is a typical trait of an arrogant person.      
The original form of the word ﻰﱠطََمتَي is believed to be ططمتي. With regards to its lexical 
meaning, Lane (1968, p. 2721) states the following: “طّطمت He stretched himself: he 
walked with an elegant, and a proud, and a self-conceited, gait, with an effected inclining 
of his body from side to side, and stretching out his arms” (author’s italics). Lane adds 
that the word  َُرتْخََبتَي is a synonym for ﻰﱠطََمتَي, which means ‘to swagger’. In addition, it is 
said that the word ﻰﱠطََمتَي is derived from the word اطملا which signifies ‘the back’, “because 
he who so walks twists his back” (ibid.). We can notice that both original forms of the 
word ﻰﱠطََمتَي signify the meaning of ‘to swagger’, which reflects the personality traits of a 
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person with an arrogant and self-conceited manner (see ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 4226; 
Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 1048; Penrice, 1991, p. 139; Mustafa, et al., 
2004, p. 876; Farid, 2006, p. 755; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 2108; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, 
p. 887). As a result, the word ﻰﱠطََمتَي is regarded as a kināyah for arrogance, similar in a 
way to the kināyah expression, لا ِشْمي  ِيف ِضَْرﻷٱ  ًاحَرَم , in [Q. 31:18]. 
Kināyah 35 
Kināyah 35: سْفﱠنلا تقَهز in [Q. 9:55/85] 
﴿ َﻻَو ْمُُهلاَوَْمأ َكْبِجُْعت ََﻼف  َو اَيْنﱡدلا ِةاَيَحْلا يِف اَهِب مَُهب ِّذَعُيِل ُ ﱠဃ ُديُِري اَمﱠنِإ ۚ ْمُُهدَﻻَْوأ ْمُهُسُفَنأ َقَهَْزت َك ْمُهَونوُرِفا﴾ 
 ةيآ55ةبوتلا ةروس ،  
1 
 ُديُِري اَمﱠنِإ ْمُُهد ٰـ َلَْوأَو ْمُُهل َٰوَْمأ َكْبِجُْعت َﻻَو ﴿ٱ ُ ﱠ๡ يِف اَهِب ْمَُهب َِّذعُي َنأ ٱاَيْنﱡدل  َو ْمُهُسُفَنأ َقَهَْزت  َنوُرِف َٰك ْمُهَو﴾ يآ ة85 ،
 ةيوتلا ةروس 
2 
Death is mentioned in several parts of the Qur’an and in various ways. Sometimes death 
is mentioned literally and at times indirectly. For example, one of the expressions that 
refer to death indirectly is the kināyah  ْمُهُُسفَنأ َقَهَْزت in [Q. 9:55/85]. According to the 
exegetes, both āyahs are related to the hypocrites, and were addressed to the Prophet 
Muhammad, specifically, and to the believers, in general. The two āyahs report that we 
should not be fascinated by the wealth and luxurious life of the hypocrites. These were 
given to them as a type of enticement to punish them in this worldly existence and die 
while they are in a state of being unbelievers. The image of death is conveyed through 
the phrase  ْمُهُُسفَنأ َقَهَْزت. Ibn Manẓūr points out that linguistically the word قهز hold the 
meanings of to become null/abolished, destroyed, or to fade away (1980, p. 1879). 
Additionally, Lane (1968, p. 1262) notes that the primary meaning of قهز is to go forth, 
pass forth, or depart with difficulty. We can notice these meanings in the familiar Arabic 
proverb ﻞطابلا قهزو قحلا رهظ (the truth came out/emerged and the falsehood faded 
away/vanished) which is taken from [Q. 17:81]62. However, when the word قهز is 
collocated with سفنلا (the soul), the whole phrase holds the meaning of ‘to die/pass away’ 
(see Farid, 2006, p. 366; ᶜUmar, 2008, p. 1004; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 405). 
This is because when a person’s soul leaves or departs his/her body it means that they are 
dead. This departure of the soul could be with difficulty (Riḍā, 1947; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; al-
Alūsī, 199463; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 404) as a punishment, because naturally there is 
a difference between dying quickly and dying in pain. This interpretation is probably 
                                                
62 ءارسﻹا ةروس ،81 ةيآ ﴾ًاقوُهَز َناَك َﻞِطاَبْلا ﱠنِإ ۚ ُﻞِطاَبْلا  َقَهَزَو ﱡقَحْلا َءاَج ْﻞُقَو﴿ 
63 In their explanation respecting [Q. 9:55] 
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reasonable, since the meaning of death is expressed in various ways in the Qur’an, as we 
will see in the following three kināyah expressions. In this case, the death is visualised or 
depicted in a way that shows the suffering of the unbelievers.  
Kināyah 36 
Kināyah 36: نيَِقيْلا in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] 
﴿ َكَِيْتَأي ٰﻰﱠتَح َكﱠبَر ُْدبْعاَو  ﴾نيَِقيْلا ةيآ99  نمسرجحلا ةرو ]Q. 15:99[ 1 
﴿ اَنَاَتأ ٰﻰﱠتَح﴾ُنيَِقيْلا  ةيآ47 رثدملا ةروس نم ]Q. 74:47[ 2 
The word نيِقَيْلا (lit. the certainty/inevitable) in [Q. 15:99] and [Q.74:47] is another kināyah 
expression for death. It is logical to say that every person is eventually going to die; in 
other words, death is an absolute certainty. Therefore, it is not strange that the famous 
Islamic scholar al-Ḥasan al-Baṣarī (642-728 AD) said he had never seen an 
unquestionable certainty such as death (cited in al-Jurjānī, 1908, p. 8; al-Jurjānī, 2003, p. 
56). In view of this, نيَِقيْلا is obviously associated with death. In addition to this association, 
it is also an attribute for death. Therefore, it is considered a kināyah of an attributed ( ةيانك
ةفص نع). Through this attribute, along with the surrounding context, the addressee can 
arrive at the intended meaning, i.e. the attributed thing/person, which in this case is 
‘death’ (see abū Zalāl, 2001, p.200-201). The surrounding context, for example in [Q. 
15:97-99]64, informs us that God directed the Prophet Muhammad to praise, glory, and 
prostrate to Him, especially whenever he, i.e. the Prophet, is feeling sad or depressed. 
God also ordered the Prophet to continue worshiping Him until the absolute certainty, 
which is the inevitability of death, comes to him. Correspondingly, the surrounding 
context in [Q.74:42-47]65, acquaints us with the fact that the Companions of the Right 
(the true believers) wondered why those who are guilty of wrongdoing (culprits) are in 
Hellfire. The culprits replied that they did not perform their prayers, nor did they feed the 
destitute; they used to indulge themselves in absurd acts or discourse and they denied the 
Day of Recompense (Judgement Day). They used to perform one or all of these 
wrongdoings (az-Zamakhsharī, 1998a) until the inevitability of death came to them. So, 
to put it briefly, نيَِقيْلا is a kināyah for death since death itself is an absolute certainty (see 
ar-Rāzī, 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; ath-Thaᶜlabī, 
                                                
64 ﴾ ُنيَِقيْلٱ ََكيِْتأَي ٰﻰﱠتَح َكﱠبَر  ُْدبْعٱ َو۞َنيِدِجا ﱠسلٱ َن ِّم ْنُكَو َكِّبَر ِدْمَحِب ْح ِّبََسف۞َنوُلوَُقي اَمِب َكُرْدَص ُقيِﻀَي َكﱠَنأ َُملَْعن ْدَقَلَو﴿ 
65  ٰﻰﱠتَح۞ِني ِّدلٱ ِمَْويِب ُب ِّذَكُن اﱠنُكَو۞َنيِﻀِئآَُخلٱ َعَم ُضوَُخن اﱠنُكَو۞َنيِكْسِمْلٱ ُمِعْطُن َُكن ْمَلَو۞َنيِّلَصُمْلٱ َنِم َُكن َْمل ْاوُلاَق۞ََرقَس يِف ْمُكََكلَس اَم﴿
 َانَاَتأٱ ُنيَِقيْل﴾  
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2002)66. That is to say, death is certain to happen sooner or later (cf. ibn Manẓūr, 1980, 
p. 4964; Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 1219; Penrice, 1991, p. 165; 
Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 1066; Farid, 2006, p. 845; ᶜ Umar, 2008, p. 2516; Badawi & Abdel 
Haleem, 2008, p. 1059). 
Kināyah 37 
Kināyah 37: راز ٱ َقْلرب  in [Q. 102:2] 
﴿ ُمُكاَهَْلأٱ ٰﻰﱠتَح۞ُُرثاﱠكﱠتل  ُُمتْرُزٱ َرِباَقَمْل ﴾ تايﻵا1-2 رثاكتلا ةروس نم ]Q. 102:1-2[ 
According to the exegetes, [Q. 102:1-2] refers to those who used to compete with each 
other in issues related to worldly gain and neglected to fulfil their duties towards God. 
Some exegetes say that these issues were related to proliferation, i.e. size of population 
(abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; Az-Zamakhsharī , 1998a; aṭ-Ṭabarī, 2001; ath-
Thaᶜlabī, 2002), and some exegetes argue that the rivalry was in gaining worldly wealth 
in general (ar-Rāzī, 1981; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; ath-Thaᶜālabī, 1997; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; aṭ-
Ṭabarī, 2001). It is believed that the rivalry was between two different tribes, and that 
they used to vie in boasting with one another over the size of their population or in the 
wealth they had. This rivalry caused them to neglect their duties towards God until they 
died. That is to say, they were busy in increasing their worldly wealth and neglected their 
religious duties until each one of them was buried in the grave. 
According to the exegetes and particularly aṣ-Ṣābūnī (1981; 2009),  ُُمتْرُز ٰﻰﱠتَح َرِباَقَمْلٱ  (lit. 
until you visited the graves) is a kināyah for death (to die). Possibly the reason that death 
is expressed through visiting the graves is because the deceased stays in the grave for only 
a limited time until the Day of Judgment (ibn ᶜ Āshūr, 1984; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992). Furthermore, 
ar-Rāzī  (1981) indicates that expressions such as هربق راز (lit. he visited his grave) and 
هسمر راز (lit. he visited his grave) are commonly said about a person who dies. There are 
similar expressions in Arabic that expresses the meaning of death, such as هلجأ ناح (lit. 
His time has come) and هرمع ﷲ كاطع (lit. Allah gave you his life). These expressions are 
normally used for euphemistic reasons. However, every expression provides a different 
depiction to convey a specific meaning along with death. 
                                                
66 See their comments on [Q. 15:99]. Also see the comments on [Q. 74:47] by ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī 
1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001), and ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002). 
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Kināyah 38 
Kināyah 38: ةقانلا رقع in [Q. 7:77], [Q. 11:65], [Q. 26:157], and [Q. 91:14] 
 ﴿ ْاوُرَقَعَفٱ َةَقاﱠنل  ْمِهِّبَر ِرَْمأ ْنَع ْاَْوتَعَو  َنيِلَسْرُمْلا َنِم َتنُك نِإ اَُندَِعت اَِمب اَنِْتئا ُحِلاَص اَي اوُلاَقَو﴾  ةيآ77 ةروس ،
فارعﻷا ]Q. 7:77[ 
1 
اَهوُرَقَعَف ﴿ ...ٍماﱠَيأ ََةثََﻼث ْمُكِراَد يِف ْاوُعﱠتََمت َلَاقَف﴾ ةيآ دوه ةروس ، [Q. 11:65] 2 
﴿ اَهوُرَقَعَف  َنيِمِداَن ْاوُحَبَْصأَف﴾  ةيآ157ءارعشلا ةروس ، ]Q. 26:157[ 3 
﴿ ُهُوبﱠذََكف اَهوُرَقَعَف ...﴾  ةيآ14سمشلا ةروس ، [Q. 91:14] 5 
One of the stories of the prophets recited in the Qur’an is the story of Prophet Ṣāliḥ. In 
this story, the people of Thamūd refused to listen to the Prophet Ṣāliḥ and insisted that he 
should come up with a miracle to prove his prophecy. Accordingly, God provided them 
with a unique and wondrous she-camel. The she-camel was so unique that it is believed 
it was able to provide the whole people of Thamūd with milk. The Prophet Ṣāliḥ asked 
his people not to harm the she-camel in any way and to leave it to pasture peacefully, and 
warned them that if they did harm it, they would be punished by God. Arrogantly, some 
of the people of Thamūd decided to brush the Prophet’s warning aside and cruelly kill the 
she-camel. 
The act of killing the camel is conveyed through the kināyah expression  َةَقاﱠنلا اوُرَقَع. 
Linguistically, one of the meanings of the word رقع is to cut or wound one of the 
hamstrings, feet or legs of an animal, normally a camel, sheep, or goat just before the 
slaughtering process it to prevent the animal from running away (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 
3034). It is held that Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq, one of The Rashidun Caliphs, gave a precept to 
his army which included the prohibition of hamstringing a sheep or camel except for 
butchering for food, because such an act is considered torture. Therefore, since 
hamstringing an animal was always performed for the sake of butchering, it gradually 
became a term, or as ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984) states67, a kināyah for the act of 
slaughtering/killing, while generally it refers to the slaughtering of an animal (Lane, 1968, 
p. 2107; cf. Riḍā, 1947; ar-Rāzī , 1981; Ṭanṭāwī, 1992; abū Ḥayyān, 1993; al-Alūsī, 
1994)68. 
                                                
67 In his comments on [Q. 7:77]. 
68 In their comment on [Q. 7:77]. 
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Kināyah 39 
Kināyah 39:  ُمَْظعْلا َنَهَو in [Q. 19:4] 
﴿ ِّبَر َلاَق يِّنِإيِّنِم ُمْظَعْلا َنَهَو ̒ايِقَش ِّبَر َِكئاَُعدِب نَُكأ ْمَلَو ًابْيَش ُْسأ ﱠرلا َﻞََعتْشاَو﴾  ةيآ4 ميرم ةروس ، 
This āyah, [Q. 19:4], which includes the words of the Prophet Zachariah’s supplicant 
while invoking God, is full of figurative expressions. It contains kināyah, majāz mursal 
(Arabic synecdoche/metonymy), and istiᶜārah (Arabic metaphor). The metaphorical 
expression is ًابْيَش ُْسأ ﱠرلا َﻞََعتْشا (lit. the head is aflame with hoariness), which means that his 
hair is full of hoariness. This indicates that he has become old in age. As for the phrase 
يِّنِم ُمْظَعْلا َنَهَو يِِّنإ (my bone is weakened), it is, as a whole, a kināyah but within it there is 
a majāz mursal. All exegetes, such as ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī 
(1994), az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a), and ibn al-Jawzī (2002), agree that the intended 
meaning of  ُمَْظعْلا َنَهَو is the loss of strength, which indicates that the body has become 
weak. The exegetes (ibid.) point out that  ُمْظَعْلا (the bone) is used in its singular form to 
signify the whole body, because the plural form (ماظعلا) would only signify some of the 
bones and not the whole body. This is quite true unless ‘عيمج/ﻞك’ (all) were to precede the 
plural word ماظعلا; in this case, ماظعلا عيمج/ﻞك would signify the whole body. In view of this, 
we can notice that the word  ُمْظَعْلا, according to the semantic relationship, is one of the 
forms of majāz mursal (Arabic synecdoche/metonymy), which is a part-to-whole 
relationship (cf. Abdul-Raof, 2006, p. 225). That is to say, the bone, which is the part, 
refers to the whole, which is the body. As a result, the whole expression  ُمْظَعْلا َنَهَو ِّينِإ ِّينِم  
is a kināyah for the lack of strength and weakness (physically) (aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981, 2009, p. 
196; al-Alūsī, 1994), which together with اًبْيَش ُْسأ ﱠرلا َﻞََعتْشاَو portrays an image of a person 
who has grown too old and become weak. 
Kināyah 40 
Kināyah 40:  ُهاَنْيَع ْت ﱠضَيْبا in [Q. 12:84 ] 
﴿ َو َفُسوُي َٰﻰلَع ٰﻰَفََسأ اَي َلاَقَو ْمُهْنَع ٰﻰﱠلََوتَو ُهاَنْيَع ْت ﱠضَيْبا ميِظَك َوَُهف ِنْزُحْلا َنِم﴾  ةيآ84 فسوي ةروس نم 
Previously, we shed light upon a kināyah expression involving the colour black, and once 
more, in [Q. 12:84], we can notice another kināyah expression but this time involving the 
colour white, in  ِنْزُحْلا َنِم ُهاَنْيَع ْت ﱠﻀَيْباَو (lit. His eyes whited from grief). Ar-Rāzī (1981) 
argues that the whitening of the eyes is a kināyah for ‘weepiness’ (lachrymosity), i.e. 
crying a lot/ crying overwhelmingly, and not for blindness as some may claim. The reason 
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for these tears is clearly mentioned in the āyah, which is the suppressed grief that the 
Prophet Jacob was going through. That is to say, one of the natural results of grief, 
especially if it concerns the loss of a loved one, is the shedding of tears. If a person tries 
to subdue their grief and prevent tears from being shed, you would notice the tears welling 
up in their eyes and covering the iris of the eye, which makes the colour of the eye look 
as if it was white. The majority of exegetes, for example az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), al-
Bayḍāwī (1998), al-Qurṭabī (2006), and ash-Shawkānī (2007) agree with this 
interpretation. However, some exegetes, such ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984) and abū Ḥayyān (1993) 
consider the whitening of the eyes (نينيعلا ضاﻀيبا) as a kināyah for not being able to see, 
i.e. blindness (cf. al-Alūsī, 1994). Ibn Ashur (1984) believes that the continuance of grief 
had an effect on the brain, which caused the disruption of the nerves of the eyes and led 
to blindness. The exegetes who support this construal, for instance, abū Ḥayyān (1993), 
claim that [Q. 12:93]69 and [Q. 12:96]70 proves the Prophet Jacob was blind during his 
grief and that his eyesight returned once he realised his son, Prophet Yusuf (Joseph) was 
alive.  Some Qur’anic dictionaries and lexicons too believe that نيعلا ضاﻀيبا refers to 
blindness (see Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 173; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 
78; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 122). 
Kināyah 41 
Kināyah 41: هجولا داوس in [Q. 16:58] 
﴿  ﱠﻞَظ َٰﻰﺜُنْﻷاِب مُُهدََحأ َر ِّشُب َاذِإَوا̒دَوْسُم ُهُهْجَو  ٌميِظَك َوُهَو﴾  ةيآ58ﻞحنلا ةروس ، ]Q. 16:58[ 
Colours, such as white and black, are mentioned in several parts of the Qur’an, mostly to 
describe the state of people, the believers and non-believers (see al-Ḥayānī, 2014, pp. 
110-116). For example, in [Q. 16:58], the phrase ̒ادَوْسُم ُهُهْجَو ﱠﻞَظ (his face became blackish) 
expresses the state of the polytheists or pagans, in the pre-Islamic age, when they realise 
they have been endowed with a baby girl. Though they hideously claim that the angels 
are the daughters of God, as described in [Q. 16:57]71, they so hate being endowed with 
baby girls they will bury their daughters alive, as described in [Q. 16:59]72. Their hate 
and dejection is conveyed through the kināyah ̒ادَوْسُم ُهُهْجَو ﱠﻞَظ (ar-Rāzī, 1981; abū Ḥayyān, 
1993; al-Alūsī, 1994; al-Bayḍāwī, 1998; al-Qurṭubī, 2006; ash-Shawkānī, 2007). Ar-Rāzī 
                                                
69 [Q.12:93] فسوي ةروس ،93 ةيآ ﴾اًريَِصب ِْتَأي ﻰَِبأ ِهْجَو َٰﻰلَع ُهوُقَْلَأف َاذ ٰـ َه يِصيَِمقِب اُوبَهْذا﴿ 
70[Q. 12:96] فسوي ةروس ،96 ةيآ ﴾ ًاريَِصب ﱠَدتْرَاف ِهِهْجَو َٰﻰلَع ُهاَقَْلأ ُريَِشبْلا َءآَج َنأ ا ﱠَملَف﴿ 
71 [Q. 16:57]ﻞحنلا ةروس ،57 ةيآ ﴾َنوَُهتَْشي ا ﱠم ْمُهَلَو َُهناَحْبُس ِتَانَبْلٱ ِ ﱠ๡ِ َنوُلَعْجَيَو﴿ 
72 [Q. 16:59]ﻞحنلا ةروس ،59 ةيآ ﴾نوُمُكْحَي اَم َءآَس ََﻻأ  ِباَرﱡتلا يِف ُهﱡسَُدي َْمأ ٍنوُه َٰﻰلَع ُهُكِسُْمَيأ ِِهب َر ِّشُب اَم ِءۤوُس نِم ِمْوَقْلا َنِم ٰىَراََوتَي ﴿ 
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(1981), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and al-Alūsī (1994) demonstrate that when a person is 
blissful, the spirit of his/her heart spreads to the extremities of the body, specifically the 
face, due to the strong connection between the heart and brain, and therefore the face 
would seem shining and bright. On the other hand, in a state of an extreme sorrow or 
miserableness, that spirit is confined within the heart and the face turns yellowish and 
black, i.e. a pallid and gloomy complexion. Therefore, it is believed that one of the 
entailments or concomitants of bliss is the brightness and glitter of the face, and pallor 
and gloom is for sorrow. Hence, the use of the brightness/whiteness or gloom/blackness 
of a face as a kināyah for bliss or sorrow respectively (ibid.). In addition, white and black 
colours of the face are used in our everyday utterance in Arabic to express good and bad 
deeds. For example, the phrases كهجو ﷲ ضﱠيب (May God brightens your face) in the sense 
of May Allah bless you with joy/cheerfulness or كهجو ﷲ دّوس (May God blacken your face) 
in the sense of May Allah grant you sorrow/disgrace are said to a person in response to 
his/her good or bad deeds respectively.  
There are other āyahs where the colours of white and black are used to describe the state 
of the believers and non-believers, particularly on Judgement Day, such as [Q. 3:106-
107]73. According to some exegetes and scholars, for instance al-Bayḍāwī (1998) and al-
Ḥayānī (2014, pp. 110-113), these colours are kināyah expressions too, where white 
represents bliss and black represents sorrow (cf. Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 122). 
On Judgement Day, it is believed that every single person is going to be asked about 
his/her actions, even the slightest ones, they have done during their lifetime. On that 
account, the exegetes who support this construal, such as ath-Thaᶜlabī (2002), al-Qurṭabī 
(2006), and al-Shawkānī (2007), argue that the whiteness of the face conveys bliss due to 
the rewards a person is going to have from God in return for their obedience to Him and 
the good deeds done in their lifetime. The blackness of the face, however, conveys 
sorrow, hate, and dejection (see Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah, 1989, p. 607; Farid, 
2006, p. 420; Mustafa, et al., 2004, p. 460; Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 464) due 
to the punishment a person is going to have from God in return for their disobedience to 
Him and the bad deeds done in their lifetime. 
On the other hand, a considerable number of exegetes, such  as ar-Rāzī  (1981), ibn ᶜ Āshūr 
(1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), argue that that the 
                                                
73  ْت ﱠَﻀيْبا َنيِذﱠلا ا ﱠَمأَو۞نوُُرفَْكت ُْمتْنُك اَمِب َبَاذَعْلٱ ْاوُقو َُذف ْمُِكناَميِإ َدْعَب ُْمتْرَفَْكأ ْمُهُهوُجُو ْتﱠدَوْسٱ َنيِذﱠلٱ ا ﱠَمَأف ٌهوُجُو ﱡدَوَْستَو ٌهوُجُو ﱡَضيَْبت َمْوَي﴿
ا ﴾َنوُدِلاَخ اَهيِف ْمُه ِ ﱠဃ ِةَمْحَر يَِفف ْمُهُهوُجُو تايﻵ106-107  نارمع لآ ةروس نم  
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whiteness or blackness of the face, specifically in situations related to the afterlife and the 
Judgement Day, should be construed in their canonical, i.e. non-figurative, meaning. 
Those who support this view contend that there is no reason for a figurative construal 
because faces on Judgement Day actually acquire either a bright and shining complexion 
or a pallid and gloomy complexion. Al-Alūsī (1994) even presumes that this colouring 
affects the whole body and not only to the complexion. He adds, the faces were only 
mentioned because normally when you look at a person you look at his face, and the face 
is generally considered the noblest part of the body. Moreover, ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), 
Ṭanṭāwī (1992), al-Alūsī (1994), and az-Zamakhsharī (1998a) posit that the colouring of 
the complexion is considered a mark to distinguish the believers from the non-believers 
and culprits. This view can be justified through [Q. 39:60]74 and [Q. 55:41]75, especially 
if we take into account that one of the ways of understanding the meaning of the Qur’an 
is through the Qur’an itself. 
Kināyah 42 
Kināyah 42: قاسلا نع فشكلا in [Q. 68:42] 
﴿  َمَْوي ٍقاَس نَع ُفَشْكُي ۞َنوُعيَِطتْسَي َﻼَف ِدوُجﱡسلا ﻰَلِإ َنْوَْعدُيَو  ْمُهُر َٰصَْبأ ًةَعِش َٰخ  َنْوَعُْدي ْاُوناَك ْدَقَو ٌةﱠلِذ ْمُُهقَهَْرت
 َﻰلِإٱ ِدوُجﱡسل  َنوُمِل َٰس ْمُهَو﴾  ةيآ-4342ملقلا ةروس ، ]Q. 68:42-43[ 
According to exegetes, the above extract, [Q. 68:42-43], reveals that on Judgement Day 
everyone is asked to prostrate themselves before God. Those who had been worshiping 
Allah sincerely in the lifetime will be able to do so. The unbelievers and hypocrites, on 
the other hand, will be punished by not be able to do likewise, no matter what every effort 
they make, because they had refused to prostrate themselves to Allah in their lifetime. 
Once they realise their wrongdoings, they will feel ashamed, regretful, and depressed, 
and suffer this ignominy. 
Judgement Day, or the Day of Resurrection, is depicted throughout the Qur’an by various 
kināyah expressions. Each expression describes or visualises one of the characteristics or 
qualities of that day. For example, ةعِقاولا (lit. ‘which is coming’ or ‘the occurrence’) in 
[Q. 56:1]76 and [Q. 69:15]77 is used to depict the Day of Resurrection because it is a fact; 
                                                
74 ﴾  ٌةﱠدَوْس ﱡم مُهُهوُجُو ِ ﱠ๡ٱ َﻰلَع ْاوَُبذَك َنيِذﱠلٱ ىََرت ِةَم ٰـ َيِقْلٱ َمْوَيَو ﴿ 
75 [Q. 55:41]: ﴾ْمُه ٰـ َميِسِب َنوُمِرْجُمْلا ُفَرْعُي ﴿ 
76 [Q. 56:1-2]: ﴾ٌةَبِذاَك اَهِتَعْقَوِل َسَْيل ۞  َُةعِقاَوْلٱ َِتَعقَو َاذِإ﴿ 
77 [Q. 69:15]: ﴾ ُةَعِقاَوْلٱ َِتعَقَو ٍذِئَمَْوَيف﴿ 
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whether you like or not, this day is inevitably coming. Additionally, 78ةعراقلا, 79ةقاحلا, 
80ةيشاغلا, 81ةفزﻵا, are other kināyah expressions that allude and attest to the Day of 
Resurrection by providing one of its distinctive features for the recipient to visualise and 
conceptualise that day. The expression  َمْوَي ٍقاَس نَع ُفَشُْكي  (lit. the day the shank will be 
bared) is amongst these kināyah expressions. قاسلا نع فشكلا is an expression used to show 
how tense, nerve-wracking, and dire is that day (aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 1981, ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984; abū 
Ḥayyān, 1993; aṣ-Ṣābūnī, 2009), particularly for those who have failed to worship God 
properly and sufficiently. It is known that traditionally Arabs used to say about a person 
in dire straits: هقاس نع فشك. Apparently, it is also used in some Arabic poetry, according 
to some exegetes, to indicate the same sense (al-Alūsī, 1994; Al-Qurṭabī, 2006; cf. ar-
Rāzī , 1981; ibn ᶜĀshūr, 1984)82. This is because someone who was dealing with a 
difficult matter or was in dire states used types to bare their shanks, i.e. lift up their 
garment, to prevent themselves from being tripped over or to avoid any impediment or 
hinderance. It is through this that the phrase originated and then became a kināyah to 
express any dire straits (Al-Hayani, 2014, p. 258). Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-ᶜArabiyah 
also proposes that قاس نع فشكي is a kināyah for the matter becoming tense and ominous 
due to the gravity and magnitude of the Day of Resurrection. However, they claim that 
the sense of the phrase originated from the fact that women used to bare their shanks to 
flee a battle when it became dire (1989, p. 967; cf. Farid, 2006, p. 125). A similar phrase, 
هيدعاس نع رمش (he rolled up his sleeves), is also said today in our daily life, to indicate the 
state of someone in dire straits or about to face a diffitult issue, similarly to ‘gird (up) 
one's loins’ in English. Al-Hayani (ibid.) adds that the purpose of the usage of this kināyah 
is to amplify and stress how serious the situation will be on the Day of Resurrection. 
It is worth noting that the ignominious state of the unbelievers and hypocrites on the Day 
of Resurrection and their submission is depicted through the kināyah expression  ًَةعِش َٰخ
 ْمُهُر َٰصَْبأ (their eyes downcast). The phrase  ٌةﱠلِذ ْمُُهقَهَْرت (overwhelmed with shame and 
disgrace) illustrates the downcastness. Usually when someone has done something wrong 
and ignominious they walk with their heads down, bowed in shame. Therefore, Ṭanṭāwī 
(1992) and al-Ḥayānī (2014, p. 157) argue that  ْمُهُر َٰصَْبأ ًَةعِش َٰخ is a kināyah for shame and 
                                                
78 [Q. 101:1-3]: ﴾ ُةَعِراَقْلٱ اَم َكاَرَْدأ آَمَو ۞  ُةَعِرَاقْلٱ اَم ۞  ُةَعِراَقْلٱ﴿ 
79 [Q. 69:1-3]: ﴾ ُةﱠقاَحْلٱ اَم َكاَرَْدأ آَمَو ۞  ُةﱠقآَحْلٱ اَم ۞  ُةﱠقاَحْلٱ﴿ 
80 [Q. 88:1-2]: ﴾ٌةَعِشاَخ ٍذِئَمْوَي ٌهوُجُو ۞  َِةيِشاَغْلٱ ُثيِدَح َكَاَتأ ْﻞَه﴿ 
81 [Q. 53:57-78]: ﴾ٌةَفِشاَك  ِ ﱠ๡ٱ ِنوُد نِم اََهل َسْيَل ۞  َُةفِزﻵٱ َِتفَِزأ﴿ 
82 For example, ارّمَش ُبْرَحْلا اهقاس نع ترّمَش نإو   اهﱠﻀَع ُبرحلا هب تّﻀع نإ برحلا ﻰتف 
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disgrace. Ṭanṭāwī adds the sense of fear to shame and disgrace. In their comments on [Q. 
54:7]83, ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), abū Ḥayyān (1993), and az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a) also agree 
that it is a kināyah which portrays shame and disgrace.  
Kināyah 43 
Kināyah 43: يف طارفﻹا ﷲ بنج  in [Q. 39:56] 
﴿  اَم ٰﻰَلَع َاتَرْسَح اَي ٌسْفَن َلُوَقت َنأ ِ ﱠဃ ِبنَج ِيف ُتط ﱠَرف  َنيِرِخاﱠسلا َنِمَل ُتنُك نِإَو﴾  ةيآ56رمزلا ةروس ، ]Q. 
39:56[ 
According to [Q. 39:56], those who do not abandon their bad deeds and turn to God with 
sincere penitence will regret their undutifulness and disobedience towards God, 
specifically when His punishment suddenly befalls them. This negligence of obedience 
is expressed through the expression  ِ ﱠဃ ِبنَج يِف ُتط ﱠرَف (lit. I neglected in Allah’s side), in 
which the phrase  ِبنَج  ِ ﱠဃ  (Allah’s side) refers to the matters and obligations related to 
Allah, and hence is a kināyah for fulfilling one’s obligations or duties towards God, in 
other words, obeying God. Linguistically, the word  ُبْنَجلا or  ُبِناجلا means the side of a 
person’s body (ibn Manẓūr, 1980, p. 691). However, it is also used to indicate the area or 
direction of someone or something. For example, derivatives of ِبناَج, such as ُهَبَناج,  ٌَةبَناَجُم, 
or  ٌباَنِج, as in نﻼُف ٌَةبَناَجُم means ‘he became by/at the side of X, or close to X’ (ibid.; Lane, 
1968, p. 465). Therefore, some exegetes, for instance ash-Shawkānī (2007) and ath-
Thaᶜālabī (1997), highlight that the phrase  ِﱠဃ ِبنَج signifies attaining closeness to God or 
that which is God’s right. Other exegetes, such as az-Zamakhsharī (1998a), aṣ-Ṣābūnī 
(1981; 2009, p. 282), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-Alūsī (1994), and al-Bayḍāwī (1998), clearly 
state that  ِﱠဃ ِبنَج is a kināyah expression for obeying God. This construal seems more 
accurate because in order to gain God’s gratification or attain nearness to God, one has to 
obey Him by fulfilling what is His right, which is following Islamic law along with the 
Sunna of His Prophet. Moreover, in his comments, al-Bayḍāwī suggests the expression 
in this context is used for hyperbolical reasons, while aṣ-Ṣābūnī claims it is for elegance. 
Kināyah 44 and 45 
Kināyah 44:  ُ ﱠဃ ُمُهُمِّلَكُي َﻻ   
Kināyah 45:  ْمِهْيَِلإ ُرُظنَي َﻻ 
                                                
83 ﴾ٌرَِشتن ﱡم ٌداَرَج ْمُهﱠَنأَك  ِثَادَْجﻷٱ َنِم َنوُجُرْخَي  ْمُهُر َٰصَْبأ ًاعﱠشُخ﴿ 
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﴿ ﱠِنإ  ِةَرِخْﻵا يِف ْمَُهل َقَﻼَخ َﻻ َِكئ َٰلُوأ ًﻼيِلَق ًانََمث ْمِهِناَمَْيأَو ِ ﱠဃ ِدَْهعِب َنوَُرتْشَي َنيِذﱠلا  ُ ﱠဃ ُمُهُم ِّلَكُي َﻻَو َي َﻻَو ْمِهَْيلِإ ُرُظن
 ِةَماَيِقْلا َمَْوي ﴾... ةيآ 77نارمع لآ ، ]Q. 3:77[ 
According to the Qur’anic exegetical literature, there are several versions regarding the 
circumstances of the revelation (asbāb an-nuzūl) of [Q. 3:77]. The first is that there was 
a man named al-Ashᶜath bin Qays who went the Prophet Muhammad to complain about 
a Jewish man who had deprived him of his land. The prophet asked al-Ashᶜath if he had 
any proof and he said ‘no’, so the Prophet asked the Jewish man to swear an oath; al-
Ashᶜath said, ‘If he swears an oath then I will lose my land’. In reply, the Prophet said, 
‘He who swears an oath to acquire the property of a Muslim unjustly will meet Allah and 
He will be angry with him’, and then God revealed [Q. 3:77] (for other Hadiths respecting 
this construal see ibn Kathīr, 2000). The second version is that there was a seller who 
swore falsely to a buyer that he was selling him his merchandise at less than he originally 
bought it. A third version is that a buyer came to buy some merchandise at the end of the 
day and the seller swore falsely that earlier he had refused to sell it at the price the buyer 
asked for. Another version is related to the Jews, who altered the scripture of the Torah 
respecting the Prophet, and decided to sell their covenant with God and their oath and not 
to obey Him in believing the Prophet (abū Ḥayyān, 1993; ibn al-Jawzī, 2000). 
Accordingly, āyah [Q. 3:77] informs us that whoever performs such acts will face God’s 
wrath on the Day of Resurrection and will not gain His mercy. In other words, that person 
will not have his/her share of God’s grace in the Hereafter; neither will he/she be spoken 
to endearingly and tenderly by God, nor will he/she be looked at by God with leniency 
and mercy, because God prohibits such actions. In view of this, the phrases  ُ ﱠဃ ُمُهُمِّلَُكي َﻻ 
(God will not talk to them) and  َي َﻻ ْمِهْيَلِإ ُرُظن  ([God] will not look at them), according to 
Riḍā (1947), ar-Rāzī (1981), ibn ᶜĀshūr (1984), Ṭanṭāwī (1992), abū Ḥayyān (1993), al-
Alūsī, and az-Zamakhsharī  (1998a), are kināyah expressions to convey God’s wrath 
towards those who break His covenant and their oaths. According to ar-Rāzī (1981), this 
is definitely the intended meaning of both phrases; and we cannot construe them literally, 
because this would be contrary to what God says in [Q. 15:92-93]84 and [Q. 7:6]85. 
Additionally, we can deduce that the purpose of the kināyah in this context is to remind 
and warn people of their fate and the consequences they will face if by any chance they 
perform such acts. Moreover, this notion of ‘not talking’ or ‘not looking at’ is also used 
                                                
84 رجحلا ةروس ،93-92 تايﻵا ﴾نُولَمْعَي ُوناَك ا ﱠمَع۞نيِعَمَْجأ ْمُهﱠَنَلأْسََنل َِّكبَرََوف﴿ 
85 فارعﻷا ةروس ،6 ةيآ ﴾نيِلَسْرُمْلا ﱠَنَلأَْسنَلَو ْمِهَْيِلإ َﻞِسُْرأ َنيِذﱠلا ﱠَنَلأْسَنََلف﴿ 
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in everyday life to express anger, discontent, or disappointment because of breaking 
promises. An example of this can be seen between two spouses when one of them breaks 
the marriage vows; the reaction would very possibly be ‘I do not want to talk to you’ or 
‘I do not want to see you’ to express their anger. 
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Chapter Six: TT Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Forty-five kināyah expressions extracted from the Qur’an were analysed in the previous 
chapter, linguistically and contextually, based on several authoritative Qur’anic exegeses 
and well-known classical Arabic and Qur’anic dictionaries. This initial or first-phase 
analysis, which included a componential and contextual analysis, was important in order 
to comprehend the semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) meaning of the element(s) that 
form each kināyah expression, along with its surrounding context, which can lead to the 
precise intended meaning. This chapter, however, will descriptively and critically 
examine the renditions of the chosen forty-five kināyah expression in the TL, i.e. English, 
made by Ali (1998) [Amanah’s edition], al-Hilali and Khan (1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh 
International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005). The examination will focus, in general, 
on how these translators deal with the renditions of kināyah, whether they were able to 
convey the intended meaning and maintain its purpose (function), and whether they were 
consistent in rendering the same kināyah in the event it occurs in other parts of the Qur’an. 
Note that whenever the term ‘literal translation’ is mentioned in this TT descriptive 
analysis it is in conformity with Beekman and Callow (1974) and Larson’s (1998) 
modified literal translation. In other words, it means that “the denotative meaning of 
words is taken as if straight from the dictionary (i.e. out of context), but TL grammar is 
respected” (Dickins, et al., 2017, p. 14). It should not be confused with what Dickins, et 
al. (ibid. p. 13) refer to as interlinear translation. Additionally, what we mean by a 
semantic translation is that the translator attempts to convey what the original expression 
is trying to communicate apart from its literal meaning, that is to say, the author's intention 
in using the expression. It may involve paraphrasing or explicitly stating the intended 
meaning of the kināyah. Finally, what we mean by idiomatic translation is that the 
translator renders the original expression, whether its literal meaning or the intended 
meaning, using TL expressions that sound natural to the TT recipient. In other words, the 
recipient is familiar with these expressions. This could include expressions or idioms 
which are already established in the TC that may convey the same sense as the original 
expression does. 
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Kināyah 1 
Table 6.1: Translations of Kināyah expression 1. 
﴿ن ِّم  ٍسْفﱠن  ٍةَدِحاَو﴾  in [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6:98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6] 
Literal translation: (from one soul) Intended meaning (referent): Adam 
Purpose of use: Reminding and warning of God’s (Allah) greatness and power 
 
Ali 
[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single person … 
[Q. 6:98]: … He Who hath produced you from a single person… 
[Q. 7:189]: … He Who created you from a single person …  
[Q. 39:6]: He created you (all) from a single person … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q.4:1]: … Who created you from a single person (Adam) … 
[Q. 6:98]: …He Who has created you from a single person (Adam)… 
[Q. 7:189]: …He Who has created you from a single person (Adam)… 
[Q. 39:6]: He created you (all) from a single person (Adam) … 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from one soul … 
[Q. 6:98]: … He who produced you from one soul … 
[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you from one soul … 
[Q. 39:6]: He created you from one soul … 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 4:1]: … who created you from a single soul … 
[Q. 4:1]: … He who  ﬁrst produced you from a single soul …  
[Q. 7:189]: … He who created you all from one soul …  
[Q. 39:6]: He created you all from a single being … 
The phrase ةدحاو سفن نم, as a kināyah for Adam, occurs in four different parts in the 
Qur’an, [Q. 4:1], [Q. 6:98], [Q. 7:189], and [Q. 39:6]. None of the four translators attempt 
to render the intended meaning of the kināyah directly. Instead, they decide to render it 
almost literally, except for Saheeh International who opted for a purely literal translation. 
Abdel Haleem’s rendition also can be considered an exact literal translation (in three of 
his translations, [Q. 4: 1], [Q. 6:98], and [Q. 7:189]). To put it in another way, it appears 
that all translators were faithful to the ST, but Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem 
were too faithful. This is clearly evident if we apply a back translation (BT) to the 
renditions. For example, the BT of Saheeh International’s rendition in all four āyahs as 
well as Abdel Haleem’s in [Q. 7:189] is ةدحاو سفن نم, which is exactly as the ST. The rest 
of Abdel Haleem’s rendition seems to be the same too, though he translates the adjective 
اوةدح  as ‘single’ that holds the meaning of ‘one’, but also includes the sense of ‘only one 
and not one of several’, which is close to the intended meaning. Unlike the rest of his 
translations and without significant reason, Abdel Haleem renders the word سفن in [Q. 
39:6] as ‘being’ instead of ‘soul’, notwithstanding that both ‘soul’ and ‘being’ may refer 
to a person. 
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Both of Ali and Hilali and Khan’s translations are alike, that is, they both render the 
kināyah as ‘from a single person’ (BT: دحاو صخش نم), which is almost literal. The only 
difference between the two translators is that Hilali and Khan add the implicit intended 
meaning ‘Adam’ between brackets at the end of the phrase. This type of addition is what 
Baker and Olohan (2000) refer to as explicitation, which is “the spelling out in a target 
text of information which is only implicit in a source text”. Translation by addition is a 
typical procedure in translation in which the translator adds something to the TT that does 
not explicitly exist in the ST (Dickins, et al., 2017, p. 21; also see Pym, 2014 , p. 14). 
Hoever, we must say that there is probably no reason for not using the word ‘soul’ for 
سفن, especially given that it does in fact hold the meaning of  an individual person; besides, 
the word ‘soul’ may have a more religious connotation than ‘person’ (for details on 
denotative and connotative meanings related to Arabic-English translation, see Dickins, 
et al., 2017, pp. 73-105). It seems that Hilali and Khan’s addition is not really necessary, 
because the reader may discern that the intended person is Adam, particularly from the 
surrounding context. Most importantly, a literal translation (from one/a single soul) in 
this case is quite sufficient; not only does it convey the meaning but also the purpose of 
the kināyah as well as the rhetorical image. Let us not forget al-Jurjānī’s definition of 
kināyah: 
Kināyah is the process through which the text producer seeks to substantiate 
a specific meaning without mentioning it directly through its known 
(original/conventional) word in the language. Instead he [sic] opts for a 
meaning (word) that is ‘associated’ and adjacent to the true meaning in order 
to allude to and attest the meaning intended (al-Jurjānī, 1995, p. 66; my 
translation). 
Accordingly, if a literal translation can convey all the aspects of a kināyah, then why not 
use it? After all, Newmark asserts that a “literal translation is correct and must not be 
avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-
69). As for the consistency of the translators, it is to be noted that all of them, apart from 
Abdel Haleem, were consistent. It is also worth noting that Abdel Haleem’s inconsistency 
did not affect the intended meaning, purpose, or image of the kināyah. 
Kināyah 2 
Table 6.2: Translations of Kināyah expression 2. 
 ا ﱠَملَف﴿اَهاﱠشََغت﴾  in [Q. 7:189] 
Literal translation: (when he covered her)  
Referent: sexual intercourse Purpose of use: Euphemism 
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 Ali  ... when they are united ... 
Hilali & Khan ... when he had sexual relation with her ... 
Saheeh  International ... when he covers her* ... 
Abdel Haleem ... when one [of them] lies with his wife ... 
As pointed before, throughout Qur’anic discourse, it is quite impossible to come across a 
word or term that is culturally or socially unaccepted even when the idea expressed is 
taboo. Such expressions are always expressed euphemistically, i.e. indirectly, as in this 
context through the kināyah  َيِشَغ. The table above shows that the translators have 
attempted to render اَهاﱠشََغت differently. Ali, for example, avoids a literal translation and 
tries to render the intended meaning euphemistically. In spite of this, his rendition of  ا ﱠَمل
اَهاﱠشََغت as ‘when they are united (BT: نودحتم اونوكي امدنع/امل) seems to be quite strange. It is 
true that the word ‘unite’ could mean the joining of a person with another in marriage, 
which is rarely used, but it does not standardly convey the meaning of intercourse; neither 
do its other conventional meanings, such as joining or combining two things or persons 
to form a single entity or body (OED), carry the meaning of intercourse. 
As for al-Hilali and Khan, they too avoid a literal translation and opt for the intended 
meaning. Although their rendition, ‘when he had sexual relation with her’ (BT:  امدنع/امل
اهعم ةيسنج ةقﻼعب ماق), does in fact convey the intended meaning, it falls short in achieving 
the purpose of the kināyah used in this āyah, i.e. euphemism, because it includes the word 
‘sex’. The more standard usage in English is also ‘have sexual relations’, rather than ‘have 
sexual relation’. If there is a possibility to achieve both the intended meaning of the 
kināyah and its purpose of use then the translator(s) should go for this. For example, 
Abdel Haleem’s choice to render the kināyah as ‘lies with his wife’ (BT:  عم عجطﻀي/ددمتي
هتجوز) not only conveys the rhetorical image and intended meaning but also achieves the 
purpose of the kināyah. It is worth noting that the phrase ‘lie with’ in the sense of sexual 
intercourse is also used in Bible translations possibly for euphemistic reasons too. In some 
cases a literal rendition may be sufficient and conveys the features of a kināyah, but not 
always. This can be perceived in Saheeh International’s choice to render the kināyah 
literally, as ‘when he covers her’ (BT: اهاشغي/اهيطغي وه امل). The rendition does not tell the 
reader with what did the husband cover his wife. In other words, did the husband cover 
his wife with a blanket, sheet, or his body? That is to say, the Arabic phrase evokes the 
image of the husband lying over his wife, whereas the English phrase does not. An 
addition to the literal translation, a translation such as ‘he covered her with himself” may 
evoke this image and convey the intended meaning of the kināyah as well as its purpose. 
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Therefore, given the obscurity the expression may have, Saheeh International places a 
footnote stating that it is “[a]n allusion to sexual intercourse” to clear up any ambiguity. 
Kināyah 3 and 4. 
Table 6.3: Translations of Kināyah expressions 3 and 4. 
﴾ َراﱠنلا اوُقﱠتاَف﴿ ،﴾اوُلَعَْفت َنلَو اُولَعَْفت ْمﱠل نَِإف ﴿ in [Q. 2:24] 
Literal translation: 
1) If you do not do and you will never do. 
2) Fear the fire. 
Referent: 
1) If you do not produce/come up with a comparable sūrah and you never will. 
2) [Obey Allah and] Refrain from your pertinacity and wilfulness regarding the false 
accusations that the Qur’an is not from Allah.  
Purpose of use: Brevity 
Ali But if ye cannot- and of a surety ye cannot- then fear the Fire ...  
Hilali & Khan But if you do it not, and you can never do it, then fear the Fire (Hell) ... 
Saheeh  
International 
But if you do not - and you will never be able to - then fear the 
Fire ... 
Abdel Haleem If you cannot do this - and you never will - then beware of the Fire ... 
We must stress that in order to comprehend the two kināyah phrases, وُلَعَْفت نَلَو اوَُلعَْفت ْمﱠل ِنإ 
and اراﱠنلا اوُقﱠت  in [Q. 2:24] one must read the preceding āyah that is [Q. 2:23] (see their 
contextual analysis in the previous chapter). The main purpose of use for both kināyahs 
is brevity, which means that most of the information related to the intended meaning is 
omitted to avoid repetition, particularly in the first kināyah. That is to say, the request or 
challenge addressed to the unbelievers to come up with a similar sūrah is implicit in  ْمﱠل ِنإ
وَُلعَْفت نَلَو اوُلَعَْفت. The act of [obeying Allah by] leaving aside the pertinacity and wilfulness 
of making false accusations to avoid the fire of Hell is also implicit in اراﱠنلا اوُقﱠت . 
All translators have decided to render both kināyah phrases literally and maintain the 
purpose of the kināyah. The only significant differences between the four renditions are 
the choice of words and some slight additions. For example, Ali chooses to use some 
archaic words, such as the pronoun ‘ye’ instead of ‘you’. Hilali and Khan as well as Abdel 
Haleem add some words while translating the first kināyah, such as the pronouns ‘it’ and 
‘this’ respectively to their renditions. This addition may help the reader to comprehend 
what is meant by ‘if you do not/cannot’. In other words, these pronouns, which refer to 
the request or challenge mentioned in the previous āyah help in clarifying the conditional 
phrase and remove any ambiguity. Hilali and Khan decide to add the word ‘Hell’ between 
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brackets to explicate the meaning of fire while rendering اراﱠنلا اوُقﱠت , which, in our opinion, 
is probably unnecessarily because the recipient would understand that the fire here refers 
to Hell. 
In general, the literal translation of both kināyah expressions by the translators maintains 
the intended meaning as well as its purpose of use. That said, Abel Haleem’s rendition 
reads more easily and smoothly than the rest due to his choice of contemporary words.  
Kināyah 5 and 6 
Table 6.4: Translations of Kināyah expressions 5 and 6. 
﴿ ٌةَلوُلْغَم ِ ﱠဃ َُدي ، ﴾﴿ ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهاَدَي﴾  in [Q. 5: 64] 
﴿ َْﻞعَْجت َﻻَو ًَةلُولْغَم َكََدي  َكُِقنُع ﻰلإ َﻻَو ِطَْسبْلا ﱠلُك اَهْطُسَْبت﴾  in [Q. 17:29] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 5:64]: (Allah’s hand is shackled/tied up), (His hands are spread out) 
[Q 17:29]: (do not make your hand shackled/tied up to your neck and do not spread it/lay 
it all out) 
referent: 
ديلا ﻞغ for miserliness; ديلا طسب for generosity 
Purpose of kināyahs:  
Elegance and hyperbole 
 
Ali 
[Q. 5: 64]: (…Allah's hand* is tied up), (both His hands are widely 
outstretched) 
[Q. 17:29]: Make not thy hand tied* (like a miser's) to thy neck, nor 
stretch it forth to its utmost reach … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 5: 64]:  (…Allah's Hand is tied up (i.e. He does not give and spend 
of His Bounty)), (both His Hands are widely outstretched) 
[Q. 17:29]: let not your hand be tied (like a miser) to your neck, nor 
stretch it forth to its utmost reach (like a spendthrift) … 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 5: 64]: (... “The hand of Allah is chained”*…) , (… both His hands 
are extended …) 
[Q. 17:29]: do not make your hand [as] chained to your neck* or extend 
it completely* … 
Abdel Haleem [Q. 5: 64]: (God is tight-ﬁsted), (God’s hands are open wide) 
[Q. 17:29]: Do not be tight-ﬁsted, nor so open-handed … 
Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have attempted to render the two kināyah 
expressions ديلا ﻞغ and ديلا طسب literally, with a slight difference in choice of words made 
by the latter. This literal rendition may not convey the intended meaning of the kināyah 
nor its purpose of use. The hand being tied up and stretched out could indicate a person 
not being able to do something and being very welcoming or helpful respectively, but 
they do not connote the meaning of miserliness and generosity. It is true that literally  دم
ديلا (stretching out the hand) is a synonym of the Arabic phrase ديلا طسب but culturally they 
do not have the same implication. Therefore, Ali, in his translation of [Q. 5:64], clarifies 
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in a footnote what is meant by Allah’s hand being tied up. He also points out that ‘hands 
widely outstretched’ is a figurative expression for extreme generosity: 
… Allah’s hand are tied up. He is close-fisted. He does not give!’ This 
blasphemy is repudiated. On the contrary, boundless is Allah’s bounty, and 
He gives, as it were, with both hands outstretched – a figure of speech for 
unbounded liberality (2001, my emphasis). 
It is clear that Ali is fully aware the TL has an idiomatic epithet for miserliness, ‘close-
fisted’, yet he favoured a literal approach, which is common among scriptural translators 
(cf. Marlowe, 2012), i.e. Qur’anic or Biblical translators. Nonetheless, the procedure Ali 
chose is similar to what Beekman and Callow (1974) or Larson (1998) suggested chiefly 
when the ST gesture does not have a symbolic significance in the TL culture or has not 
been heard of before.  
Again, in his translation of [Q. 17:29], Ali places a footnote in which he compares this 
expression with the one in [Q. 5:64] in terms of the sense of miserliness. Also, in his 
comments, he clarifies that what is meant by both kināyah expressions in general is that 
one should be careful and wise while spending money; not to be a miser nor a spendthrift. 
In addition to his footnote, Ali adds between brackets the phrase ‘like a miser’ almost 
transforming the kināyah into a simile, to explain the tying of the hand. This procedure is 
again similar to what Beekman and Callow (ibid.) and Larson (ibid.) referred to.          
Hilali and Khan also adds an explanatory information between brackets while translating 
[Q. 5:64] to explain what is meant by ‘Allah’s hand is tied up’. In their translation of [Q. 
17:29] they add two comparative phrases ‘like a miser’ and ‘like a spendthrift’ to convey 
the meaning of miserliness and generosity, almost transforming the two kināyah 
expressions into a simile like Ali’s approach while rendering [Q. 17:29]. 
Saheeh International’s rendition is quite similar to that of Ali as well as Hilali and Khan’s 
in terms of being literal. The only difference is that Saheeh International chose to use ‘to 
chain’ and ‘to extend’ instead of ‘to tie up’ and ‘to stretch’ respectively. These choices of 
words also do not convey the intended meaning. Therefore, in their rendition of [Q. 5:64], 
they decided to explain in a footnote that ‘Allah’s hand is chained’ carries the implication 
of “inability to give or stinginess”. Also, while rendering [Q. 17:29], they provide 
explanations in a footnote for ‘the hand chained to the neck’ and for it ‘to be extended 
completely’. However, what is interesting about Saheeh International’s translation of [Q. 
17:29] is that they strangely add the word ‘as’ between square brackets! This addition 
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appears to be of no use; especially in this location, and although it may be intended to 
convey a comparison, the use of ‘as’ in this context is not clear in English. In other words, 
if you compare the rendition with the ST, you will notice that not only is there no Arabic 
equivalent of ‘as’ in the ST, but the location where they have placed it does not make 
sense, either as an adverb, conjunction, or preposition. 
As for Abdel Haleem’s translations, it looks like he attempts to convey the referent of 
miserliness and generosity through a target-oriented approach by using idiomatic (i.e. 
idiom-like) TL epithets. Both epithets ‘tight-fisted’ and ‘open-handed’ are commonly 
used in English to connote miserliness and generosity respectively, though their literal 
meanings do not do this. Therefore, it may be fair to say that these epithets are similar to 
the original kināyah expressions in terms of producing a rhetorical image and conveying 
the referents indirectly. In other words, the English epithets ‘tight-fisted’ and ‘open-
handed’ can be considered appropriate idiomatic equivalent expressions for ديلا ﻞغ and 
ديلا طسب. As to Abdel Haleem’s inconsistency in rendering ديلا طسب, possibly it is because 
‘open-handed’ does not convey the dual form of طسب as in ‘ ِنَاتَطوُسْبَم ُهَادَي’ which gives the 
sense of extreme generosity. Hence, he preferred to translate it as ‘hands are open wide’. 
Above all, Abdel Haleem’s choice of words is more convenient; not only it is much more 
intelligible, which meant no need for footnotes or explanations within the text, but it 
conveys the intended meaning implicitly and more or less portrays an image of 
miserliness and generosity like the original expressions does.  
Kināyah 7 and 8 
Table 6.5: Translations of kināyah expression 7. 
﴿...  َنأ ٌمْوَق ﱠمَه ْذِإ ْمُهَيِدَْيأ ْمُكْيَلِإ ْاوُطُسْبَي ﴾ْمُكنَع ْمَُهيِدَْيأ ﱠفََكف  in [Q. 5:11] 
﴿ ِنئَل َكََدي ﱠيَلِإ َتطَسَب  ْاََنأ آَم ِينَُلتَْقتِل َكَْيلِإ َيِدَي ٍطِساَبِب ﴾ََكُلتَْقﻷ  in [Q. 5:28] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 5:11]: (…when people intended/planned to stretch their hands towards you, [Allah] 
restrained their hands from you) 
[Q. 5:28]: (If stretch your hands toward me to kill me, I am not stretching my hands 
towards you to kill you) 
Referent: assault (kill) Purpose of use: Elegance 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 5:11]: … when certain men formed the design to stretch out their 
hands against you, but (Allah) held back their hands from you.  
[Q. 5:28]: If thou dost stretch thy hand against me, to slay me, it is not 
for me to stretch my hand against thee to slay thee. 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 5:11]: …when some people desired (made a plan) to stretch out their 
hands against you, but (Allah) withheld their hands from you. 
[Q. 5:28]: If you do stretch your hand against me to kill me, I shall 
never stretch my hand against you to kill you.  
 -213- 
 
Saheeh  
International 
 
[Q. 5:11]: … when a people determined to extend their hands [in 
aggression] against you, but He withheld their hands from you. 
[Q. 5:28]: If you should raise your hand against me to kill me – I shall 
not raise my hand against you to kill you. 
 
Abdel Haleem 
 
[Q. 5:11]: …when a certain people were about to raise their hands 
against you and He restrained them﴿ [Q. 5:11] 
[Q. 5:28]: If you raise your hand to kill me, I will not raise mine to kill 
you. 
The kināyah phrase ديلا طسب does not always refer to generosity as has been pointed out in 
the previous chapter. In some cases, it can be a referent for an assault as in [Q. 5:11] and 
[Q. 5:28]. As far as their translations is concerned, it seems that Ali, Hilali and Khan, and 
Saheeh International maintain the same technique they chose in translating ديلا طسب as a 
referent for generosity. That is to say, they render ديلا طسب whether it is a referent for an 
assault or generosity in a similar way, which is literal. Ali, for example, as well as Hilali 
and Khan employ the word ‘stretch’ for طسب, while Saheeh International use the word 
‘extend’ in both kināyah expressions. Saheeh International do, however, avoid a literal 
translation while rendering the preposition ﻰلإ in the kināyah phrase; they decide to 
translate it as ‘against’ instead of ‘towards/to’. It is obvious that they wanted to be faithful 
to the ST but at the same time, they wanted the recipient to understand that the act of 
stretching out the hand, in this context, is in an assaultive way and not in a helping way 
as the rendition without ‘against’ may suggest. This may be the reason why Saheeh 
International adds the prepositional phrase ‘in aggression’ between square brackets so 
that the reader would not get the wrong impression about stretching out the hand. It is, of 
course, true that the hand is used in both Arabic and English expressions to connote 
miserliness, generosity, and assault, but they are used differently. Therefore, like the 
previous kināyah, a literal translation may not connote the image of an assault as the 
Arabic phrase would, even with the addition of ‘in aggression’, particularly when the type 
of assault is not mentioned. The appropriate way to overcome such an issue is to look for 
an idiomatic TL expression that connotes a similar image and referent, assuming the 
priority is to convey the message and not something else. The renditions of Abdel Haleem 
to connote miserliness and generosity through idiomatic TL expressions, such as ‘tight-
fisted’ and ‘open-handed’ respectively are good examples, especially given that these TL 
expressions include the hand as the SL does. Strange to say, Saheeh International were 
aware of such an approach and yet they have decided not to apply it consistently. To be 
specific, Saheeh International renders  َأ ْمُكْيَِلإ ْاوُطُسَْبي ْمَُهيِدْي  in [Q. 5:11] almost literally as Ali 
and Hilali and Khan did, but in rendering the same kināyah  َكَدَي ﱠَيلِإ َتطَسَب in [Q. 5:28] they 
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opt for a target-oriented approach. They choose to use the idiomatic TL expression of 
raising one’s hand to/against that implies ‘a threat to assault’, ‘actual assault’, or ‘being 
about to assault someone’. This TL expression could be seen as the closest equivalent of 
the Arabic expression in terms of depicting the image and meaning of an assault or 
expected assault, not to mention the fact that it includes the use of the hand as the Arabic 
expression does. Besides, raising one’s hand to/against may sound more elegant than 
stretching out/extending. 
As for Abdel Haleem, once again, he applies a target-oriented approach om rendering 
 ْمُهَيِدَْيأ ْمُكْيَلِإ ْاوُطُسَْبي in [Q. 5:11] and  ََكدَي ﱠيَلِإ َتطَسَب in [Q. 5:28] rather than a literal approach. He 
too uses the TL expression of raising one’s hand to/against to signify the image and 
meaning of an assault. Though Abdel Haleem and Saheeh International use the same TL 
expression in [Q. 5:28], Abdel Haleem’s rendition may be more elegant and reads much 
more smoothly. For example, Saheeh International’s rendition (BT: ينلتقتل يدض كدي تعفر ول 
كتلتقﻷ كدض يدي عفرا نل انأ –) includes the preposition ‘against’ while the infinitive verb ‘to 
kill’ is quite sufficient. In addition, it repeats the ‘possessive determiner + hand’ (your/my 
hand) while this can be avoided by using the possessive pronoun ‘mine’. Contrariwise, 
Abdel Haleem’s rendition (BT: كلتقﻷ [يدي] يتصاخ عفرا نل انأ ،ينلتقتل كدي تعفر ول) has only the 
infinitive verb ‘to kill’, which is sufficient to infer that the hand is (about to be) raised 
aggressively against another person. If this infinitive verb, i.e. type of assault, was not 
mentioned, as in [Q. 5:11], then the preposition ‘against’ would have to be included. 
Furthermore, the possessive pronoun ‘mine’ is used to avoid the repetition of the 
‘possessive determiner + hand’ (your/my hand). 
Moreover, another kināyah can be formed with the word طسب when it collocates with ناسللا 
(tongue) to depict the sense of swearing. This can be seen in [Q. 60:2] when both hands 
and tongue collocate with طسب as a referent for assault and insult (verbal assault) (see table 
below). As for its rendition, all four translators chose to render the whole phrase (both 
kināyah expressions together) literally apart from the prepositional phrase مكيلإ. 
Table 6.6: Translations of kināyah expression 8. 
﴾... ِءۤو ﱡسلﭑ ِب  ْمَُهتَنِسَْلأ َو  ْمُهَيِدَْيأ ْمُكَْيلِإ ْاۤوُطُسْبَي ...﴿ in [Q. 60:2] 
Literal translation: (…stretch out their hands and tongues towards/to you with evil ...) 
Referent: insult (swear and blaspheme ) Purpose of kināyah: Elegance 
Ali ...stretch forth their hands and their tongues against you for evil ... 
Hilali & Khan ...stretch forth their hands and their tongues against you with evil ... 
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Saheeh  
International ... extend against you their hands and their tongues with evil ... 
Abdel Haleem ... stretch out their hands and tongues to harm you … 
Ali as well as Hilali and Khan continue to use the word ‘stretch’ to express the meaning 
of طسب as they did previously. The difference between the two is related to the rendition 
of the preposition ‘ـب’ accompanying the prepositional phrase ءوسلاب, i.e. the type of assault 
and insult. Ali renders the preposition ‘ـب’ as ‘for’ while Hilali and Khan render it as ‘with’. 
In this case, it seems that the preposition ‘with’ is more appropriate than ‘for’ because it 
describes the physical state or the means of stretching out the hands and tongue, whereas 
‘for’ may refer to the purpose of stretching out the hands and tongue. Furthermore, both 
translators continue to render the preposition phrase مكيلإ (towards/to you) as ‘against you’ 
instead of its literal rendition ‘towards/to you’ to show that the intentions of stretching 
out the hands and tongue are not friendly but antagonistic.  
Saheeh International also continue to use the word ‘extend’ to express the meaning of طسب 
and render the preposition phrase مكيلإ (towards/to you) as ‘against you’. As for Abdel 
Haleem, strange to say, he opts for a literal rendition instead of a target-oriented approach 
as he did in rendering ديلا طسب in [Q. 5:11] and [Q. 5:28]. This time, he decides to render 
طسب as ‘stretch out’. Perhaps the reason behind this decision is the lack of an idiomatic TL 
expression that infers a similar image and referential meaning to that of ناسللا طسب. Also, 
the reason could be that he had already mentioned the action or intent of the hand in 
translating  ًءَآدَْعأ ْمُكَل ْاوُنوُكَي ْمُكوُفَْقﺜَي ِنإ, the beginning of the āyah, as “[I]f they gain the upper 
hand over you, they will revert to being your enemies”. Nonetheless, in the TL, the word 
‘tongue’ may occur in several idiomatic expressions/phrases that refer to a special 
meaning different from their literal meaning, but none of them are similar to the Arabic 
kināyah. For example, the expressions ‘have a forked tongue’, ‘sharp tongue’, and ‘keep 
a civil tongue (in one’s head)’, indicate dishonesty/deceitfulness, speaking in a harsh or 
critical manner, and a request to speak decently and politely respectively. The closest TL 
expression could be ‘sticking one’s tongue out (at someone)’, which indicates contempt 
or insult, yet it does not include the sense of swearing and blasphemy as the kināyah in 
[Q. 60:2] does. This is possibly why Abdel Haleem chooses to render the kināyah literally. 
At the same time, he does render  ِبﭑ ِءۤوﱡسل  using the word ‘harm’ rather than ‘evil’, which 
could hold both types of inflictions, physical or emotional, so that the rendition of the 
kināyah can be read smoothly and intelligibly. 
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Kināyah 9 
Table 6.7: Translations of Kināyah expression 9. 
 َمَْويَو﴿ ﱡَﺾعَي ُمِلاﱠظلا ِهْيَدَي ﻰَلَع ِيَنتَْيل اَي ُلوُقَي ...﴾  in [Q. 25:27] 
Literal translation: 
(And the day the wrongdoer bites on his hands, he will say I wish ...) 
Referent: Remorse Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole 
Ali The Day that the wrong-doer will bite at his hands, he will say, "Oh! 
would that I ... 
 
Hilali & Khan 
And (remember) the Day when the Zalim (wrong-doer, oppressor, 
polytheist, etc.) will bite at his hands, he will say: "Oh! Would that I ... 
Saheeh  
International 
And the Day the wrongdoer will bite on his hands [in regret] he will 
say, "Oh, I wish ... 
Abdel Haleem On that Day the evildoer will bite his own hand and say, ‘If only ... 
It appears that all four translators have decided to render ديلا ضع literally. However, Ali 
and Hilali and Khan render the preposition ﻰلع as ‘at’ rather than ‘on’. It is true that the 
two propositions are close to each other in terms of meaning, but the appropriate 
equivalent preposition for ﻰلع, in this context and in the event of applying a pure literal 
translation, would be ‘on’, exactly like the translation of Saheeh International. However, 
unlike the rest, Abdel Haleem omits the preposition ﻰلع and adds the word ‘own’ after 
the possessive pronoun ‘his’. That said, this addition only emphasises that the hands 
belong to the wrongdoer (ملاظلا) and, therefore, it may not affect the general meaning of 
the ST or the referential meaning of the kināyah. Nonetheless, what is interesting and may 
affect the literal meaning is his attempt to render نيدي (in the dual form) as ‘hand (singular 
form) rather than ‘hands’ as it is in the ST (BT: [هب ةصاخلا] هدي ضعي). According to Quṭb 
(2003, p. 2560), the wrongdoer might not only bite one hand but might bite both hands 
alternately, or due to his deep regret, he might bite both hands at once. However, Quṭb’s 
interpretation should not be taken literally if we remember that kināyah expressions are 
used figuratively to allude to and attest a specific meaning. Nevertheless, Abdel Haleem 
should not make such changes, especially given that ‘hands’, i.e. the plural form referring 
here to two things, is grammatically acceptable in the TL. 
As for a literal rendition of the kināyah and whether or not it implies a similar referent of 
that of the ST, this is, of course, somewhat debatable. Probably there is no doubt that the 
TT recipient will comprehend the intended meaning of ‘biting their own hands’ through 
the context of the āyah, but there would be a possibility of misunderstanding it if it were 
to be on its own. The reason for this misunderstanding may be culture-bound. That is to 
say, expressions or gestures such as biting their own hands (ديلا ضع) or fingertips ( ضع
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ﻞمانﻷا) may imply a specific meaning in one culture but not in another (see the analysis of 
the next kināyah). To dispel any misunderstanding, Saheeh International add the 
prepositional phrase ‘in regret’ between square brackets. According to Beekman and 
Callow, such an addition is not ideal and would possibly confuse the TT recipient because 
the biting of one’s hand already exists in the TC with a different sense than remorse. 
Kināyah 10 
Table 6.8: Translations of Kināyah expression 10. 
...﴿  اَْولَخ َاذِإَو اوﱡضَع ُمُكْيَلَع َلِمَاَنْﻷا  ِﻆْيَغْلا َنِم...﴾  in [Q. 3: 119] 
Literal translation: 
(... and when they are alone they bite their fingertips in rage at you ...) 
Referent: Rage Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole 
Ali ... when they are alone, they bite off the very tips of their fingers at 
you in their rage ... 
Hilali & Khan ... when they are alone, they bite the tips of their fingers at you in rage 
... 
Saheeh  
International 
... when they are alone, they bite their fingertips at you in rage ... 
Abdel Haleem ... when they are alone, they bite their ﬁngertips in rage at you ... 
As with the rendition of ديلا ضع, a literal translation was used by translators to render  ضع
ﻞمانﻷا. The only odd rendition amongst the four is the one made by Ali. Bizarrely, he adds 
the words ‘off’ and ‘very’ that may lead to a totally different meaning (BT:  مكيلع نوعطقي
مهبﻀغ [ةلاح] يف ًاديدحت (مهلمانا) مهعباصا فارطا). The phrase ‘bite off’ suggests removing or 
separating, i.e. cutting off, something from another, which in this case involves the 
fingertips. In addition, there is no explanation for him adding the word ‘very’, since there 
is absolutely no reason to emphasize the fingertips. Also, there is no need for adding the 
possessive determiner ‘their’! Generally, Ali’s rendition may lead the TT recipient to 
visualise a different image to that of the original kināyah.   
Once more, the ability of the TT recipient to understand the intended meaning of this 
kināyah is roughly similar to their understanding of ديلا ضع. In fact, it may be more 
difficult, especially if we take into consideration that the nails are located in the fingertips 
and biting the nails in most, if not all, Western cultures implies a sense of anxiety and not 
remorse. That said, there is no equivalent TL expression that implies a similar image and 
referent as the Arabic kināyah. In contrast, the translation of ديلا ضع literally is possibly 
more acceptable than translating ﻞمانﻻا ضع literally because biting the fingertips is 
definitely an established gesture in the TC for anxiety. Though the āyah states clearly that 
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the biting was done in a state of rage, it would probably confuse the TT reader and cause 
what Beekman and Callow refer to as a ‘semantic clash’. The solution to avoid such 
confusion, according to the views of Larson or Beekman and Callow, is to drop the 
specific reference to the symbolic action ( ضع ﻞمانﻷا ) and use a generic word (with a 
descriptive phrase). However, we suggest the same approach as used by the translators, 
but with a footnote that explains that this gesture in the SC is known also as a sign of 
remorse, unlike in the TC where it could refer to anxiety. 
Kināyah 11 
Table 6.9: Translations of Kināyah expression 11. 
 ََحبَْصأَف ِهِرََمﺜِب َطيُِحأَو﴿ ِهْيﱠفَك ُبِّلَقُي اَهيِف ََقفَنأ اَم ٰﻰَلَع... ﴾  in [Q. 18: 42] 
Literal translation: (His fruits were encompassed thereby he began inverting/turning his 
palm about over what he has spent on it...) 
Referent: Remorse and sorrow Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole 
Ali So his fruits (and enjoyment) were encompassed (with ruin), and he 
remained twisting and turning his hands over what he had spent on 
his property ... 
Hilali & Khan So his fruits were encircled (with ruin). And he remained clapping his 
hands with sorrow over what he had spent upon it… 
Saheeh  
International 
And his fruits were encompassed [by ruin], so he began to turn his 
hands about [in dismay] over what he had spent on it ... 
Abdel Haleem And so it was: his fruit was completely destroyed, and there he was, 
wringing his hands over what he had invested in it ... 
It appears that the four translators have rendered  ِهْيﱠفَك ُب ِّلَُقي differently in terms of word 
choice or approach. What is interesting, however, is that they all render the word فك as 
‘hand’ rather than ‘palm’, which is the inner surface of the hand, even those who chose a 
literal approach, such as Saheeh International. Perhaps the reason for this is that they 
considered the palm and the hand as one organ, i.e. one part of the body, and that any 
physical movement of the palm will obviously involve an exactly correspondingly 
movement of the hand and vice versa. Even if this was true, however, there is no excuse 
not to render فك as ‘palm’ unless it sounds unidiomatic or there is an appropriate 
idiomatic TL expression including the word ‘hand’ that is equivalent to that of the ST in 
terms of referent and function (i.e. purpose of use). That said, there might be some 
idiomatic English phrases, proverbs, or idioms that may describe or involve the meaning 
of regret as in ‘kicking oneself’ or ‘no use crying over spilt milk’. However, such 
expressions might not be formal or appropriate to use in this type of text. The other TL 
expressions (or gestures) that one might think of are ‘clapping a hand [briefly] 
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against/over/to/across a forehead, cheek(s), or mouth’ in a token of dismay or regret. For 
example, ‘Tom clapped his hand to his forehead when he heard that he had failed the 
exam’. The other is ‘wringing one’s hand’, as in ‘Tom then wrung his hands together and 
buried his face into his hands’. The underlined phrase, i.e. bury one’s face into their hands, 
also involves ‘hands’, but generally all three expressions suggest the sense of dismay, 
distress/agitation/exasperation, or embarrassment/shame respectively more than the sense 
of remorse or regret. This shows us that not all expressions in a language, particularly 
those involving gestures, exist or have the same referent in another language. So how did 
the four translators handle the rendition of  ِهْيﱠفَك ُبَِّلُقي, a kināyah that involves a gesture as a 
referent of remorse as well as sorrow?  
It looks like Ali decided to render it literally (apart from the word فك) and, strangely, add 
the word ‘twist’ [BT: هيدي بلقيو يولي ﻞظف]. Regardless of whether the words ‘twist’ and 
‘turn’ are synonyms or near-synonyms in English, adding the two words ‘twist’ and ‘turn’ 
together does not help the TT reader in comprehending or conceiving the kināyah. In 
other words, there is no reason for this addition. In fact, it may confuse the reader, not to 
mention the fact that ‘twist’ and ‘turn’ are normally used together in the TL as a phrase 
to imply a meaning other than  ُبِّلَُقي. That is, the phrase ‘twist and turn’ expresses a total 
different meaning in the TL, for example, it could mean that a road, path, river, or suchlike 
has a lot of bends, as in ‘the road twists and turns throughout the mountain’. It could also 
mean complicated dealings or circumstances, as ‘the party are concerned with the twist 
and turns of their leader’s political career’. Therefore, mentioning either ‘twist’ or ‘turn’ 
by itself would have been more appropriate. Saheeh International applied a literal 
approach too but with an addition that describes the state of turning about the hands. In 
spite of this, a back translation (BT: [ﻰسأب/ﻞمأ ةبيخ يف يف] هيدي بلقي حبصاف) will show that 
Saheeh International’s rendition is roughly more faithful to the ST, and probably sounds 
more idiomatic than Ali’s. The downside, however, with Saheeh International’s rendition 
is to do with the addition they have placed between two square brackets to explain the 
reason for this gesture or the state while producing it. What they have mentioned does not 
correspond with any authoritative exegetical literature nor does it lead the TT reader to 
the actual intended meaning of the kināyah. Therefore, since they have decided to make 
an addition, they should have at least included one of the referents (remorse, regret, or 
sorrow) to show the actual state of that person who is turning his palms about and more 
importantly for the TT reader to conceive what this expression is used for in the SL. 
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With respect to Hilali and Khan’s rendition, it is quite obvious they have relied on one of 
the exegetical works, which is without doubt part and parcel of the Qur’anic translation 
process (see the textual and contextual analysis of this kināyah in the previous chapter). 
Nevertheless, their rendition is considered a partial interpretation. Among the exegetes 
who described the movement of فكلا بيلقت as ‘clapping’ without further information are 
ibn Kathīr (2000) and aṭ-Ṭabarī (2001). The majority of the exegetes who in their 
description of فكلا بيلقت mentioned ‘clapping’ or ‘striking’ clearly indicate that one hand 
strikes over the other hand, i.e. on the back of the other hand; are ar-Rāzī (1981), abū 
Ḥayyān (1993), and ath-Thaᶜlabī (1997) describe in meticulous detail that the palm of one 
hand strikes over the back of the other hand. That is why Hilali and Khan’s rendition is 
incomplete even with their addition of the phrase ‘with sorrow’. In fact, the two phrases 
together do not make sense. Normally when a person is clapping, it is as a token of 
approval or praise, and in some cases, sarcasm but never as a token of remorse or sorrow. 
Probably it would have been acceptable if they had rendered the kināyah as ‘remorsefully 
(or sorrowfully) he remained clapping one hand on the back of the other’ or ‘he remained 
clapping one hand on the back of the other with remorse (or sorrow)’ since they have 
opted for an exegetical rendition. At least this way the TT recipient would read and 
understand one of the authoritative exegeses of  ِهْيﱠفَك ُب ِّلَُقي properly. 
Unlike the other translators, Abdel Haleem attempts to render the kināyah by applying a 
target-oriented approach. It seems, however, that his effort is to some extent unsuccessful. 
One of the gestures of agitation or exasperation is rubbing and twisting the hands together, 
in other words, wringing one’s own hands. For that reason, the phrase ‘wringing one’s 
own hands’ has become an established TL expression to describe a person who is worried, 
anxious, distressed, irritated, and suchlike, chiefly when they are powerless to change the 
situation. In a way, it may hold the sense of sorrow to some degree, but certainly not deep 
regret or guilt for a wrongdoing as the ST phrase does. Therefore, since the twisting of 
the palms or striking them over the back of the other hand is not an established gesture 
with a specific meaning in the TC, the translators should probably have translated the 
expression literally along with an addition or footnote that explained the intended 
meaning or emotional state. If they had done this, there would not be any semantic clash 
and at least the TT recipient would have a knowledge of the gesture and its intended 
meaning. 
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Kināyah 12 
Table 6.10: Translations of Kināyah expression12. 
﴿ ا ﱠَملَو ْمِهيِدَْيأ ِيف َطِقُس اوﱡلَض َْدق ْمُهﱠَنأ اَْوأَرَو......﴾  in [Q. 7: 149] 
Literal translation: 
(When it fell in their hands and they perceived that they went astray ...) 
Referent: Remorse Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and hyperbole 
 Ali  When they repented, and saw that they had erred ... 
Hilali & Khan And when they regretted and saw that they had gone astray ... 
Saheeh  
International 
And when regret overcame them* and they saw that they had 
gone astray ...  
Abdel Haleem When, with much wringing of hands, they perceived that they 
were doing wrong ...  
In direct contrast to their renditions of the three previous kināyah expressions for remorse, 
Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have decided to avoid a literal approach 
in rendering  ْمِهيِدَْيأ ِيف َطِقُس. It seems they have realised that a literal rendition, in this case, 
would make no sense even if they were to apply additions or omissions to it, this being 
probably due to the culture-specific nature of the kināyah, and because ديلا يف طوقسلا is 
more of an expression to express a specific reference rather than a gesture. Furthermore, 
the lack of an appropriate TL phrase holding a rhetorical image and/or at least a referent 
similar to the original kināyah left the translators with no choice but to state the intended 
meaning of the kināyah explicitly. There is no doubt by doing so the TT loses the 
rhetorical features and function the ST phrase, i.e. kināyah, has but most importantly the 
intended meaning is maintained and delivered to the TT recipient. Saheeh International 
do, however, add a descriptive footnote in which they provide a literal translation and 
meaning of  ْمِهيِدَْيأ يِف َطِقُس: “Literally, ‘When their hands had been descended upon,’ i.e., 
bitten by them out of severe regret”. Interestingly, despite all this Abdel Haleem decides 
to render  ْمِهيِدَْيأ ِيف َطِقُس using the same approach, i.e. target-oriented with exactly the same 
TL expression (wringing one’s own hands) which he used in rendering  ِهْيﱠفَك ُبِّلَُقي. As we 
have illustrated previously, this TL phrase is commonly used to express agitation or 
exasperation but never the sense of remorse. Hence, using this expression will certainly 
cause a loss in meaning, which will lead to a miscomprehension of the kināyah 
specifically and the proper meaning of the whole āyah in general. 
Kināyah 13 
Table 6.11: Translations of Kināyah expression 13. 
﴿ ِماَي ِّصلا ََةلَْيل ْمُكَل ﱠﻞُِحأ ْمُكِئآَِسن ﻰَلِإ َُثف ﱠرلا ...﴾  in [Q. 2:187] 
 -222- 
﴿  َثَفَر َﻼَف  ِّجَحْلا ِيف َلَادِج َﻻَو َقوُُسف َﻻَو...﴾  in [Q. 2:197]  
Literal translation: 
[Q. 2:187]: (It has been made permissible for you, on the night of fasting, to talk lewdly 
[obscenely] to your women)  
[Q. 2:197]: (… no lewd [obscene] language, immorality [sinful behaviour], and quarrels in 
Hajj …)  
Referent: Sexual intercourse  Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 2:187]: Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to 
your wives ... 
[Q. 2:197]: ... no obscenity, nor wickedness, nor wrangling in the Hajj... 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 2:187]: It is made lawful for you, during the nights of fasting, to have 
sexual relations with your wives ... 
[Q. 2:197]: ... he should not have sexual relations (with his wife), nor 
commit sin, nor dispute unjustly during the Hajj ... 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 2:187]: It has been made permissible for you the night preceding 
fasting to go to your wives [for sexual relations] ... 
[Q. 2:197]: ... no sexual relations and no disobedience and no disputing 
during Hajj ... 
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 2:187]: You [believers] are permitted to lie with your wives during 
the night of the fast ... 
[Q. 2:197]: ... no indecent speech, misbehaviour, or quarrelling for 
anyone undertaking the pilgrimage ... 
As has been explained in the previous chapter, there are no disagreements among the 
exegetes consulted in this study that the word  ََثفَر is used in [Q. 2:187] as a kināyah for 
copulation. There are, however, some disagreements regarding its referent in [Q. 2:197]. 
The majority believe it is also used figuratively as a kināyah for sexual intercourse, but 
some say it holds its literal sense (lewd/obscene language) and some believe it may hold 
both the literal and figurative meanings at the same time. We are not at liberty to decide 
which one of the interpretations is truer, but probably the majority view is more 
convincing since the act of indecent speech is already included in the word  َقوُُسف (immoral 
or sinful behaviour).  
With the exegetes’ opinions in mind, one can notice that the rendition of the word  َثَفَر in 
both āyahs is consonant with the exegetes’ views. To put it another way, the renditions 
of  َثَفَر made by the four translators in [Q. 2:187] indicate or refer to the sense of sexual 
intercourse, but the renditions differ in [Q. 2:197] concurring with the exegetes’ views 
(as did the exegetes’ views). For example, Ali’s rendition of  ََثفَر in [Q. 2:187] evidently 
shows that he avoids a literal rendition and tries to convey the referent (intended meaning) 
semantically through the word ‘approach’ in order to achieve a euphemism. The word 
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‘approach’ by itself does not indicate or refer to a sexual relation, but the TT reader may 
perceive the intended meaning through the context. It usually refers to a sexual relation 
when collocated with ‘sexual’, as in ‘sexual approach’, but if Ali had added the word 
‘sexual’ then a euphemism would have not been achieved. There are better or more 
idiomatic TT phrases that refer to sexual intercourse indirectly and politely, i.e. in a 
euphemistic manner, than ‘approach’. Even if Ali were to insist on using ‘approach’ then 
it would have been better to use ‘approaches’ instead, especially given that he used the 
noun form. At least the word ‘approaches’, the synonym of ‘advances’, denotes a 
behaviour or attempt to initiate a sexual relation with someone. On the other hand, Ali’s 
rendition of  َثَفَر in [Q. 2:197] is quite different. It is obvious that he is in favour of the 
exegetical literature that believes the phrase  َُثف ﱠرلا holds its literal sense; hence, his 
rendition is ‘obscenity’. 
In almost the same way, Abdel Haleem renders the phrase  َثَفَر disparately. That is to say, 
he decides to render the phrase  َثَفَر in [Q. 2:187] based on its figurative sense, and in [Q. 
2:197] based on its literal sense. Nonetheless, Abdel Haleem’s translation in [Q. 2:187] 
is quite distinct, due to his selection of words. Abdel Haleem chose the TL phrase ‘to lie 
with’ (عم عاجطضﻻا) to express sexual intercourse, which not only expresses the referential 
meaning of the kināyah idiomatically, but also euphemistically as the ST phrase does. It 
is worth noting that the phrase ‘lie with’ is also used in some English biblical versions, 
for example, the King James Bible or Douay–Rheims Bible, to express sexual intercourse 
euphemistically (cf. Leviticus 18:22).  
Turning to the renditions of Hilali and Khan along with Saheeh International, both 
translators appear to believe that  َُثف ﱠرلا is used in both āyahs figuratively as the majority 
of exegetes do. Accordingly, their renditions of  ُثَف ﱠرلا in both āyahs refer to the referential 
meaning. Apart from the addition of ‘with his wife’ in [Q. 2:197], Hilali and Khan’s 
translations are consistent, unlike Saheeh International. That said, their translations may 
look like as if they have made the intended meaning explicit due to the use of the TL 
phrase ‘sexual relations’. One might argue that the adjective ‘sexual’ is not taboo and that 
the expression of ‘sexual relations’ is in fact a euphemistic expression for having sex. 
This may be true, but why use such an expression when there are other much more 
euphemistic expressions that denote sexual intercourse without including the word ‘sex’, 
such as the technical or scientific terms ‘copulation’, ‘coitus’, or more general terms such 
as ‘coupling’, ‘carnal knowledge/relations’, ‘intimate relations’, ‘intimacy’, ‘to lie with’, 
‘sleeping with’, ‘going to bed with’, ‘lovemaking’, and the like? Moreover, adding the 
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phrase ‘with his wife’ in [Q. 2:197] has no proper justification either. This is because 
extramarital intercourse is prohibited at all times, let alone during an important sacred 
ceremony such as the Hajj, which means that the intercourse issue is marital-related 
unless stated otherwise. This is strange, since Qur’anic translators usually are aware of 
this matter; or else why render  ْمُِكئآَسِن, following  ُثَف ﱠرلا, as ‘your wives’ and not literally as 
‘your women’?  
Saheeh International render  َثَفَر, in [Q. 2:197] in the same way as Hilali and Khan apart 
from the unnecessary addition of ‘with his wife’. Therefore, the argument made about 
Hilali and Khan’s rendition can be applied to Saheeh International’s rendition of [Q. 
2:197]. As for their rendition of  ُثَف ﱠرلا in [Q. 2:187], it seems that Saheeh International 
thought that their construal (to go to your wives [BT:  ﻰلإ باهذلامكتاجوز ] may confuse the 
TT recipient, and probably cause them to misapprehend the intended meaning. Hence, 
they decided to add the intended meaning explicitly between square brackets, though, 
according to OED, the verb ‘go’ with the prepositions ‘in, to, or unto’ refers to ‘sexual 
intercourse with a particular woman’, in addition to the fact it is used frequently in the 
Hebrew Scriptures such as Genesis 38:8. Therefore, if they just had added the phrase ‘bed 
with’ to the end of ‘to go to’, their translation would have been appropriate and easily to 
comprehend without explicitness. Had they done so, they would have produced a 
euphemistic vernacular expression, in other words, idiomatic, for sexual intercourse (to 
go to bed with [عم شارفلل باهذلا]). 
Kināyah 14 
Table 6.12: Translations of Kināyah expression 14. 
...﴿  َنﻵاَف ﱠُنهوُرِشاَب.... ...  َﻻَو ﱠنُهوُرِشاَُبت  ِدِجاَسَمْلا يِف َنوُفِكاَع ُْمتَنأَو  ...﴾  in [Q. 2:187] 
Literal translation: 
( …and now have skin-to-skin contact with them … … do not have skin-to-skin contact 
with them while devotionally confining yourselves in the mosques …) 
Referent: Sexual intercourse  Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
Ali … so now associate with them … do not associate with your wives 
while ye are in retreat in the mosques … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
… So now have sexual relations with them … And do not have sexual 
relations with them (your wives) while you are in I'tikaf … 
Saheeh  
International 
... So now, have relations with them … And do not have relations 
with them as long as you are staying for worship in the mosques ... 
Abdel Haleem … now you can lie with them… Do not lie with them during the nights 
of your devotional retreat in the mosques … 
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The word  َرَشاب, which is another kināyah for having sexual intercourse, is mentioned twice 
in the same āyah, [Q. 2:187], where the word  ُثَف ﱠرلا occurs. It appears that the translators 
have decided to adopt the same approach in rendering the two kināyah expression,  َرَشاب 
and  ُثَف ﱠرلا. That is to say, they all try to avoid a literal translation and attempt to convey 
the intended meaning. However, what is interesting is that though the two words have the 
same referent and occur in the same āyah, the translators, apart from Abdel Haleem, 
render them differently. Ali, for instance, renders  َرَشاب as ‘associate with’ (رِشاع), a plain 
general TL phrase, to convey the sense of sexual intercourse euphemistically [BT:  َنﻵَاف
ع ُت َﻻَو .... ... ﱠنُهوُرِشا َعوُرِشامكتاجوز ا ]. According to OED, one of the meanings of ‘associate’ as 
a verb is “to keep company or have intercourse (with)”. Therefore, it is quite sensible to 
say that Ali’s translation is more or less a success in terms of delivering the intended 
meaning of  َرَشاب euphemistically, and even if the TL phrase ‘associate with’ is not often 
used in this sense or manner, the TT recipient is able to arrive at this sense through the 
context. 
We could have said the same thing to Hilali and Khan’s translation if they had just used 
the same expression in rendering  َُثف ﱠرلا cited in the same āyah, but unfortunately we cannot 
because of the word ‘sexual’. As we explained before, there are several idiomatic TL 
expressions to convey the sense of sexual intercourse without including the word ‘sex’. 
The word ‘relations’ without the word ‘sexual’ would have relayed both the intended 
meaning and the function of the kināyah, especially given that the context of the āyah 
revolves around spousal relationships, which was exactly what Saheeh International did 
in their rendition. Additionally, if Hilali and Khan were to assume that the word 
‘relations’ on its own does not refer to intercourse, it would still have been sufficient 
because the type of relation has already been mentioned previously in rendering  ُثَف ﱠرلا, 
which was ‘sexual relation’. Therefore, there was no need to add the word ‘sexual’. Also, 
there was no need to add the phrase ‘with his wife’, because the context of the āyah is 
obviously about spousal relationships. 
As for Abdel Haleem’s translation, it appears that he is the only translator to be consistent 
in rendering the kināyah expressions in [Q. 2:187] that have a sexual intercourse referent. 
That is to say, Abdel Haleem renders the act of intercourse in [Q. 2:187], represented by 
the words  َُثف ﱠرلا and  َرَشاب, exactly the same way by employing the same idiomatic TL 
expression ‘to lie with’, which as we pointed out before is also used in some English 
Biblical translations. 
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Kināyah 15 and 16 
Table 6.13: Translations of Kināyah expressions 15 and 16. 
﴿ ًىَذأ َوُه ْﻞُق ِضيِحَمْلا ِنَع ََكنوَُلأْسَيَوءاَسِّنلا ْاُولَِزتْعاَف  ِضيِحَمْلا ِيف ﱠُنهوُبَرَْقت َﻻَو َنْرُهَْطي َﻰﱠتَح ...﴾  in [Q. 2:222] 
  Literal translation:  
(They ask you [Prophet] about menses, say it is harmful, hence, seclude yourselves from 
women during menses and do not approach them until they are cleansed/purified …)    
Referent: Avoid sexual intercourse  Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
Ali 
They ask thee concerning women's courses. Say: They are a hurt and a 
pollution: So keep away from women in their courses, and do not 
approach them until they are clean … 
 
Hilali  
& Khan 
They ask you concerning menstruation. Say: that is an Adha (a harmful 
thing for a husband to have a sexual intercourse with his wife while she is 
having her menses), therefore keep away from women during menses 
and go not unto them till they have purified (from menses and have taken 
a bath) … 
Saheeh  
International 
And they ask you about menstruation. Say, It is harm, so keep away from 
wives* during menstruation. And do not approach them until they are 
pure … 
 
Abdel Haleem 
They ask you [Prophet] about menstruation. Say, ‘Menstruation is a 
painful condition, so keep away from women during it. Do not approach 
them until they are cleansed …*  
It appears that all four translators have decided to be too faithful to the ST and render both 
kināyah expressions,  ْاوُلَِزتْعا ءاَسِّنلا  and  َﻻوُبَرَْقت ﱠنُه  literally. The employment of such a 
technique here does in fact conceal the phrase ‘sexual intercourse’ just as the SL words 
do, and that is probably because the context helps. However, it may mislead the TT reader 
about the intended meaning. Thus, rendering  ْاوُلَِزتْعا and وُبَرَْقت َﻻا  literally as ‘keep away’ 
and ‘do not approach’ may lead the reader to understand that a man should literally avoid 
being close to a woman at all times during her menses rather than only not having 
intercourse. It seems that the translators, apart from Ali, were aware of this possible 
misinterpretation by the reader. Therefore, they have clarified the intended meaning, i.e. 
sexual intercourse, either through a footnote or between two brackets within the TT. For 
example, Hilali and Khan place the following explication between brackets after the word 
ًىَذأ (harmful): “a harmful thing for a husband to have a sexual intercourse with his wife 
while she is having her menses”, though their rendition ‘go unto’ is a well-known 
expression for intercourse used frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures such as Genesis 38:8. 
In a footnote, Saheeh International explain that the exact meaning of ‘keep away from 
wives’ is “refrain from sexual intercourse”. Also in a footnote, Abdel Haleem states the 
following: “The Arabic expressions used here are clear euphemisms for ‘do not have 
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sexual intercourse with them’”. If they had rendered the intended meaning by using a 
euphemistic TL expression, as they did with previous kināyah expressions, they would 
have not needed to add any explications or comments. Also, the referent would have be 
conveyed comprehensibly as well as euphemistically, but it is quite obvious that they 
wanted to be faithful to the ST. Note also that it appears that Saheeh International have 
decided to render ءاسنلا as wives, which we think is unjustifiable because it is quite clear 
the sexual intercourse would be between spouses. 
Kināyah 17 
Table 6.14: Translations of Kināyah expression 17. 
 َنْر ﱠهََطت َاِذإَف ...﴿ ّنُهُوْتأَف. ُဃّ ُمُكَرََمأ ُثْيَح ْنِم ْمُكﱠل ٌثْرَح ْمُكُؤآَِسن ۞.. ْمَُكﺛْرَح ْاُوْتأَف ﴾ ...ُْمتْئِش ﻰﱠَنأ  in [Q. 2:222-223] 
Literal translation: (… and then when they are cleansed/purified, come to them from where 
Allah has ordered you ۞ Your women are [as] tilth for you, so come to your tilth 
when/wherever you desire …) [Q. 2:222-223] 
Referent: Sexual intercourse Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
Ali 
… And when they have purified themselves, then come to them from 
where Allah has ordained for you …۞ Your wives are as a tilth* unto 
you; so approach your tilth when or how ye will … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
… And when they have purified themselves, then go in unto them as 
Allah has ordained for you (go in unto them in any manner as long as it is 
in their vagina) …۞Your wives are a tilth for you, so go to your tilth* 
… 
 
Saheeh  
International 
… And when they have purified themselves, then come to them from 
where Allah has ordained for you …۞Your wives are a place of sowing 
of seed for you, so come to your place of cultivation however you wish 
… 
 
Abdel Haleem 
… when they are cleansed, you may approach them as God has 
ordained* …۞ wives are your ﬁelds, so go into your ﬁelds whichever 
way you like* … 
The phrase  ّنُهُوْتأ is another kināyah expression mentioned at the end of [Q. 2:222], where 
the previous kināyah phrases  ْاوُلَِزتْعا ءاَِّسنلا  and  َﻻوُبَرَْقت ﱠنُه  occur. The same translation 
method used by the translators in rendering the two latter phrases is also employed in 
rendering  ّنُهُوتْأ, i.e. literal rendition. It is worth noting that the comments and footnotes 
used by some of the translators in [Q. 2:222] to clarify that  ْاوُلَِزتْعا and  ﱠنُهوُبَرَْقت are 
expressions related to sexual intercourse also include the phrase  ُهُوْتأ ّن .  
The word َﻰتأ as a referent for intercourse (particularly between spouses) is also repeated 
in the āyah following [Q. 2:222], i.e. [Q. 2:223], and it too is rendered literally using 
‘come to’, its synonym ‘approach’, or near-synonym ‘go to/into’. Hilali and Khan along 
with Saheeh International use the same rendition, ‘go into/to’ and ‘come to’ respectively, 
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in both āyahs. That is to say, they are consistent in their rendition of the word َﻰتأ. Ali and 
Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, are not quite as consistent as the other translators and 
decide to use ‘come to’/‘approach’ and ‘approach’/’go into’ respectively. It is safe to say 
that the expressions ‘come to’, ‘go to/into’, and ‘approach’, in the current context, all 
convey both the intended meaning and purpose of the kināyah, particularly the last two 
expressions. It is worth noting that both Hilali and Khan and Abdel Haleem have added 
a footnote in [Q. 2:223], which either clearly identifies or implies that what is meant by 
 ْمَُكثْرَح ْاُوْتأَف is sexual intercourse. It is evident that the reason for this footnote is to the 
comparison of women with tilth and that the appropriate intercourse is through the vagina 
and not the anus.  
Table 6.15: Translations of Kināyah expression 17 that implies sex with men. 
 ْمُكﱠنِإ﴿ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأتَل﴾...ِءاَِّسنلا ِنوُد ن ِّم ًةَوْهَش  in [Q. 7:81] 
 ْمُكﱠنَِئأ﴿ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأتَل﴾...ِءاَِّسنلا ِنُود ن ِّم ًةَوْهَش  in [Q. 27:55] 
 ْمُكﱠنَِئأ﴿ َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأتَل ﴾... َﻞيِبﱠسلا َنوُعَطَْقتَو  in [Q. 29:29] 
 ﴿ َناَرْكﱡذلا َنُوْتَأَتأ ﴾َنيِمَلاَعْلا َنِم  in [Q. 26:165] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 7:81]: (Indeed you come to/approach men with lust without women …) 
[Q. 27:55]: (Do you come to men with lust without women …) 
[Q. 29:29]: (Do you come to men and cut of the roads [rob travellers/wayfarers]) 
[Q. 26:165]: (Do you come to males of all creatures) 
Referent: Sexual intercourse (sodomy) Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 7:81]: For ye practise your lusts on men in preference to women… 
[Q. 27:55]: Would ye really approach men in your lusts rather than 
women? … 
[Q. 29:29]: Do ye indeed approach men, and cut off the highway? … 
[Q. 26:165]: Of all the creatures in the world, will ye approach males 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 7:81]: Verily, you practise your lusts on men instead of women… 
[Q. 27:55]: Do you approach men in your lusts rather than women? … 
[Q. 29:29]: Verily, you do sodomy with men, and rob the wayfarer 
(travellers, etc.)! 
[Q. 26:165]: Go you in unto the males of the 'Alamin (mankind) 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 7:81]: Indeed, you approach men with desire, instead of women… 
[Q. 27: 55]: Do you indeed approach men with desire instead of 
women? … 
[Q. 29:29]: Indeed, you approach men and obstruct the road … 
[Q. 26:165]: Do you approach males among the worlds﴿  
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 7:81]: You lust after men rather than women! … 
[Q. 27:55]: How can you lust after men instead of women? … 
[Q. 29:29]: How can you lust after men, waylay travellers … 
[Q. 26:165]: Must you, unlike [other] people, lust after males 
The word َﻰتأ also appears in the phrase  َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأت as a referent for intercourse (but in the 
sense of sodomy) in four other āyahs, [Q. 7:81], [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 26:165]. 
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Strikingly, Ali avoids a literal translation of the kināyah in [Q. 7:81] and decides to 
convey the meaning of intercourse by expressing the exercise of sexual desire: ‘practise 
your lusts on men’ [BT: لاجرلا يف مكتاوهش نوسرامت]. It is quite strange because a literal 
translation, as in ‘approach men’, would have sufficed, especially given that the word 
 ًةَوْهَش describes the intention of approaching with lust. There is no explanation why he 
chose this method in rendering this āyah, and did not opt for a literal translation as he did 
with the same expression in [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 26:165]. In addition, Ali’s 
translation of  َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأت in [Q. 27:55] is slightly odd, but it has nothing to do with the 
rendition of the kināyah. It involves the translation of the word  ًةَوْهَش: ‘approach men in 
your lusts’ [BT: مكتاوهش يف لاجرلا نوتأت]. There was no need to add the possessive determiner 
‘your’ nor pluralise the word ‘lust’. A simple literal translation and the addition of the 
proposition ‘with’, as in ‘go to/approach men with lust’ would have been sufficient; or 
rendering the word  ًةَوْهَش in the adverbial form ‘lustfully’ as in the original text, as in ‘go 
to/approach men lustfully’, probably would have been more adequate. Despite all this, 
Ali’s renditions of [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 26:165] do in fact render the meaning 
of intercourse (sodomy) in a euphemistic manner. 
Hilali and Khan’s translations are also striking, specifically when rendering [Q. 7:81] and 
[Q. 29:29]. Apart from being inconsistent, their translation of  َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأت in the former 
āyah and in [Q. 27:55] is exactly like Ali’s; therefore, the oddity we noted concerning 
Ali’s translation is the same here. The oddity also extends to Hilali and Khan’s translation 
of  َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأت in [Q. 29:29] because of the word ‘sodomy’. Using this word not only 
renders the act of intercourse with men explicitly but also contradicts the purpose of 
kināyah. Due to its hideousness, the word is not even used in biblical translations. If Hilali 
and Khan had placed the word ‘sodomy’ between brackets, as they usually do in such 
cases, or in a footnote, to explain the type of intercourse then probably it would have been 
acceptable. The question that has no answer is why they did not use the same rendition as 
they used in [Q. 27:55] or [Q. 26:165], specifically the latter. Not only does the phrase 
‘go in unto’ convey ‘sexual intercourse’ implicitly and euphemistically but it is also an 
idiomatic TL expression which is used in biblical translations. 
As for Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem, they are both consistent in their renditions 
of  َلاَج ِّرلا َنُوْتَأت. Saheeh International continue to apply a literal translation in rendering the 
word ﻰتأ, but this time they use the word ‘approach’ instead of ‘come to’, which in fact 
delivers the intended meaning implicitly as the ST does. With respect to Abdel Haleem’s 
renditions, not only do they not deliver the intended meaning but they can be considered 
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distortional. Using the TL phrase ‘lust after” only indicates a strong sexual attraction to 
someone, but it does not include the sense of having sex with a person. Therefore, there 
is a significant loss of meaning, i.e. the act of intercourse, in his renditions and most of 
all they are misleading, since they only convey the sense of the desire and not the 
performance [BT (Q. 29:29): [ةدشب] لاجرلا [ًايسنج] نوهتشت; (Q. 26:165):  نوهتشت[ًايسنج]  ناركذلا
[ةدشب]]. Another fact about their misleading nature is that the SL word  ًةَوْهَش (lust) is not 
mentioned explicitly or implicitly in [Q. 29:29] nor in [Q. 26:165], yet Abdel Haleem 
insists on interpreting نايتﻹا as lusting.  
Kināyah 18 and 19 
Table 6.16: Translations of Kināyah expressions 18 and 19. 
﴿...  ن ِّم مُكن ِّم ٌدََحأ ءاَج ِطِئآَغْلا َْوأءاَِّسنلا ُُمتْسَمَﻻ ...﴾  in [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] 
Literal translation: [Q. 4: 43] and [Q. 5: 6]: (…one of you come from a wide low ground 
or have been in touch with women …)  
Referent: 
1-Urination or defecation. 2- sexual intercourse 
Purpose of kināyah: 
Euphemism 
Ali [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6]: … one of you cometh from offices of nature, or ye 
have been in contact with women … 
 
 
Hilali & 
Khan 
[Q. 4:43]: … one of you comes after answering the call of nature, or you 
have been in contact with women (by sexual relations) …  
[Q. 5:6]: … any of you comes from answering the call of nature, or you 
have been in contact with women (i.e. sexual intercourse) … 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6]*: … one of you comes from the place of relieving 
himself or you have contacted women [i.e., had sexual intercourse] … 
 
Abdel 
Haleem 
[Q. 4:43]: … have relieved yourselves, or had intercourse … 
[Q. 5:6]: … has just relieved himself, or had intimate contact with a 
woman … 
It is quite obvious that all four translators tried to avoid a literal translation of the word 
طِئَآغْلا and chose to render the intended meaning semantically. This is because a literal 
translation would not convey the intended meaning, in addition to the fact that طِئآَغْلا has 
been lexicalised. All four translators use established idiomatic TL expressions to convey 
the meaning of urination or defecation. Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem’s 
renditions are quite similar as they both opt for the TL phrase ‘relieve oneself’. One 
difference between the two renditions is that Saheeh International try to adhere to the ST 
as far as they can by adding the word ‘place’ before. Another difference is that Saheeh 
International use the same pronoun ‘himself’ in both their renditions in [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 
5:6], whereas Abdel Haleem uses the pronouns ‘yourselves’ and ‘himself’ in [Q. 4:43] 
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and [Q. 5:6] respectively. It is worth noting that the second person pronoun ‘yourself’ 
might be more appropriate since it is neutral in terms of gender, while the third person 
singular pronoun ‘himself’ is confined to a male addressee. Hilali and Khan use the phrase 
‘the call of nature’, which is also a well-known euphemistic TL phrase that expresses the 
need for urination or defecation. Ali uses the phrase ‘office of nature’. Despite the fact 
that this phrase is not widely used as the previous expressions, i.e. ‘the call of nature or 
‘relieve oneself’, but following OED it conveys the same sense as these expressions 
convey. That is, ‘office of nature’ expresses the meaning of “[T]he function or action of 
defecating or urinating; excretion” (OED). This in turn, justifies the translator’s use of 
this phrase. 
As for the translation of the kināyah phrase  ُُمتْسََمﻻ, it appears that the translators, apart 
from Abdel Haleem, have decided to go for a literal approach. In other words, they render 
the kināyah literally, and it looks like some of the translators, specifically Hilali and Khan 
as well as Saheeh International, have decided to state the intended meaning explicitly 
between brackets or through a footnote to leave no room for confusion or ambiguity 
regarding the intended meaning of contacting a woman. Hilali and Khan add ‘by sexual 
relations’ and ‘i.e. sexual intercourse’ in their rendition for [Q. 4:43] and [Q. 5:6] 
respectively, whereas Saheeh International state ‘i.e., had sexual intercourse’ in both 
renditions, once within the text and the other through a footnote. Stating the word ‘sexual’ 
explicitly within the text, even between brackets, may contradict with the purpose of using 
the kināyah, but probably it would not do so if it was placed in a footnote, as Saheeh 
International did in their rendition of [Q. 5:6]. 
Abdel Haleem too provides a literal rendition with an addition in translating  ُُمتْسََمﻻ in [Q. 
5:6]. Nonetheless, his rendition is considered euphemistic since the adjective ‘intimate’ 
indicates a sexual relationship implicitly. However, in his rendition of  ُُمتْسََمﻻ in [Q. 4:43], 
Abdel Haleem avoids a literal translation and interestingly decides to render the intended 
meaning, i.e. sexual intercourse, taking into consideration the function of the kināyah, i.e. 
euphemism. This is noticeable since he only states the word ‘intercourse’, which suffices 
for delivering the intended meaning euphemistically without mentioning the word ‘sex’. 
Kināyah 20       
Table 6.17:Translations of Kināyah expression 20. 
 َْملَو ٌدَلَو يِل ُنوَُكي ﻰﱠَنأ...﴿يِنْسَسْمَي ﴾...ٌرَشَب  in [Q. 3:47] 
 َْملَو ٌمَﻼُغ يِل ُنوَُكي ﻰﱠَنأ...﴿يِنْسَسْمَي ﴾... ٌرَشَب  in [Q. 19:20] 
 -232- 
 َْمل اَم ...﴿ ﱡُنهوﱡسََمت  َنأ ِﻞْبَق نِم ﱠنُهوُُمتْقﱠلَط ِنإَو۞... ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت﴾...  in [Q. 2:236-237] 
 َنأ ِﻞَْبق نِم ﱠنُهوُُمتْقﱠلَط ...﴿ ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت ﴾...  in [Q. 33:49] 
 َنأ ِﻞَْبق ن ِّم ...﴿اﱠساََمتَي  َنأ ِﻞَْبق ن ِّم ...۞...اﱠساََمتَي ﴾...  in [Q. 58:3-4] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 3:47]: (How can I have a child and no man has touched me) 
[Q. 19:20]: (How can I have a boy and no man has touched me)  
[Q. 2:236-237]: (…as long as you have not touched them …۞And if you have divorced 
them before you have touched them …) 
[Q. 33:49]: (…divorced them you have touched them …) 
[Q. 58:3-4]: (…before they touch each other …۞ …before they touch each other …) 
Referent:  sexual intercourse Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 3:47]: How shall I have a son when no man hath touched me? 
[Q. 19:20]: How shall I have a son, seeing that no man has touched me  
[Q. 2:236-237]: …before consummation …۞And if ye divorce them 
before consummation … 
[Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before ye have touched them … 
[Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch each other…۞… before they touch 
each other ... 
 
 
 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 3:47]: How shall I have a son when no man has touched me 
[Q. 19:20]: How can I have a son, when no man has touched me 
[Q. 2:236-237]: …while yet you have not touched (had sexual 
relation with) them …۞And if you divorce them before you have 
touched (had a sexual relation with) them … 
[Q. 33:49]: ... divorce them before you have sexual intercourse with 
them … 
[Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch each other …۞…before they both 
touch each other … 
 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 3:47]: how will I have a child when no man has touched me? 
[Q. 19:20]: How can I have a boy while no man has touched me 
[Q. 2:236-237]: … you have not touched* …۞And if you divorce 
them before you have touched them … 
[Q. 33:49]: … divorce them before you have touched them [i.e., 
consummated the marriage] 
[Q. 58:3-4]: before they touch one another …۞…before they touch 
one another … 
 
 
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 3:47]: how can I have a son when no man has touched me? 
[Q. 19:20]: How can I have a son when no man has touched me? 
[Q. 2:236-237]: … you have not yet consummated the marriage 
…۞If you divorce wives before consummating the marriage … 
[Q. 33:49]: …divorce them before you have touched them … 
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[Q. 58:3-4]: before the couple may touch one another again 
…۞…before they touch each other … 
The word  ﱠسَم as a kināyah for sexual intercourse occurs in different forms in seven āyahs. 
All of the four translators have decided to render يِنْسَسَْمي literally as ‘touch me’ in [Q. 
3:47] and [Q. 19:20], which is reasonable, because the context clearly indicates that what 
is meant by touching is intercourse, particularly given that they all also decided to render 
رَشَب as ‘man’ instead of ‘human being’. In other words, touching a woman clearly refers 
to sexual intercourse especially given that pregnancy or having a child cannot occur 
without it. 
Āyah [Q. 2:236-237] and [Q. 33:49] is related to marital intercourse. Despite the fact that 
the context is clear and that the reader could easily deduce that  اَم ﱡنُهوﱡسََمت َْمل  or  َنأ ِﻞْبَق نِم
 ﱠنُهوﱡسََمت is related to intercourse, Ali and Abdel Haleem decided to use the word 
‘consummate’ in their rendition of [Q. 2:236-237], which is more of a technical term. The 
word ‘consummate’ formally means making a marriage complete by having sexual 
intercourse, and nowadays it is more generally used for having sexual intercourse (OED). 
There is nothing wrong with using this word, specifically given that it fits the context, i.e. 
divorce without/before the spouses having intercourse, though a literal translation would 
have been sufficient, particularly if we take into consideration Newmark’s opinion that a 
literal translation is ‘always the best’ as long as it offers the same semantic and 
communicative effect as the ST (1981, p. 21). However, since [Q. 2:236-237] and [Q. 
33:49] discuss the same issue in terms of the state of marital intercourse, why did Ali and 
Abdel Haleem not use the word ‘consummate’ again in [Q. 33:49] as they did in [Q. 
2:236-237]. Instead, they went for the literal translation ‘touch’, as they did in their 
translations of  ّسم in [Q. 58:3-4]. It is noticeable that Abdel Haleem adds the phrase ‘the 
couple may’ before ‘touch one another’, when there was no need for this, but possibly he 
does it for stylistic reasons. 
Saheeh International employ a literal translation throughout their renditions of  ّسم. They 
do, however, place a footnote in [Q. 2:236] in which they indicate “[t]he marriage has not 
been consummated”. Also in [Q. 33:49] they add “i.e., consummated the marriage” as an 
explanation between square brackets. 
As for Hilali and Khan, they translate  ّسم in [Q. 58:3-4] literally, as they did in [Q. 3:47] 
and [Q. 19:20], and by doing so, they convey the intended meaning of the kināyah and 
maintain its purpose of use. In [Q. 2:236-237], they adopt the same method. However, 
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they fail to maintain the euphemistic function because they include the word ‘sexual’ in 
their explanation, which they place between brackets within the text. There translation 
would have been a success to a certain degree in terms of euphemism had they omitted 
the word ‘sexual’ from their explanation. In [Q. 33:49], not only do they fail to convey 
the intended meaning of  ّسم implicitly, but they also fail to maintain the euphemistic 
function, because they have stated the intended meaning directly. 
Kināyah 21 
Table 6.18: Translations of Kināyah expression 21. 
 ْمُُكتاَنَبَو ْمُُكتاَه ﱠُمأ ْمُكْيَلَع ْتَم ِّرُح﴿ ... ...  مُكِروُجُح يِف ِيت ﱠﻼلا ُمُُكبِئاَبَرَو ْمُكِئاَِسن ُتاَه ﱠُمأَو ِيت ﱠﻼلا ُمُكِئاَسِّن ن ِّم ﱠنِِهب ُمتْلَخَد  ْمﱠل ِنإَف
وُنوَُكت ﱠنِِهب ُمتْلَخَد ا ْمُكَْيلَع َحاَنُج ََﻼف...﴾  in [Q. 4:23] 
Literal translation: (Prohibited to you [for marriage] your mothers and daughters … … 
your mothers-in-law and your step daughters who are in your laps [guardianship] [born 
from] of your women whom you had gone into them, but there is no sin upon you if you 
have not gone into them …) 
Referent:  sexual intercourse Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
Ali 
Prohibited to you (For marriage) are:- Your mothers, daughters ...  
…your wives’ mothers; your step-daughters under your 
guardianship, born of your wives to whom ye have gone in,- no 
prohibition if ye have not gone in … 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
Forbidden to you (for marriage) are: your mothers, daughters … … 
your wives’ mothers; your step-daughters under your guardianship, 
born of your wives to whom you have gone in – but there is no sin 
on you if you have not gone in them (to marry their daughters), …  
 
Saheeh  
International 
Prohibited to you [for marriage] are your mothers, your daughters … 
… your wives' mothers, and your step-daughters under your 
guardianship [born] of your wives unto whom you have gone in. 
But if you have not gone in unto them, there is no sin upon you 
 
Abdel Haleem 
You are forbidden to take as wives your mothers, daughters … … 
your wives’ mothers, the stepdaughters in your care - those born of 
women with whom you have consummated marriage, if you have 
not consummated the marriage, then you will not be blamed … 
It appears that Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International have decided to render 
ةأرملاب لوخدلا literally using ‘go in/unto’, which is a well-known TL expression for 
intercourse even used frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures. As we have previously 
explained (see kināyah 16 in this chapter), this TL expression delivers the intended 
meaning of sexual intercourse implicitly in a euphemistic manner as does the original 
kināyah. On the other hand, Abdel Haleem again chose to use the modern technical 
expression ‘consummate’, which also conveys the referent semantically but in a 
euphemistic manner. Taking into consideration the type of marital intercourse mentioned 
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in the āyah, Abdel Haleem’s choice might be reasonable. To put it differently, the phrase 
‘consummation of marriage’ designates a specific type of marital intercourse compatible 
with what is mentioned in [Q. 4:23], though the use of ‘go in/unto’ would have conveyed 
the intended meaning implicitly and maintain the euphemism.    
Kināyah 22 
Table 6.19: Translations of Kināyah expression 22. 
﴾اًظيِلَغ ًاقَاﺜي ِّم مُكنِم َنْذََخأَو  ٍﺾْعَب ٰﻰَلِإ ْمُكُضْعَب ٰﻰَضَْفأ َْدقَو ُهَنُوذُْخَأت َفْيَكَو﴿ in [Q. 4:21] 
Literal translation: (And how do you take it and already some of you have reached the 
other and they [wives] have taken from you a solemn pledge) 
Referent:  sexual intercourse Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
Ali And how could ye take it when ye have gone in unto each other, and 
they have Taken from you a solemn covenant?  
 
Hilali & Khan 
And how could you take it (back) while you have gone in unto each 
other, and they have taken from you a firm and strong covenant? 
Saheeh  
International 
And how could you take it while you have gone in unto each other 
and they have taken from you a solemn covenant? 
 
Abdel Haleem 
How could you take it when this is unjust and a blatant sin? How could 
you take it when you have lain with each other and they have taken a 
solemn pledge from you? 
It is clear that all four translators have decided to render  ٍضْعَب ٰﻰَِلإ ْمُكُﻀْعَب ٰﻰَﻀَْفأ semantically 
rather than literally, since the latter would confuse the reader and lead him/her to 
miscomprehend the intended meaning. The translators chose idiomatic TL expressions, 
which are also used in some versions of the Hebrew Scriptures. Ali, Hilali and Khan, and 
Saheeh International again use the phrase ‘gone in unto each other’, whereas Abdel 
Haleem uses ‘lain with each other’. Most importantly, the expressions they have used 
convey the intended meaning of sexual intercourse implicitly and euphemistically as the 
original expression does. 
Kināyah 23 and 24 
Table 6.20: Translations of kināyah expressions 23 and 24 
﴿ ... َنُوفاََخت يِت ﱠﻼلاَو ﱠُنهَزوُُشن  َو ﱠنُهوُظِعَف ِعِجاَضَمْلا يِف ﱠُنهوُرُجْها﴾...  in [Q.4:34] 
﴿ اَهِلَْعب نِم َْتفاَخ ٌَةأَرْما ِِنإَواًزوُُشن ...﴾  in [Q. 4:128] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 4:34]: (and [those wives] whom you fear their elevation, advise them and forsake them 
in bed)  
[Q. 4:128]: (And if a woman fears an elevation from her husband) 
Referent: 
(1) لازوشن جوزلا/ةجوزلا : The ill-behaviour of the spouse towards the 
other partner and not fulfilling their marital responsibilities.   
Purpose of kināyah: 
(1) Exaggeration 
(2) Euphemism 
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(2) عجﻀملا يف ةجوزلا رجه: To avoid having intercourse with the 
wife. 
 
Ali 
[Q. 4:34]: ...  As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-
conduct, admonish them (first)*, (Next), refuse to share their beds … 
[Q. 4:128]: If a wife fears cruelty … 
 
Hilali & 
Khan 
[Q. 4:34]: ... As to those women on whose part you see ill-conduct, 
admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds … 
[Q. 4:128]: And if a woman fears cruelty … 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 4:34]: ... But those [wives] from whom you fear arrogance - [first] 
advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed … 
[Q. 4:128]: And if a woman fears from her husband contempt … 
 
Abdel 
Haleem 
[Q. 4:34]: ... If you fear high-handedness* from your wives, remind them 
[of the teachings of God], then ignore them when you go to bed … 
[Q. 4:128]: If a wife fears high-handedness … 
In respect of the translation of جوزلا/ةجوزلا زوُُشن, the translators seem to have decided to 
avoid a literal rendition and opt for a semantic one, which is a wise decision since the 
former method of rendition would not make sense, and hence, confuse the TT reader. 
What is interesting is that though the translators adopted the same method of translation, 
the outcome differs in different cases. Perhaps this diversity is ascribed to the way the 
different translators interpret the spouses’ act of defiance based on Qur’anic exegesis. Ali, 
for example, chooses the phrase, ‘disloyalty and ill-conduct’ to describe the wife’s 
defiance in [Q. 4:34] and the word ‘cruelty’ for the husband’s defiance in [Q. 4:128]. 
Apart from the word ‘disloyalty’, Hilali and Khan’s renditions are similar to Ali’s. Saheeh 
International also choose different words to describe the wife and husband’s defiance 
towards each other, ‘arrogance’ and ‘contempt’ respectively. Unlike the rest of the 
translators, Abdel Haleem decides to be consistent in his rendition of the spouses’ 
defiance by using a general expression, ‘high-handedness’. This phrase, however, may 
seem appropriate for a husband’s attitude more than that of his spouse, since authority 
and the family’s provision are traditionally one of the husband’s marital responsibilities, 
though currently these responsibilities have become mutual. Abdel Haleem usually uses 
contemporary vocabulary, hence, the usage of ‘high-handedness’, but in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding he explains through a footnote the meaning of زوُُشن and states the 
following:  
The verb nashaza from which nushuz is derived means ‘to become high’, ‘to 
rise’. See also verse 128, where the same word is applied to husbands. It 
applies to a situation where one partner assumes superiority to the other and 
behaves accordingly (2005, author’s italics). 
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As to the renditions of the other kināyah ال َه ْج ِعِجاَﻀَمْلا يِف ُر , the translators, except for Saheeh 
International, opt for a semantic rendition rather than a literal one. Ali and Hilali and 
Khan’s renditions are similar, but their interpretation differs from the actual intended 
meaning, i.e. to avoid having intercourse with the wife. Apparently, they have decided 
not to follow what the majority of exegetes had to say concerning this kināyah and opt 
for one of the other exegetical versions, which suggest avoiding sharing the same bed 
with the wife (see the previous chapter). Unlike Ali and Hilali and Khan, Abdel Haleem 
follows the interpretation of the majority of exegetes. His rendition suggests that the 
husband could share the same bed with his wife, but his use of the word ‘ignore’ delivers 
the meaning of disregarding any activity with her in a euphemistic manner to a certain 
degree as the ST phrase does. Differently from the rest of the translators, Saheeh 
international opt for being faithful to the ST and render the kināyah literally. However, 
the TT reader may comprehend their literal rendition either as abandoning intercourse or 
literally abandoning sleeping in the same bed with the wife as a minority of exegetes 
presume. 
Kināyah 25 and 26 
Table 6.21: Translations of kināyah expressions 25 and 26. 
 ْمُهَدنِعَو﴿ ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق ﴾ٌنيِع  in [Q. 37:48] 
 ْمُهَدنِعَو﴿ ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق ﴾ٌباَرَْتأ  in [Q. 38:52] 
﴾ ﱞناَج َﻻَو ْمُهَلَْبق ٌسنِإ ﱠنُهْثِمَْطي ْمَل  ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق ﱠنِهِيف﴿ in [Q. 55:56] 
﴾ ﱞناَج َﻻَو ْمُهَلَْبق ٌسنِإ  ﱠنُهْثِمَْطي ْمَل﴿ in [Q. 55:74] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 37:48]: (And with them [women of] restrained eyes/glances and beautiful wide eyes)  
[Q. 38: 52]: (And with them [women of] restrained eyes/glances [and of] equal age)  
[Q. 55:56]: (In them are [women of] restrained eyes/glances whom no man had 
touched/menstruated them before nor jinn)  
[Q. 55:74]: (No man had touched/menstruated them before nor jinn) 
Referent: 
1-  ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق: Faithful, chaste, and modest women. 
2- ةأرملا ثمط: The blood from a woman’s hymen breakage 
due to intercourse, hence,  ﱠنُهْﺜِمَْطي ْمَل refers to the women’s 
virginity.   
Purpose of kināyah: 
1- Elegance and 
exaggeration. 
2- Euphemism and 
exaggeration.  
 
 
 
 
Ali 
[Q.37:48]: And besides them will be chaste women, restraining 
their glances, with big eyes* (of wonder and beauty)  
[Q. 38:52]: And beside them will be chaste women restraining 
their glances, (companions) of equal age 
[Q. 55:56]: In them will be (Maidens), chaste, restraining their 
glances*, whom no man or Jinn before them has touched 
[Q. 55:74]: Whom no man or Jinn before them has touched 
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Hilali & Khan 
[Q.37:48]: And with them will be Qāsirāt-at-Tarf [chaste females 
(wives), restraining their glances (desiring none except their 
husbands)], with wide and beautiful eyes 
[Q. 38:52]: And beside them will be Qāsirāt-at-Tarf [chaste 
females (wives), restraining their glances (desiring none except 
their husbands)], (and) of equal ages 
[Q. 55:56]: Wherein both will be Qāsirāt-ut-Tarf [chaste females 
(wives), restraining their glances desiring none except their 
husbands] with whom no man or jinni had tamth* 
[Q. 55:74]: With whom no man or jinni has had tamth* before them 
 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q.37:48]: And with them will be women limiting [their] glances*, 
with large, [beautiful] eyes 
[Q. 38:52]: And with them will be women limiting [their] glances* 
and of equal age 
[Q. 55:56]: In them are women limiting [their] glances*, 
untouched* before them by man or jinni 
[Q. 55:74]: Untouched before them by man or jinni 
 
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q.37:48]: With them will be spouses– modest of gaze and beautiful 
of eye– 
[Q. 38:52]: they will have well-matched [wives] with modest gaze 
[Q. 55:56]: There will be maidens restraining their glances, 
untouched beforehand by man or jinn 
[Q. 55:74]: Untouched beforehand by man or jinn 
With regards to the renditions of  ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق, Ali and Saheeh International render the 
kināyah literally. Saheeh International, however, add a footnote in their translation of 
[Q.37:48] explaining that what is meant by ‘limiting [their] glances’ is “chaste and 
modest, looking only at their mates”. Saheeh International also provide similar notes in 
their translations of [Q. 38:52] and [Q. 55:56]. Ali, by contrast, explicitly adds the 
intended meaning of the kināyah to his literal translation.  Ali’s translations are also 
accompanied by footnotes which have an exegetical sense. In his footnote related to [Q. 
55:56], Ali states: “[t]heir purity is the feature chiefly symbolised”. One of the 
procedures, i.e. either a literal translation or explicitly stating the intended meaning, 
would suffice, or at least pointing out the intended meaning in a footnote like Saheeh 
International.  
On the other hand, both Hilali and Khan and Abdel Haleem avoid a literal translation. 
Hilali and Khan, interestingly, decide to borrow, i.e. use as a loan word (phrase),  ُتاَرِصاَق
 ِفْرﱠطلا and transliterate it into the TT along with an explanation inserted between brackets. 
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Their explanation is virtually the same as the literal renditions provided by Ali and Saheeh 
International, apart from the additions ‘desiring none except their husbands’. Therefore, 
it seems that there was no need to borrow the ST phrase into the TT especially given that 
their literal rendition and additions could deliver the intended meaning of the kināyah 
sufficiently. Abdel Haleem provides a semantic rendition in [Q.37:48] and [Q. 38:52], 
but in [Q. 55:56] he opts for a literal translation accompanied by an addition similar to 
Ali’s. Probably Abdel Haleem thought that his description of the women as maidens along 
with a literal rendition was sufficient not to approach the ST expression semantically. 
However, there is no reason for this inconstistency, i.e. why he did not apply the same 
method in his previous renditions? Moreover, his translation of  ِفْرﱠطلا ُتاَرِصاَق as ‘modest 
of gaze/modest gaze’ (ءايحب/ةلوجخ ةقداح ةرظن) is not as idiomatic as ‘lowering/dropping 
one’s eyes/gaze’, and therefore does not, to a certain degree, convey the intended meaning 
of the original expression.    
In respect of the renditions of  ﱠنُهْﺜِمْطَي ْمَل, all the translators, except for Hilali and Khan, have 
decided to provide a literal rendition, which adequately conveys the intended meaning 
euphemistically as does the original expression. Though the expression of a woman not 
having been touched by a man before clearly suggests that she never had sex before, 
hence, a virgin, Saheeh International explain in their translation of [Q. 55:56] that  ّنُهْﺜِمْطَي ْمَل 
literally means “they have not been caused to bleed by loss of virginity”.    
On the other hand, Hilali and Khan, strangely once again decide to borrow the ST 
expression into the TT, and explain in a footnote that the meaning of ثمط is “opening 
their hymens with sexual intercourse”. Obviously, there was no need for this borrowing 
especially given that a literal rendition could have delivered the intended meaning in the 
same way as the original expression. Even if we were to assume that they have employed 
this procedure to add some flavour or elements of the SL culture in the TT, or for stylistic 
and rhetorical reasons, it would not make sense, because their translations, in general, are 
more of an exegetical nature rather than a stylistic one.   
Kināyah 27 
Table 6.22: Translations of kināyah expression 27 
﴿ ُهْتَدَواَرَو  اَهِتَْيب ِيف َُوه يِتﱠلا ِهِسْفﱠن نَع﴾ ... َتْيَه ْتَلاَقَو َباَوَْبْﻷا َِتقﱠلَغَو  in [Q. 12:23] 
 َيِه َلَاق﴿ يِسْفﱠن نَع يِنْتَدَواَر﴾...  in [Q. 12:26] 
 ِزيِزَعْلٱ َُةأَرْمٱ ِةَنيِدَمْلٱ يِف ٌةَوِْسن َلاَقَو﴿ ِهِسْفﱠن نَع اَهَاتَف ُدِواَُرت ﴾...  in [Q. 12:30] 
 ْدَقَلَو ...﴿ ِهِسْفﱠن نَع ُهﱡتدَواَر ﴾... َمَصَْعتْساَف  in [Q. 12:32] 
Literal translation: 
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[Q. 12:23]: (she coaxed/cajoled him [the person] who is in her house about/from himself  
and closed the doors and said come here ...) 
[Q. 12:26]: (He said, she coaxed/cajoled me about/from myself …) 
[Q. 12:30]: (And women in the city said, al-Azīz’s woman (wife) is coaxing/cajoling her 
young [slave] man about/from himself …)  
[Q. 12:32]: (… and I did coaxed/cajoled him about/from himself and he resisted …)  
Referent: Seduction: to persuade someone, gently and 
in a deceptive way, to have sex with 
Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism 
 
 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 12:23]: But she in whose house he was, sought to seduce him* from 
his (true) self: she fastened the doors, and said: "Now come, thou (dear 
one)!" … 
[Q. 12:26]: He said: "It was she that sought to seduce me* - from my 
(true) self." … 
[Q. 12:30]: Ladies said in the City: "The wife of the (great) 'Aziz is 
seeking to seduce her slave from his (true) self … 
[Q. 12:32]: … I did seek to seduce him from his (true) self but he did 
firmly save himself guiltless! .... 
 
 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 12:23]: And she, in whose house he was, sought to seduce him (to 
do an evil act), she closed the doors and said: "Come on, O you." … 
[Q. 12:26]: He [Yusuf (Joseph)] said: "It was she that sought to seduce 
me," … 
[Q. 12:30]: And women in the city said: "The wife of Al-'Azīz is seeking 
to seduce her (slave) young man … 
[Q. 12:32]: … and I did seek to seduce him, but he refused … 
 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 12:23]: And she, in whose house he was, sought to seduce him. She 
closed the doors and said, "Come, you." … 
[Q. 12:26]: [Joseph] said, "It was she who sought to seduce me." … 
[Q. 12:30]: And women in the city said, "The wife of al-'Azeez is seeking 
to seduce her slave boy … 
[Q. 12:32]: … And I certainly sought to seduce him, but he firmly 
refused … 
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 12:23]: The woman in whose house he was living tried to seduce 
him: she bolted the doors and said, ‘Come to me,’ … 
[Q. 12:26]: but he said, ‘She tried to seduce me.’ … 
[Q. 12:30]: Some women of the city said, ‘The governor’s wife is trying 
to seduce her slave! … 
[Q. 12:32]: … I tried to seduce him and he wanted to remain chaste … 
All of the translators have agreed to translate سفنلا نع ةدوارملا semantically using the phrase 
‘try/seek to seduce’. Choosing the word ‘seduce’ is wise because it implies the same sense 
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as the intended meaning of the original expression, which is persuading someone, in a 
gentle way and not too directly to agree to have sex with you. Therefore, since ‘seduce’ 
on its own is sufficient to convey the intended meaning of the ST expression, there is no 
need for any additions to the translation, as made by Ali, especially given that his 
translations of [Q.12:23] and [Q. 12:26] were accompanied by exegetical footnotes, or to 
add any explanations, as Hilali and Khan did in their translation of [Q. 12:23]. 
Kināyah 28 
Table 6.23: Translations of kināyah expression 28. 
  ...﴿اَهَجْرَف ْتَنَصَْحأ ﴾...  in [Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12] 
 ْمُه َنيِذﱠلاَو﴿ ْمِهِجوُُرفِل  َنوُِظفاَح﴾  in [Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29] 
 َ...﴿ ْمُهَجوُُرف اوُظَفَْحي ﴾...  in [Q. 24:30] 
 ...﴿ ﱠنُهَجوُُرف َنْظَفَْحي ﴾...  in [Q. 24:31] 
 ...﴿ ْمُهَجوُُرف َنيِظِفاَحْلا ﴾...  in [Q. 33:35] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: (fortified her slit/opening/orifice [private parts (pudendum)]) 
[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]: (they whom preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private 
parts]) 
[Q. 24:30]: (preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts]) 
[Q. 24:31]: (preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts]) 
[Q. 33:35]: ([who] preserve their slits/openings/orifices [private parts]) 
Referent: 
‘جرفلا’ on its own is a referent for the human’s 
private parts. If it is accompanied by the words 
‘نصح’ or ‘ﻆفح’ then the whole phrase becomes a 
referent for refraining from any sexual activity 
(protecting/maintaining chastity) 
Purpose of kināyah: 
The purpose of using ‘جرفلا’ as a 
kināyah for the private parts is 
euphemism. The purpose of the 
whole phrase, i.e. ‘جرفلا ﻆفح/نصح’ is 
euphemism and elegance 
 
 
 
Ali 
[Q. 21:91]* and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity … 
[Q. 23:5]: Who abstain from sex*  
[Q. 70:29]: And those who guard their chastity 
[Q. 24:30]: … guard their modesty* … 
[Q. 24:31]: … guard their modesty* … 
[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their chastity … 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity … 
[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]*: And those who guard their chastity (i.e. 
private parts, from illegal sexual acts) 
[Q. 24:30]: … protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) … 
[Q. 24:31]: … protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) … 
[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their chastity (from illegal sexual acts) … 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity … 
[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]: … who guard their private parts 
[Q. 24:30]: … guard their private parts* … 
[Q. 24:31]: … guard their private parts … 
[Q. 33:35]: … who guard their private parts … 
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Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 21:91] and [Q. 66:12]: … guarded her chastity … 
[Q. 23:5] and [Q. 70:29]: who guard their chastity 
[Q. 24:30]: … guard their private parts … 
[Q. 24:31]: … guard their private parts … 
[Q. 33:35]: … chaste men and women … 
If one takes into consideration the translation of the SL word جرفلا on its own, one notices 
that most of the translators have avoided a literal rendition and decided to render it 
semantically. However, if one takes into account the rendition of the whole phrase 
جرفلا ﻆفح/نصح, which is the essential part because it leads to the intended meaning, one 
realises that they use a semi-semantic method. That is to say, the translators render half 
of the phrase literally, ‘guard’ for ﻆفح/نصح and the other half semantically, ‘chastity’ or 
‘private parts’ for جرفلا. The only slight issue is that though the word ‘guard’ is a near-
synonym of ‘preserve’, the latter would probably sound more accurate, namely with 
‘chastity’ than ‘guard’. That is because chastity is not something tangible that can be 
guarded, such as one’s private parts, but it is more of a principle or state that can be 
preserved or maintained. 
All of the renditions produced by the translators do in fact succeed in conveying the 
intended meaning, but we cannot say the same with regards to the purpose of the kināyah 
usage. In other words, not all of the renditions succeed in delivering the referent in the 
same manner as the ST did, i.e. euphemistically. For instance, in his rendition of [Q. 23:5], 
Ali uses the word ‘sex’ which eliminates the euphemistic function. The question is why 
Ali did not render [Q. 23:5] the same way he rendered [Q. 70:29], especially given that 
both āyahs are exactly the same. Another question is why did Ali use the word ‘modesty’ 
rather than chastity in his translations of [Q. 24:30-31]? Possibly the reason for this using 
‘modesty’ is that, according to OED, ‘modest’ can refer to the human’s private parts; it 
can also refer to the common meaning, which is dressing or behaving scrupulously to 
avoid impropriety or indecency, mainly to avoid drawing sexual attention. Both meanings 
can be employed, according to a few Qur’anic exegetes. The answer to this question may 
lie in the following comments, which Ali placed as footnotes:  
The rule of modesty applies to men as well as women. A brazen stare by a 
man at a woman (or even at a man) is a breach of refined manners. Where sex 
is concerned, modesty is not only “good form”: it is not only to guard the 
weaker sex, but also to guard the spiritual good of the stronger sex [in Ali’s 
rendition of (Q. 24:30)]. 
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The need of modesty is the same in both men and women. But in account of 
the differentiation of the sexes in nature, temperaments and social life, a 
greater amount of privacy is required for women than for men, especially in 
the manner of dress and the uncovering of the bosom [in Ali’s rendition of 
(Q. 24:31)]. 
It is probably clear from Ali’s notes that what he meant by ‘modesty’ is the behaviour 
rather than the actual private parts, which is not exactly compatible with what the majority 
of exegetes have argued. Therefore, in our view, ‘chastity’ is more adequate in this 
context than ‘modesty’. Saheeh International, in their translation of [Q. 24:30], went 
along with the majority of exegetes, but in a footnote they refer to the sense of unlawful 
acts.  
Hilali and Khan also fail to achieve the function of euphemism in most of their 
translations due to the use of the word ‘sexual’ in their added explanations. They could 
have easily avoided this by placing their explanations in a footnote instead of placing 
them within the text. 
Kināyah 29 and 30 
Table 6.24: Translations of kināyah expressions 29 and 30. 
﴿  َﻻَو َكﱠدَخ ْر ِّعَُصت َﻻَو ِساﱠنلِل يِف ِﺶَْمتٱ ِضَْرﻷ  ً احَرَم  ﱠنِإٱ َ ﱠ๡  ٍروُخَف ٍلَاتْخُم ﱠﻞُك ﱡبِحُي َﻻ﴾  in [Q. 31:18] 
﴿ َﻻَواًحَرَم ِضَْرْﻷا يِف ِﺶَْمت ...﴾  in [Q. 17:37] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 31:18]: (And do not bend [aside] your cheek (wry-cheek) to people nor walk exultantly 
on the earth, verily Allah does not like all boastful swaggers) 
[Q. 17:37]: (And do not walk exultantly on the earth …) 
Referent: 
دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت: contempt with haughtiness. 
رم يشملاح ً ا : Self-conceit and arrogance. 
Purpose of kināyah: 
To exaggerate impolite 
demeanour or behaviour. 
 
Ali 
[Q. 31:18]: And swell not thy cheek* (for pride) at men, nor walk in 
insolence through the earth; for Allah loveth not any arrogant boaster 
[Q. 17:37]: Nor walk on the earth* with insolence … 
 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 31:18]: And turn not your face away from men with pride, nor walk 
in insolence through the earth. Verily, Allah likes not each arrogant 
boaster*  
[Q. 17:37]: And walk not on the earth with conceit and arrogance … 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 31:18]: And do not turn your cheek [in contempt] toward people* 
and do not walk through the earth exultantly. Indeed, Allah does not 
like everyone self-deluded and boastful﴿  
[Q. 17:37]: And do not walk upon the earth exultantly …*  
 
 Abdel Haleem 
[Q. 31:18]: Do not turn your nose up at people, nor walk about the 
place arrogantly, for God does not love arrogant or boastful people 
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[Q. 17:37]: Do not strut arrogantly about the earth  
Concerning the translations of the first kināyah expression دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت, the translators have 
produced different renditions from one another, though some of them have used similar 
translation techniques. For example, on a prima facie account, Ali attempts to render the 
first half of دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت, i.e. رِيِعَْصت, semantically and the second half دخلا literally (though in 
fact the whole phrase is probably rendered semantically as will be discussed below). His 
mixed-translation method, mainly his choice of words, have led the outcome to be more 
or less confusing. The word ‘swell’, which Ali chose, along with ‘thy (your) cheek’ and 
the addition of ‘for pride’ does not generally convey the sense of bending or turning the 
cheek, nor does it express the feeling or emotion of being insolent and haughty. The word 
‘swell’ generally indicates inflation, distension, an increase of something, such as size, 
amount, and suchlike. It may, however, indicate the sense of ‘to curve’ or ‘making 
something curve’ as in ‘strong winds swelled the sails’, but it seems highly improbable 
that it will have this sense when it is used with ‘thy (your) cheek’. The appropriate way 
to use the word ‘swell’ in relation to the feeling or emotion of pride, anger, arrogance, 
insolence, haughtiness, and the like is to use it in the phrasal form ‘swell with’ followed 
by such personal characteristics; for instance, ‘do not swell with pride’. However, if Ali 
had done this, the rhetorical image of bending/turning the cheek to people to express 
insolence and haughtiness, which the SL expression holds, would be lost. Apart from 
Ali’s usage of ‘swell’, there is another issue related to the word ‘cheek’ that he chose to 
render دخلا. At first glance, one might think that Ali renders دخلا literally, which is natural 
because the word ‘cheek’ is indeed the English equivalent word for دخلا, but following a 
close look at his footnote one would probably think otherwise. Ali notes that “[t]he word 
‘cheek’ in English, too, means arrogance or effrontery, with a slightly different shade 
added, viz.: effrontery from one in an inferior position to one in a superior position. The 
Arabic usage is wider, and includes smug self-satisfaction and a sense of lofty 
superiority” [my italics and boldness]. Based on Ali’s note, particularly his usage of ‘too’, 
we can deduce that his intention in rendering the word دخلا as ‘cheek’ was probably 
semantic rather than literal. If we assume this to be true, then his usage of ‘thy’ (your) is 
incorrect, and he should have chosen the preposition ‘with’ instead, along with the word 
‘pride’. In short, Ali could have avoided this confusion by rendering the whole kināyah 
either literally as Saheeh International did or semantically using the appropriate 
collocations.  
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Saheeh international’s rendition, on the other hand, is purely literal. They do, however, 
show between brackets the purpose of such demeanour, i.e. the turning of the cheek 
towards people. They also add a footnote explaining that one way to respect a person is 
by directing one’s face and attention to them. Their addition and footnote is probably to 
remove any ambiguity in their literal rendition in case دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت is a culture-specific 
expression and gesture. Hilali and Khan’s rendition is very similar to that of Saheeh 
International. The difference between the two is that Hilali and Khan do not render the 
kināyah phrase literally as does Saheeh international, but they literally render the whole 
physical act that involves turning the cheek towards others. That is to say, when a person 
turns his cheek to another person, he does so by turning his face away. However, turning 
one’s face away, in the TL, is not necessarily a sign of insolence or haughtiness. 
Sometimes a person turns their face away because they are  shy or to avoid seeing 
something they do not like, and sometimes they do so out of respect, for example, when 
someone is changing his/her shirt. Therefore, Hilali and Khan add the phrase ‘with pride’ 
to their rendition to avoid any misunderstanding. They also add a footnote asking the TT 
reader go back to the Hadith mentioned in their footnote related to the kināyah expression 
 ِهِفْطِع َيِنَاث in [Q. 22:9] (see the following kināyah), in which they present a Hadith that 
demonstrates the stance of Islam towards a person with too much pride. 
Unlike the rest of the translators, Abdel Haleem avoids using both translation methods, 
literal and semantic, and decides to render دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت using an idiomatic TL expression. 
The phrase ‘turn up one’s nose (at something)’ that Abdel Haleem chose is normally used 
in the TL informally to show disdain or contempt, but there is another idiomatic TL 
expression, which is more formal, that shows a haughty or disdainful manner, which is 
‘with one's nose in the air’. Perhaps Abdel Haleem was in favour of the former expression 
because it includes the word ‘turn’, which conveys the meaning of  َرِعَص. Nonetheless, 
Abdel Haleem’s translation does in fact convey the intended meaning of the original 
expression but with a different image. The image of the original expression is associated 
with a disease which when a camel is infected with it, it is forced to bend its neck. 
Therefore, the image of depicting contempt and arrogance as a disease is not conveyed 
through ‘turn up one’s nose (at something)’      
As for the translations of يشملا  يِفٱ ِضَْرﻷ  َم َر ًاح , it appears that the translators, apart from 
Saheeh International, tried to render the intended meaning explicitly, specifically with the 
word  َاحرم, in both of its occurrences, [Q. 31:18] and [Q. 17:37]. Ali chose the word 
‘insolence’ in both his translations. The common meaning of ‘insolence’ is disrespectful, 
 -246- 
offensive, impudent, or rude behaviour. It may also refer to a person being arrogantly 
contemptuous or overbearing, but it is rarely used in this sense. Despite the slight 
differences in these meanings, Ali puts an end to any ambiguity, if there is any, by 
pointing out in a footnote in [Q. 17:37], where the expression first occurred, that 
arrogance or undue elation are also included.  
In their rendition of the same ST expression, namely in [Q. 17:37], Hilali and Khan chose 
to state the referent ‘conceit and arrogance’ explicitly. In the translation of [Q. 31:18], 
their rendition was precisely the same as Ali’s, which is quite surprising and raises the 
question of their inconsistency. As for Abdel Haleem, he too chose to translate the 
referent directly, but used only the word ‘arrogant’ in its adverbial form in both of his 
renditions. What is interesting about Abdel Haleem’s rendition, in [Q. 17:37], is his use 
of the word ‘strut’ instead of ‘walk’. The word ‘strut’ and its near-synonyms, such as 
‘swagger’ and ‘prance’, mainly refer to the way a person walks proudly and confidently, 
though ‘swagger’ is the most common word used to show disapproval. Therefore, one 
might wonder why Abdel Haleem did not use the word ‘strut’ or ‘swagger’ again in his 
rendition of [Q. 31:18]. Also, why did not the other translators who chose a semantic 
translation method use one of these words, specifically ‘swagger’, as it is usually used to 
show disapproval? That is to say, the words ‘strut’, ‘prance’ or ‘swagger’, and particularly 
the last, would have been a suitable choice for those who chose to apply a semantic 
rendition. 
In contrast to the rest of the translators, Saheeh International render يشملا  يِفٱ ِضَْرﻷ  َم َر ً اح  
literally in both of its occurrences. In its first occurrence, [Q. 17:37], Saheeh International 
accompany their rendition with a footnote stating that “[m]an, for all his arrogance, is yet 
a weak and small creature”. Therefore, the TT reader would definitely understand that 
what is meant by walking upon the earth exultantly is an arrogant person, in case the 
translation was not clear enough. 
Kināyah 31 
Table 6.25: Translations of kināyah expression 31. 
﴿ ِهِفْطِع َِينَاﺛ ِ ﱠဃ ِﻞيِبَس نَع ﱠﻞِﻀُيِل ...﴾  in [Q. 22:9] 
Literal translation: 
(Turning his side [away] to mislead [people] from Allah’s path …) 
Referent: contempt with arrogance; Insolence 
and haughtiness. 
Purpose of kināyah: To exaggerate 
impolite demeanour or behaviour 
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Ali (Disdainfully) bending his side, in order to lead (men) astray from 
the Path of Allah … 
Hilali & Khan Bending his neck in pride (far astray from the Path of Allah), and 
leading (others) too (far) astray from the Path of Allah … 
Saheeh  
International 
Twisting his neck [in arrogance] to mislead [people] from the way 
of Allah … 
Abdel Haleem turning scornfully aside to lead others away from God’s path … 
In respect of the interpretation of word  ُفْطِعلا, it appears that two of the translators, Hilali 
and Khan and Saheeh International, have decided to follow the exegetical works that 
suggest the part of the body that is twisted or turned away is the neck. The other two 
translators, Ali and Abdel Haleem, have decided to follow the other exegetical 
interpretation that suggests it is the person’s side. They do, however, agree on adding the 
state of turning one’s side/neck explicitly. Though the chosen words to describe the state 
of contempt or haughtiness are different from one another, they revolve around the same 
sense. These additions are probably an attempt to enable the TT reader to understand what 
is meant by turning one’s side (or neck) away, especially given that such a gesture in the 
sense of contempt and arrogance is not known in the TL culture. Hilali and Khan also add 
a footnote in which they present the following Hadith that demonstrates the stance of 
Islam towards such an insolent act: 
Narrated Abdullah bin Musʿūd هنع ﷲ يضر: Allah’s messenger ملسو هيلع ﷲ ﻰلص 
said, “Whosoever has pride in heart equal to the weight of an atom (or a small 
ant) shall not enter Paradise.” A person (amongst the audience) said, “Verily, 
a person loves that his dress should be beautiful, and his shoes should be 
beautiful.” The Prophet ملسو هيلع ﷲ ﻰلص remarked, “Verily, Allāh is the Most 
Beautiful and He loves beauty, (سانلا طمغو قحلا رطب :ربكلا) Pride is to 
completely disregard the truth, and to scorn (to look down upon) the people. 
(Sahih Muslim, Book of Faith, Vol.1, Hadīth No. 164) 
Apart from this addition, suffice it to say that Ali and Abdel Haleem’s renditions can be 
described as literal renditions, despite Abdel Haleem’s omission of the singular 
possessive pronoun (هــ). On the other side, Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International’s 
renditions are not quite literal. Hence, they can be seen as semi-semantic renditions 
because they employed the word ‘neck’ instead of ‘side’. 
Kināyah 32 
Table 6.26: Translations of kināyah expression 32. 
 َو َضَرَْعأ ِناَسنِﻹا ﻰَلَع اَنْمَعَْنأ َآِذإَو﴿ ِهِبِناَجِب َىأَن  ﴾اًسوُؤَي َناَك ﱡرﱠشلا ُهﱠسَم َاِذإَو  in [Q. 17:83] 
Literal translation: 
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(And when We bestow [grace/favour] on humankind, he turns away and distances [himself] 
through his side [or withdraw aside], and when evil touches him he becomes in despair. 
Referent: Insolence and haughtiness; contempt 
with arrogance 
Purpose of kināyah: To exaggerate 
impolite demeanour or behaviour. 
 
Ali 
Yet when We bestow Our favours on man, he turns away and 
becomes remote on his side (instead of coming to Us [sic]), and 
when evil seizes him he gives himself up to despair! 
 
Hilali & Khan 
And when We bestow Our Grace on man (the disbeliever), he 
turns away and becomes arrogant (far away from the Right Path). 
And when evil touches him he is in great despair 
Saheeh  International And when We bestow  favor upon man  [i.e.,  the disbeliever], he  
turns  away  and  distances  himself;  and when  evil  touches him, 
he is ever despairing 
Abdel Haleem When We favour man he turns arrogantly to one side, but when 
harm touches him, he falls into despair 
Both Ali and Saheeh International employ a literal method in rendering the kināyah 
expression بناجلاب يأنلا, particularly Ali. The difference between the two renditions is that 
Ali adds an explanation between brackets whereas Saheeh International do not. Another 
difference is that Saheeh International omit any equivalent of the phrase هبناجب from their 
rendition. Perhaps the reason for Saheeh International’s omission is so that the TT can 
read fluently, because rendering the SL preposition ‘ـب’ literally, using ‘on’, ‘at’, or 
‘through’, along with ‘his side’ would probably hinder the fluency. Rendering هبناجب as ‘to 
one side’ (distances himself to one side) seems an appropriate way to overcome this 
problem, if a translator wants to be more faithful to the ST. On the other hand, Hilali and 
Khan have decided to render the intended meaning of the kināyah explicitly, using the 
word ‘arrogant’. However, they strangely add an explanation to their rendition, which the 
TT reader can get a grasp of through the context. In other words, Hilali and Khan’s 
addition is not necessarily. Abdel Haleem also attempts to render the intended meaning 
of turning to one’s side. However, we can deduce that Abdel Haleem considers the acts 
of ‘turning away’ and ‘distancing oneself to one side’ are more or less similar to each 
other. Hence, he decided to merge the words ضارعﻹا and يأنلا together and render 
explicitly the state of that person who refuses to obey Allah and turns away from His 
obedience. 
Kināyah 33 
Table 6.27: Translations of kināyah expression 33. 
 ِ ﱠဃ ُلوُسَر ْمُكَل ْرِفَْغتْسَي اَْولاََعت ْمُهَل َﻞيِق َاذِإَو﴿ ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠَول ﴾َنوُرِبَْكتْس ﱡم مُهَو َنوﱡدَُصي ْمَُهتَْيأَرَو  [Q.63: 5] 
Literal translation: 
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(And when they are told, ‘Come, the Messenger of Allah [will] ask forgiveness for you’, 
they twist their heads [away/aside], and you see them turning away arrogantly) 
Referent: contempt with arrogance; ridicule and 
haughtiness. 
Purpose of kināyah: To exaggerate 
impolite demeanour or behaviour. 
 
Ali 
And when it is said to them, "Come, the Messenger of Allah will pray 
for your forgiveness", they turn aside their heads, and thou wouldst 
see them turning away their faces in arrogance 
 
Hilali & Khan 
And when it is said to them: "Come, so that the Messenger of Allah 
may ask forgiveness from Allah for you", they turn aside their 
heads, and you would see them turning away their faces in pride* 
 
Saheeh  
International 
And when  it  is said  to  them,  "Come,  the Messenger  of Allāh will  
ask  forgiveness  for  you,"  they  turn  their  heads  aside  and you 
see them evading while they are arrogant 
 
Abdel Haleem 
They turn their heads away in disdain when they are told, ‘Come, 
so that the Messenger of God may ask forgiveness for you,’ and you 
see them walking away arrogantly 
The kināyah expression of سأرلا ْيَل is similar to دَخْلا رِيِعَْصت,  ِفْطِعلا ِيَنث and بناجلاب ِيأﱠنلا in 
terms of the meaning intended. It is clear that the translators have all rendered this kināyah 
purely literally. Interestingly, the translations of Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh 
International are free this time from any additions. We have noted that most of their 
previous translations of the expressions that involve gestures of contempt or arrogance 
were accompanied by additions or footnotes. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, maintains 
his consistency in adding an expression that describes the intention of the physical 
gesture, in other words, rendering the intended meaning explicitly. There are two possible 
reasons for Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh International not adding anything to their 
rendition, but we cannot say for sure which one is correct. The first possible reason is that 
they may have felt the TT reader can deduce the intended meaning through the context, 
especially given that the state of turning away, which is arrogantly, is mentioned at the 
end of the context. Thus, they possibly thought that there is no need for repetition. The 
other possible reason is that they might have followed some of the exegetes who believe 
that ‘ ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠَول’ is used in a literal sense rather than a figurative one. Whatever the case 
may be, Abdel Haleem’s rendition is most likely to be more accurate, if we take into 
consideration ‘ ْمُهَسوُؤُر اْو ﱠوَل’ is used in its figurative sense. By changing the structure in the 
TT and preposing the rendition of the kināyah expression, Abdel Haleem was able to 
maintain both meanings of the kināyah: contempt and arrogance, without even affecting 
the whole meaning of the ST. 
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Kināyah 34 
Table 6.28: Translations of kināyah expression 34. 
﴿ ِهِلَْهأ ﻰَِلإ َبَهَذ ﱠُمثﻰﱠطََمتَي﴾  in [Q. 75:33] 
Literal translation: (Then [he] went to his people, stretching his limbs [arms and legs]) 
Referent: 
Self-conceit and arrogance. 
Purpose of kināyah: 
To exaggerate impolite demeanour or behaviour. 
  Ali Then did he stalk to his family in full conceit*! 
 Hilali & Khan Then he walked in conceit (full pride) to his family admiring 
himself! 
Saheeh  
International 
And then he went to his people, swaggering [in pride] 
Abdel Haleem Walking back to his people with a conceited swagger 
It is worth noting that the expression ﻰﱠطََمت has the same referent as  يِف يشملاٱ ِضَْرﻷ  ًاحَرَم , 
which is self-conceit and arrogance. In spite of this fact, the renditions of ﻰﱠطََمت appears to 
be quite different from  ًاحَرَم يشملا, particularly in terms of word choices, even though the 
method(s) of translation employed by the translators are fairly similar. Some of the word 
choices had an impact on the whole rendition of the āyah, which led some of the 
translators to omit words, such as  َبََهذ, from their translation. This omission could have 
been avoided simply by choosing an appropriate word as Saheeh International did. To 
illustrate, Ali chose to render the whole āyah semantically, and chose the word ‘stalk’ 
along with the phrase ‘in full conceit’ to convey the sense of walking in a self-conceited 
and arrogant manner explicitly. By doing this he omitted any equivalent of the word  َبََهذ 
(went) from the TT. Regardless of whether or not the word ‘stalk’ is the correct choice, 
he could have easily avoided this omission simply by placing it at the end of the sentence, 
as in ‘he went to his family stalking in full conceit’. Furthermore, it is true that one of the 
meanings of the word ‘stalk’ in its verbal form is ‘striding in an angry or a proud manner, 
and often used disparagingly, implying haughtiness’, but usually it is accompanied by 
one of the adverbs ‘out’, ‘in’, ‘off’, or ‘away’. That is to say, Ali’s rendition in its current 
state lacks one of the adverbs, namely ‘off’. It should have been, at least, as follows: ‘he 
stalked off to his family in full conceit’. Ali’s addition of the phrase ‘in full conceit’, is 
probably understandable since the word ‘stalk’, in this current situation, does not only 
imply haughtiness but also sullenness, hence, the addition is made to avoid any confusion 
between the two possible interpretations. It is worthy of note that Ali also added a footnote 
in which he refers to both traits, conceit and arrogance. Hilali and Khan’s rendition of the 
whole āyah including the kināyah expression is also similar to Ali’s. That is, they too 
decide on rendering the whole āyah semantically, in an attempt to render the intended 
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meaning of ﻰطمتي explicitly. In this process, they also omit the ST word  َبََهذ from the TT. 
The differences between the two renditions are related to the choice of words and the 
amount of additions made in the translation. Hilali and Khan chose the word ‘walk’ along 
with the additional phrases ‘in conceit’ and ‘full pride’, most likely an attempt to convey 
the whole referent, i.e. self-conceit and arrogance. They strangely added a third additional 
phrase ‘admiring himself’ to the end of their rendition. Frankly, there is no need for this 
last addition because the previous two additions already indicate self-admiration; hence, 
it is merely a repetition. Again, Hilali and Khan could have easily avoided this third 
unnecessarily addition and the omission of the ST word  َبََهذ if they just had rendered the 
āyah literally and the kināyah expression semantically, as in ‘he went to his family 
walking in conceit (full pride)’, ‘he went to his family admiring himself’, or at least as 
‘he went swaggeringly to his family’ 
Concerning Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem, they have both chosen the TL word 
‘swagger’, which not only is an established idiomatic TL expression but also the closest 
equivalent TL expression to ﻰﱠطََمتَي in terms of both referent and physical behaviour. Both 
of their renditions were accompanied by additions. Saheeh International add the phrase 
‘in pride’ between square brackets, whereas Abdel Haleem adds the phrase ‘with a 
conceited’ within his rendition just before the word ‘swaggering’. As it happens, there is 
no need for these additions as the word ‘swagger’ already represents the sense of a person 
walking or behaving in a self-conceited and arrogant manner, with a disparaging 
association, similarly to the original expression. It is noteworthy that Abdel Haleem omits 
any equivalent of the ST word  َبََهذ from the TT, like Ali and Hilali and Khan, which 
simply could have been avoided had he rendered the āyah as literally as possible like 
Saheeh International. 
Kināyah 35 
Table 6.29: Translations of kināyah expression 35. 
...﴿  ْمُهُُسفَنأ َقَهَْزتنوُرِفاَك ْمُهَو﴾  in [Q. 9:55/85] 
   Literal translation:  
(…their souls perish/depart [with difficulty]/exit/fade away while they are disbelievers)  
Referent: To die. Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism, also reminding and warning of 
fate. 
Ali [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]*: …their souls may perish in their (very) 
denial of Allah  
Hilali & Khan [Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: … their souls shall depart (die) while they 
are disbelievers 
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Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 9:55] and [Q. 9:85]: … their souls should depart [at death] 
while they are disbelievers﴿ 
Abdel Haleem [Q. 9:55]: … for their souls to depart while they disbelieve 
[Q. 9:85]: … their souls should depart while they disbelieve 
All four translators have agreed on rendering  ْمُهُسُفَنأ َقَهَْزت literally. Ali chose the TL word 
‘perish’ in both of his translations, while the rest of the translators chose the word ‘depart’ 
in both of their translations. The word ‘perish’ is more likely to be closer to the literal 
sense than ‘depart’. Nonetheless, both words sufficiently assist the TT reader to 
comprehend the intended meaning of the kināyah, but not the image of departing with 
extreme difficulty. However, Hilali and Khan as well as Saheeh International seem to 
doubt that the TT reader would reach the intended meaning and therefore decided to add 
some information to their renditions in an attempt to help the reader to understand the 
referent. Hilali and Khan add the word ‘die’ between brackets, which is the referent. In 
other words, they state the intended meaning of the kināyah explicitly, telling the TT 
reader that what is meant by the departure of the soul is dying. Saheeh International, on 
the other hand, add the phrase ‘at death’ between square brackets. Saheeh international’s 
addition, however, does not imply the exact intended meaning as does that of  Hilali and 
Khan, but rather the phase in which the soul shall depart, which is evident and known to 
the TT reader. Since both Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International employed the 
translation by addition technique, they should have at least added the phrase ‘from/this 
life’, as in ‘their souls shall/should depart from/this life’, instead of ‘die’ or ‘at death’ 
respectively, especially given that it is an idiomatic TL phrase for ‘die’. Be that as it may, 
it seems strange that the translators did not choose the word ‘exit’ as they have decided 
on a literal rendition, particularly those who chose the word ‘depart’. Not only is ‘exit’ a 
near-synonym for ‘depart’, but also, according to OED, it can be used in figurative 
contexts to signify the meaning of ‘to die’, similarly to the SL phrase: “fig. and in 
figurative contexts; spec. (literary) to die, to depart from life” (OED). 
Kināyah 36 
Table 6.30: Translations of kināyah expression 36. 
﴿ َكَِيْتأَي ٰﻰﱠتَح َكﱠبَر ُْدبْعاَونيَِقيْلا﴾  in [Q. 15:99] 
 ا اَنَاَتأ ٰﻰﱠتَح﴿ ُنيِقَيْل﴾  in [Q. 74:47] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 15:99]: (And worship your Lord until the certainty comes to you) 
[Q. 74:47]: (Until the certainty comes to us) 
Referent: Death Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate. 
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Ali 
[Q. 15:99]: And serve thy Lord until there come unto thee the Hour 
that is Certain* 
[Q. 74:47]: Until there came to us (the Hour) that is certain* 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 15:99]: And worship your Lord until there comes unto you the 
certainty (i.e. death)* 
[Q. 74:47]: Until there came to us (the death) that is certain 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 15:99]: And worship your Lord until there comes to you the 
certainty [i.e., death] 
[Q. 74:47]: Until there came to us the certainty [i.e., death] 
Abdel Haleem [Q. 15:99]: worship your Lord until what is certain comes to you 
[Q. 74:47]: until the Certain End came upon us 
The four translators provide different renditions from one another in respect of  ُنيِقَيْلا 
despite using largely similar translation methods. Ali, for example, renders the kināyah 
expression literally, but uses the word ‘certain’ in its adjective form (rather than the noun 
‘certainty’) instead. He also adds the word ‘Hour’ to his rendition and abnormally 
capitalises it, which seems very peculiar, as it may mislead the TT reader to think it is the 
Judgement or Resurrection Day. The reason for this possible misinterpretation by the 
recipient is because ‘the Hour’ is one of several kināyah expressions used in the Qur’an 
for the Day/Time of Judgement or Resurrection. In an attempt to avoid such a 
misinterpretation, Ali points out the intended meaning explicitly through a footnote 
stating: “Yaqīn: Certainty: the Hour that is Certain: death”. However, this footnote might 
confuse or further mislead the TT reader, instead of clarifying the situation. That is to say, 
based on this footnote the TT reader would probably mistake the ‘Hour’ for death, in 
other parts of the Qur’an, while in fact it is the Day/Time of Judgement or Resurrection.  
Abdel Haleem also renders  ُنيِقَيْلا in [Q. 74:47] in a similar way to Ali, in terms of 
capitalisation and employing a literal translation method along with an addition. Though 
Abdel Haleem’s addition of ‘end’ is possibly more acceptable than Ali’s addition of 
‘hour’, in terms of conveying the sense of death, it still may confuse the TT recipient due 
to his capitalisation of the phrase just like Ali’s translation. The capitalisation of ‘Certain 
End’ might suggest to the TT reader that this certain end is the Time or Day of 
Resurrection and not death alone. Therefore, a footnote, similar to like Ali’s would clarify 
any possible ambiguity. As for Abdel Haleem’s rendition of [Q. 15:99], he also uses the 
word ‘certain’ in its adjective form, but this time without any additions. However, due to 
his use of ‘certain’ in its adjective form he had to add ‘what is’ (وه ام) for the text to be 
read smoothly.  
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With regards to Hilali and Khan and Saheeh International’s renditions, they are similar to 
each other. Hilali and Khan render  ُنيَِقيْلا literally using ‘certainty’ and ‘certain’ along with 
the word ‘death’ inserted between brackets in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] respectively. 
Saheeh International use ‘certainty’ consistently with the addition of the word ‘death’ 
inserted between brackets in [Q. 15:99] and [Q. 74:47] respectively. It is noteworthy that 
the word ‘certain’ collocates with ‘death’ forming the phrase, ‘certain death’, which is an 
idiomatic TL expression, but by doing so the one of the functions of the kināyah, i.e. 
euphemism, is lost in the TT. 
Kināyah 37: 
Table 6.31: Translations of kināyah expression 37. 
﴿ ٰﻰﱠتَح ُُمتْرُزٱ َرِباَقَمْل﴾  in [Q. 102:2] 
Literal translation: (Until you visit the graveyards)  
Referent: 
Death 
Purpose of kināyah: 
Euphemism, also reminding and warning of fate. 
Ali Until ye visit the graves* 
Hilali & Khan Until you visit the graves (i.e. till you die) 
Saheeh  International Until you visit the graveyards* 
Abdel Haleem until you go into your graves* 
There is a slight difference between ةَرَبْقَم (plural: رِبَاقَم [graveyards]) and رْبَق (plural: روُبُق 
[graves]). The former is a burial area where people are buried, while the latter is a place 
in the ground, a pit, where a corpse is buried. In other words, a graveyard is where you 
can find a number of graves, yet, Ali, Hilali and Khan, as well as Abdel Haleem have all 
decided to render ٱ َرِباَقَمْل  using the word ‘grave’ rather than its literal rendition, i.e. 
‘graveyards’. Saheeh International, on the other hand, have opted for the exact literal 
rendition. The word ‘grave’, according to OED is seen as “the natural destination or final 
resting-place of” every person, hence, it is sometime used to deliver the sense of being 
dead or death. For example, the phrases ‘to the grave’ or ‘to find one's grave’ mean ‘till 
death’ or ‘to meet one's death’ respectively (OED). Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English also notes that the expression ‘the grave’ is used in literature for 
the meaning of death. That being so, rendering ٱ َرِباَقَمْل  as ‘graves’ seems more appropriate 
than ‘graveyards’, particularly in this context in order to deliver the sense of death 
similarly to the original expression. 
As for the first part of the kināyah, i.e.  َراَز (visit), all the translators, except for Abdel 
Haleem, have rendered it literally. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, chose a semantic 
rendition using the TL phrase ‘go into’. He did, however, cite in a footnote that the literal 
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rendition of the āyah is “until you visit the graves”, and added that “[T]heir stay in the 
grave is like a short visit”. The word  َراَز (visit) conveys the image that a person after death 
remains in the grave for a period of time until the Day of Resurrection, which is a fact all 
Muslims believe. Nonetheless, the actual referent of رْبَقلا ةَراَيِز is ‘death’, which it seems 
only Ali and Hilali and Khan recognise, unlike Abdel Haleem and Saheeh International. 
This is clear from their notes or additions. For instance, Ali states in a footnote: “… until 
the time comes when you must lie down in the graves and leave the pomp and 
circumstance of an empty life”, while Hilali and Khan cite between brackets, within the 
TT, the intended meaning explicitly ‘till you die’. On the other hand, Saheeh 
International’s footnote is similar to Abdel Haleem’s; they state the following: “i.e. 
remain in them temporarily, meaning until the Day of Resurrection”. Therefore, even if 
the TT recipient who is reading Saheeh International’s rendition is able to comprehend 
the actual intended meaning, they would be misled into thinking otherwise because of 
such notes. 
Kināyah 38 
Table 6.32: Translations of kināyah expression 38. 
﴿ اوَُرقَعَف  ْمِهِّبَر ِرَْمأ ْنَع اَْوتَعَو ََةقاﱠنلا﴾...  in [Q. 7:77] 
﴿  اَهوُرَقَعَف ٍماﱠَيأ ََةثََﻼث ْمُكِراَد يِف ْاوُعﱠتََمت َلاَقَف﴾...  in [Q. 11:65] 
 ﴿اَهوُرَقَعَف ﴾َنيِمِداَن ْاوُحَبَْصأَف  in [Q. 26:157] 
﴿ ُهوُبﱠذَكَفاَهوَُرَقعَف﴾...  in [Q. 91:14] 
Literal translation: 
[Q. 7:77]: (So they hamstrung the she-camel and turned away from their Lord’s 
commandment …)  
[Q. 11:65]: (And then they hamstrung her, thereupon [he] said: enjoy [yourselves] in your 
homes for three days …) 
[Q. 26:157]: ( So they hamstrung her then [they] became regretful) 
[Q. 91:14]: (So they denied him and then hamstrung her)  
Referent: Kill (slaughter an animal) Purpose of kināyah: Euphemism; elegance 
 
 
 
 
Ali 
 
 
[Q 7:77]: Then they hamstrung the she-camel, and insolently defied the 
order of their Lord, … 
[Q. 11:65]: But they did hamstring her. So he said: "Enjoy yourselves in 
your homes for three days … 
[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her: then did they become full of 
regrets* 
[Q. 91:14]: Then they rejected him (as a false prophet), and they 
hamstrung her* … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
[Q. 7:77]: So they killed the she-camel and insolently defied the 
Commandment of their Lord, … 
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 [Q. 11:65]: But they killed her. So he said: "Enjoy yourselves in your 
homes for three days … 
[Q. 26:157]: But they killed her, and then they became regretful 
[Q. 91:14]: Then they denied him and they killed it … 
 
 
Saheeh  
International 
[Q. 7:77]: So they hamstrung the she-camel and were insolent toward the 
command of their Lord … 
[Q. 11:65]: But they hamstrung her, so he said, "Enjoy yourselves in your 
homes for three days … 
[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her and so became regretful 
[Q. 91:14]: But  they  denied  him  and  hamstrung* her … 
 
 
 
Abdel Haleem 
 
[Q. 7:77]: and then they hamstrung the camel. They deﬁed their Lord’s 
commandment …  
[Q. 11:65]: But they hamstrung it, so he said, ‘Enjoy life for another three 
days 
[Q. 26:157]: But they hamstrung her. In the morning they had cause to 
regret it 
[Q. 91:14]: but they called him a liar and hamstrung her 
It appears that Ali, Saheeh International, and Abdel Haleem chose to render رقع ةقانلا  
literally in all of its four occurrences. The TL word ‘hamstring’ carries the sense of being 
incapacitated or disabled but not being killed or slaughtered. Even the surrounding 
context in the TT does not imply that what is meant by hamstringing the she-camel is 
killing it. Hence, suffice it to say the intended meaning of the kināyah is lost in the 
rendition. In some cases where the rendition causes either a loss of meaning or confusion, 
the translators attempt to add some information within the TT (with or without brackets) 
or as a footnote to compensate or clarify this loss or confusion respectively. Abdel Haleem 
did nothing of the sort. Saheeh International, on the other hand, do in fact place a footnote 
in their translation of [Q. 91:14] and indicate that the she-camel is then killed. The only 
issue with Saheeh International’s clarification is that they only placed it in [Q. 91:14]. So, 
if we assume the TT reader is reading the Qur’an from the first sūrah, he/she will not 
understand the intended meaning of ‘hamstring’ cited in [Q. 7:77], [Q. 11:65], and [Q. 
26:157] until they reach [Q. 91:14]. In other words, Saheeh International were supposed 
to place their clarification in each āyah where ‘hamstring’ is cited as a rendition for ‘ رقع 
ةقانلا’, or at the very least in their rendition of [Q. 7:77] where it was first cited. In his 
renditions of [Q. 26:157] and [Q. 91:14], Ali too places footnotes, but they are merely 
exegetical. To put it another way, Ali’s footnotes are not intentionally placed to clarify 
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the intended meaning of ‘hamstring’ specifically, though the phrase ‘killing the she-
camel’ is mentioned in his exegetical footnote in [Q. 26:157]. 
On the other hand, Hilali and Khan have decided to avoid rendering the kināyah literally 
and instead they render the intended meaning directly, even if this is at the expenses of 
the kināyah’s function or image. Probably the reason for them doing this is that they 
thought the TT recipient would not be able to grasp the intended meaning of the kināyah 
through the word ‘hamstring’ or the surrounding context, which is probably true to a great 
extent. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are other TL words or phrases that 
express the meaning of killing with a less unpleasant association, such as ‘take the life’, 
‘end the life’ or ‘terminate’, assuming that the word ‘kill’ is too harsh or distasteful to cite 
explicitly. 
Kināyah 39 
Table 6.33: Translations of kināyah expression 39. 
﴿ يِّنِإ ِّبَر َلَاقيِّنِم ُمْظَعْلا َنَهَو ًابْيَش ُْسأ ﱠرلا ََﻞعَتْشاَو﴾...  in [Q. 19:4] 
Literal translation: (He said: My Lord, I indeed the bone [have] weakened from me and 
the head is flamed with grey/white)  
Referent: Loss of strength Purpose of kināyah: Elegance 
Ali Praying: "O my Lord! infirm indeed are my bones, and the hair 
of my head doth glisten with grey … 
Hilali & Khan ﴾He said: “My Lord! Indeed my bones have grown feeble, and 
grey hair has spread on my head … 
Saheeh  International He said, "My Lord, indeed my bones have weakened, and my 
head  has filled with white … 
Abdel Haleem Lord, my bones have weakened and my hair is ashen grey ... 
At first sight one would probably think that Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem’s 
renditions of  ُمَْظعْلا َنَهَو sound pure literal. However, in fact they are not, and neither are 
the renditions of Ali and Hilali and Khan. Regardless of the auxiliary verbs used and the 
renditions of  َنَهَو as ‘infirm’, ‘grown feeble’, or ‘weakened’, the translators have rendered 
the word  ُمْظَعْلا as ‘bones’ instead of ‘bone’. That is to say, they chose a plural form rather 
than a singular form, despite what the exegetes have explained regarding the significance 
of  ُمْظَعْلا being in its singular form (see the previous chapter for more details). The ST word 
 ُمْظَعْلا in its singular form represents all of the body’s bones, i.e. the whole body and to 
deliver this meaning in the TT the translators should have at least said ‘all of my bones’, 
‘every single bone of mine’, or ‘every single one of my bones’. So, the method of 
translation adopted by the translators in rendering the whole kināyah expression is more 
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or less literal but not purely literal. Having said that, the renditions do deliver the intended 
meaning, i.e. the loss of strength due to age, adequately, particularly with the surrounding 
context, which without question assists the TT reader in grasping this referent. 
Kināyah 40 
Table 6.34: Translations of kināyah expression 40. 
﴿ َو َفُسوُي ٰﻰَلَع ٰﻰَفََسأ اَي َلاَقَو ْمُهْنَع ٰﻰﱠلََوتَو ُهاَنْيَع ْتﱠَضيْبا ِنْزُحْلا َنِم ميِظَك َوَُهف﴾  in [Q. 12:84] 
Literal translation: (And he turned away from them, and said: “Alas for Joseph (Yusuf)!” 
And his eyes whited from grief, for he was filled with inward sorrow)   
Referent: 
blindness; Weep (shed tears; cry) 
Purpose of kināyah: 
Elegance and exaggeration 
 
 Ali  
And he turned away from them, and said: “How great is my grief for 
Joseph!” And his eyes became white* with sorrow, and he fell into 
silent melancholy 
 
Hilali & Khan 
And he turned away from them and said: “Alas, my grief for Yūsuf 
(Joseph)!” And he lost his sight because of the sorrow that he was 
suppressing 
Saheeh  
International 
And he turned away from them and said, “Oh, my sorrow over 
Joseph,” and his eyes became white* from grief, for he was [of that] 
a suppressor 
Abdel Haleem and he turned away from them, saying, ‘Alas for Joseph!’ His eyes 
went white with grief and he was ﬁlled with sorrow 
As explained in the previous chapter, there is a polarity of opinion amongst exegetes on 
the referential meaning of  ُهَانْيَع ْت ﱠﻀَيْبا. Some believe it is crying and others believe it is the 
loss of sight. Apparently, this polarity did not have a great effect on the translators’ 
renditions of the kināyah, since the majority of the translators, i.e. Ali, Saheeh 
International, and Abdel Haleem, have decided to render it literally. Ali and Saheeh 
International’s translations included footnotes in which Ali implies indirectly that  ْتﱠﻀَيْبا
 ُهاَنْيَع refers to crying whereas Saheeh International clearly note that the intended meaning 
is the loss of sight. Abdel Haleem’s translation was free of any notes leaving the TT reader 
to deduce the intended meaning.      
Unlike the rest of the translators, Hilali and Khan have decided to avoid a literal 
translation and render the intended meaning directly. Most likely they thought a literal 
method would not convey the intended meaning of the kināyah. This is probably because 
the general notion that a blind person’s eye turns white may not be that common in the 
TL culture. Regardless of the scientific facts, there a few who believe it might turn to 
white, grey, or cloudy white; otherwise why would motion pictures sometimes present a 
blind person with such an eye colour. In this case, why not use a literal translation, 
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especially given that it does not sound exotic, and most importantly it may convey the 
rhetorical image and function of the kināyah simultaneously. If there is any doubt 
respecting the TT’s reader’s ability to grasp the referent, this can be solved by a simple 
footnote as Saheeh International did with their translation. 
Kināyah 41 
Table 6.35: Translations of kināyah expression 41. 
 ﱠﻞَظ َٰﻰﺜُنْﻷِاب مُُهدََحأ َر ُِّشب َاذِإَو﴿  ا̒دَوْسُم ُهُهْجَو﴾ٌميِظَك َوُهَو  in [Q. 16:58] 
Literal translation: (When one of them is given [good] news of a [newborn] female, his 
face remains blackened/blackish with suppressed anger/grief)  
Referent: Sorrow Purpose of kināyah: Elegance and exaggeration  
Ali When news is brought to one of them, of (the birth of) a female (child), 
his face darkens, and he is filled with inward grief! 
 
Hilali & Khan 
And when the news of (the birth of) a female (child) is brought to any 
of them, his face becomes dark, and he is filled with inward grief! 
Saheeh  
International 
And when one of them is informed of [the birth of] a female, his face 
becomes dark, and he suppresses grief 
Abdel Haleem When one of them is given news of the birth of a baby girl, his face 
darkens and he is ﬁlled with gloom 
Here is another kināyah expression that involves the use of colour, but this time with the 
colour black. The use of the word ‘black’ to describe one’s expressions or feelings is not 
something exotic in the TL. For instance, phrases like ‘black look’ or ‘black mood’ are 
usually used to show anger or unhappiness. Yet, all four translators have decided not use 
the word ‘black’ or one of its derivatives in their translations, and instead, employ the 
word ‘dark’ or its derivative ‘darkens’, which in some cases is also used for describing a 
person's countenance or disposition, as in ‘The news plunged him/her into 
abject/thick/deep darkness’. Therefore, the word ‘dark’ may, in some cases, be a near-
synonym for ‘black’. There is, however, another word which not only includes in its sense 
the shade of black or darkness but is also commonly used to show one’s dejection and 
that is the word ‘gloom’. Having said that, all three words, ‘black’, ‘dark’, and ‘gloom’ 
(and their derivatives) are used to show dejection, though the last two may seem more 
common than ‘black’. Interestingly, Abdel Haleem employs the word ‘gloom’ instead of 
‘grief’ when translating ميظك وهو, possibly to express the state of one’s face darkening and 
taking advantage of the that ‘gloom’ has both the senses of darkness and great sadness.     
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Kināyah 42 
Table 6.36: Translations of kināyah expression 42. 
﴿ ٍقاَس نَع ُفَشْكُي َمْوَي ﴾َنوُعيَِطتْسَي َﻼَف ِدوُجﱡسلا ﻰَلِإ َنْوَعْدُيَو  in [Q. 68:42] 
Literal translation: 
(The day when the shank shall be uncovered, and they will be called upon to prostrate, 
but they cannot thereupon)  
Referent: 
A time of gravity and intensity (to be in dire straits), 
which in this āyah, refers to the Day of Resurrection.  
Purpose of kināyah: 
Reminding and warning of fate. 
Ali The Day that the shank shall be laid bare*, and they shall be 
summoned to prostrate in adoration, but they shall not be able 
 
Hilali & Khan 
(Remember) the Day when the Shin shall be laid bare (i.e. the Day 
of Resurrection) and they shall be called to prostrate themselves (to 
Allāh), but they (hypocrites) shall not be able to do so 
Saheeh  
International 
The Day the shin will be uncovered* and they are invited to 
prostration but they [i.e., the disbelievers] will not be able 
 
Abdel Haleem 
On the Day when matters become dire*, they will be invited to 
prostrate themselves but will be prevented from doing so 
Apart from the differences of ‘shin’ and ‘shank’, Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Saheeh 
International have employed a literal translation method in rendering the kināyah 
expression of ‘قاسلا فشك’. Abdel Haleem, on the other hand, has decided to explicitly 
render part of the general meaning of the original expression semantically. That is to say, 
Abdel Haleem attempts to describe the meaning of the kināyah idiomatically rather than 
rendering it literally as do the rest of the translators. Abdel Haleem does, however, 
explicate in a footnote that ‘On the Day when matters become dire’ is “the meaning of 
the Arabic expression ‘when shins are bared’”, but he does not explicitly explicate to the 
recipient that that the time when matters become dire is related to the Day of Resurrection, 
possibly because the recipient could deduce this sense from the capitalised word ‘Day’. 
Perhaps the reason that led Abdel Haleem to avoid a literal rendition is that he thought it 
would not convey the general meaning of the ST expression, which apparently is true 
because the Arabic expression is culturally specific. Probably this explains why all of 
translators have decided to accompany their renditions with a footnote. Through these 
footnotes, the TT recipient understands that the original expression refers to the Day of 
Resurrection and the dire straits that one might face on that day. Hilali and Khan explicitly 
state within brackets that this day is the Day of Resurrection. They also provide a footnote 
that contains narrated Hadiths about this day. Both Hilali and Khan and Saheeh 
international’s footnotes indicate that ‘the shin’ might refer to that of Allah as a minority 
of exegetes believe. 
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Kināyah 43 
Table 6.37: Translations of kināyah expression 43. 
 يِف ُتط ﱠَرف اَم َٰﻰلَع َاتَرْسَح اَي ...﴿ ِ ﱠဃ ِبنَج ...﴾  in [Q. 39:56] 
Literal translation: (... Woe is me for what I have neglected regarding Allah’s side …) 
Referent: Allah’s behest/due/rights; obey Allah.  Purpose of kināyah: Elegance 
Ali …Ah! Woe is me!- In that I neglected (my duty) towards Allah … 
Hilali & Khan … Alas, my grief that I was undutiful to Allāh (i.e. I have not done 
what Allāh has ordered me to do) … 
Saheeh  
International 
… Oh, [how great is] my regret over what I neglected  in  regard  to 
Allāh … 
Abdel Haleem ... Woe is me for having neglected what is due to God … 
It is clear that all four translators chose not to fully render ‘ ِﱠဃ ِبنَج’ literally and preferred 
to either render the original expression semantically or explicitly state the intended 
meaning. It seems that they have noticed that adopting a literal translation method would 
not only confuse the TT recipient but most importantly it would not convey the referent. 
Therefore, Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Abdel Haleem have all decided to render ‘ ِﱠဃ ِبنَج’ 
semantically. Additionally, Ali and Hilali and Khan’s translations include some additions. 
The former adds ‘my duty’ between two brackets whereas the latter explain what they 
mean exactly by being ‘undutiful to Allāh’. Abdel Haleem’s rendition is free from any 
additions or footnotes, and this is because he decided to render the referent explicitly 
choosing the appropriate words. Saheeh International, on the other hand, only chose to 
delete the word ‘ ِبنَج’, which seems more or less sufficient with the presence of ‘in regard 
to’, though it may look as if the rendition generalises the meaning of the referent. In other 
words, ‘in regards to Allah’ includes the feeling, attitude, or behaviour towards Allah in 
every aspect and not only obedience to Allah or the fulfilment of Allah’s rights. 
Kināyah 44 and 45 
Table 6.38: Translations of kināyah expressions 44 and 45. 
 ِةَمَايِقْلا َمْوَي  ْمِهْيَلِإ ُرُظنَي َﻻَو ُ ﱠဃ ُمُهُم ِّلَكُي َﻻ َو ِةَرِخْﻵا يِف ْمُهَل َقَﻼَخ َﻻ َكِئ َٰلُوأ ًﻼيِلَق اًنََمث ْمِِهناَمَْيأَو ِ ﱠဃ ِدْهَِعب َنوُرَتْشَي َنيِذﱠلا ﱠِنإ﴿
...﴾  in [Q. 3:77] 
Literal translation: 
(Indeed, those who barter the covenant of Allah and their oaths for a small price will have 
no share (of good/benefit) in the Hereafter; and Allah will not speak to them and not look 
at them on the Day of Resurrection …) 
Referent for both  َﻻ ُ ﱠဃ ُمُهُم ِّلَكُي  and  ْمِهَْيلِإ ُرُظنَي َﻻ: 
Allah’s wrath 
Purpose of kināyah: 
Elegance and a reminder and warning of 
fate. 
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Ali 
As for those who sell the faith they owe to Allah and their own plighted 
word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter: Nor 
will Allah (Deign to) speak to them or look at them on the Day of 
Judgment … 
 
Hilali & Khan 
Verily, those who purchase a small gain at the cost of Allāh's Covenant 
and their oaths, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter (Paradise). 
Neither will Allah speak to them, nor look at them on the Day of 
Resurrection … 
 
Saheeh  
International 
Indeed, those who exchange the covenant of Allah and their [own] oaths 
for a small price will have no share in the Hereafter, and Allah will not 
speak to them or look at them on the Day of Resurrection … 
Abdel Haleem but those who sell out God’s covenant and their own oaths for a small 
price will have no share in the life to come. God will neither speak to 
them nor look at them on the Day of Resurrection … 
All four translators have made an effort to render the kināyah literally, which is not 
strange because phrases such as ‘not speaking’ or ‘not looking’ to/at someone are also 
used in the TL to express wrath or displeasure. However, their renditions of the kināyah 
are not purely literal due to the word choices related to the Arabic negative particle ﻻ and 
coordinating conjunction و. Apart from Abdel Haleem’s use of the word ‘God’ (بّرلا) for 
‘Allah’, his and Hilali and Khan’s renditions are probably the closest to being purely 
literal because they have avoided the use of English conjunction ‘or’ ( ْوأ), though it can 
be used in sense of ‘and not’; namely after a negative verb or when the first alternative is 
negated by ‘neither’. One may also notice that Ali adds the phrase ‘deign to’ between 
brackets, which implies that Allah will not talk down to/look down on those who disobey 
Him with any leniency or mercifulness due to His disappointment with their actions. 
There is no need for this addition since a refusal to speak or look at someone is a general 
sign of disappointment or wrath. 
A brief overview of the entire TT analysis shows that the translators were trying to be 
faithful as much as they can. A literal approach has been employed whenever it conveys 
the intended meaning implicitly as the ST expression. This approach appears to comply 
with Newmark’s assertion that a literal translation is the best method “if it secures 
referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-69). Larson, on the 
other hand, who prefers an idiomatic approach, claims that literal translations “often 
change the meaning, or at least result in a form which is unnatural in the second language” 
(ibid, p. 10), which is to a great extent is true. Therefore, you would probably notice that 
in some kināyah expressions the translators apply a semantical approach to convey the 
meaning, even if this requires sacrificing the function of the kināyah or making implicit 
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information explicit. This is due to them prioritising meaning over function, which is 
practically compatible with Larson (see 4.2.6; cf. ibid, p. 495) and Beekman and Callow’s 
suggestions (see 4.2.5: cf. Beekman and Callow, 1974, pp. 104/144). In the event of any 
type ambiguousness or loss in the translation, the translators employ varies of techniques, 
such as additions, omissions, and footnotes, for compensation. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will conclude the study, by presenting answers to the main questions of the 
study. The chapter will also comment on the strategies employed by the translators in 
rendering kināyah, including procedures involving compensation for any sort of loss 
during the translation process. This will be followed by suggestions and recommendations 
to take into consideration in any future research related to the translation of kināyah. 
7.2 Summary and findings 
The central focus of the present work was on kināyah and its translation, a crucial Arabic 
figure of speech that has been frequently referred to incorrectly as ‘metonymy’ on the one 
hand, and has been neglected in TS, compared to its fellow figures of speech, on the other. 
Figures of speech are employed in everyday speech and they form an integral part of our 
language. One can find them in all sorts of texts – religious, political, poetry, literature, 
and suchlike. Nonetheless, the study has decided to extract its kināyah examples from the 
Qur’an. There are several reasons for choosing this source specifically. It is an attempt to 
contribute to Qur’anic studies and Qur’an translation since the Qur’an is considered the 
central religious text of Islam and a fundamental source of guidance for Muslims. Also, 
in view of the fact that the majority of Muslims are non-Arabs and the original language 
of the Qur’an is Arabic, translating its meanings has gradually become fundamental. 
Furthermore, the examples that early Arabic linguists, grammarians, and rhetoricians 
used to employ in their discussions or theories were usually extracted from the Qur’an 
(cf. Thackston, 2000). Therefore, choosing the Qu’an as the main source of data is more 
or less like catching two birds with one stone.    
This study was carried out with the following questions in mind, which attempt to achieve 
the aims and objectives of the study: 
- Is metonymy the equivalent English figure of speech for kināyah? If not, then: 
a- Which is the closest Arabic figure that has similar features to metonymy? 
b- Which English figure of speech is equivalent to or at least shares some of the 
features and functions of kināyah? 
- If there is no equivalent English figure of speech for kināyah, then were the 
translators able to render the intended meaning of the original implicitly as in the 
ST and simultaneously maintain the kinayah function? If not, then why not? 
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- What translation methods do the translators tend to employ in rendering Qur’anic 
kināyah? 
- What translation procedures do the translators adopt to compensate for any loss in 
translation? 
- Were the translators consistent in translating the same kināyah in the event it occurs 
in other parts of the Qur’an? 
To answer the first question, the study had to look into the main Arabic figures of speech 
as well as the English ones (see chapter one). The examination shows that metonymy and 
kināyah are in fact not one in the same. Majāz mursal is probably the closest equivalent 
Arabic figure of speech to metonymy and synecdoche, since they share similar forms or 
semantic relationship between their literal and figurative meanings (see figure 7.1). 
Concealing the intended meaning and evoking a specific image of that meaning in the 
recipients’ mind are the only aspects that kināyah shares with metonymy and synecdoche. 
However, nota bene that these are general characteristics of all figures of speech, not only 
metonymy and synecdoche. It is the relationship between the literal meaning and the 
figurative that differentiates figures of speech from one another and how that specific 
image is evoked. Overall, this part of the study demonstrates that there is no English figure 
of speech that is similar to kināyah, which substantiates the study’s hypothesis that the 
common usage of the term ‘metonymy’ for kināyah is actually incorrect. 
 
Figure 7.1: The relationship between kināyah, majāz mursal, metonymy, and synecdoche 
After establishing the fact that kināyah and metonymy are not one and the same, forty-
five kināyah expressions were extracted from various parts of the Qur’an Then a 
contextual analysis of the original expression was performed, linguistically and 
descriptively, in order to gain an understanding of each kināyah used in the Qur’an and 
their purposes. A number of authoritative Arabic and English dictionaries (including 
Qur’anic dictionaries) and Qur’anic exegeses, particularly those that approach the 
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Qur'anic text from a linguistic and rhetorical perspective, were used in the ST analysis. 
Subsequently, the translations of the Ali (1998) [Amanah’s edition], al-Hilali and Khan 
(1417 H. [1996]), Saheeh International (2004), and Abdel Haleem (2005) were selected. 
There are several translations of the meaning of the Qur’an on the bookshelves, but the 
reason for selecting the translations of Ali and al-Hilali & Khan is due to their widespread 
use among non-Arabs, specifically English speakers. In addition, the King Fahd Complex 
for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an (al-Madīnah, Saudi Arabia) has adopted their 
translations and complimentarily distributed them to millions of pilgrims every year as 
well as to non-Arabic countries. They are also pretty well accepted by a substantial 
number of Muslim scholars. On the other hand, the reason for choosing Saheeh 
International and Abdel Haleem is that they are current translations and their backgrounds 
seem interesting (see 3.7). A comparative TT analysis of the four selected English Qur’an 
translations was performed, taking into account the following: (1) how the four 
translations render each kināyah, (2) the intelligibility of the renditions, (3) whether there 
is any loss of meaning, (4) whether the renditions maintain the function of the original 
kināyah, and (5) consistency in rendering the same kināyah when it occurs in different 
āyahs. With some of the kināyah expressions occurring in more than place, the total 
number of expressions that were examined was eighty-seven. 
It seems that none of the translators were deceived by the literal meanings of the kināyah 
expression and were able to recognise its intended meaning. This is because the 
translators have consulted some of the Qur’anic exegeses, which as we have previously 
noted are considered an essential source for understanding the Qur’anic text (see 3.8). For 
instance, Abdel Haleem affirms that he made use of various Qur’anic commentaries, 
particularly those of ar-Rāzī and abū Ḥayyān (2005, p. xxxv). Abdel Haleem also asserts 
that in obtaining semantic information and identifying the meaning of some of the 
Qur’anic words he relied on several classical Arabic dictionaries, such as ibn Manẓūr’s 
Lisān al-ᶜArab, al-Fayrūz Ābādī’s, al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ, and Mujammaᶜ al-Lughati al-
ᶜArabīyah’s (the Arabic Language Academy in Cairo), al-Muᶜjam al-Wasīṭ (ibid, p. 
xxxiii). Similarly, Saheeh International aver that: 
Each verse was reviewed in Arabic with reference to several works of tafseer 
[Qur’anic exegesis] and grammar. Where differences arose, explanations 
were generally taken from an authentic ḥadīth [Prophetic saying] or, in the 
absence of such, those by the most knowledgeable of the ṣaḥābah 
[companions of the Prophet] and tābiᶜūn [companions of the ṣaḥābah] as 
quoted by Ibn Katheer (2004; author’s italics and transliteration). 
 -267- 
Ali seems to have done much the same as Saheeh International (cf. ᶜAlī, 1989, pp. xv-
xvi). The King Fahd Complex’s edition of Hilali and Khan’s translation does not precisely 
note reliance on exegeses as do other translations, but it does name a number of scholars 
and clerics who have revised the translation. Undoubtedly, Qur’anic exegesis were used 
in the revision, as the complex’s website contains a section on Qur’anic exegeses 
including the commentaries of aṭ-Ṭabarī, ibn Kathīr, al-Baghawī, as-Saᶜdī, and tafsīr al-
muyyasar86. It is worth noting that the revisions the four translations underwent virtually 
comply with Larson’s suggestions for establishing a translation project, i.e. steps related 
to the translation process (see 4.2.6; Larson, 1998). So, by all accounts the selected 
translators were able to identify the intended meaning of the kināyah, and were not misled 
by its literal meaning.  
This leads us to the second question: whether the translators were able to render the 
intended meaning of the kināyah expressions implicitly as in the ST and simultaneously 
maintain their function. The examination shows that not all of the original messages were 
rendered implicitly as in the ST. Among the four translators, Saheeh International and 
Abdel Haleem were able to render equally most of the original messages implicitly. 
Surprisingly, the translation of Ali comes next. In fact, the number of messages Ali was 
able to render implicitly is fairly close to that of Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem 
(see below, figure 7.2). Hilali and Khan had the least number in terms of implicitness, 
despite the fact that their translation is similar to Ali’s. The reason for this is their 
excessive use of additions within the TT. There are some cases where their translations 
were sufficient in terms of conveying the message implicitly and at times the function as 
well, particularly euphemism, yet they decided to add the intended meaning explicitly 
within the TT, usually inserted between brackets. That is to say, there were situations 
where the additions were unnecessary. This explains why they had the highest number of 
additions employed in TT (see below, figure 7.2). It seems that they were keen to convey 
as far as they could the precise meaning of the Qur’an with no room for any ambiguity or 
obscurity on the part of the TT reader. This excessive number of additions, however, 
could hinder the flow and readability of  the TT. Therefore, some might describe their 
work as an exegesis rather than a translation, but let us not forget that all of the translations 
                                                
86 Tafsīr al-Muyyasar (simple exegesis) is a Qur’anic exegesis composed by elite scholars and published 
by the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an (available at: 
http://qurancomplex.gov.sa). 
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of the Qur’an are merely interpretations of its meanings as is usually indicated in their 
preface. That said, Hilali and Khan were the only translators amongst the four that were 
able to render all of the kināyah messages with no loss of meanings. This is demonstrated 
in the translation of the word رقع (see kināyah 38, chapter six). Hilali and Khan have 
decided to render the intended meaning directly, which is ‘kill [the she-camel]’, while 
Ali, Saheeh International and Abdel Haleem translated the kināyah literally as 
‘hamstring’, which does not convey the intended meaning, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Note that Saheeh International do in fact refer through a footnote that the she-
camel was ‘then killed’, but this note was placed in the last occurrence of the kināyah in 
the Qur’an, to be precise in [Q. 91:14] and not in its previous citations, which are [Q. 
7:77], [Q. 11:65], and [Q. 26:157]. If they preferred a literal rendition, then Saheeh 
International should have placed this note in all of the other three citations or at least when 
it was first cited, that is in [Q. 7:77]. 
 
Figure 7.2: Statistics of types of translation, additions, omissions, footnotes, implicitness, 
and explicitness for the four selected translators. 
As we mentioned not all of the original messages were rendered implicitly as in the ST, 
mainly because some of the kināyah expressions are culture-specific. When a cultural 
concept is shared between two languages it becomes much easier to render it from one 
language to the other in the same manner, but when it is not shared it may become an 
obstacle. One of the methods to overcome such an obstacle is to use a TL expression that 
could convey the intended meaning the same way as the original does, whether by using 
an established TL expression, paraphrasing, or addition. If this is not possible or could 
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cause ambiguity or obscurity then there is no choice but to render the intended meaning 
directly (see 4.2.5 [Beekman and Callow] and 4.2.6 [Larson]). 
As far as maintaining the functions of the kināyah while simultaneously rendering the 
intended meaning implicitly as the original is concerned, apparently the translators were 
not able to achieve this in all of their renditions. There are several reasons for this. 
Possibly one of the reasons is related to the unique genre of the Qur’an. Thus, some of 
the functions of kināyah are Qur’an-specific, particularly those related to elegance and 
hyperbole. Therefore, it appears that the translators were more interested in conveying 
the message than in maintaining some of the functions. In other words, they prioritised 
meaning over function, which is quite reasonable especially if we take into consideration 
that the main aim of their translations of the Qur’an is to deliver its meaning to the TT 
reader. This also complies with one of the guidelines that Larson suggests regarding 
making implicit information explicit: “when necessary for correct and clear expression of 
the source text meaning” (1998, p. 495). It is also compatible with what the suggestions 
of Beekman and Callow (see previous chapter 4.2.5: cf. Beekman and Callow, 1974, pp. 
104/144). Another reason is related to the differences between the SL and TL in terms of 
culture again, as well as the whole concept of kināyah functions. For example, the 
function of brevity is shared between the two languages, hence, this function is 
maintained in the translations. Euphemism is another function that is shared between 
Arabic and English and therefore it should be easily preserved. That said, not all of the 
translators were able to maintain euphemism in the TT, apart from Abdel Haleem (see 
figure 7.3 below). This is mainly due to some of their word choices. Abdel Haleem’s 
employment of idiomatic expressions not only enabled him to maintain the euphemistic 
function in the TT, but also allowed him to produce an intelligible TT with the least 
number of footnotes (see figure 7.2 above). Perhaps exploiting idiomatic expressions 
makes the TT more readable and intelligible, but preserving euphemism may not be 
contingent upon it. Ali, whose translation contains quite a number of archaic words, and 
Saheeh International have both opted mostly for literalism in their translations, yet they 
were able to maintain euphemism in the greater part of them. Therefore, we would like 
to emphasise that it all goes back to word choice when it comes to maintaining 
euphemism, specifically when the expressions are based on concepts shared by the two 
languages. Overall, the answer to the second question is that the translators were able to 
a great extent to render the meanings of the kināyah expressions, but not all were rendered 
implicitly along with the function as in the original expressions. 
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              Figure 7.3: Number of euphemistic failures  
With regards to the third question about what types of translation methods translators 
tend to employ while rendering Qur’anic kināyah, the study reveals that the translators 
chose to render the Qur’anic kināyah expressions either literally (including pure and 
modified) or semantically. As we have clarified in the previous chapter (6.1) what is 
meant by the latter is conveying what the original expression is trying to communicate 
apart from its literal meaning, that is to say, the author's intention in using the expression. 
It may involve paraphrasing or explicitly stating the intended meaning of the kināyah. It 
is worth noting that for no given reason Hilali and Khan have used loan words in some of 
their translations. However, from figure 7.2 one can notice that Saheeh International are 
the translators with the most literal translation. They are then sequentially followed by 
Ali, Hilali and Khan, and Abdel Haleem. Though some translation schools may not prefer 
a literal approach, Newmark stresses that a “literal translation is correct and must not be 
avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original” (1988, pp. 68-
69). With regards to Saheeh International’s methodology, they state in their introduction:   
Without going to excessive detail, a word is due about the methodology 
of this abbreviated edition. Three main objectives served as guidelines for 
this work: 
1- To present the meanings, as far as possible, in accordance with 
ʿaqeedah of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamāʿah 
2- To simplify and clarify the language for the benefit of all readers 
3- To let the Qur’ān speak for itself, adding footnotes only were 
deemed necessarily for explanation of points not readily understood 
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or when more than meaning is acceptable (2004; Authors italics and 
transliteration)    
Consequently, it seems that Saheeh International believed that a literal approach could to 
large extent serve their objectives, hence, a large proportion of their translations were 
literal. This explains the number of footnotes that were present in their translations. Ali 
also employed literalism and his translations too had a quite few footnotes. We have to 
mention, though, that in most parts his footnotes were more of religious explanations 
while Saheeh International’s were brief and do in fact clarify what they have indicated in 
their methodology. 
Although Newmark argues that if literal translation conveys the referential and pragmatic 
equivalence of the original then it should be used, Larson believes that “[a] translation 
may be accurate but still not communicate to the people who are to use it” (1998, p. 531). 
She adds that it may also “be accurate in that the translator understood correctly the source 
text and is attempting to communicate that information, and it may even by [sic] 
understandable, and yet the forms may not be the natural idiomatic forms of the receptor 
language” (ibid.). Therefore, she highly recommends that one should use the natural 
idiomatic forms and expressions of the TL. Therefore, Abdel Haleem is the translator who 
most adopts a semantic approach and makes use of idiomatic expressions. He notes the 
following: 
Throughout this translation, care has been taken to avoid unnecessarily close 
adherence to the original Arabic structures and idioms, which almost always 
sound unnatural in English. Literal translations of Arabic idioms often result 
in meaningless English (2005, p. xxxi). 
Despite his use of natural idiomatic forms and expressions in the TL, Abdel Haleem was 
not successful in rendering ﻞجرلا نايتإ in [Q. 7:81], [Q. 27:55], [Q. 29:29], and [Q. 
26:165]. Unlike, the rest, for no reason he decided not to render ﻞجرلا نايتإ as he did with 
رملا نايتإةأ  and preferred to use the TL expression ‘lust after’, which does not exactly 
convey the intended meaning of the original expression (see kināyah 17, chapter six).  
The rest of the translators also used a semantic approach in rendering some of the 
kināyah expressions. The reason that they turned to this approach seems to be that some 
of the original expressions are either culture-specific or they wanted to convey the 
intended meaning of the kināyah implicitly and a literal approach could not achieve 
either of these goals.          
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As for the procedures used by the translators to compensate for any loss in translation, 
which is related to the fourth question, it varied from additions, omissions to footnotes. 
Some of the additions were necessarily but some were not, particularly those that were 
inserted between brackets in the TT. Footnotes was a wise solution, particularly when 
they are concise and to the point as in the cases of Saheeh International and Abdel 
Haleem. 
Respecting the fifth question on consistency, the translators were most of the time 
consistent. Larson highly recommends that consistency should be maintained specifically 
“when the same meaning is to be communicated” (1998, 546). Abdel Haleem generally 
agrees: “It is important for the translator to recognize when it is appropriate to be 
consistent in the translation of a repeated term, and when to reflect the context” (2005, p. 
xxxi).     
In essence, this study concludes the following: 
1-  Kināyah is an independent Arabic figure of speech and there is no similarity 
between kināyah and metonymy nor synecdoche. The closest Arabic figure of 
speech to metonymy and synecdoche is majāz mursal. As a result the mainstream 
academic tendency to refer to kināyah as metonymy or at times as synecdoche is 
indubitably incorrect. 
2- Translators should have sufficient knowledge of Arabic figures of speech and their 
features. They should pay careful attention and not be misled by their literal 
meanings, especially given that a literal meaning may sound true as in kināyah, or 
as Larkin puts it, “it does correspond to reality” (1995, p. 87). The translator 
should also have good cultural knowledge of both languages, because quite a few 
kināyah expressions are culture-specific. 
3- Qur’anic kināyah expressions are mainly translatable; however, not all can be 
rendered with same features as the original, i.e. conveying the intended meaning 
implicitly and at the same time preserving their function. Thus, if the meaning 
intended cannot be rendered implicitly, then it could be made explicit in the TT, 
particularly when the primary aim of the translation is to translate the actual 
meaning of the ST as in Qur’anic translations. 
4- When it comes to translating the meaning of the Qur’an it is vital that one should 
consult the appropriate authoritative Qur’anic exegeses and dictionaries. 
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7.3 Suggestions and recommendations 
In the light of the findings of this study, we strongly suggest that the mainstream approach 
referring or translating kināyah as ‘metonymy’ should be corrected. Kināyah should be 
referred to in English through transliteration or at least it should be assigned a new term. 
For instance, Larkin transliterates kināyah and refers to it as ‘descriptive periphrases’ 
(1995, p.86); whether we agree with this term or not, at least the reader would not get 
confused or misled into thinking that it is metonymy. Referring to kināyah as metonymy 
is not only incorrect, but it also misleads and confuses both Arabic and English readers, 
particularly those who are interested in their translation studies. 
Moreover, kināyah like other figures of speech, are employed in everyday speech. They 
are used in poetry, literature, political speeches, and suchlike. Therefore, we recommend 
that further studies should take an interest in how kināyah are rendered in such types of 
texts. 
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